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ABSTRACT
Although the insurance industry demonstrates a growing concern about
the severe rise in losses from natural disasters, only about one third of all
potential victims have in fact purchased first-party catastrophe insurance.
Although first-party insurance has several advantages, we find that there is
indeed actually no demand for and supply of first-party insurance against
natural catastrophes. Therefore, the central question we examine from a
behavioral law and economics perspective is why so little use is made of
the possibilities of first-party insurance and why first-party insurance can
constitute a viable alternative to government compensation. Further, we
consider whether compulsory first-party disaster coverage may be a
solution. To conclude, we consider under which circumstances the further
introduction of first-party catastrophe insurance should be applauded as a
means to encourage potential victims to take control over their
compensatory means while also benefiting from preventative incentives.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The scope and frequency of catastrophes, natural or technological, is
increasing. Moreover, recent studies suggest that global warming has
resulted in the intensification of floods, draughts, tropical cyclones and
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destructive hurricanes, one example being Katrina in the United States.1
Further, earthquakes and floods are being covered more frequently in the
media, which emphasizes the number of victims who lost their lives, their
home and their family members, as well as the survivors remaining in the
devastated areas. Apart from natural catastrophes, man-made disasters are
also on the rise as the unavoidable price of technological progress and as a
consequence of the so-called terrorism era. Depending upon the specific
characteristics of the country, natural disasters such as earthquakes,
hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, may be more common than technological
disasters such as fires or explosions. Nevertheless, catastrophes threaten all
countries. This is especially true for risks regarding weather conditions,
like exceptional rainfall and flooding. The rise of catastrophes generates an
increasing number of victims, who require assistance and compensation for
their losses.
Various perspectives regarding compensation for catastrophe victims
exist. Often the insurance industry is included, to some extent, as part of
the proposed compensation scheme. Thus, a great deal of attention is
increasingly paid to the role of insurance in providing compensation for
victims of catastrophes. A key consideration in utilizing insurance as a
compensatory tool turns on how catastrophe is defined in the insurance
policies. Though the everyday meaning of catastrophe or disaster may
seem clear, developing a formal definition can be much more difficult. In
some cases, catastrophe is defined statutorily. Such statutes typically
define an event as a catastrophe based upon its scale and the damage
incurred both in terms of property as well as loss of life. These definitions
are necessary to determine the obligations of public authorities as well as
1

One of the expected effects of global warming is, as predicted by theory and
modeling, an increase in hurricane intensity. This is not to say that there is consensus among
scientists regarding the correlation between hurricane activity and climate change. See
Alicia Rivera, Katrina y Rita son hijos del azar. Entrevista con Kerry A. Emanuel, cientifico
del MIT y experto en huracanes, EL PAÍS, Sept. 25, 2005 (Colom.); Quirin Schiermeier,
Hurricane link to climate change is hazy, 437 NATURE, Sept. 22, 2005 at 461 available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v437/n7058/pdf/437461a.pdf. See generally reports
from
the
Intergovernmental
Panel
on
Climate
Change,
available
at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/assessments-reports.htm; NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xvi, 3 (Cambridge University Press 2008) (2007);
P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a
Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE, Sept. 16, 2005 at 1844; Johnny C.L. Chan et al.,
Comment on “Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming
Environment,”, 311 SCIENCE, Mar. 24, 2006 at 1713b; P.J. Webster et al., Response to
Comment on “Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming
Environment”, 311 SCIENCE, Mar. 24, 2006 at 1713c.
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the amount of financing required. When financial loss is the focal point,
the number of victims is usually the most important factor. It is this
financial aspect of catastrophes that result in a large number of victims that
will be the focus of this paper.2
It may be interesting to provide some more concrete facts and figures.
The following charts show the increasing number of catastrophic events
and of victims from 1970 until 2007.

3

2
Because of the large number of victims, the financial effect of catastrophes can be
distinguished from the example of traffic accidents. The total number of victims on a yearly
basis in traffic can be large as well, but that is usually not considered “catastrophic”. For a
criticism, see Ulrich Magnus, Germany, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH, 119 (Michael Faure et al. eds.,
Springer-Verlag/Wien 2006) who argues that it is strange to qualify the flooding of the Elbe
where only a few people died as a catastrophe, whereas all the hundreds of victims dying
yearly in traffic accidents are apparently not considered “catastrophic”.
3
Swiss Re, Sigma: Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2007: high
losses in Europe, 5 fig.1 (2008).
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Focusing only on natural catastrophes, the following figure again
demonstrates a marked increase in occurrences:

4

Id at 6 fig.2.
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In 2007, more than 21,500 people lost their lives, due to approximately
335 natural catastrophes and man-made disasters. The corresponding
property damage totaled more than $ 70 billion, of which about one third, $
27.6 billion was covered by insurance.6 Of the latter amount, $ 23.3 billion
was attributable to natural catastrophes, while the remaining $ 4.3 billion
was due to major man-made disasters.7 This insurance coverage is
represented in the following figure:

5
Munich
Re,
Topics
Geo
2007,
45,
available
at
http://www.munichre.com/publications/302-05699_en.pdf.
6
Swiss Re, Sigma: Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2007: high
losses in Europe, 3 (2008).
7
Id.
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8

and

8
Munich Re, Topics Geo 2007, 45, available at http://www.munichre.com/publications/
302-05699_en.pdf.
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Or:

10

9

Swiss Re, Sigma: Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2007: high
losses in Europe, 7 fig.3 (2008).
10
Munich Re, Topics Geo 2007, 49 (2008) available at http://www.munichre.com/
publications/302-05699_en.pdf.
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These figures demonstrate surprisingly low levels of insurance
coverage, most notably for geophysical, climatological and hydrological
events. Accordingly, the figures raise the question of whether first-party
insurance can play a greater and more influential role in the compensation
of catastrophe victims. This question is particularly relevant, especially in
Western society, where insurance techniques are broadly developed.
Therefore, this paper only focuses on catastrophe insurance coverage for
potential victims and does not address man-made or technological disasters
for which a person, group, or company may be liable as tortfeasors.
Consequently, third party liability insurance, which is available for possible
tortfeasors, is not discussed. Moreover, most natural catastrophes do not
involve a third party who can be held liable as many natural catastrophes
are considered “acts of God.” The only potential liable party in case of
natural catastrophes is the government (e.g. for failure to warn or to take
adequate measures in case of e.g. flooding). Cases of government liability
for natural catastrophes are, however, rare. Hence, the role of third party
insurance plays a limited role in natural catastrophes and accordingly, this
paper focuses solely on first-party insurance.
As noted this paper will address the use of first party insurance in
Western societies, where insurance techniques are well developed but have
not fully been utilized as a response to catastrophic losses. Instead, there
seems to be a preference for either no compensatory solution or for
government provided compensation. Indeed, empirical evidence, discussed
below, demonstrates that even where first-party insurance is widely
available, potential victims only use it to a limited extent. This of course
raises the question whether catastrophic risks have specific features that
make the problem difficult to treat.
Addressing the role of first-party insurance is also interesting in light of
governments’ increasing attempts to provide financial solutions when the
number of catastrophe victims is high.11 These types of government
funding are, however, heavily criticized in current law and economics

11
Hirshleifer can be regarded as one of the first to address this issue. He had the
insight that providing compensation after the occurrence of a disaster is so politically
attractive that the government will invariably find it impossible to resist. See Jack
Hirshleifer, War Damage Insurance, 35 THE REV. OF ECON & STAT. 144, 146-47 (1953),
reprinted in 9 CONN. INS. L.J.1 (2002). See also Peter Siegelman, A New Old Look at
Terrorism Insurance: Jack Hirshleifer’s War Damage Insurance After Fifty Years, 9 CONN.
INS. L.J. 19 (2002).
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literature.12 The question therefore arises whether first-party insurance can
constitute a viable alternative to government compensation.13 First-party
insurance is indeed only one of the many approaches regarding
compensation for catastrophe victims.14 It is intriguing to analyze this
particular solution from an economic perspective: on the one hand we can
rely on the broad law and economics literature on liability and insurance,15
and on the other hand on literature on the demand for insurance protection
against catastrophes.16 This traditional law and economics literature starts
from the assumption that the human race consists of all rational human
beings. However, cognitive psychology research regarding patterns of
human decision-making illustrates deviation from the pure rational thinking
model. In other words, human behavioral patterns provide added and
essential analyses that complement the traditional law and economics
perspectives. Moreover, a comparative analysis will be adopted as well, by
inter alia focusing on solutions adopted by various (Western) countries.17
Of course, this analysis is mostly applicable in societies where wellorganized insurance markets exist. Thus, the question can be asked why
disaster insurance, in these countries and societies, are relatively

12

See Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 167 (1991); George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem
of Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996); Richard A. Epstein,
Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287 (1996).
13
Of course, the main sources of pressure on the government concerning
catastrophes are probably other than the mere claim for the loss of some definite goods.
People indeed usually prefer not being flooded at all over being flooded and compensated,
which is fully consistent with the common assumption that compensation, as a matter of
fact, is always insufficient to put the victim back to her utility level prior to the catastrophe.
14
For other compensation mechanisms, see TRANSBOUNDARY RISK MANAGEMENT
(Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer et al., eds., Earthscan Publications 2001); Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development, CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE 25
(OECD Publishing 2005).
15
See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (Harvard
University Press 1987).
16
Howard Kunreuther et al., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS (John Wiley & Sons Inc. 1978); Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses
through Insurance, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171 (1996); Paul J.H. Schoemaker &
Howard Kunreuther, An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK & INS. 603
(1979).
17
For a more general comparative approach to the financial compensation for
victims of catastrophes, see MICHAEL FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES (Springer 2006).
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underutilized.18 First-party disaster insurance, however, is not a viable
alternative in many developing countries where either insurance markets
are underdeveloped or consumers lack resources to pay a premium ex
ante.19
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: first, we will
address the potential of first-party insurance in covering catastrophic losses
(Section II). Second, the question arises whether prospective victims
actually seek ex ante protection through first-party insurance coverage
(Section III). Next, after considering the demand side of the equation this
paper will discuss the supply side of first-party insurance coverage (Section
IV). Then the paper will critically review the phenomenon of compulsory
disaster coverage as a reaction to the lack of both supply and demand
(Section V). Lastly, concrete examples from France and Belgium will be
used to analyze the theoretical solutions put forth (Section VI). The paper
concludes with a few final remarks (Section VII).
II. FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE
First-party insurance is a system whereby insurance coverage is
provided and compensation is awarded directly by the insurer to the victim.
It is thus the prospective victim himself who buys this type of insurance
coverage, with the eye on possible future harm and corresponding
damages. The underlying principle in first-party insurance is that the
insurance company – in principle – pays as soon as damage occurs,
provided that it can be proven that the particular damage is an insured risk

18

As was the case in the Netherlands, for example, supply of disaster insurance was
lacking due to a cartel agreement not to provide coverage.
19
The insurance market for catastrophic risk in the Caribbean Region, for example,
remains a thin market characterized by high prices and low transfer of risks. Philippe
Auffret, Catastrophe Insurance Market in the Caribbean Region: Market Failures and
Recommendations for Public Sector Intervention (The World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper 2963, January 2003) offers an overview of the existing market failures,
followed by recommendations for public sector interventions. See also, John D. Pollner,
MANAGING CATASTROPHIC DISASTER RISKS USING ALTERNATIVE RISK FINANCING AND
POOLED INSURANCE STRUCTURES (World Bank 2001). Non-life (i.e. property/casualty)
insurance penetration rates were (and still are) low in those countries affected by the Asian
tsunami in 2004. In Indonesia, for example, just $8 per capita was spent on non-life
insurance in 2003.
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covered by the insurance policy. Contrary to third party insurance, payment
by the insurance company occurs irrespective of whether there is liability.20
Accordingly, insurance protection trends away from tort law and third
party insurance and towards insurance schemes whereby victims ex ante
seek coverage on a first-party basis where possible. For example, in the
area of environmental insurance there is a movement toward environmental
damage insurance operating as a form of first party insurance.21 There is a
similar movement toward first-party insurance in some legal systems in
medical malpractice insurance22 and when compensating traffic accident
victims.23 The benefits of various first-party insurance schemes are
accordingly being used to address a range of societal issues. Indeed, Priest
suggested that the shift towards first-party insurance would have been an
appropriate remedy to the American insurance crisis that occurred in the
eighties.24 Priest reasoned that:
[I]n comparison to first-party insurance, third party tort law insurance
provides coverage in excessive amounts, in a manner that substantially
restricts risk segregation, and at costs that far exceed the costs of first-party
insurance. For both consumer and provider risk pools, these differences
will increase the correlation of risks within existing pools and, as a
consequence, increase the extent of adverse selection, leading to the
breakdown of the pools.25
Other commentators, such as Bishop and Epstein, also favor first-party
insurance.26 It has particularly been argued that first-party insurance

20

MICHAEL FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYSTEMATIC RISKS
149 (OECD 2003).
21
Michael Faure, Environmental Damage Insurance in the Netherlands, 10 ENVTL.
LIAB. 31, 37 (2002).
22
See, e.g., Lotta Wendel, Compensation in the Swedish Health Care Sector, in NOFAULT COMPENSATION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR 367, 367 (J. Dute et al. eds., 2004)
(showing Swedish system of patient insurance).
23
Michael Faure, Tort Liability in France: An Introductory Economic Analysis, in 6
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES 169, 177-79 (Bruno Deffains et al. eds.,
2001); and A. Tunc, The ‘Loi Badinter’, Ten Years of Experience, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &
COMP. L. 3 (1996).
24
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 968 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1552 (1987).
25
Id. at 1552-53.
26
William Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 241 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance
Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985); RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD 33 (Harvard University Press 1996).
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schemes have the advantage of low administrative costs27 as well as the
ability to better adapt premiums and policy conditions to specific risks.28
The latter enables first party insurance to engage in easy risk
differentiation, which is advantageous for insurers. Under this arrangement
it is possible for the insurer to assess ex ante the risk and consequently
damage that a particular victim would suffer.29 This ex ante analysis is not
available with third party insurance because assessment of risk is to a third
party not known at the time of contracting and potential liability that may
or may not follow.30 Lower administrative costs are due to the fact that
under a first-party insurance policy the insurer covers the risk of damage to
a particular victim or a particular site.31 It is therefore much easier for the
insured to signal particular circumstances, which may influence the risk to
the insurer.32 The reason for the trend away from third party insurance and
towards first-party coverage thus becomes clear.
First-party insurances can be divided into two main groups: (1)
insurance, which compensates for personal injuries; and (2) insurance,
which takes the form of coverage for specific property damage.33 The
schemes, which focus on personal injury compensation usually, do not vary
coverage based on the source of the injury, i.e. whether the cause was a
catastrophe or not.34 Accordingly, it takes the form of generalized accident
insurance coverage. As a result, coverage depends on the specific costs that
a victim would incur as a result of an accident, such as lost income,
coverage of (additional) medical expenses, and in some cases even pain
and suffering.35 Most European countries cover a majority of personal

27
Indeed, one will not spend time nor money looking for a liable tortfeasor and
bringing liability claims. RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 31
(Harvard University Press 1996).
28
Ronen Perry, Relational Economic Loss: An Integrated Economic Justification for
the Exclusionary Rule, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 711, 771-78 (2004).
29
See Bishop, supra note 26, at 246.
30
See Richard A. Epstein, Product Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 645, 648-50 (1985).
31
See Bishop, supra note 26, at 249.
32
Id.
33
Elizabeth Medaglia et al., The ‘Concurrent Cause’ Theory: Inapplicable to
Environmental Liability Coverage Disputes, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 823, 829 (Spring 1995).
34
Id. at 829-30.
35
This is more particularly the case in the French policy referred to as “Garantie
contre les accidents de la vie”. This new insurance policy provides broad (first-party)
compensation against accidents and compensates as if tort law were applicable, therefore
including compensation for pain and suffering. See also The French GAV® Accident
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injury expenses through a social security system.36 Consequently, wellinformed potential victims can purchase additional or complimentary
coverage according to their individual degree of risk aversion and
corresponding need for insurance.37
The second type of first-party insurance schemes applies (only) to
property damage, for example housing insurance. In many countries,
however, first-party insurance for property damage excludes damages
caused by a natural disaster.38 In the Netherlands, for example, property
damage caused by flooding is excluded.39 Therefore, this paper analyzes
the demand for disaster coverage (Section III), whether competitive
insurance markets are supplying such coverage (Section IV) and whether
regulatory intervention is necessary to provide access to disaster insurance
(Section V). Lastly, this paper will look at general legal practices
surrounding the issue (Section VI).
III. DEMAND FOR FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE AGAINST
NATURAL DISASTERS
A. THE DECISION TO PURCHASE FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE:
EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESIS
The first issue that arises is whether there is demand by the public for
coverage against damage caused by catastrophes. According to the
expected utility model, an individual is assumed to behave as if he engaged
in a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the purchase
of an insurance policy.40 As a result, a potential victim residing in a hazardprone area will voluntarily purchase first-party insurance if he perceives the
Compensation, SCOR Technical Newsl. (SCOR Group, Paris, France), Oct. 2003, at 2, available
at http://scor.com/www/fileadmin/uploads/publics/NTNV2003_05_en_tuknv05.pdf.
36
Arye Miller, Should Social Insurance Pay Compensation for Pain and Suffering?,
31 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 550, 554-56 (1982).
37
This assumes that competitive insurance markets offer applicable policies.
38
The Demand for Flood Insurance: Statement before the Comm. On Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs 2 (Oct. 18, 2005) (Statement of Mark Browne, Gerard D.
Stephens CPCU Chair in Risk Management and Insurance).
39
Id.
40
This utilitarian approach on insurance has, among others, been described by Nobel
Prize winner Kenneth J. Arrow. See generally, Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare
Economics of Medical Care: Reply (The Implications of Transaction Costs and Adjustment
Lags), 55 AM. ECON. REV. 154 (1963); Kenneth Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard:
Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1968).
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premium to be sufficiently low in comparison to the risks (and if he is
convinced that ex post governmental disaster relief will not be
forthcoming).41
Doherty and others, however argue that financial considerations are
only one of the reasons why homeowners would purchase first-party
insurance.42 Decisions regarding the purchase of insurance coverage may
also be driven by emotion-related goals (either worry or regret), the need to
satisfy legal or other official requirements, the need to satisfy social and/or
cognitive norms, and the need to maintain a relationship with a trusted
agent/advisor.43 Indeed, regarding the emotion-related goals, there is a
growing literature on how emotional goals impact individuals’ decision
making regarding risk.44 Three main emotional goals pertaining to
catastrophe coverage are: (1) reduction of anxiety (i.e. peace of mind); (2)
avoidance of anticipated regret45; and (3) disappointment.46 Thus, reasons
for purchasing insurance are complicated and take into account an
individual’s need to feel justified and avoid anxiety. Sunstein also
indicated that people focus on the unpleasantness of the outcome rather
than on its probability when they have strong sentimental attachment to the
catastrophe.47 Moreover, Hsee and Kunreuther found that individuals are
willing to pay higher premiums for the same amount of coverage for
objects they love than for ordinary non-sentimental property.48 Further,
regarding the need to satisfy social and/or cognitive norms, there is
41

Kunreuther and Pauly adhere to the expected utility theory to explain the failure of
individuals to purchase insurance against low-probability large-loss events, but agree that
implicit or explicit costs discovering the true probability of these events may inhibit
insurance purchase. See Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Neglecting Disaster: Why
Don’t People Insure Against Large Losses?, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2004).
42
NEIL A. DOHERTY ET AL., MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF
CATASTROPHES 137 (Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center in
conjunction with the Georgia State University and the Insurance Information Institute
March 2008).
43
Id. at 137-38.
44
George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001).
45
See, e.g., Michael Braun & Alexander Muermann, The Impact of Regret on the
Demand for Insurance, 71 J. RISK & INS. 737 (2004); David E. Bell, Regret in Decision
Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES. 961 (1982).
46
See David E. Bell, Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 33
OPERATIONS RES. 1 (1985).
47
Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
121, 122 (2003).
48
Christopher K. Hsee & Howard Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in Insurance
Decisions, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141 (2000).
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empirical evidence that the purchase of insurance is based on knowledge of
what friends and neighbors have done.49 Additionally, the decision to
purchase insurance can be influenced by the pursuit of happiness. One can
argue that an ex post injury will make victims seek ex ante protection.
Human and economic decisions thus reflect and contribute to human
happiness.50
Whether potential victims need insurance for losses resulting from a
particular catastrophe will to a large extent depend on whether they can
rely on other sources, such as government, to provide compensation or not.
For example, in Europe most potential victims will not have a large
incentive to purchase insurance against the risks of personal injury.51 This
is because coverage is mainly provided by a social security system.52 If,
however, there is not an alternative source of compensation, it is logical
that there would be an increased demand for coverage against personal and
property loss generally and specifically that caused by catastrophe.
B. EXAMPLES
Contrary to our expectations, empirical evidence, reported inter alia by
both Kunreuther53 and Zeckhauser,54 amongst others, suggests that there is
generally no adequate interest in and thus no demand for voluntary
insurance protecting against natural catastrophes. Consequently, this
evidence suggests that most homeowners do not buy adequate levels of
insurance coverage.
One example concerns the financial compensation system for natural
catastrophes utilized in Germany generally, and specifically existing
49

For more on the importance of friends and neighbors in providing information, see
Mark A. Satterthwaite, Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the Number
of Sellers, 10 BELL J. ECON. 483 (1979).
50
For a study on the importance of happiness in economic analysis, see BRUNO S.
FREY & ALOIS W. STRUZER, HAPPINESS & ECONOMICS (Princeton University Press 2002);
Bruno S. Frey & Alois W. Stutzer, Happiness Research: State and Prospects, 62 REV. SOC.
ECON. 207 (2005); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and CostBenefit Analysis (UNIV. PA. INST. LAW & ECONOMICS Research Paper No. 07-15), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999928.
51
Comité Europeen des Assurances, Reducing the Social and Economic Impact of
Climate Change and Natural Catastrophes 27-28 (2007).
52
Id.
53
Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster, supra note 16, at 174.
54
Richard Zeckhauser, The Economics of Catastrophes, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
113, 115 (1996).
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insurance arrangements. As a general rule, most first-party insurance
policies exclude catastrophic risks which result from natural disasters such
as floods and earthquakes.55 Coverage therefore depends on the specific
terms of the respective insurance policy. In practice, only a small
percentage of German citizens have catastrophe insurance coverage: only
about 50% of those households hit by the 2002 Elbe flooding were insured
against the risk of property damage caused by natural resources. Endres,
Ohl & Rundshagen have recently held that this lack of adequate insurance
coverage may be the result of a lacking demand because of a lack of risk
aversion.56 Although this last topic should be subject of further empirical
research, they already stress that it is too easily accepted (at the policy
level) that there is risk aversion, whereby this may not always be the case.
Especially since the lack in demand could just as easily be explained by the
lack of flood insurances on the German market.
There are examples of this in the American market as well. Indeed,
although the United States has several (government supported) initiatives to
stimulate natural hazard insurance, relatively little progress has been made.
The standard U.S. homeowners’ insurance policy offered by private
insurance carriers is an “all risk” policy and therefore covers damage to a
home by fire, windstorms, hail, riots and explosions. Flood and earthquake
damage receive, however, different treatment. Coverage for flood damage
due to rising water is explicitly excluded in homeowners’ insurance
policies, but coverage for these losses is voluntarily available through the
federal government’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).57
Earthquake coverage on the other hand can be a separate policy or an
endorsement to the homeowners or renters policy and is voluntarily
available from most insurance companies. In California, it is also available
through the California Earthquake Authority.58 Although U.S. citizens are
55

Magnus, supra note 2, at 129.
Alfred Endres, Cornelia Oh & Bianca Rundshagen, ‘Land unter!’ Ein
institutionenökonomische Zwischenruf’, 29 LIST FORUM FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND
FINANZPOLITIK 284 (2003).
57
For more on the NFIP, see D.R. Anderson, D. R. The National Flood Insurance
Program – Problems and Potential, 41 J. RISK & INS. 579 (1974); H.S. Cohn and T.M.
Rowe, Overwhelmed: The Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956, 13 CONN INS. L.J. 329
(2006-2007); Quynh T. Pham, The Future of the National Flood Insurance Program in the
Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 629 (2005-06); Raymond J. Burby,
Flood Insurance and Floodplain Management:The US Experience, 3 ENVTL. HAZARDS 111
(2001).
58
See generally Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Behavioral Models of
Insurance: The Case of the California Earthquake Authority 1-2 (Feb. 19, 2000) (
56
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not obliged to purchase homeowners insurance by law, the process of
obtaining a mortgage often requires it. In addition, the Flood disaster
Protection Act of 1973 and the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of
1994 mandate the purchase of flood insurance as a condition for federal or
federally-related financial mortgages for acquisition and or construction of
buildings in Special Flood Hazard Areas.59 In general, there is however
substantial evidence that most individuals in flood-prone areas do not
voluntarily purchase insurance despite highly subsidized rates.60 For
example, less than 3,000 out of 21,000 flood-prone communities entered
the NFIP during its first four years of operation (since 1968) and less than
275,000 homeowners voluntarily bought an insurance policy.61 Only
through excessive publicity and information campaigns has knowledge of
flood risks among the population increased. By 1992, a conservative
estimate of coverage suggests that less than 20 percent of the homes
located in the floodplain were covered by flood insurance.62 The Federal
Insurance Administration estimates that as of 1997 about 27 percent of
households living in high-risk flood areas had insurance.63 This is
consistent with the findings of a study where FEMA examined 1549
disaster relief applications from victims of the 1998 flood in Northern
Vermont. There, almost 84 percent of Northern Vermonters residing in the
Special Flood Hazard Areas did not have flood insurance coverage at the
time; 45 percent of whom were required to purchase it.64
The famous example of hurricane Katrina also deserves our attention as
well. The victims of Katrina complained, rather vociferously, that the
received compensation was substantially less than the actual costs of
repairing or rebuilding their destroyed houses.65 Even those covered who
suffered large losses from rising water were only able to recover a portion
of their losses because the maximum coverage limit on residential
unpublished manuscript prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research Insurance
Conference, Feb. 2000), available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/papers/nber00.pdf.
59
See Pham, supra note 57, at 632-33, 641-43.
60
See id. at 641-42.
61
Risa Palm, Demand for Disaster Insurance: Residential Coverage, in PAYING THE
PRICE. THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED
STATES 51, 55 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds., Joseph Henry Press 1998).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
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Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 179
(Ronald J. Daniels et al. ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 2005).
65
Id. at 175.
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buildings (not including contents) under NFIP was $250,000 and these
homeowners did not purchase excess flood coverage from private
carriers.66 However, this is not to suggest that the coverage itself was
inadequate rather as we have seen repeatedly people were not purchasing
necessary coverage. In the Louisiana parishes affected by Katrina the
percentage of homeowners with flood insurance ranged from 57.7 percent
in St. Bernard’s parish to 7.3 percent in Tangipahoa parish.67 Only 40
percent of the residents in New Orleans had flood insurance, although they
were eligible to purchase such a policy through the NFIP.68 The Economist
reported similar numbers: in Mississippi’s coastal areas, less than one in
five households had flood insurance and in New Orleans it was less than
fifty percent.69
Even in less recent history, very few people had acquired coverage
prior to flooding caused by tropical storm Agnes. Agnes wreaked havoc on
many areas in the Northeastern United States in June 1972.70 Again, a
number of the communities in the affected regions qualified for the federal
government’s subsidized National Flood Insurance Program but had not
taken advantage of it.71 In fact, only 1,580 claims – totaling $5 million –
were paid under this Program. Consequently Congress responded to the
plight of the (uninsured) victims with liberal relief through its Small
Business Administration Disaster loan program.72
Another example is the Northridge Earthquake in California in 1994
which caused more than $ 19.6 billion (in 2007 dollars) in insured losses.73
Immediately after this catastrophic event, a high number of citizens decided
to buy first-party disaster insurance, as a reaction to the suffered damages.
Soon, however, this reactionary behavior dissipated and Californians began
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Id.
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Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL
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(Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., Springer-Wien New York 2006).
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to let those policies lapse or cancelled them.74 Indeed, eight years after the
creation of the California Earthquake Authority, the acquisition rate of
coverage has decreased from thirty to seventeen percent.75
The empirical evidence, however, does not clearly support a pure lack
of demand for the lack or inadequacies of catastrophe insurance. A recent
study by the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center76
reports that after Florida went through several flooding episodes in 2004,
people effectively purchased more flood insurance. They found that in
2000 there were 973,444 flood insurance policies in place versus 1,143,844
in 2005 (which represents a 17% increase, while the costs of flood
insurance remained virtually the same between 2000 and 2005).77 The
authors indicate several explanations for these changes. First, regret: people
living in devastated areas, who had coverage, wished they had purchased
the better and larger policies that would have provided more adequate
coverage. Second, flood insurance began to look like a sound financial
investment. Third, the floods were a vivid experience not only for those
affected but also for their neighbors and family members who were not
directly affected by property loss.78 As loss due to flooding became a
reality in these people’s lives purchasing flood insurance seemed more
appealing and more purposeful.
Therefore, even though there is some evidence of serious under
demand for catastrophe insurance, there are also cases (like in the Florida
example) where (at least in the short term) the insurance purchase has
increased. It is unclear whether these policies purchased in Florida in 2005
(after the 2004 flooding) will be maintained after a few flood-free years.
The example of the California earthquake indeed illustrates that once the
memory of the disaster is forgotten, a large quantity of the new insurance
coverages were cancelled.
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C. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE DEMAND FOR
FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL CATASTROPHES
Economics and behavioral law provide insight into several phenomena
which may explain this lack of catastrophe insurance demand. A low
demand may be caused by problems on the supply side as well, more
particularly if premiums would be inefficiently high either as a result of
distorted estimations of probabilities by insurers or as a result of high
loading. These problems on the supply side will be discussed separately in
the next section. For now, focus will be on the reasons why, even if
catastrophe coverage is offered at actuarially fair premiums in competitive
markets,79 demand for coverage remains low.
First, it seems that those with a higher perceived vulnerability to future
catastrophic losses are more likely to acquire first-party insurance than
those who believe that a catastrophe is unlikely to affect their home or their
community. Slovic concluded that a perceived probability of loss was a
critical factor in triggering the purchase of catastrophe insurance.80
Potential victims who do not purchase coverage do not deem the risk of
loss to be sufficient to require such protection. They tend to take an “it will
not happen to me” attitude.
Perceived vulnerability, however, constitutes a problem in the case of
low-probability high-consequence events like natural disasters.
Overwhelming evidence from psychologists and behavioral law and
economics indicates that those events are systematically misjudged.
Experiments showed that the “affect heuristic” is a large factor in this
misconception. As a consequence, the characteristic most correlative to
perceived risk was fear, i.e. the degree to which a hazard evoked feelings of
dread.81 Risk perception is thus highly dependent upon intuitive and
79

The price of homeowners insurance is, of course, a primary area of interest in
order to purchase insurance coverage. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season
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experimental thinking, guided by emotional and affective processes.82 The
affect heuristic further suggests that, if a general affective view guides
perceptions of risk and benefit, providing information about benefit should
change the perception of risk.83 These ‘heuristics and biases’ thus may
explain why only those who are directly affected by the risk demand
insurance, whereas others who are exposed to the risk as well may wrongly
estimate their exposure. This analysis fits into classic information
deficiencies which lead to an under demand for catastrophe insurance.
Apart from the mentioned affect heuristic, other behavioral attitudes may
also explain the misjudgment of exposure and consequently need.
Experimental studies have observed behavior contrary to the expected
utility theory.84 Consequently, Kahneman and Tversky proposed an
alternative theory, called “prospect theory.”85 Under prospect theory, an
insurance policy that covers fire but not flood can be presented either as
full protection against the specific risk of fire or as a reduction in the
overall probability of property loss.86 Prospect theory predicts that the
policy will appear more attractive in the former perspective, in which it
offers unconditional protection against a restricted set of problems.87 The
two authors further found empirically that low probability events generally
are overweighted and high ones generally underweighted in policies.88
Risk-averse people hence will, both under utility theory as under prospect
theory, prefer insurance against low-probability high-loss events rather than
against high-probability low-loss events.89 This seems, at first, contrary to
the above analysis. By taking into account, however, the “probability
threshold,” which says that potential victims ignore those events for which
the probability of a loss is too low to constitute a threat, the theory in fact
Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived
Benefit, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1085 (20041994).
82
See Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts
about Affect, Reason, Risk and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311 (2004).
83
Id. at 315.
84
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Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK & INS. 603 (1979); Paul Slovic et al., Preference for
Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237
(1977); Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability
Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565 (1989).
85
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supports the lack of demand we have seen.90 This suggests that if the
chances of an event are sufficiently low, people do not even reflect on its
consequences. Potential victims thus have a tendency to insure only if they
feel the probability of a disaster is high enough that they will suffer damage
and accordingly receive a return on their investment in the policy. More
research, however, is needed to establish a solid theory regarding the
perceived risks of natural hazards.
Another alternative to utility theory, “bounded rationality,” was
introduced by Simon.91 This concept asserts that the cognitive limitations
of the potential victim, the decision-maker, force him to construct a
simplified model of the world.92 A person thus does not strive for
maximization of his utility but for some satisfactory level of achievement.93
Potential victims consequently are too limited in their cognitive capacity to
adjust to natural hazards via insurance. Therefore, an individual will
neglect to purchase insurance because his knowledge of the subject is
limited – not because he has studied the matter carefully and concluded that
the cost-benefit ratio is unattractive. Potential victims must consequently be
made graphically aware of the potential losses from the disaster before
considering the purchase of insurance coverage.94
Finally, other theories emphasizing people’s limited capabilities of
judging the probabilities of natural hazards include, inter alia, “the
gambler’s fallacy” (or “negative recency effect”), which means that people
have a very poor conception of randomness and thus e.g. expect that a
flood which occurred in year x will not occur again in year x+1,95 and the
“availability heuristic,” as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky,96
according to which the frequency of some event is estimated by judging
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how easy it is to recall other instances of this type.97 The availability
heuristic implies that past experience may be necessary to raise an
individual’s awareness of the risks and prompt the purchase of insurance.
So, while the financial losses could be significant should an event within
the range of 1-in-50 to 1-in-50098 occur, the great majority of people will
not purchase insurance because they have never been exposed to the
consequences of such an event.99 Evidence in these low probability cases
suggests that many individuals do not use an expected utility model such as
the one characterized above to determine how much insurance coverage to
purchase.100
A second argument explaining the limited interest in voluntary firstparty insurance is the knowledge of potential victims that the state or the
government will provide them with ex post disaster assistance irrespective
of insurance coverage.101 The intuitive appeal of this argument is clear: if
victims could count on state- provided ex post compensation after disasters,
then their incentives to purchase first-party insurance coverage may be
diminished. It refers to the argument made by Hirshleifer that in the
absence of insurance, the government may find it difficult to resist the
political pressure to provide compensation.102 This is the so-called
“Samaritan’s dilemma.”103 Why pay for this coverage via insurance
premiums if the government would provide compensation regardless?104
The empirical evidence concerning this argument, however, provides little
clarity. Kunreuther found that “there does not appear to be any evidence
suggesting that individuals refuse to purchase property insurance because
they feel that they will be bailed out by the government should they suffer
97
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damage.”105 Nevertheless, a recent comparative overview of compensation
systems in a variety of European countries showed that in countries where
state compensation was generously (and almost automatically) provided
after a disaster (such as Germany or Italy), the degree of insurance
coverage was low, whereas in countries where the state takes a principal
attitude of not providing any compensation after a disaster (like in the
United Kingdom), the degree of insurance coverage was substantially
higher.106 This anecdotal evidence indicates that there is some relationship,
tenuous or not, between government provided compensation and the
willingness of potential victims to obtain insurance coverage.
Third, psychological experiments show that people may ex ante prefer
uncertain losses rather than the certain loss of paying the premium.107
Kunreuther discussed this concept concerning decisions to purchase
insurance against the risk of flooding.108 Insurance is an investment.109
People prefer to insure against high-probability, low-damage events since a
monetary return is more likely.110 The problem, according to this literature,
is that with ex ante, the potential victim (like a house owner) is confronted
with the certain loss of a premium, whereby the expected damage in the
case of flooding can only be estimated and therefore constitutes an
uncertain loss. There is, in other words a low expectation of a return on the
“investment” during a lifetime and hence a low demand with catastrophe
insurance. Consequently, potential victims who did buy first-party
insurance against the risk of catastrophic losses and did not experience
losses that allowed them to make claims will, within a few years, cancel
their insurance coverage or allow it to lapse.111 This reasoning can be
correlated to the emotional goals mentioned earlier of peace of mind and
anxiety avoidance. A similar line of reasoning applies to those who are
underinsured. If one is underinsured at the time of a catastrophe, the losses
are not, generally, large enough to provide incentives to buy an insurance
105
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policy. This is because once a catastrophe has happened, people consider it
unlikely that a similar disaster will affect them in the future.112
Fourth, the lack of demand is attributed to ineffective information
filtering, particularly with probabilistic information regarding catastrophes.
Slovic and Monahan demonstrated that risk assessments in terms of relative
frequency (“of every 100 neighbors similar to you, 10 are estimated to
suffer catastrophic damages”) created more frightening images of
catastrophic events than statistically represented frequencies (“neighbors
similar to you are estimated to have a 10% chance of suffering catastrophic
damages”).113 Moreover, according to Dake, people have “worldviews,”
which influence individual judgments and actions.114 Consequently, the
available information has little effect on individuals’ attitudes towards
‘normal’ hazards, as they are part of who we are and of how we see the
world.115
Fifth, some families also face budget constraints which limit their
interest and/or ability to voluntarily purchase adequate insurance coverage
in case of a major loss. Such behavior is likely in areas where property
values have increased rapidly. An increase in premium will typically then
cause people to buy less insurance due to budgetary constraints. In contrast
to the expected utility model where the demand for insurance depends on
the premium relative to the expected loss,116 demand under this scenario
depends only on the premium for a given amount of coverage.
Therefore, numerous reasons explain the failure of potential victims to
purchase first-party insurance coverage and correspondingly necessary
protection against catastrophic losses. One final remark should still be
made: low demand for insurance coverage is often confused with adverse
selection.117 For example, suppose that the only parties who wish to buy
flood insurance are those with material exposure to damage. Low-risk
parties thus may rationally decide not to insure. Regardless of this being
112
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113
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true, it would not imply adverse selection. Adverse selection after all
requires asymmetric information: insurers must be unable to identify highrisk buyers.118 Generally, it is hard to see how insured could have an
informational advantage over insurers in predicting catastrophes.119 The
reverse is more likely to be true.120 Insured might, however, know their
own potential loss better than insurers do,121 but that could be solved
through inspection measures imposed by the insurer. The fact that adverse
selection is not a serious problem is also confirmed in recent studies
concerning hurricane insurance.122 Indeed, there is no evidence that those
at risk have an informational advantage over the insurer. In fact, the
opposite might be true: if insurance companies spend a lot of resources
estimating the risk (which they do today) they might gain an informational
advantage over their policyholders who cannot afford or do not want to do
such research.123 In recent years, there has been growing literature on the
impact of insurers’ knowledge advantage regarding risks. Research in this
field reveals that insurers might want to exploit this reverse information
asymmetry, which results in low risk agents being optimally covered, while
high risks are not.124 Low insurance demand even for high-risk parties can
then simply stem from the high cost of coverage, the availability of
alternative compensation mechanisms or from any of the other above
mentioned reasons.
IV. SUPPLY OF FIRST-PARTY DISASTER INSURANCE
A. CORRELATION, UNCERTAINTY AND LIMITED CAPACITY
Even though it is – as just indicated – questionable whether there is a
high demand for catastrophe insurance, there are definitely problems on the
supply side. A number of insurers exclude coverage for property damage
118
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caused by (natural) catastrophes and argue that those losses are
uninsurable. The three principal reasons for this attitude are the fear of
catastrophic losses, the uncertainty of the risk, and the lack of insurance
capacity.125
First, natural hazards normally occur within one specified area and are
highly correlative. Past disasters indicate that a significant number of
(especially non-geographically diverse) insurance companies became
insolvent as a result of such catastrophic losses. Consequently, property
insurance became increasingly difficult to obtain in hazard-prone areas.
Second, the absence of historical data and the present imperfect
scientific knowledge contributes to the supply deficiencies of first party
catastrophe coverage.126 However, this point needs to put into perspective
due to the new insights into catastrophe modeling.127 The lack of
predictability regarding both the probability of an extreme event occurring
and of the outcomes of such an event results in ambiguity. This ambiguity
may lead to uninsurability of a specific catastrophic event or in a specific
hazard-prone area.128 Insurers can, however, take account of this
uncertainty regarding the probability of catastrophic damage by charging a
so-called risk premium.129 Nevertheless, two problems still exist: (1) a
higher insurance premium can in turn decrease demand for insurance
against catastrophic risks; and (2) insurance regulation might limit insurers’
ability to apply high premiums to catastrophic risks.130 Regulated rates are
in fact a major problem in some countries and may be, in certain high-risk
areas, the main obstacle to an effective voluntary insurance market for
125
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catastrophic risks. Therefore, these additional risk premiums are rarely
charged in practice. Gollier adds that an insurability problem may occur
only if insurers are systematically more ambiguity-averse than
consumers.131
Third, insurance companies need sufficient financial reserves to cover
the particular catastrophic risk.132 In many cases, however, and especially
with catastrophic events, the expected loss may exceed the capacity of the
individual insurer. The insurer can use various traditional insurance
techniques to cope with this capacity problem, such as co-insurance,
reinsurance, pooling of capacity by insurers, and alternative risk transfer
(ART) mechanisms.133 As a consequence, the supply of insurance is largely
conditioned by the price and availability of reinsurance and other
alternative risk transfer mechanisms. For the most part, investors who
supply capital for the insurance companies control this price since they
want to realize a profitable rate of return. Even these solutions, however,
have their limits.
B. LIMITS OF REINSURANCE AND ART
Reinsurance helps insurance companies underwrite large risks, limits
liability on specific risks, increases capacity, and shares liability when
claims overwhelm the primary insurer’s resources.134 In reinsurance
transactions, one or more insurers (the reinsurers) agree, for a premium, to
indemnify a primary insurer against all or part of the loss that that primary
insurer may sustain under its policies.135 The contractual and business
relationships between insurers and reinsurers facilitate relatively low
transaction costs. However, in the case of extremely large or multiple
catastrophic events, insurers might not have purchased sufficient
reinsurance, or reinsurance providers might not have sufficient capital to
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meet their existing obligations.136 In any event, after a catastrophic loss,
reinsurance capacity may be diminished and reinsurers might limit
availability of future catastrophic reinsurance coverage. In contrast, after a
catastrophic event, the demand of potential victims only increases. This
simultaneous occurrence of shrinking supply and rising demand naturally
leads to a sharp increase in reinsurance pricing. High reinsurance prices
induce investment in the reinsurance business (e.g. new reinsurance
companies may be formed, investors may be willing to purchase new
tranches of equity issued by existing reinsurers). This, in turn, increases the
supply of catastrophe coverage and causes prices to stabilize again.
Additionally, if no major catastrophe occurs in a close time frame to
another, reinsurers offer premiums at prices below expected loss and costs,
while primary insurers have excess supply of capital and are therefore
capable of supporting new risk exposures. In order to win or retain market
share, reinsurers lower their underwriting criteria and may accept marginal
risks or liberalize policy conditions. This ushers in a period of low
premium rates. Reinsurance is thus clearly influenced by price cycles,
which are particularly pronounced in catastrophe insurance.137 Given the
cyclic nature of the reinsurance market, investors have incentives to look
for alternative capital sources to add financial capacity. After all, these
instruments have the ability to absorb the effects of a hard market and to
manage complex or difficult risk exposures, which are often hard to insure
in the traditional insurance market. The emergence of catastrophe bonds,
catastrophe derivatives, sidecars, and industry loss warranties, already
complement the catastrophe reinsurance market. Therefore, many more
alternative capital sources are being developed.138 Nevertheless, capital
market instruments should be characterized as a supplement, rather than an
136
See, e.g., Anne Gron, Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance, in THE
FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 23 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999).
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app4_natcaten2006.pdf (last visited November 4, 2008).
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capital sources. See, e.g., Guy Carpenter, http://www.guycarp.com (last visited October 22,
2008); Benfield Group, http://www.benfieldgroup.com (last visited October 22, 2008). See
generally DOHERTY, supra note 42.
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alternative, to catastrophe (re)insurance, especially since most of these
tools are still in their infancy.139
C. LIMITS OF POOLING
There are also negatives regarding the pooling capacity of insurers.
One risk is that pooling may lead to welfare losses as a result of cartel
agreements. For example, in the Netherlands during the 1950s, the Dutch
Insurers’ Association issued a so-called “binding decision” on all of its
members, prohibiting them from insuring flood and earthquake risks (the
latter being a relatively small risk in the Netherlands with the exception of
the area around Southern Limburg). Their argument was that these risks
were technically not insurable since the flooding and earthquake risks were
uncertain in their nature and hence, difficult to calculate. Moreover, these
types of insurance would only be attractive to high-risk individuals (e.g.
those living in flood prone areas) and this would result in incurable adverse
selection. As a consequence, it was determined that the members of the
Dutch Insurers’ Association should all refrain from covering these risks.
The arguments concerning the uninsurability seemed highly doubtful,
but the Association’s binding decisions also clearly violated competition
law. At the time European Commission Regulation 3932/92 of December
21, 1992140 exempted many cartel agreements in the insurance world from
the prohibition under the old article 85(3) of the EC Treaty.141 The
Regulation provided that certain strict conditions were met. Law and
economics scholars, who argued that competition policy should be fully
applied to insurance markets, heavily criticized this exemption.142 The
139

Isabel M. Torre-Enciso & John E. Laye, Financing Catastrophe Risk in the
Capital Markets, 1 INT’L REV. SOC. SCI J. EMERGENCY MGMT. 61 (2001).
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binding decisions not to insure flood and earthquake risks not only clearly
limited supply (it effectively excludes it as a result of a cartel agreement),
but it also violated the conditions of Regulation 3932/92. Consideration
8,143 preceding the Regulation, states that standard policy conditions may
not contain any systematic exclusion of specific types of risk without
providing for the express possibility of including that coverage by
agreement. This is repeated in article 7(1)(a) of the exemption. The
European Commission also issued a report to the European Parliament and
to the Council on May 12, 1999 concerning the functioning of the
exemption in Regulation No. 3932/92.144 In this report, the Commission
explicitly discusses these binding decisions. The report states that as a
result of the questions asked by the Commission, the Dutch Association of
Insurers decided to bring its binding decision in line with Article 7.1,
Subsection a, by simply converting it into a non-binding recommendation,
which left each insurer free to extend coverage to flood risks. This example
demonstrates that a minimal supply of insurance coverage may well be the
result of anti-competitive behavior by insurers, who mutually agree not to
cover particular catastrophic risks.
At a policy level, this demonstrates that a necessary condition of
insuring catastrophic risks is a competitive insurance market that offers a
wide variety of differentiated insurance policies and responds to the
demand of the market. Instead of direct government intervention,
government should guarantee an adequate competition policy with respect

143

Consideration 8:
Standard policy conditions may in particular not
contain any systematic exclusion of specific types of risk
without providing for the express possibility of including
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contractual relationship with the policyholder to be
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object to the policy. This is without prejudice to obligations
arising from Community or national law.
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to insurance markets. Otherwise uninsurability may, as the Dutch example
shows, simply be the result of a cartel agreement.145
Therefore, as long as insurers are able to estimate the frequency and
magnitude of potential catastrophic losses, catastrophic first-party
insurance is and should be available. Due to problems of ambiguity,
adverse selection, moral hazard, and highly correlated losses, insurance
companies will want to charge a risk premium that considerably exceeds
the expected loss. This premium can, however, be so high that there would
be very little demand for coverage at that rate. In such cases, the insurer
will not want to invest the time and money necessary to develop the
product. If the insurer is convinced that there is sufficient demand, he will
try to raise sufficient capacity to survive possible catastrophic losses.
V. COMPULSORY DISASTER COVERAGE?
A. CORRECTING MARKET FAILURE?
The question of whether compulsory first-party disaster coverage could
solve the above mentioned problems regarding the lack of demand and/or
supply at the insurance market has often been addressed. With compulsory
first-party insurance, we refer to both first-party insurances against natural
disasters that potential victims have to take in all countries where these are
available on the insurance market, and to regulatory interventions, as a
result of which voluntary coverage is mandatorily extended to include
natural disasters. The latter refers more specifically to a duty on persons
who voluntarily subscribed a property insurance policy to purchase a
catastrophe extension. A distinction between both types of compulsory
first-party insurance will only be made where necessary.
The classic economic rationale behind compulsory liability insurance is
the externality argument: in the absence of adequate insurance, injurers
could, through their insolvency, externalize risk. That indeed may be an
argument in favor of compulsory liability insurance, but it is not very
145

We do not argue, however, that competition necessarily provides better results
than (state) monopolies. See Winand Emons, Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance
Monopolies, 49 J. INDUSTRIAL. ECON. 247, 247-48 (2001) (empirical researched showed that
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convincing in the case of first-party insurance. An argument could still be
made that the victims who would not be adequately insured for personal
injury would then extensively call upon the healthcare system and thus
“externalize” that risk. However, given the fact that most European legal
systems provide, through social security, wide coverage for healthcare
(precisely through mandatory healthcare insurances), one cannot see why
that should be supplemented with an additional compulsory accident
insurance. The same is true for the property damage that victims may suffer
as a result of a natural disaster. Of course, the absence of insurance may
lead those victims to make additional calls for government relief (and as a
result to political pressure caused through the large number involved), but
there is as such no direct issue of externalization of their harm. Of course,
an argument in favor of compulsory insurance could be made if the disaster
were to occur in a country (e.g. a developing country) where no social
security system existed and the disaster did not merely cause property
damage, but also personal injury. This increase in personal injury would
then lead to an increasing call on state provided health care services.
However, this would instead be an argument in favor of a compulsory
social security system rather than for a mandatory insurance system merely
focused on damage caused by disasters. However, an argument could be
made that the availability of mandatory disaster insurance would reduce the
pressure to provide government bailouts. This again is based on
Hirshleifer’s argument that, in the absence of insurance, governments may
not be able to resist the political pressure to compensate.146 Compulsory
insurance could thus be seen as a way of reducing pressure on the
government.
The second traditional economic argument in favor of compulsory
insurance would be the presence of information problems. Indeed,
compulsory insurance may improve all agents’ welfare due to the problem
of asymmetric information.147 Information problems might arise in cases
where the potential victim cannot accurately assess the catastrophic risk he
is exposed to or the benefits of the purchase of first-party insurance. An
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underestimation of the risk would, in that case, lead to the wrongful
decision of the potential victim not to buy first-party insurance.
In other words, this would assume that citizens are averse against the
risk of large damage as a consequence of catastrophes and would be willing
to pay a premium to have that risk removed from them, but simply do not
purchase insurance because they lack information e.g. on the probability
and magnitude of the risk and/or on the availability of insurance. Also,
given the result of psychological experiments it could easily be argued that,
because of imperfect information, individuals are not fully informed about
their own preferences.148 Regulation would then be the classic remedy to
cure an information deficiency: the legislator could remedy the information
problem by introducing a general duty to insure.149 Information problems
thus could constitute an argument in favor of compulsory first-party
insurance. An example of this would be for property damage caused as a
result of natural disasters if empirical evidence showed that victims would
greatly underestimate these risks and would, being well informed,
definitely have a demand for insurance.
Alternatively, one could again take into account the results of
happiness research and argue that people might experience a higher life
satisfaction or subjective well-being if ex ante arrangements could be made
guaranteeing financial compensation after disasters. Whether that is the
case is of course an empirical question. A weakness is that, as we showed
above, behavioral research seems to indicate that it is not poor information
that causes the low demand, but rather a lack of willingness to insure
against probability events. Moreover, if there were really poor information,
the remedy could consist of a mandatory disclosure of information to the
public rather than in making insurance compulsory.
A third rationale for compulsory insurance is behavioral. Individuals
may, as was shown above, underinsure because they are overconfident.150
In that situation, compulsory insurance does not harm unbiased agents
because they want to be insured, and should be imposed on overconfident
individuals for their own benefit. However, Sandroni and Squintani found
that the asymmetric-information rationale and the behavioral rationale for
compulsory insurance do not reinforce each other. After all, compulsory
insurance ceases to improve all agents’ welfare when there is a significant
148
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fraction of overconfident agents because it makes low-risk agents worse
off. As a result, behavioral biases may weaken asymmetric-information
rationales for government intervention in the insurance sector because they
may turn policies beneficial to all insured into wealth transfers between the
insured. High-risk citizens benefit from compulsory insurance because they
obtain insurance coverage at lower prices. Compulsory insurance also
benefits low-risk citizens because it relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint. However, when the economy has a significant fraction of
overconfident agents, the incentive compatibility constraint no longer
binds. Compulsory insurance then becomes a transfer of wealth from lowrisk to high-risk agents. The previously-referenced study by Sandroni and
Squintani hence shows that one has to be very careful with introducing
mandatory insurance to off-set information deficiencies resulting from
behavioral shortcomings. Sandroni and Squintani show that in particular
circumstances (in the presence of overconfident consumers) such a
regulatory mechanism may lead to a decrease in social welfare.
B. MANDATORY ADDITIONAL COVERAGE?
Slovic, Fischhoff, and others, wondered if, as people prefer to insure
against high-probability low-loss events, they would also insure against
unlikely disasters if such insurance were sold at a reasonable extra cost
along with insurance against likely losses.151 Their behavioral experiments
showed that adding protection against a small but likely loss might help
accomplish the purpose of also being insured against low-probability
losses. A compound insurance will thus lead to more people being insured
against catastrophic losses.
At the side of the insurers, such a comprehensive insurance policy also
has several advantages. After all, it is likely that the chances that an insurer
will become insolvent are reduced due to a larger premium base and the
diversification of risks across a wider area.152 Moreover, if the extra
premium to be paid for the mandatory additional coverage would be based
on risk, then the policyholder would be charged only for the hazard that he
faces. One would need to highlight this idea of all-hazards coverage to the
general public, who may otherwise feel that they are paying for risks that
151
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they do not face. To conclude, support for a regulatory duty to insure
against disasters, in addition to voluntary housing insurances (like this is
the case in France) can be received from behavioral experiments.
However, here we should recall that recent studies showed that one has
to be very careful with regulatory interventions (like mandatory insurance)
to cure behavioral shortcomings since, in particular market situations (more
particularly in the presence of overconfident consumers), this may lead to a
reduction in welfare.153 Thus, whether such a compound insurance will
have beneficial effects may well depend upon the particular market and is
largely an empirical matter.
C. DRAWBACKS
However, there are various drawbacks to a duty to purchase first-party
insurance against (natural) catastrophes.
First, let’s turn back to the basic principles of insurance as developed
by the expected utility theory on insurance. One of the most important
benefits of insurance is that it removes the risk from risk-averse persons
and thus increases their utility. Are those benefits now large enough to
warrant the introduction of compulsory insurance?154 A problem with this
argument is that the degree of risk aversion varies. The introduction of a
generalized duty to insure might be inefficient in as far as it forces some
people that would normally not have a demand for insurance to purchase
insurance. Insurance does not increase these people’s expected utility. A
generalized duty to insure might therefore create a social loss. This means
that the simple fact that insurance increases utility can as such not justify
the introduction of a duty to insure, as long as it is assumed that all
individuals are informed about the risk to which they are exposed and the
availability of insurance.
This argument also rather paternalistically assumes that insurance is
under all circumstances beneficial to potential victims. The argument
neglects the fact that the insured has to pay a price to have the risk removed
from him. This price will unavoidably be a lot higher than the actuarially
fair premium, as insurer’s ambiguity increases the price with a risk
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premium. For some potential victims this premium will still be attractive,
but for others it may not.
Compulsory insurance generally neglects the fact that the demand for
insurance may vary according to the individual risk situation (and financial
possibility) of every possible victim. Of course one could rebut that, as
shown above individuals often do not buy insurance for reasons that are not
consistent with standard economic theory.155 There are indeed behavioral
shortcomings that are a main argument advanced in favor of
comprehensive disaster insurance. Still, the danger exists that behavioral
shortcomings are then used as an argument for a regulatory intervention,
the effects of which on social welfare are not always clear.
A second drawback is not related to the insights of the utilitarian
approach. This drawback relates to the fact that it is not only the lack of
information on the risk that causes the low demand for insurance, but a
bounded rationality linked to the idea that “it will not happen to me,”
combined with the unwillingness to pay the premium for a highly unlikely
hazard. The question thus arises whether forcing people to take out disaster
coverage should not be considered as a paternalistic intervention which
would have unclear effects on social welfare.
Third, if, to the contrary, one would assume that potential victims are
poorly informed on their potential exposure to disasters and on the benefits
of first-party insurance, then a regulatory intervention should aim at a
mandatory disclosure of such information to potential victims rather than at
a mandatory coverage. Again, this is supported by behavioral experiments
which show that graphic presentations may – to some extent – increase the
perceived risk of that hazard.156
A fourth disadvantage relates to cross-subsidization. A general duty to
purchase disaster coverage may be disadvantageous for those victims who
do not run any risk. Take the example of flood insurance: one can imagine
that a person living in a house close to a river might have a demand for
flood insurance, but the same is probably not true for someone living in an
apartment in a city on the 20th floor. A generalized duty to purchase
insurance coverage would therefore force all individuals to take insurance
coverage, even those that run no risk at all and therefore have no demand
for insurance. This could thus create inefficiencies and lead to crosssubsidization or negative redistribution whereby those who run no risk

155
156

See supra section III.
As already discussed above. See Slovic et al., supra note 84.

2008]

CATASTROPHIC RISKS

39

would have to contribute to the premium of those who may actually benefit
from the insurance coverage.157
A more efficient (and fairer) solution may therefore be the one
whereby the compulsory coverage (e.g. for flood risks) is limited to those
individuals who actually are exposed to the particular risk. This result can
of course be reached when risk-based premiums are used. The extra risk
premium can in other words vary according to the individual risk situation
of each insured. Moreover, if the premiums were based on risk, then
insurance would provide information on ways that individuals could protect
themselves against a disaster.158 However, it could be very costly to
develop premiums, which would differentiate between types of structures
and location. Additionally, the complexity of the rate schedule would be
very confusing to the homeowner. There is also no easy way to make sure
that the homeowner has met the standards upon which his premium is
based. Thus, there would have to be a cost of checking reflected in the rate
structure. If this cost were incorporated into the rates, then the premium
might be considerably higher than the actuarial figure. It might then
unnecessarily discourage some individuals and businesses from locating in
a particular area where it might have been profitable for them to do so
Moreover, the question arises whether lower income residents would be
able to pay these risk-based premiums and hence whether politicians would
allow insurers to relate premiums to risk.159
Fifth, compulsory insurance against disasters may be necessary to
avoid the risk of adverse selection, wherein only bad risks purchase
coverage. Thus, some argue that, in order to make the risk insurable, good
risks should also be covered and disaster insurance (for instance, flooding
insurance) made compulsory. As we have argued above, this argument is a
bit odd given that the adverse selection problem is unlikely in the of
disaster insurance context. If the insured knew his potential loss exposures
better than insurers, the insurer could easily impose inspection measures.160
But, the adverse selection argument is in fact wrongly presented by some
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(e.g. Dutch) insurers,161 who suggest that disaster risk would only be
insurable if everyone, even those who run no risk at all, were forced to
purchase insurance coverage.162 Adverse selection can also be avoided if
only those who are exposed to the risk are forced to take the mandatory
coverage. Otherwise, people would be forced to pay for insurance that they
do not need.163 Fortunately, within risk-prone groups, insurers can
adequately differentiate risks and premiums, as a remedy to adverse
selection.164 This is again an argument in favor of risk-based premiums.
Further, the second type of compulsory disaster insurance schemes
involves a tie-in agreement, whereby a potential buyer of property
insurance is forced to purchase insurance against catastrophic loss. Tie-in
agreements limit competition because consumers cannot opt to include
catastrophe insurance and because separate markets for both types of
insurance cannot develop. Consequently, a compulsory catastrophe
extension of first-party property insurance potentially generates effects that
competition law tries to avoid. Introducing a duty to insure may only be
efficient if sufficient competition on the particular insurance market exists.
Obviously, in a monopolistic market compulsory insurance will create
inefficiencies. Hence, the additional premium for the disaster coverage
should not be fixed by law but should be the result of competition between
insurers.165
Of course, the concern about tying disaster coverage to ordinary
insurance limiting competition assumes the development and existence of a
full-blown disaster insurance market. This paper began by noting that
people do not widely purchase first-party disaster insurance. Therefore, a
large degree of competition is unlikely in current insurance markets
offering disaster coverage. In that respect the tie-in argument may not be
very strong in the early development of a market for disaster coverage.
161
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Finally, some particular catastrophic risks may be so “new” that
insurance markets may not yet have developed. One could question
whether it makes sense to introduce mandatory insurance if coverage is
limited (or not subject to sufficient competition) on private insurance
markets.
D. COMPREHENSIVE INSURANCE OR THE PUBLIC PURSE?
Notwithstanding these objections, there is an important advantage to
mandatory disaster insurance: if a comprehensive first-party insurance
system exists, it will remove pressure on governments to provide disaster
relief. Though politicians may always have the tendency to provide
compensation when a large number of victims are affected by a disaster,166
randomly using public means to compensate disaster victims has been
highly criticized.167 First-party insurance at least guarantees that victims
pay themselves for the compensation they will afterwards obtain. And, with
adequate risk differentiation, first-party insurance can have preventive
effects which are usually absent in government relief programs.168 Indeed,
insurance can encourage risk mitigation prior to a disaster through
premium reductions and/or lower deductibles while providing financial
assistance after a disaster through claim payments.169 If insurance is to play
a central role in a hazard management program, then rates need to be based
on risk so that those in disaster-prone areas are responsible for the losses
after a disaster occurs.
A limitation of any government insurance program is that premiums
are not likely to be risk-based because of political pressure to make
coverage affordable to those residing in high-hazard areas. One way to
encourage adoption of cost-effective mitigation measures is to have banks
provide long-term mitigation loans that could be tied to the property. The
bank holding the mortgage on the property could offer a home
improvement loan with a payback period identical to the life of the
mortgage.170
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Nevertheless, government assistance in protection against natural
disasters may not be optimal ex ante, but it may be optimal ex post.
Suppose that an uninhabited area is likely to be affected by tropical storms,
and that this risk is so high that it is not socially desirable from an ex ante
perspective for the population to settle there. The necessary protective
assistance, which only the government can undertake, is too costly. The
question then is what action the government would undertake if the area is
in fact settled: either it assists settlers in constructing protective devices to
limit losses in the event of a storm, or it refrains. When it is socially
desirable to provide protection ex post, there is a time consistency
problem.171 If the government can commit to not providing such assistance
in the event the area is settled, the citizens will simply not settle there and
the socially desirable outcome is attained. If, on the other hand, the
government cannot commit, there will be settlement, since the citizens then
know that they will receive assistance and protection, and a socially less
desirable outcome is obtained.
In sum, from an ex ante perspective, there are strong arguments in
favor of a comprehensive disaster insurance program where disaster
coverage is made mandatory in addition to insurance for more likely
events, provided that premiums can sufficiently reflect risks.172 Such an
insurance program can avoid the negative redistribution resulting from
government intervention, while still providing incentives for risk
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mitigation. This conclusion is supported by law, economic scholarship, and
most particularly in the many Kunreuther publications.173
VI. EXAMPLES
One can now notice a European-wide tendency towards an increasing
use of partially mandatory catastrophe insurance. This tendency can partly
be explained by the fact that government-provided compensation is,
because of increasing pressure on public budgets, losing popularity.174
Mandatory insurance is thus seen as a way to avoid “catastrophic responses
to catastrophic risks” referring to the negative incentives for prevention and
the development of insurance markets resulting from government-provided
compensation.175 We will summarize the compulsory insurance programs
in France and Belgium, which raise a set of points that suggest why such
coverage may be a good idea and why it may not.176
A. FRANCE
France is probably the most well known example of a country, which
for many years has had compulsory first-party insurance against
catastrophes.177 The French model indeed introduced mandatory first-party
insurance, where all individuals whom have taken out first-party property
damage insurance policies have to pay a supplementary premium for a
mandatory coverage for natural disasters. Hence, France does not have a
generalized duty to insure, but a compulsory complementary coverage on
voluntary property damage contracts. However, those property damage

173
Since 1968 Kunreuther argued for mandatory comprehensive disaster insurance.
Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, 11 J. LAW & ECON.
133, 150 (1968). Kunreuther later repeated his argument with added theoretical and
empirical data. Kunreuther, supra note 16, at 182-83.
174
For a comparison of government provided compensation and insurance: see
Michael Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and Economics
Perspective, 29 LAW & POL’Y 339, 356 (2007).
175
See Epstein, supra note 12, at 296. For further examples see FAURE & HARTLIEF,
supra note 17, at 406-15.
176
But further examples could be provided as well. See FAURE & HARTLIEF supra
note 17.
177
Michel Cannarsa, Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moréteau, France, in FINANCIAL
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 81, 8590 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., Springer 2006).
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policies are widespread and all individuals who purchase such a policy
have to pay for the additional coverage for natural disasters.
This system is apparently accepted in France because the risk of cross
subsidization may be small: France seems to be confronted with many
types of natural disasters. This means that if one is presumably (as e.g.
inhabitant of an apartment on the 12th floor) not exposed to the risk of
flooding, one may be exposed to other natural disasters, such as
earthquakes or heavy storms.
The system is financed with a fixed premium on property insurance
contracts. The initial rate was 5.5% when the system started in 1982; it
was raised to 9% the following year and to 12% in 2000. The insurer
compensates, within three months as from the date of the submission of the
estimate of damaged property or losses sustained, on the basis of the
scheme when an event is declared a “natural catastrophe” through an
administrative decision. The insured must bear a share of the loss (a socalled deductible or franchise), which is higher in municipalities that have
not adopted a “prevention of risk plan.” This should provide incentives for
the municipality and for the local population to adopt such a prevention
plan or to move to safer places.178 Economic loss is not compensated in
case of a natural catastrophe except where expressly provided for in the
insurance policy.
Note, moreover, that in France, as a result of the explosion in Toulouse
on 21 September 2001, a legislative change was effectuated in July 2003.
As a result of this change, victims now also have additional compulsory
coverage for damage caused by technological risks (such as the explosion
in Toulouse). This system is financed by an additional premium of € 5 per
year and per contract. On the basis of the € 50 million contracts existing in
2005, this means there is € 250 million in anticipation of the coverage of
this risk.
That latter solution is, however, debated (also in France). It is not so
clear why in this case of technological disasters, where a liable wrongdoer
can be identified, a mandatory coverage for victims was introduced rather
than examining the introduction of solvency guarantees on the side of the
wrongdoer, such as compulsory liability insurance. Insurance coverage
will be excluded in special areas recognized in a “prevention plan of
178

Olivier Moréteau, Policing the Compensation of Victims of Catastrophes:
Combining Solidarity and Self-Responsibility, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 199, 217 (Willem H. Van Boom & Michael Faure eds.,
2007).
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technological risks” as causing a serious risk to human life, for all buildings
erected in this area after the plan has been published, and where a building
is erected in violation of administrative rules.
Reinsurance is provided through the “Caisse Centrale de Réassurance,”
(CCR) which is state-controlled. Half the premiums levied to cover the
consequences of catastrophes go to the CCR, which will always cover half
the damage insured. This way, the CCR is acting as a mutual fund, which
balances the risk of catastrophes among all insurance companies. The CCR
is itself covered by the State, which provides an unlimited guarantee.
Further, the French initiative in the field of reinsurance against risks of
terrorism should be mentioned. In 2002, the French insurance companies
and the companies authorized to carry on direct insurance business on
French territory created a pool called GAREAT (“Gestion de l’assurance et
de la reassurance des risques attentats et actes de terrorisme”). This pool
was originally created for one year, but it was renewed in 2003 and it is
still in force today. GAREAT reinsures damage to the property of
enterprises, local authorities and large buildings caused by terrorist attacks
where the insured capital exceeds € 6 million. Reinsurance is also provided
by CCR, with unlimited State cover. The premium ceded to the pool is
determined in relation to the premium currently charged for the natural
catastrophe cover. Meanwhile, France accepted a new Terrorism Act in
2007. Prior to the new Terrorism Act, all property contracts were to
include terrorism cover. Following the introduction of the new Act, only
contracts with a fire guarantee must cover terrorism. Therefore, GAREAT
will no longer accept risks where there is no fire guarantee.
B. BELGIUM
Belgium had a compensatory Disaster Fund since 1976. As a result of
a legislative change in May 2003 compulsory flood coverage, in addition to
the voluntary fire insurance contract, was introduced. It looks like the
French system, but the major difference is that this mandatory
supplementary coverage would only apply for specific flood-prone areas.
This would hence avoid a negative redistribution because those who are not
exposed to the risk are not forced to take out the coverage. Due to
disagreement, however, regarding the demarcation of those risk areas, the
act could not enter into force. Thus recently, the system has been changed
again: since September 2005, the compulsory first-party coverage includes
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not only flooding but natural catastrophes in general, regardless of whether
the catastrophe happened in a risk area.179
The Belgian legislature thus created the 17 September 2005 Act
establishing a general solidarity between all citizens who have fire
insurance coverage for the so-called simple risks – comprising 90 to 95%
of the Belgian population – by introducing a mandatory extension to
natural disaster coverage. The natural catastrophe insurance coverage
comprises four perils: flooding, earthquake, the flowing over or the
impoundment of public sewers, and landslide or subsidence. The insurer
can investigate the natural hazard risk for every individual case and will
adjust the extra premium accordingly. As a result, an inhabitant of the 10th
floor of an apartment building in the centre of the city will normally pay a
lower extra premium than the average premium increase, which is expected
to be € 3 to 4 per € 25.000 insured. The final premium will hence differ in
function of the real risk.
However, Colle found that insurers operate with two different systems:
half of the insurance companies charge the same extra premium for all its
insured, namely between € 2,60 and € 3,76 per € 25.000 insured good (plus
a tax of 15,75%), while the other insurance companies vary their premiums
according to the location of the ground, past damage, and deductibles.180
The maximum indexed deductible for the disaster coverage amounts to €
610 per claim. Further, every individual insurer has been given some limits
regarding the monetary burden he can carry, since the disaster coverage
concerns catastrophic risks, which can take extraordinary proportions. The
ratio legis is to avoid the financial downfall of the insurance companies.
The law sets up an intervention limit on the basis of a formula by event and
by individual insurer according to his premium income for the coverage for
fire as concerns the simple risks: € 8 million for earthquakes, decreased to
€ 3 million for other natural catastrophes. When this limit is attained, the
Disaster Fund makes up the amount with a general upper limit of € 280
million (€ 700 million for earthquakes). In case these amounts would not
be sufficient to compensate the victims, then the intervention of the
Disaster Fund will be reduced in proportion.
Thus, to conclude, a public-private partnership has now been created in
the Act of 17 September 2005: the government created the conditions under
179

For this recent legislative change: see Philippe Colle, De wet van 17 september
2005 betreffende de verzekering van natuurrampen, 23 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD, Feb. 4,
2006, at 881-885.
180
Colle as interviewed by Verhaeghe in DE STANDAARD (October 18, 2006).
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which the natural catastrophe risk became insurable thanks to the solidarity
between all the holders of a fire insurance agreement for simple risks, and
the insurers will fully play their social role. Every family can insure itself
against the direct damages to their goods which are a consequence of a
natural catastrophe for a reasonable price and will receive full
compensation, apart from the freely stipulated, but maximum franchise of €
610.
Further, the Belgian State created very recently a system of mandatory
insurance against damage caused by terrorist attacks. The Act of 1 April
2007 extends the life insurance policy, hospitalization insurance policy,
accident insurance policy and health insurance policy to mandatorily
include terrorism cover – apart from the already existing compulsory
coverage in the workers’ compensation insurance policy, the motor liability
insurance policy and in the fire insurance policy for simple risks.
Moreover a Committee has been set up to judge whether concrete events
can be considered to be terrorist actions and to decide on the amounts of
compensation. The total compensated amount will be set for the first time
after six months and a revision of this amount is possible every six months.
The final decision with respect to this amount will be set after three years.
The Act of 1 April 2007 guarantees the cover of terrorism claims during a
calendar year up to a global annual limit of € 1 billion. Hereto, a solidaritybased pooling arrangement has been established, which is financed by the
Belgian State, the insurers and reinsurers, and other legal persons who are
active in the performance of duties. Participation at the Fund is not
compulsory, but the liability of the participants is capped at € 1 billion,
which will not be the case for possible non-participants. If no other
agreement has been made between the Belgian State and the participants to
the Fund or by the King, then the Fund will pay the first € 700 million to
the victims of terrorism,181 while the Belgian government will pay a
maximum of € 300 million. The part payable by the State should be
considered as a reinsurance against which the government receives a
reimbursement.

181

Of this € 700 million, the intention is for the insurers to keep the first € 300
million (this amount is not yet fixed – amounts from € 280 million up to € 350 million are
mentioned) in retention and distribute this according to market share. The next € 400
million or so will be reinsured. See the thesis of Evy Nolman, entitled “Terrorisme: nieuwe
uitdagingen voor de verzekeringswereld en de overheid” (2007) at the Economics Faculty of
the Catholic University of Leuven, 30.
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C. COMPARATIVE AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS ON FRANCE AND
BELGIUM
The French system undoubtedly has the advantage that it provides
comprehensive disaster insurance for a large part of the population, all of
those who already have voluntarily purchased first-party property damage
insurance. The problematic aspect is that all insured have to take the
disaster coverage mandatorily. Theoretically, those who are never exposed
to the risk of natural disasters may thus be forced to purchase coverage
even though they have no demand. The seriousness of this danger of crosssubsidization depends on the extent to which some are forced into the
system even though they have no risk at all. Belgium originally had a new
Act adopted in 2003, which provided that the mandatory supplementary
coverage would only apply for specific flood-prone areas. Hence, this
would completely avoid any negative risk distribution since only those
exposed to the risk would be forced to purchase the coverage. However,
the political costs to identify those areas seemed so large that it was
impossible to identify those risk zones as a result of which the Act
remained a dead letter. The new 2005 Act has enlarged the coverage to
include (in addition to flooding) also other risks, such as earthquake,
damage due to flowing-over of public sewers and landslide. This
enlargement may, like in the case of France, reduce the danger of crosssubsidization: even if an insured is not exposed to the risk of flooding he
may be exposed to another covered natural disaster risk, such as e.g.
earthquake.
However, a major difference between the French and the Belgian
system is that premiums in France are fixed by the regulator, whereas in
Belgium insurers fix the premiums on a risk-based basis. In France,
premiums are not at all related to the risk and moreover, the regulatory
intervention may limit competition. Competition is still possible as far as
the basis, for example, housing insurance, is concerned.182 The Belgian
system seems preferable to the extent that it incorporates risk-related
premiums. However, the French system has also incorporated some
incentives for prevention by providing that compensation will be lower if a
community has adopted a “prevention of risk plan”. This should provide
incentives to voters to demand the adoption of such a plan within their
community.

182

See Van den Bergh & Faure, supra note 165, at 26-36.
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In addition, in both countries, the governments largely intervene by
providing reinsurance (in the case of France) and by intervening above
certain limits (in the case of Belgium). Insurers don’t have to pay any
contribution for this state intervention; as a result of this, it effectively
constitutes a subsidy.183 This idea of states being able to intervene in
providing intervention without market distortive effects certainly deserves
more attention.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we merely dealt with one aspect of the compensation for
victims of catastrophes. We more specifically addressed the question
whether potential victims can and do purchase first-party insurance to
obtain ex ante protection against the damage they could be exposed to as a
result of natural catastrophes. Of course, many other questions also related
to catastrophe insurance could be tackled.184 Moreover, although our paper
specifically focused on natural catastrophes, the results may have
consequences for man-made disasters (like terrorism) as well, even though
more difficulties might arise in that respect with the insurability of the
terrorism risk. We therefore focused on the question of why, in the case of
natural catastrophes (where often coverage is available on commercial
insurance markets), victims often do not use the existing possibilities.
Indeed, a general finding as far as the use of first-party insurance by
potential victims of catastrophes is concerned was that there is a
remarkably low degree of coverage. This could be supported by examples
from a flooding in Germany, but also by reference to the number of
available first-party insurances. After earthquakes in California, and
recently after Hurricane Katrina, it was again established that the number
of insured victims was relatively low.
The question why victims seek so little ex ante protection through firstparty insurance has been addressed in the literature from various angles.
The traditional neo-classic answer would be that victims apparently lack
information on the catastrophe risk and that the lacking demand for
catastrophe coverage is thus a classic example of market failure. However,
183

At least as concerns the natural catastrophes; a reinsurance premium should
indeed be paid in Belgium for state intervention in the terrorism risk.
184
For instance, the scope of liability insurance on the side of liable operators might
be addressed as well. However, since our focus was on natural catastrophes we assumed
that liability insurance will mostly not play a role, except in the rather exceptional cases that
public authorities can be held liable for failure to prevent natural catastrophes.
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more recent literature resulting from psychological experiments in the field
of behavioral law and economics showed that even in cases where victims
were well informed, they did not seek coverage or only to a limited extent.
The explanation by behavioral law and economics is that victims
apparently have no demand for insurance against low-probability highdamage events. To some extent, it has to do with the well known
“heuristics and biases” that decision-making concerning the purchase of
insurance is subjected to. The most important problem in that respect is
apparently the fact that many consider insurance as a type of investment
and hence expect some return over a lifetime. With low-probability events,
there is a large likelihood of merely paying a premium and never receiving
any return.
A more difficult question is, however, whether these heuristics and
biases are an argument at the policy level to introduce mandatory cover for
catastrophic risks. The classic counterargument would be that such a
paternalistic duty might be inefficient since people may be forced to
purchase insurance coverage even if it does not match with their
preferences. However, an alternative model (instead of outright mandatory
cover for catastrophes), which is increasingly popular in many countries, is
the introduction of a mandatory cover for natural catastrophes in addition to
voluntarily purchased insurances, like e.g. a home insurance. This model,
which has worked in France for a long time and which has been recently
introduced in Belgium, seems to have various attractions.185 It offers
victims at least some guarantee that ex post compensation will be available.
This construction can moreover decrease the pressure for government
relief. Law and economics scholars have often criticized governmentprovided compensation after catastrophes since it does not provide any
incentives to those exposed to catastrophic risks to make efficient
preventive efforts. Insurance is traditionally much better able to cope with
this moral hazard problem.
Moreover, since potential victims pay ex ante for the protection they
will receive, this model also has benefits compared to government relief in
the sense that a negative redistribution from the general taxpayer towards
particular victims exposed to catastrophic risks is avoided. The mandatory
catastrophe cover in addition to voluntary insurances against more likely
losses also received support from behavioral law and economics. The
traditional disadvantage also with this construction is still that insurance
185
The model of comprehensive natural disaster insurance was also proposed by
Kunreuther after Hurricane Katrina. See Kunreuther, supra note 64, at 176.
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cover is forced upon some individuals who would perhaps have no demand
for coverage. This problem can to some extent be limited if at least the
additional duty to obtain catastrophe coverage is limited to those
individuals who are actually exposed to the specific risk (e.g. those living
in flood-prone areas). Thus, the cross subsidization inherent in a
generalized duty could be avoided. However, the administrative costs of a
differentiation between individuals exposed to natural catastrophes and
those who are not may be high, taking also into account the fact that there
may be considerable political costs involved with such a differentiation.
The Belgian example showed that the political costs to introduce such a
differentiated comprehensive insurance (limited to specific risk areas) were
apparently too high.
This particular model of additional mandatory catastrophe coverage,
supplementing voluntary housing insurances was first introduced in France,
but seems to become increasingly popular in many other European
countries as well. It was recently introduced in Belgium, is the subject of a
bill in Italy and has been proposed in the literature in Germany as well.
The most important motivation for these institutional arrangements is that
this structural solution can take away some of the pressure on governments
to provide ex post relief to victims of catastrophes, the latter often being
arbitrary and of course leading to cross-subsidization.186 However, we do
not claim here that the Belgian or French solutions are necessarily the most
efficient ones. One could also envisage other solutions whereby a
combination of limited government funding and insurance would be
introduced. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of these
alternative arrangements. Moreover, it should be repeated that the
insurance solution of course is only possible within the institutional context
of a country where a well functioning insurance market is available and
where potential consumers have sufficient financial capacity to buy the
insurance products that have been developed. In many developing
countries, these conditions will often not be fulfilled and in those situations
disaster insurance can of course not be the panacea for victims of
catastrophes. Other mechanisms, like ex post government compensation,
will then still be necessary.
186
We do not argue here that (mandatory) first-party insurance is generally more
effective in providing compensation than government provided compensation since this was
not the focus of this paper. However, generally law and economics scholars are very critical
of government provided compensation. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 12; Priest, supra note
12; Epstein, supra note 12.
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In addition, there are many other problems related to the insurance
against damage caused by catastrophes than merely the problems with
demand discussed in this paper. As we briefly indicated, there may be
serious problems on the supply side as well. Also in that respect, one can
notice a variety of regulatory solutions whereby governments intervene to
facilitate the functioning of insurance markets.187
Finally we would like to make a few recommendations as to what next
steps can be taken to deal with the problem here discussed. First of all,
natural catastrophe insurance, and especially flood and earthquake
insurance, should be made more attractive by presenting information on the
probability of a disaster on a different time interval than the traditional oneyear period through normal channels to increase the concern of potential
victims. Homeowners should moreover be better educated in order to see
insurance as an investment with a big return. Homeowners insurance could
further be expanded with flood and earthquake coverage so that this forms
a package, with the extra premiums on the compulsory coverage reflecting
the hazard risk of each individual. Second, the example of flooding
insurance in the Netherlands188 shows that government policy should also
be addressed to stimulate insurers to provide attractive products for disaster
coverage at actuarially fair prices. If insurers would collectively decide
(like it was the case in the Netherlands) not to cover e.g. flooding and
earthquake risks a de facto uninsurability is of course reached. Finally, it
should be examined whether in case where problems on the supply side
exist, government support can be provided (eventually at a temporary
basis) to stimulate the development of efficient insurance markets. This
type of government intervention, stimulating market solutions, may be
preferred to the traditional ex post government relief which de facto only
inhibits the development of market solutions to the compensation for
victims of catastrophes.

187
These facilitative strategies have especially been developed in the United States,
e.g. as far as earthquake and hurricane insurance is concerned. An interesting example is
also provided by the California earthquake authority. For a detailed description of these
models: see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 73, at 327-30.
188
See discussion supra section IV.
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ABSTRACT
Medical malpractice insurance is a highly specialized and risky
business. Over the past three decades, the market has experienced three
dramatic periods of rising prices and shrinking supply. For medical care
providers subject to such market volatility, a response has been the
development of physician-owned and physician-run entities as their
insurance providers. Yet regulators and rating agencies demonstrate
concern over geographic and business risk concentration of these entities,
encouraging them to diversify across state lines as well as across lines of
business. We hypothesize that physician-directed insurers are inherently
more conservative and better informed than non-physician directed
insurers, calling into question the value of such diversification, which we
believe reduces their informational advantage. We test this hypothesis
through analysis of insurer loss reserving practices and find that physiciandirected insurers are more likely to over reserve and less likely to under
reserve than are non-physician-directed insurers. We also find that
physician-directed insurers that do under-reserve have smaller relative
errors than their non-physician-directed counterparts. Importantly, we also
observe that rapidly growing insurers have demonstrated risky reserving
practices. We consider these results as relevant to regulators and rating
agencies in assessing medical malpractice insurer riskiness.
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INTRODUCTION
Medical Malpractice insurance is a highly volatile product in terms of
price and supply. It also provides coverage against liabilities that are often
specific to location and medical specialty. A natural outgrowth of these
underlying conditions is that the majority of premiums written in medical
malpractice are earned by insurers that focus on this particular line of
coverage, that operate in only one or a few states, and that are owned by
health care providers themselves. Yet from a risk standpoint, such
specialization should lead to increased volatility because of lack of
diversification. Indeed, we have observed that regulators and rating
agencies encourage such insurers to expand their geographic market as well
as the lines of coverage offered.1 We believe that such encouragement may
be counter-productive; we test our belief in the research reported here. Our
purpose is to analyze differences in reserving practices between medical
malpractice insurers defined as physician-directed versus those that are not.
Since reserving practices provide an indication of an insurer’s stability and
strength, we hypothesize that specialized physician-directed insurers will
be more conservative in their liability estimates than will less specialized
widely-owned insurers.
Many readers will think of “bed-pan mutuals” in our discussion of
physician-directed insurers. These readers are correct in their thinking, yet
the list of physician-directed insurers extends beyond bed-pan mutuals.
Bed-pan mutuals began in the 1970s in response to the initial “crisis” in
medical malpractice insurance. They are small mutual insurers owned by
health care providers to offer medical malpractice insurance to their
members. These insurers will be included in our group of physician
directed insurers. In addition to the bed-pan mutuals, risk retention groups,
which became possible in the 1980s following the passage of the Federal
Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986,2 also will be considered “physiciandirected insurers” in our analysis if they focus on medical malpractice
insurance and are owned by health care providers. Importantly, some stock
insurers also fit within our definition of “physician directed.” These are
insurers formed by medical societies or others for the purpose of offering
their members and owners medical malpractice coverage. They differ from
mutuals, however, in that they are organized as corporations with
ownership distributed through corporate stock. Importantly, not all mutual
1
2

A review of Best’s Insurance Reports demonstrates this practice.
Federal Liability Risk Rention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906 (2000).
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insurers selling medical malpractice insurance are considered “physician
directed.” Large, diversified entities, such as Liberty Mutual, which
participate in the medical malpractice market but which are not managed
by nor focused on health care providers will not be considered physician
directed. Because of their special characteristics, physician-directed
insurers have formed their own industry trade group, the Physician Insurers
Association of America (PIAA).3 The PIAA has created a listing of
physician-directed versus non-physician directed insurers. We use this
listing as generously provided by Patricia Danzon, Andrew Epstein and
Scott Johnson. We supplement this listing with information from the Risk
Retention Reporter.
Our underlying premise is that physician-directed insurers provide a
significant service to the market, one not typically observed in mutual
insurers, which usually provide coverage on less-complex risks. We
anticipate that physician-directed insurers will operate differently from
non-physician directed insurers for two reasons: they have differing
organizational goals; and they have differing informational opportunities.
While non-physician-directed insurers can be expected to set their primary
organizational goal as maximization of the firm’s value or profit, physician
directed insurers are generally formed with the purpose of offering a stable
insurance environment and even to try to alter the underlying tort system. A
personal review of numerous physician-directed insurer Web pages
indicates that their mission statements generally focus on supporting the
health care community through legal advocacy, strong loss-control support,
and other mechanisms designed to alter the underlying loss conditions
rather than simply to finance those losses.4 As stated above, physiciandirected insurers are often owned by or at least initiated by state medical
societies. Their objective tends not to be profit maximization. Moreover, in
many instances, these two types of insurers are subject to different levels of
3
See generally Patricia Danzon, Andrew J. Epstien, & Scott J. Johnson, The Crisis in
Medical Malpractice Insurance, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FIN. SERVICES, 2004, at 56,
68.
See also Medical Liability Insurers—U.S.,
http://www.piaa.us/directory/public/
results.asp?st=member&mt=primary&loc=usa (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Directory of RRGs and
PGs, http://www.rrr.com/rrgspgs/advancedSearchResults.cfm (last visted Nov. 9, 2008).
4
A review of numerous physician-directed insurer websites reveals these priorities. See,
e.g., The Applied Medico-Legal Risk Retention Group available at, http://www.amsrrg.com/
(last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Centurion Medical Liability Protective http://www.cmlpins.com/
over_history.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); The Emergency Physicians Insurance Company,
http://www.epicrrg.com/index.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Novus Insurance Company Risk
Retention Group, http://www.novusrrg.com/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Premier Physicians
Insurance Company, http://www.ppicdocs.com/about_history.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
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regulation. For instance, medical malpractice risk retention groups, which
usually are physician-directed, are established under the Federal Liability
Risk Retention Act of 1986, which preempts certain aspects of state laws
regulating the activities of risk retention groups.5 As a result, operating
practices are likely to differ between the two types of organizations.
One possible variation comes in the area of loss reserve practice. Prior
research has hypothesized that insurers may manage loss reserve estimates
to achieve organizational goals, including reducing taxes, enhancing
apparent financial strength to avoid regulatory actions, and smoothing
income for the benefit of investor preferences.6 Managers of physiciandirected insurers, however, generally do not face the same pressure to
maximize profits because they do not have to answer to investors
preoccupied with maximizing profits. Additionally, these insurers tend to
be subject to less stringent regulation than are most non-physician-directed
insurers. We anticipate, therefore, that physician-directed insurers will
approach operational decisions such as loss reserving practices differently
from non-physician-directed insurers.
Moreover, physician-directed insurers may have informational or risksharing advantages over other insurers in writing medical malpractice
insurance, which makes it more plausible that physician-directed insurers
differ from non-physician-directed insurers in loss reserving accuracy.7
This informational advantage is generated from the insurer’s strong
connection to the medical community, and by its focus on the medical
malpractice line of business. While some physician-directed insurers offer
general liability coverage to their participating insureds, it is rare for those
insurers to sell property coverage or other major lines of liability insurance,
unlike many non-physician directed medical malpractice carriers, whether
stock or mutual. Certainly non-physician-directed insurers can hire health
care providers to close some of this informational gap, but we contend that
physician-directed insurers possess such informational advantage
throughout the entity because of their focus on affecting the underlying
5

15 U.S.C. § 3603 (2000).
See, e.g., Kathy R. Petroni, Stephen G. Ryan & James M. Wahlen, Discretionary
and Non-discretionary Revisions of Loss Reserves by Property-Casualty Insurers:
Differential Implications for Future Profitability, Risk and Market Value, 5 REV. OF ACCT.
STUD. 95, 96 (2000).
7
See Danzon Rule 15 supra note 3, at 56; Neil A. Doherty & Georges Dionne,
Insurance with Undiversifiable Risk: Contract Structure and Organizational Form of
Insurance Firms, 6 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 187, 197 (1993).
6
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exposure itself. In short, physician-directed insurers have a different
underlying purpose.
To test our hypothesis that physician-directed insurers are more
conservative in their business practices, and therefore more financially
secure, than non-physician-directed insurers, we test for differences in loss
reserving across physician-directed and non-physician directed insurers.
We also consider the influence of geographic and business specialization.
In the following section of the paper, we review the literature on loss
reserve development, and follow with a discussion of organizational form.
With this background as a foundation, we present our data and
methodology, leading to results. The last section concludes the paper with a
summary of our findings and suggestions for future research.
LITERATURE ON LOSS RESERVE DEVELOPMENT
Insurance companies are required to hold loss reserves to account for
all unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses. These reserves are first
established in the year of coverage and then updated with new information
as time passes. Because many years may pass between an initial
malpractice event or claim and ultimate payment for the underlying injury,
and because not all events are known when they occur, insurers must
estimate their future liabilities with quite a bit of uncertainty. This
requirement leads to inevitable errors along the way. The difference
between the initially reported estimate of ultimate loss payments (the “loss
reserve”) for any given coverage year and the ultimate realized paid losses
for that coverage year is known as the loss reserve error (or loss reserve
development), which reflects the estimation error in the originally reported
reserve. This amount can be positive or negative. Loss reserves are
important representations of insurance company financial performance,
directly affecting current profits. How they are estimated, therefore, creates
significant implications for insurers.
Two major theories have been proposed in the rich literature regarding
the underlying influences on the size and direction of reserve errors. The
first theory is that reserve errors simply represent mistakes in original loss
estimates due to uncertainty regarding future claims.8 As new information
about claims becomes available, loss reserves are frequently revised until
all claims are settled. Differences between the original estimates and
8
Mary Weiss, A Multivariate Analysis of Loss Reserving Estimates in PropertyLiability Insurance Companies, 52 J. OF RISK & INS. 199, 204 (1985).
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ultimate payments represent the reserve error. Grace and Leverty conclude
that mis-estimation is the dominant cause of reserve errors in the long run.9
The second major theory regarding causes of reserve errors is that
management consciously manipulates them to manage earnings.
Three sub-categories of theories or propositions have been developed
to explain the practice of earnings management using reserve errors. The
first proposition is the income-smoothing theory. According to the incomesmoothing theory, management may be encouraged to set reserves in a way
that minimizes earnings variability from period to period. Prior research
indicates that indeed reserve errors are not random and tend to stabilize
underwriting income, 10 including evidence that the firms in the left tail of
the earnings distribution understate reserve errors while those in the right
tail overstate reserve errors.11
The second proposition associated with reserve management is the taxreducing theory. As noted above, early efforts to understand reserving
practices focused on income smoothing. Such focus was due in part to
regulatory concern with transparency and the concern that manipulating an
insurer’s financial status could harm shareholders and consumers alike. A
full understanding of reserve management, however, required development
of an overall theory about insurer reserving practices. An early approach to
a full-picture analysis of reserve management assumes insurers follow a
cash flow maximization objective, with income smoothing constraints. In
such a model, tax deferral can become significant.12 Empirical examination
of property-liability insurers is supportive, finding that the examined
insurers’ reserving practices aided in reduction of tax liabilities.13
The third proposition associated with reserve management is the
regulatory constraint theory which holds that insurers may revise loss
9
Martin Grace & J. Tyler Leverty, Property-Liability Insurer Reserve ErrorsMotive, Manipulation, or Mistake, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, May 31, 2007, at 25-26,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=964635 (The authors also test rate regulation
incentives, but given that we are considering a single line of insurance, this issue is not
relevant in the current study).
10
See Barry D. Smith, An Analysis of Auto Liability Loss Reserves and
Underwriting Results, 47 J. OF RISK & INS. 305, 317 (1980); Weiss, supra note 8, at 203.
11
William H. Beaver, Maureen F. McNichols & Karen K. Nelson, Management of
the Loss Reserve Accrual and the Distribution of Earnings in the Property-Casualty
Insurance Industry, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, October 2000, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=247702 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.247702.
12
Elizabeth Grace, Property-Liability Insurer Reserve Errors: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 57 J. OF RISK & INS. 28, 33 (1990).
13
Grace, supra note 12, at 42.
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reserves to enhance financial strength to avoid regulatory actions.
According to the theory, financially weak insurers may tend to understate
their reserves more than other insurers. Empirical study supports the theory
with findings that insurers “close to” receiving regulatory review do
Furthermore, Beaver,
underestimate their reserves considerably. 14
McNichols, and Nelson show that both financially healthy and distressed
firms manage earnings to avoid financial losses, and that both types of
firms contribute to an overall appearance of income smoothing and
opportunistic regulatory reporting.15
INFLUENCE OF PHYSICIAN-DIRECTED INSURERS
Insurance industry organizational form has been the subject of
numerous studies, likely spurred by the strong presence of both mutual and
stock insurers.16 Most of the literature to date has focused on conditions
appropriate for each form to dominate the market. The majority of these
studies conclude that the mutual form tends to dominate insurance lines
that require limited managerial control, given the absence of shareholder
pressure on performance. Mutuals, therefore, are expected to be more
common in the standardized personal insurance products such as
homeowners, while commercial liability lines are considered better suited
to the stock insurance form. Generally these expectations are met in the
market.
The medical malpractice insurance industry, however, presents an
anomaly to the underlying theory, with mutual and mutual-like physiciandirected insurers representing a large portion of the premium volume. We
are interested in understanding this situation better. Our expectation is that
the owners of physician-directed medical malpractice insurers differ from
policyholder owners of the traditional mutual insurers in other lines
because as physicians themselves they are in a better position to understand
the potential for loss, to underwrite business and adjust claims, and
14

See Kathy R. Petroni, Optimistic Reporting in the Property-Casualty Insurance
Industry, 15 J. ACCT. & ECON. 485, 486 (1992).
15
Beaver et al., supra note 11 at 1, 2, 4, 21-22 .
16
Paul Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability
Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 375, 377-79, 391 (1973). Joskow
offers an early discussion of organizational form, with Mayers and Smith providing the
impetus for much of the research that followed. See also David Mayers & Clifford W.
Smith, Jr., Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in
Insurance Markets, 54 J. OF BUS 407, 412 (1981).
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generally to manage the coverage. Whether or not this position is true is
quite important for regulatory and rating agency review. Regulators and
rating agencies tend to recommend that small physician-directed insurers
expand their book of business for diversification purposes. If we find,
however, that physician-directed, specialized, and geographically
concentrated medical malpractice insurers tend to show greater levels of
conservatism (i.e., more likely to over reserve) with their reserving
practices, as we hypothesize, such encouragement may be counter to its
purpose.
Recent work by Harrington, Danzon, and Epstein17 highlights the
importance of our research. They consider whether or not under-reserving
in medical malpractice markets during the 1990s led to under-pricing,
which in turn led to a market “crisis.” Their intent is to discern the effects
of under-pricing versus actual increases in underlying losses on later
periods of rapidly rising prices (i.e., “crises” periods). They discover that
insurers who specialize in medical malpractice insurance grew less rapidly
in soft markets than did non-specialists. They also observe that specialists
tended to experience better loss development than did the non-specialists.
Consistent with these results, Danzon, Epstein, and Johnson find that
physician-directed firms tend to be less likely to exit the market than are
non-physician directed firms, particularly in comparing small insurers.
They conclude that the physician-directed insurers appear to help stabilize
the medical malpractice market.18 These empirical investigations are
consistent with Baker’s explanation for the underwriting cycle in medical
malpractice.19 Baker outlines the importance of uncertainty due to the long
tail quality of medical malpractice claims, as well as behavioral elements of
decision makers within this market.
As stated supra, therefore, the loss reserving practices of physiciandirected insurers are likely to be different from those of non-physician
directed insurers. The informational or risk-sharing advantages of
physician-directed insurers along with organizational objectives associated
with market stability may lead them to report more accurate loss reserve
than non-physician-directed insurers. Therefore, we hypothesize that
physician-directed insurers are more likely to over-reserve and less likely
17

Scott Harrington, Patricia M. Danzon, & Andrew J. Epstein, ‘Crises’ in Medical
Malpractice Insurance: Evidence of Excessive Price-Cutting in the Preceding Soft Market,
32 J. BANKING & FIN. 157, 168-169 (2008).
18
See Danzon et al., supra note 3, at 87.
19
Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54
DEPAUL LAW REV. 393, 436 (2005).
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to under-reserve than non-physician-directed insurers. We further
hypothesize that physician-directed insurers are more likely to have smaller
absolute reserve errors than are non-physician-directed insurers.
DATA AND MODEL
From the above, we anticipate that medical malpractice insurer reserves
will be affected by: organizational form, geographic and business
specialization, incentives to smooth income, opportunities to minimize tax
liabilities, and a desire to limit regulatory intervention. To test our
hypotheses, we rely primarily on the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) database which contains information reported on
insurers’ annual statements. As discussed in the prior literature, a limitation
of the NAIC database is that it does not include all medical malpractice
insurers. Despite these limitations, the NAIC database remains the single
best source of insurer financial information available. We use data from
1994 to 2006.
DEFINITION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURERS
Our focus in this study is on the medical malpractice insurance market,
primarily on organizational form of insurers in that market. To conduct our
analyses, we first need to define a “medical malpractice insurer.” One
possible definition of a medical malpractice insurer for inclusion in our
study is any insurer with positive direct premiums written (DPW) in the
medical malpractice line. Using this definition would yield 491 insurers for
our sample period; however, as pointed out by Nordman, Cermak and
McDaniel,20 this sample selection criterion may pose difficulty.
Specifically, the NAIC database does not distinguish between active and
inactive insurers, resulting in unrepresentative observations from very
small insurers that may not be seeking new business.
To address this problem, we follow Danzon, Epstein and Johnson21 by
defining a medical malpractice insurer as one with at least $100,000 in
direct premiums written in medical malpractice (in 2001 dollars) in at least
one state. This definition gives us data from 324 insurers over the sample
20

ERIC NORDMAN, DAVIN CERMAK, AND KENNETH MCDANIEL, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT: A STUDY OF MARKET CONDITIONS AND POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS TO THE RECENT CRISIS 17 (2004).
21
See Danzon et al., supra note 3, at 60.
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period, although not all insurers have observations from each year. When
missing data are considered, the sample involves 230 insurers, 59 of which
are physician-directed.
RESERVE ERROR
In order to examine differences in loss reserving practices between
physician-directed and non-physician directed insurers, we conduct our
analysis at the firm-year level. We follow the literature by measuring
reserve error as the difference between the total incurred losses as
estimated in the year of coverage and the total incurred losses as estimated
in some future period t+j:22
Errori,t = Incurred Losses i,t - Incurred Losses i,t+j
where
Error i,t = insurer i’s medical malpractice loss reserve error for losses
incurred in year t;
Incurred Lossi,t = insurer i’s medical malpractice reserve for losses
incurred in year t and reported in year t; that is, insurer i’s incurred losses
as estimated in the year associated with coverage for those losses;
Incurred Lossesi,t+j = insurer i’s revised estimate of the year t medical
malpractice loss reserve as reported in year t+j; that is, the updated value of
losses covered by policies in year t but updated in year t+j as additional
information is available, including most of the claims being closed by the
time of our ultimate evaluation.
In the above equation, estimated incurred losses are obtained from Part
2F of Schedule P of insurers’ financial statements. A positive (negative)
Error indicates that the originally reported loss reserve was overstated
(understated).
In order to calculate loss reserve errors, we need to specify the
development period j. In this study, we use a five-year development period
(j=5) which we apply to all the sample years. Due to data availability
issues, some researchers have used shorter time periods; the shorter
development period, however leaves the value less certain. Therefore, we
employ the longer five year development period, which others argue is a
22

In Grace and Leverty, supra note 9, this measure is referred to as the “P” estimate
for Petroni. Petroni proposed this measure in Petroni, supra note 14. An alternative is to
compare the original estimate with cumulative developed losses paid at some future date,
known as the Weiss , or “W,” error for Mary Weiss. See Weiss, supra note 8. Both
measures have benefits and detriments. We found similar results for both P and W errors
and report only the P error analyses.
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sufficient development period for analyses such as ours.23 The most recent
NAIC data currently available is for year 2006; hence, the initial
observation period examined in our study is 1994 through 2001.
Based on the variable Error, we construct four dependent variables for
four distinct analyses. The first is an indicator variable Over, which takes
the value of 1 if Error is positive and 0 otherwise. The second dependent
variable is an indicator Under, which takes the value of 1 if Error is
negative and 0 otherwise. We conduct these two tests to observe whether
physician-directed insurers are more or less likely than non-physiciandirected insurers to err in the positive or negative direction.
Yet, this kind of analysis is incomplete because it does not account for
the size of error; therefore, we conduct two additional tests with the
dependent variable log (Abserror/Assets), which is the logarithm of the
absolute value of the error variable divided by net admitted assets.24 We
create two tests with this dependent variable in order to separate positive
errors from negative errors. Other literature on reserve error has suggested
that behavior may differ for positive and negative errors, leading us to
conduct two distinct tests, one for positive errors, and the second for
negative errors.25 Our results support the suggestion that positive and
negative errors are influenced by differing factors.
We now have four equations to test. For each, the dependent variable is
assumed to be a function of two sets of independent variables. The first set
of independent variables reflects the difference between physician-directed
23
See Smith, supra note 6, at 308; and Paul M. Kazenski, William R. Feldhaus and
Howard C. Schneider, Empirical Evidence for Alternative Loss Development Horizons and
the Measurement of Reserve Error, 59 J. OF RISK & AND INS. 668-69, 675 (1992). While
final claim value is not yet known after 5 years, evidence presented in these papers indicates
that reserve error has developed sufficiently to be able to test the sorts of theories considered
in here. We know of no prior study that uses a longer development period to study reserve
error.
24
Other scaling measures associated with revenue volume such as net premium
written (NPW) or direct premium written (DPW) were also employed. Differences were not
significant. We scale the value of the error because it is relevant only in relation to the
overall size of the insurer.
25
We would have liked to be able to run a fixed effects and/or random effects
model, but were unable to estimate the coefficient of Physician Direct. The reason is that
firm-specific intercepts have absorbed the effect of Physician Direct (PD), which is also
firm-specific and does not vary with time. The model takes the form: Log (Abserror/assets)
= ai + b(PDi) + cXi,t , where ai are the firm-specific intercepts. Since our PD variable is also
firm-specific and does not change with time (t), when we run regression, ai and PD will be
combined, producing just one set of coefficients. There is no value for b generated from
regressions.
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and non-physician-directed malpractice insurers in terms of organizational
form, geographic focus, medical malpractice concentration and riskiness.
The second set of independent variables represents factors that are linked to
other theories about reserve errors in the literature: income-smoothing
theory, tax-reducing theory, and regulatory constraint theory. Table 1 lists
all the dependent and independent variables used in the study, along with a
detailed description of each variable and its expected relationship with the
dependent variable. Our discussion below indicates that some of the
variables appear relevant in one or two of the models but not all four. We
report the results with the selected control variables within the manuscript.
In the Appendix, we also show results with the full model for each analysis.
The reader will note that results are substantially the same.
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Anticipated Sign
Variables

LOG(ABSERROR/
ASSETS)i,t

OVERi,t

UNDERi,t

PHYSICIAN DIRECTi

GeographicConcentration i,t

Description
Logarithm of the
absolute value of
firm i’s medical
malpractice loss
reserve error
assessed as of year
t+j for the reserve
reported in year t,
divided by its net
admitted assets in
year t
Dummy variable
equals 1 if
ERROR>0; 0
otherwise
Dummy variable
equals 1 if
ERROR<0; 0
otherwise
Dummy variable
equals 1 if firm i is
physician-directed;
0 otherwise
Firm-level
HerfindahlHirschman Index
for firm i in year t

Over

Expected Sign
log(Abserror/Assets)
Under
Positivea
Negativeb

N/A

N/A

N/A

+

-

-

-

+

-

-

-
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Firm i’s premiums
written in medical
SPECIALIZATIONi,t
malpractice divided +
by total premiums
written
reinsurance ceded
in medical
malpractice/(direct
business written in
REINSi,t
medical malpractice *
*
*
+ reinsurance
assumed in medical
malpractice) for
insurer i in year t.
[DPW in med mal
at (t) – DPW in
GROWTHi,t
med mal at (t-1)]/
+
*
+
DPW in med mal at
(t-1)
Dummy variable
equals 1 if firm i
GROUPi
+
+
belongs to a group;
0 otherwise
(net income + prior
TAXi,t
year’s loss
+
+
*
reserve)/assets
Pre-managed
SMOOTHi,t
earnings – target
+
+
earnings
Dummy variable
equals 1 if firm i’s
RBCLowi,t
risk-based capital
*
+
*
+
ratio in year t is less
than 2.
Dummy variable
equals 1 if firm i’s
RBCClosei,t
risk-based capital
+
*
*
ratio in year t is
within [2, 2.5]
Firm i’s net
NPWi,t
premiums written
+
+
in year t
Year dummy if
Yi (i=1995,…,2001)
+/year=i
a: for firms that have positive reserve errors; b: for firms that have negative reserve errors
*Not included in given equation
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FACTORS AFFECTING THE SIZE AND DIRECTION OF RESERVE
ERRORS
The variable of primary interest to our study is organizational form. We
differentiate between medical malpractice insurers considered Physician
directed or not, using a dummy variable equal to 1 if considered physician
directed. While the NAIC database classifies insurers as stock, reciprocal,
mutual, risk retention group, or “other,” we consider this categorization
insufficient. For example, a number of physician-directed medical
malpractice insurers are stock companies, with the stock held by the state
Medical Society and/or health care providers. Alternatively, some mutual
insurers clearly are not physician directed, such as Boston-based, multi-line
insurer, Liberty Mutual. We take the conservative approach of designating
as physician directed only those insurers identified as physician directed by
the Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA),26 or for which we
have other clear evidence of such status (for example, a review of Best’s
Reports or firm web page). The resulting sample includes 59 insurers
designated as Physician directed. We anticipate that physician-directed
insurers will be more likely to over-reserve, less likely to under-reserve,
and to have smaller absolute value of reserves either positive or negative.
MARKET SPECIALIZATION
Our hypotheses regarding physician-directed insurers rest on the notion
that these insurers have differing organizational objectives. They also may
possess better information than their counter-parts, a possibility we account
for with several variables. Superior information may generate from market
specialization, both in terms of knowledge of the specific legal context for
their exposure and in terms of the medical malpractice line of insurance
itself. To capture these factors, we include measures of geographic
concentration and business focus. The majority of physician-directed
insurers focuses on medical malpractice insurance rather than sell a full
range of coverage. Additionally, these insurers tend to focus their business
in one or a few states. We incorporate measures of these qualities in order
to separate the effect of specialization from the effect of organizational
ownership. Without including these variables, we might see an effect of

26
We thank Patricia Danzon, Andrew Epstein and Scott Johnson for generously
sharing this PIAA list.
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physician-directed insurers, when the real effect is due to market
specialization.
Given the state basis of medical malpractice law, both in terms of the
legal doctrines as well as medical practices, we use geographic
concentration as one measure of superior knowledge. Specifically, we use
the firm-level geographic Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, defined as the sum
of the squares of the percentage direct premiums written (DPW) market
share in each state by each firm, to measure GeographicConcentration. A
higher value of GeographicConcentration implies more concentration; that
is, the firm operates in fewer states. More geographically concentrated
insurers could be riskier because they are exposed to the systematic risk of
all of their exposures affected simultaneously to expansions of liability,
such as when a new precedent is set through plaintiff success with a novel
legal theory. Rating agencies comment on their concern over such risk in
their company discussions, and often recommend expansion to additional
states.27 We anticipate, however, that such insurers will compensate for
such potential riskiness by over-reserving more often and under-reserving
less often. We also anticipate that the superior knowledge we hypothesize
these insurers possess will lead to more accurate reserves in absolute value
of their error. Hence, they will have smaller relative over- and underreserve errors.
We also measure an insurer’s superior knowledge by the extent to
which an insurer focuses on medical malpractice or offers a wide range of
coverage. Specifically, Specialization equals the dollar value of an
insurer’s premiums written in medical malpractice divided by total
premiums written. The higher the value, the larger the percent of business
devoted to medical malpractice insurance. We anticipate a very similar
effect and for the same reasons as for geographic concentration. That is, we
anticipate that Specialization will be positively associated with overreserving and negatively associated with under-reserving and the size of
their reserve errors.
RISK PROFILE
Reserving practices in effect represent part of an insurer’s risk
management. Higher reserves generally yield lower risk, all else equal.
Another important aspect of insurer risk management is its use of
27
See, e.g., the discussion of any single-state medical malpractice insurer in the
A.M. Best’s Ratings Reports.
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reinsurance. We incorporate a Reinsurance variable equal to reinsurance
DPW ceded in medical malpractice divided by the sum of all direct
premiums written (DPW) in medical malpractice plus reinsurance DPW
assumed in medical malpractice. We anticipate that use of reinsurance will
mitigate the need to be conservative with reserving practices; hence, the
greater the relative level of Reinsurance, the less likely is an insurer to
over-reserve. We do not anticipate an effect either on under- or overreserving in absolute relative value.
Harrington, Danzon and Epstein observe that rapidly growing medical
malpractice insurers likely do so at the expense of taking greater risk in
their underwriting decisions.28 We therefore include a Growth variable to
account for this condition. We define Growth as the relative change in
medical malpractice direct premiums written (DPW) from year t-1 to t.29
Our expectation is that firms with rapid growth will be more likely to
under- and less likely to over-reserve. We further expect higher levels of
under-reserving with greater growth but no necessary effect on overreserving.
Two additional variables associated with firm risk are included: size
and whether or not the insurer is a member of a group of companies. We
consider reserving practice a form of risk management. Over (under)
reserving is a method to reduce (increase) risks, and would be included
within an insurer’s overall risk strategy. Large firms and those affiliated
with a group generally have a variety of risk management techniques
available to them; hence, we would anticipate that they could take more
risk in their reserving practices. For both, therefore, we would anticipate
greater (lesser) frequency of under (over) reserving, and larger (smaller)
under (over) reserves when they do occur. Our size variable is net
premiums written (NPW)30 and we designate Group for those firms with
group affiliation.
TAX, SMOOTHING, REGULATORY THEORIES
In addition to these measures of anticipated superior knowledge
(organizational form, geographic concentration, and business
28

See Harrington et al., supra note 17, at 167.
We also conducted the analysis standardizing for overall market growth. Results
are substantially the same in either analysis. We thank an anonymous reviewer for
suggesting this addition.
30
Conducting the analysis with total assets as our size variable instead does not alter
the basic results.
29

2008]

INFLUENCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM

69

specialization) and risk (reinsurance purchases, growth, size, and group
affiliation), we anticipate a variety of other factors may affect reserve
errors. These factors relate to the loss reserving theories discussed above.
Tax issues, income smoothing, and regulatory concerns represent the bulk
of the literature on hypothesized opportunities for managerial discretion to
influence loss reserving practices. We do not anticipate that these
incentives will differ between physician-directed insurers and nonphysician-directed insurers, and include control variables in order to try to
highlight the effect of ownership form on differences in reserve estimation
practices.
Regarding taxes, we expect to observe over-reserving more often
among firms with large tax liabilities, which can be deferred through
current reserves. We further anticipate a positive relationship between Tax
and the size of over-reserving, given that the larger the tax benefit, the
larger would be the likely reserve. We anticipate no relationship between
taxes and the size of under reserving. The tax variable is defined as31:
Tax = (net income + prior year’s loss reserve)/assets
In addition to tax benefits, reserving management may be desirable in
order to smooth out income for the debt and equity markets. According to
the smoothing hypotheses, if a firm’s current year’s earnings are
unexpectedly higher (lower) than target earnings, then it tends to over
(under) reserve. Following Baker, Collins and Reigenga,32 we define the
smoothing variable as:
Smooth = pre-managed earnings – target earnings
Where pre-managed earnings are the earnings purged of estimated
reserves.
= (net income + loss reserve)/assets;
Target earning uses a historical growth model to estimate next period’s
earnings:
= [Net incomet-1+ (Net incomet-1- Net incomet-4)/4]/assets if Net
incomet-1> Net incomet-4
otherwise Net incomet-1/assets
31
We use the prior year’s loss reserve because of possible endogeneity issues;
however, we conducted the analysis using the current year’s loss reserve as used by
Elizabeth Grace. Grace, supra note 12, at 37. We found no major differences in regression
results.
32
Terry Baker, Denton Collins, & Austin Reitenga, Stock Option Compensation and
Earnings Management Incentives, 18 J. OF ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 557, 580 (2003). We also
conducted the analysis with two alternative smoothing variables previously used in the
literature, ROA (return on assets) as employed by Petroni, et al., supra note 6, and the
average value of net income adjusted by assets as used by Grace and Leverty, supra note 9.
Our results are substantially the same with each of these measures.
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Our expectation is that Smooth will be positively (negatively) related to
the likelihood of over- (under-) reserving. We also anticipate that the
larger (smaller) the value of Smooth, the greater will be the value of over(under-) reserving errors.
In addition to preferences for smooth earnings and lower (or deferred)
taxes, managers are also believed to prefer less regulatory oversight and
therefore may be encouraged to pursue a particular loss reserving strategy
consistent with minimizing regulatory attention. To capture this incentive,
we use a dummy variable derived from the NAIC risk-based capital (RBC)
ratio, which is total adjusted capital divided by authorized control level
risk-based capital. Our variable, RBCClose, takes the value of 1 if the riskbased capital ratio is no less than two (below which is the first level of
regulatory action) and no greater than 2.5, considering this region “close
to” regulatory action, indicating firms which might have incentive to find
means to limit regulatory attention. The risk-based capital ratio is used by
regulators to indicate whether or not a firm should be subject to a certain
level of regulatory action.33 We anticipate greater likelihood of underreserving and less over-reserving in this region for the appearance of
greater surplus. We do not anticipate a relationship with size of error.
We also anticipate that firms below 2.0 may differ from those above,
perhaps signaling that the state regulator is scrutinizing their actions. We
use a second dummy variable, RBCLow for all firms with RBC below 2 to
designate these insurers, and expect it to be positively related to underreserving. Assuming financial difficulty for these firms, we also expect
larger size of under-reserving errors.
In addition to the firm-specific characteristics considered this far,
economic conditions have also been shown to affect reserve errors.34 We
believe that a variety of economic conditions, including inflation, the

33
The NAIC recommends five different levels of actions against a company
depending on the value of its risk-based capital ratio, as shown in the following table.

risk-based capital ratio >=2
2> risk-based capital ratio >=1.5
1.5> risk-based capital ratio >=1
1> risk-based capital ratio >=0.7
0.7>= risk-based capital ratio

OK, no action taken
Company action level
Regulatory action level
Authorized control level
Mandatory control level

34
Both Weiss, supra note 8, at 212, and Grace, supra note 12, at 42 provide
empirical evidence that reserve errors are associated with unanticipated inflation.
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underwriting cycle, and other factors, are likely to affect reserve errors over
time; hence, we include year dummy variables for each year of analysis.
For firms to be included in our sample, they first must be identified as
medical malpractice insurers according to our definition mentioned earlier.
They also must have complete information to calculate all the dependent
and independent variables. After applying these screens, 1142 firm-year
observations remain in our final sample.
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Summary statistics for the entire sample are shown in Table 2. The
entire sample is used to test whether or not physician-directed insurers are
more likely to over-reserve and less likely to under-reserve. We also
created two sub-samples to test the size of any error as related to insurer
organizational structure. The first sub-sample consists of observations that
have positive reserve errors (i.e., over-stated errors), and we call it Positive.
The second sub-sample includes those that have negative reserve errors
(i.e., under-stated errors), and we call it Negative. We anticipate differences
between insurers that over-reserve- from those that under-reserve, which is
the purpose of using the two samples. Summary statistics for the subsamples of Positive and Negative are shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively,
and as discussed below we do observe differences between them.
As shown in Table 2, insurers in our sample are far more likely (65%
to 35% approximately) to over reserve than under reserve. They also tend
to be specialized in the medical malpractice line, with an average of
55.52% of total direct premiums written going toward this specific line.
Our sample insurers are also geographically concentrated, with a
geographic Herfindahl of almost .60. In terms of premium growth, we see
notable variability among insurers, with the mean being 0.7043 and the
median only at 0.0579. Most insurers seem to have a very healthy RBC
ratio. Only 6.83% of the observations report RBC ratio below 2 and 5.43%
of them fall within 2 and 2.5. Also we notice 66.73% of the observations
belong to a group. Approximately one-third (33.19%) of the observations
are from physician-directed insurers.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Full Sample (N = 1142)
MIN
MAX
MEAN
Variables
LOG(ABSERROR/ASSETS) -12.5251
0.7243
-4.0818
OVER
0
1
0.6480
UNDER
0
1
0.3520
PHYDIRECT
0
1
0.3319
GEOGRAPHIC
0.0359
1
0.5935
CONCENTRATION
SPECIALIZATION
0
1
0.5552
REINS
-178.7576 1.2001
0.2495
GROWTH
-106.9752 84.82778 0.7043
0
1
0.6673
GROUP
TAX
0
7.9982
0.3101
SMOOTH
-147.653
123.0438 -4.0948
RBCLow
0
1
0.0683
RBCClose
0
1
0.0543
-0.0847
55.4442
2.4756
NPW (X108)
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MEDIAN
-3.6760
1
0
0

STD
2.2738
0.4778
0.4778
0.4711

0.6426

0.3693

0.7782
0.3180
0.0579
1
0.2226
0.0017
0
0
0.3375

0.4455
5.3134
6.2976
0.4714
0.4611
16.7344
0.2524
0.2267
6.9149

As can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, sample Positive has a different
profile from sample Negative. About 40% of the observations in sample
Positive are associated with physician-directed insurers, whereas in sample
Negative the percentage is only 20%. We also see higher average values of
geographic concentration and specialization in sample Positive. It is
interesting to note that on average insurers in sample Negative experienced
higher premium growth and are more likely to belong to a group. They also
have a larger size in terms of net premiums written.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Sample Positive (N = 740)
MIN
MAX
MEAN
Variables
LOG(ABSERROR/ASSETS) -12.5251
0.7243
-3.9375
OVER
1
1
1
UNDER
0
0
0
PHYDIRECT
0
1
0.4014
GEOGRAPHIC
0.0412
1
0.6236
CONCENTRATION
SPECIALIZATION
0.0001
1
0.5998
REINS
-178.7576
1.0536
0.1344
GROWTH
-106.9752
56.9746
0.3696
0
1
0.6270
GROUP
TAX
0
7.9982
0.3353
SMOOTH
-147.6531
123.0438 -5.3206
RBCLow
0
1
0.0676
RBCClose
0
1
0.0432
-0.0847
52.1785
1.8627
NPW (X108)

Table 4: Summary Statistics of Sample Negative (N = 402)
MIN
MAX
MEAN
Variables
LOG(ABSERROR/ASSETS) -11.8255
0.2805
-4.3474
OVER
0
0
0
UNDER
1
1
1
PHYDIRECT
0
1
0.2040
GEOGRAPHIC
0.0359
1
0.5381
CONCENTRATION
SPECIALIZATION
0.0000
1
0.4732
REINS
-0.2429
1.2001
0.4612
GROWTH
-18.1491
84.8278
1.3203
0
1
0.7413
GROUP
TAX
0
6.7555
0.2637
SMOOTH
-101.279
58.9131
-1.8385
RBCLow
0
1
0.0697
RBCClose
0
1
0.0746
-0.0023
55.4442
3.6037
NPW (X108)

MEDIAN
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-3.1419
1
0
0

STD
2.3251
0
0
0.4905

0.7593

0.3747

0.9114
0.2657
0.0451
1
0.3168
0.0243
0
0
0.3184

0.4418
6.5953
5.0734
0.4839
0.4015
19.2818
0.2512
0.2035
5.3417

MEDIAN
-4.2258
0
1
0
0.5158

STD
2.1539
0
0
0.4035

0.4467
0.3970
0.0952
1
0.0884
-0.0363
0
0
0.4118

0.4413
0.3127
8.0515
0.4385
0.5519
10.1874
0.2549
0.2631
9.0278

0.3530
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS
We conducted four separate regression analyses. The first models the
likelihood of a medical malpractice insurer to over reserve; the second
models the likelihood to under reserve. For these analyses, we use logistic
regression.35 The third and fourth dependent variables equal the logarithm
of the absolute value of loss reserve error divided by net assets, one for
those instances when insurers over-reserve, and the other when they underreserve. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for this model.36
As indicated in Table 1, we conducted the analyses with differing sets of
independent variables; however, we also conducted the tests with all
variables included. Results are substantively the same and are shown for
the full set of independent variables in the Appendix. For each equation,
Variance Inflation Factors are all below 2.5, eliminating concern regarding
overall multi-collinearity. The likelihood ratio tests of the two Logistic
regression equations reject the null hypothesis that the global regression
coefficients are zero, indicating a good overall fit. The F-tests of the two
OLS regression equations also imply a reasonable fit, with an adjusted Rsquare of 63.77% and 43.11%, respectively.
Results of the logistic regression using the dependent variable Over are
shown in Table 5; those associated with the dependent variable Under are
shown in Table 6. Both coefficient estimates and marginal effects are
reported for the two logistic regressions.37 Results of the OLS analyses
35
Logistic regression is an appropriate statistical tool when the dependent variable
takes on the value of zero or one, and the intention is to predict the probability of an
occurrence of an event. In this case, we are interested in predicting the probability of a firm
over or under reserving. Importantly, in logistic regression, no assumption that the
relationship between the dependent and independent variables is linear exists.
36
Ordinary Lease Squares, or OLS, analysis is a statistical technique often used
when the dependent variable is continuous, as is true for our analyses of the size of positive
and negative errors. The technique finds the curve which matches the relationship between
the dependent variable and the group of independent variables with the smallest amount of
squared error (or “residual,” which is the difference between predicted and observed
values).
37
Logistic regression takes the form of log[p/(1-p)]=b’X where p is the probability
of an event (in our case it’s either over reserving or under reserving), and b is the coefficient
matrix. The estimated value of b is the coefficient estimate. Because the equation is of the
logistic form, however, the coefficient estimate does not indicate the size of effect for each
variable; therefore, we also report marginal effects. Marginal effects represent the change in
p when the independent variable increases by one unit. For instance, in Table 5, the
marginal effect for geographic concentration is 0.0969, which means a one unit increase in
“geographic concentration” increases the probability of over reserving by 0.0969.
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using the relative absolute error as the dependent variable are shown in
Tables 7 and 8 for those instances of over- and under-reserving
respectively.
Table 5: Logistic Regression of OVER (N = 1142)
Estimate
Marginal Effects
Variable
1.0219
Intercept
1.1682
0.2544
PHYSICIAN DIRECT
GEOGRAPHIC
0.4450
0.0969
CONCENTRATION
-0.2916
-0.0635
SPECIALIZATION
-0.1780
-0.0388
REINS
-0.0320
-0.0070
GROWTH
-0.0661
-0.0144
GROUP
0.0629
0.0137
TAX
-0.0120
-0.0026
SMOOTH
-0.7963
-0.1734
RBCClose
-0.0212
-0.0046
NPW (X108)
0.5049
0.1100
Y95
-0.4130
-0.0899
Y96
-0.5259
-0.1145
Y97
-0.9451
-0.2058
Y98
-0.9109
-0.1984
Y99
-1.3513
-0.2943
Y00
-1.6043
-0.3494
Y01

Standard Error
0.3134
0.1931***
0.1966**
0.2266
0.2239
0.0134**
0.1751
0.1641
0.0056**
0.2963***
0.0103**
0.2989*
0.3169
0.2736*
0.2703***
0.2714***
0.2729***
0.2761***

Likelihood Ratio Test
182.1639
Chi-Square
<.0001
Pr > ChiSq
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF OVER
As discussed above, we hypothesize that physician-directed medical
malpractice insurers are more likely to over-reserve than are non-physiciandirected insurers. Therefore, our primary variable of interest is Physician
Direct, and results are consistent with our hypothesis that these insurers
tend to be more conservative than others. As can be seen from the table, the
marginal effect for Physician Direct is 0.2544, which suggests that a firm
that is physician directed is 25.44% more likely to over reserve than a firm
that is non-physician-directed. We had anticipated that more geographically
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concentrated and specialized insurers also would tend to over-reserve to
account for the greater risk associated with such lack of diversification, but
only geographic concentration appears statistically significant.
As anticipated, fast-growing insurers are less likely to over-reserve
than are their counterparts. We consider the results on growth to offer
regulators and rating agencies additional reason to pay close attention when
medical malpractice insurers show rapid growth.38
According to income-smoothing theory, if a firm’s current year’s
earnings are higher than target earnings, it tends to over reserve. The
negative coefficient on Smooth suggests the other way around. In other
words, our results do not support the income-smoothing theory.
We further observe that insurers with RBC ratios close to the
benchmark for regulatory attention are less likely to over reserve. This
result is consistent with the literature on reserve management for limiting
regulatory scrutiny. We also find that size, as measured by net premiums
written (NPW) is statistically significant in the direction anticipating,
allowing insurers to take on more risk as the firm grows in size.

38

These results support those of Harrington, et al., supra note 17, at 169.
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Table 6: Logistic Regression of UNDER (N = 1142)
Marginal
Standard
Estimate
Variable
Effects
Error
-0.9800
0.2940
Intercept
-1.1643
-0.2556
0.1907***
PHYSICIAN DIRECT
GEOGRAPHIC
-0.5097
-0.1119
0.1988**
CONCENTRATION
0.2573
0.0565
0.2248
SPECIALIZATION
0.0322
0.0071
0.0133**
GROWTH
0.1530
0.0336
0.1800
GROUP
-0.1090
-0.0239
0.1659
TAX
0.0123
0.0027
0.0056**
SMOOTH
0.4694
0.1031
0.2841
RBCLow
0.8606
0.1889
0.2997***
RBCClose
8
0.0198
0.0043
0.0102*
NPW (X10 )
-0.5020
-0.1102
0.2994*
Y95
0.4310
0.0946
0.3162
Y96
0.5405
0.1187
0.2738**
Y97
0.9563
0.2100
0.2706***
Y98
0.9000
0.1976
0.2708***
Y99
1.3561
0.2977
0.2730***
Y00
1.6190
0.3554
0.2765***
Y01
Likelihood Ratio Test
Chi-Square
182.8377
Pr > ChiSq
<.0001
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF UNDER
As already noted, we hypothesize that physician-directed insurers are
more conservative than are non-physician directed insurers and therefore
will be less likely to under-reserve. Our variable of interest, therefore,
remains Physician Direct and here too we see a statistically significant
relationship between ownership form and reserving practices. In this case,
there is a negative relationship, consistent with our hypothesis of
conservative behavior on the part of physician-directed insurers.
Geographic concentration and business line specialization again are
included in the analysis to measure superior knowledge of the underlying
risk, which we anticipate will be negatively related to under-reserving
practices. As with over-reserving, geographic concentration supports our
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hypothesis. Specialized insurers, however, show no difference to more
diverse insurers.
Consistent with expectations, rapidly growing insurers are more likely
to under-reserve than are others. As above, this result offers reason for
regulators and rating agencies to give special scrutiny to high-growth
insurers. Firms with RBC ratios “close to” regulatory attention also are
more likely to under-reserve, as we had anticipated. They might be
attempting to avoid regulatory scrutiny; or perhaps they are already in poor
financial condition. Firms with low RBC ratios, however, do not show a
statistically significant tendency to under-reserve more than do others. We
had anticipated a stronger relationship with this factor. We could be
picking up unusual results from firms in significantly poor financial
position. In the analysis of the likelihood of under-reserving, we also find
that smoothing again has the opposite sign from anticipated, in this case
showing a positive relationship between smoothing and the likelihood of
under-reserving.
OLS REGRESSION OF THE LOGARITHM OF THE ABSOLUTE
VALUE OF ERRORS/ASSETS
We hypothesize that physician-directed insurers are more conservative
than others and that they have superior knowledge compared with others.
While this leads to expectations of greater likelihood of over-reserving and
lesser likelihood of under-reserving, we also anticipate more overall
accuracy in reserving, based on superior knowledge. To test this
hypothesis, we conduct OLS analyses on the logged relative size of error
independently for both those firms that over reserve, and those firms that
under-reserve. Results, shown in Table 7 for firms that over reserve, and in
Table 8 for those that under-reserve, are consistent with our hypotheses for
under-reserving, but show no statistical difference in the OLS on firms that
over-reserve. Geographic concentration shows the same pattern. Both
factors, therefore, can be said to be related to somewhat conservative, but
mostly stable reserving practices.
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Table 7: OLS Regression of LOG (ABSPERROR/ASSETS) (N = 740) –
Sample Positive
Estimate
Standard Error
Variable
-5.4994
0.2140
Intercept
0.1212
0.1401
PHYSICIAN DIRECT
0.0242
0.1463
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
3.2896
0.1889***
SPECIALIZATION
-0.5327
0.1273***
GROUP
0.8225
0.1565***
TAX
-0.0004
0.0035
SMOOTH
8
-0.0058
0.0104
NPW (X10 )
-0.2019
0.1816
Y95
-0.3853
0.2238*
Y96
-0.3659
0.1957*
Y97
-0.5847
0.2053***
Y98
-0.7869
0.2058***
Y99
-0.6907
0.2204***
Y00
-0.6587
0.2306***
Y01
93.91
F-Value
<.0001
Pr>F
0.6377
Adjusted R-square
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.

Specialized insurers, however, demonstrate less accuracy in their
reserve errors, showing larger errors in both samples of over- and underreserving insurers. Having already accounted for an insurer’s status as
physician directed or not, a specialized insurer seems to have some
disadvantage. We note that specialization did not show significance in the
likelihood of over- (under-) reserving.
The extent of growth appears unrelated to an insurer’s accuracy
regarding reserving, somewhat contrary to our expectations. Insurers with
greater opportunities for tax deferral do seem to over-estimate reserves by
larger amounts, consistent with our hypothesis.
We did not find the variable of Group to be significant in the likelihood
of over (under) reserving. However, our results show that in both samples
of over- and under-reserving insurers, firms that belong to a group report
smaller absolute value of reserve errors, contrary to our expectation that
such firms may be less accurate in their reserving practice.
For firms that under reserved, those that have RBC ratio below 2 report
larger reserve errors, a result consistent with our hypothesis that firms in
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financial difficulty tend to under reserve more in order to appear stronger to
avoid regulatory actions. We have also found that larger size firms in terms
of net premiums written are able to take more risks, as evidenced by their
larger reserve errors.
Table 8: OLS Regression of LOG (ABSPERROR/ASSETS) (N=402) – Sample
Negative
Estimate
Standard Error
Variable
-5.4448
0.3693
Intercept
-0.6216
0.2400**
PHYSICIAN DIRECT
-0.5180
0.2555**
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
3.0095
0.2509***
SPECIALIZATION
-0.0050
0.0103
GROWTH
-0.7605
0.2247***
GROUP
0.0075
0.0096
SMOOTH
1.0173
0.3457***
RBCLow
8
0.0248
0.0098**
NPW (X10 )
-0.0111
0.4220
Y95
-0.3110
0.4275
Y96
0.1819
0.3665
Y97
0.7176
0.3499**
Y98
1.0300
0.3507***
Y99
0.8737
0.3427**
Y00
0.6058
0.3388*
Y01
21.26
F-Value
<.0001
Pr>F
0.4311
Adjusted R-square
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.

CONCLUSION
Dramatic market structure changes have occurred in the medical
malpractice insurance market in response to the high cost of medical
malpractice insurance and the shrinking supply of carriers. Many health
care providers have formed their own companies to offer malpractice
coverage. Given that physician-directed firms are likely to have different
organizational goals than traditional insurers, their loss reserving practices
are likely to differ as well.
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We test the hypothesis that physician-directed medical malpractice
insurers differ in their loss reserving practices, using the NAIC data base
for the years 1994-2006. Our results show consistent differences between
physician-directed and non-physician-directed medical malpractice
insurers. Those which are closely aligned with physicians appear to be
more conservative and more accurate in their reserving practices. We
therefore encourage rating agencies and regulators to consider the positive
influence of these insurers in evaluating their risk profile.
We also note the importance of rapid premium growth on reserve
errors. As Harrington, Danzon and Epstein39 already indicated, market
problems may be due at least in part to insurers who are making poor
underwriting decisions, thereby growing too rapidly and causing market
dislocations. Whether these are pure mistakes or intentional decisions is not
discernable from our analysis, but deserves additional investigation.

39

Id. at 168-169
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APPENDIX: REGRESSION RESULTS USING FULL SET OF
VARIABLES IN ALL EQUATIONS
Logistic Regression of OVER (N = 1142)
Standard
Estimate
Marginal Effects
Variable
Error
1.0545
0.3149
Intercept
1.1564
0.2522
0.1932***
PHYSICIAN DIRECT
0.4953
0.1080
0.2001**
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
-0.2885
-0.0629
0.2270
SPECIALIZATION
-0.1317
-0.0287
0.2252
REINS
-0.0319
-0.0070
0.0133**
GROWTH
-0.1422
-0.0310
0.1825
GROUP
0.0973
0.0212
0.1679
TAX
-0.0120
-0.0026
0.0056**
SMOOTH
-0.4442
-0.0969
0.2867
RBCLow
-0.8541
-0.1863
0.2998***
RBCClose
8
-0.0207
-0.0045
0.0103**
NPW (X10 )
0.5045
0.1100
0.2994*
Y95
-0.4202
-0.0916
0.3168
Y96
-0.5354
-0.1168
0.2739*
Y97
-0.9537
-0.2080
0.2707***
Y98
-0.9090
-0.1983
0.2716***
Y99
-1.3491
-0.2942
0.2732***
Y00
-1.6133
-0.3519
0.2766***
Y01
Likelihood Ratio Test
184.5209
Chi-Square
<.0001
Pr > ChiSq
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

(Note: We do not show the results for UNDER because they are just
the opposite of those of OVER, given that we are using the identical set of
variables in these two analyses. In other words, for each variable, the
absolute value of the coefficient is still the same, but the sign is just the
opposite.)
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OLS Regression of LOG (ABSPERROR/ASSETS) (N = 740) – Sample Positive
Estimate
Standard Error
Variable
-5.4430
0.2172
Intercept
0.1041
0.1409
PHYSICIAN DIRECT
0.0513
0.1478
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
3.2762
0.1903***
SPECIALIZATION
0.0000
0.0079
REINS
-0.0052
0.0102
GROWTH
-0.5883
0.1317***
GROUP
0.8612
0.1583***
TAX
-0.0003
0.0035
SMOOTH
-0.3588
0.2202
RBCLow
-0.1833
0.2557
RBCClose
8
-0.0057
0.0104
NPW (X10 )
-0.2012
0.1819
Y95
-0.3911
0.2240*
Y96
-0.3718
0.1958*
Y97
-0.5965
0.2056***
Y98
-0.7842
0.2073
Y99
-0.6872
0.2205***
Y00
-0.6578
0.2307***
Y01
73.14
F-Value
<.0001
Pr>F
0.6373
Adjusted R-square
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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OLS Regression of LOG (ABSPERROR/ASSETS) (N=402) – Sample
Negative
Estimate
Standard Error
Variable
-5.3772
0.3850
Intercept
-0.6245
0.2427**
PHYSICIAN DIRECT
-0.5540
0.2558**
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
2.8556
0.2625***
SPECIALIZATION
-0.1105
0.2860
REINS
-0.0042
0.0103
GROWTH
-0.7647
0.2276***
GROUP
0.2896
0.1732
TAX
0.0080
0.0096
SMOOTH
1.0039
0.3536***
RBCLow
0.1080
0.3341
RBCClose
8
0.0241
0.0099**
NPW (X10 )
-0.0051
0.4219
Y95
-0.2780
0.4280
Y96
0.1867
0.3678
Y97
0.7024
0.3518**
Y98
1.0000
0.3525***
Y99
0.8536
0.3428**
Y00
0.6275
0.3389*
Y01
18.01
F-Value
<.0001
Pr>F
0.4330
Adjusted R-square
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.

“SEZ WHO?”:
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH
EXTERNAL REVIEW LAWS AND THE
RESULTING CONUNDRUM POSED BY
RUSH PRUDENTIAL HMO V. MORAN
William Pitsenberger*
ABSTRACT
This article discusses state constitutional problems with the 2002
Supreme Court decision Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, which gave the
power to determine medical services for health organizations not
preempted by ERISA to an external review entity. Procedural fairness
issues abound in the procedural impacts of the decision, especially when
requirements set out in state constitutions are considered. External review
laws of this nature are perhaps constitutionally infirm, but judicial review
and ERISA preemption may counter such negative impacts. The article
extensively discusses state external reviews laws and their categorization
among the larger questions of appealability and their binding nature. While
many states have “open courts” provisions in their constitutions, as well as
embracing a separation of powers doctrine, the decision in question still
presents concerns. The recent Hawaii Management case seemingly adds to
the confusion, since judicial review should not be allowed for the external
review in order to avoid preemption, but not allowing so may violate
constitutional separation of powers issues. The ultimate decision as to this
clash may be to either accept the current dichotomy under Rush or to push
for a system of mandated benefits to avoid the issue altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
In Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran,1 the United States Supreme Court
determined, in a five-to-four decision, that an Illinois law giving an
external review entity the power to determine the medical necessity of
services for a health maintenance organization subscriber was not
preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),2 on
the grounds that it did not provide an alternative remedy to those exclusive
remedies set forth in ERISA. When considered in contemplation of state
constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and of open access to
courts, that decision gives rise to a major legal conundrum.
One scholar has identified a fundamental problem with the Rush result
– that an external review process including rights to judicial appeal in state
courts may not be preempted, but those without such rights, while not
preempted, are lacking in procedural fairness - as follows:
[O]ne ironic consequence of the Court’s finding that external
review systems are not a form of remedy could be to insulate
them from due process review. The more distant a mechanism is
from the basic adjudicatory function, the less likely it will be
scrutinized for procedural fairness, the very motivation for
external review laws in the first place. Conversely, the presence
of a more fully developed set of procedures within an external
review system makes ERISA preemption more likely.
The first signal of weakness created by stronger procedural protections
for patients came in Hawaii Management Alliance Ass’n v. Insurance
Commissioner, in which the Hawaii Supreme Court held that ERISA
preempted that state’s external review law because it “too closely
resemble[d] adjudication.” In distinguishing Moran, the Hawaii court
found it “fatal” to that state’s system that it allowed judicial review of
external review decisions, incorporated portions of the state’s
Administrative Procedure Act, established procedural requirements for
hearings, and provided for review by a three-member panel. Numerous

1
2

(2008).

536 U.S. 355 (2002).
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
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other state external review schemes include at least some of these same
features. 3
This article focuses on how procedural fairness is guaranteed under
state constitutions and identifies a conundrum: if procedural fairness, with
all the necessary constitutional safeguards, is provided for in an external
review law, the law is probably preempted, while if such safeguards are not
in place, the law is probably unconstitutional. It explains that some external
review statutes appear to be susceptible to challenge under state
constitutions as a violation of state separation of powers doctrines and
constitutional access to courts provisions, because they delegate judicial
authority to non-judicial entities without the opportunity for subsequent
court review. It further suggests that where the external review procedure
is cloaked with appropriate due process (that is, where it allows for judicial
review and hence does not violate those constitutional strictures), the
process becomes an alternative remedy to ERISA and hence is preempted.
That suggestion is given force by Hawaii Management Alliance
Association v. Insurance Commissioner,4 which found that the availability
of judicial review converts the external review process from a
determination of medical necessity to a state-level adjudication of the
appropriateness of claims processing under an ERISA plan, i.e., into the
sort of alternative remedy prohibited under ERISA and the case law that
has developed around it.
In Part I below, I provide a brief description of the basis for the Rush
decision and an overview of the dilemma it poses, i.e., an external review
law which is not preempted may be constitutionally infirm, and an external
review law that is not constitutionally infirm may be preempted by ERISA.
In Part II, I describe external review laws with a focus on the finality of the
external review decision, noting five categories of such laws: (a) those that
are binding on the insurer but not the insured with no right of appeal; (b)
those that are binding on both the insurer and the insured with no right of
appeal; (c) those that allow for judicial review but still require compliance
with the decision; (d) those that provide for full judicial review before the
decision is effective; and (e) those few that fit none of those categories. In
Part III, I address state constitutional provisions assuring access to courts
and state separation of powers doctrines, particularly with respect to
3

Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in
Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 93, 127-28 (2006).
4
See Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n v. Ins. Comm’r, 100 P.3d 952, 958, 965-967
(Haw. 2004), discussed infra at 112-118.
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binding arbitration and to the few cases that have raised constitutional
concerns about external review laws. I suggest that lack of judicial review
is constitutionally fatal to external review laws that purport to be binding.
In Part IV, I more fully describe the potential for ERISA preemption when
a state external review law authorizes judicial review, discussing the postRush case from Hawaii that specifically addressed that issue. I suggest that
the availability of judicial review results in preemption of external review
laws. In Part V, I briefly discuss policy choices that might be adopted in the
wake of this conundrum.
PART I. OVERVIEW – THE RUSH DECISION AND THE
RESULTING CONUNDRUM
ERISA preempts any state law creating an alternative remedy that
duplicates, supplements or supplants ERISA’s exclusive remedial scheme.5
The concern in Rush was whether the Illinois law created such an
alternative remedy. The Supreme Court’s conclusion that it did not
observed that the determination by the reviewing physician was “similar to
the submission to a second physician, which many health insurers are
required by law to provide before denying coverage.”6 The Court
analogized the state law to mandated benefit laws, a law simply calling for
inclusion of an additional contract term.7 The law is well-settled that a state
may require specific benefits in an insurance contract, and that such
requirement will be saved from preemption under ERISA by virtue of the
5

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
Rush, 536 U.S. at 383. It is worth noting that the Court wholly misconstrues the
nature of the laws relating to second opinions to which it cites in its footnote to the above
quotation. For example, CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.68 (West 2005) simply requires an insurer
to pay for a second opinion if requested by the insured when the insured questions the
medical necessity of a service or the plan of care, a circumstance entirely the reverse of one
in which the insurer questions the medical necessity of a service; IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1337-5 (LexisNexis 1999) calls for payment for a second opinion without elaboration; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17B: 26-2.3 (West 2006) requires an insurer to pay for a second opinion for
elective surgeries that would require an inpatient admission, as does R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2739-2 (2002) (both of which arguably are aimed at the same consideration as the California
statute). In each of these cases, it is not the proposed service that must be covered but rather
the second opinion, and clearly the statutes are aimed at having an insurer pay for second
opinions that might avoid the need for the service proposed, not call for coverage of the
service proposed. The Oklahoma statute cited, OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 365:10-5-4, is simply
incomprehensible, authorizing exclusion of “cost containment,” with a list following that
includes second opinions.
7
Rush, 536 U.S. at 386.
6
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“savings clause” which saves from preemption laws regulating insurance.8
Although even a law that regulates insurance and would appear on its face
to be saved from preemption would still be preempted under the broader
sweep of ERISA preemption of alternative remedies, the Court’s view of
the Illinois law was that it provided the beneficiary nothing more than
benefits for services under a health plan.9 That is, the Court concluded that
the statute did not constitute an alternative remedial scheme to that of
ERISA, providing the beneficiary no different remedial result than the
beneficiary might obtain in an action for benefits brought under ERISA. A
remedy of that kind, the Court seemed to suggest, was substantively
different from other alternative remedial schemes it had condemned, such
as claims asserting tortious breach of contract,10 wrongful discharge11 and
emotional distress and punitive damages.12
The Rush result is bothersome for many reasons, not the least of which
is that it creates a lack of symmetry in terms of rights of the health plan
(more specifically, the insurer of the health plan) and of the insured. In
effect, if the independent physician determined the service was not
medically necessary, the beneficiary would still have the right under
ERISA to seek equitable relief in federal court,13 while if the independent
physician determined the service was medically necessary, the HMO would
have no further avenue of relief. In essence, the independent reviewer acts
as a court of last resort when deciding adversely to the HMO.
The simile of the independent reviewer acting as a court is well-taken,
for many of the state laws calling for external review of the medical
necessity determinations of a health insurer, managed care organization, or
health maintenance organization explicitly provide that the decisions of
such an external reviewer are binding on the insurer, and some purport to
be binding on the insurer and the insured. Although some such laws
describing external review decisions as binding also appear to contemplate
appeal or even separate federal (i.e., ERISA) actions, several of those laws
provide that an appeal does not stay the implementation of the external
8

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732-36 (1985).
Id. at 724.
10
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54 (1987).
11
See Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
12
See Mass. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
13
See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S.
355 (2002) (No. 00-1021) . The Petitioner argued, “[U]nder respondents’ theory, they would
even be entitled to two bites of the apple: if a claim is denied by the Section 4-10 reviewer, a
beneficiary could file an ERISA action seeking the same benefits.” Id.
9
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review decision. The binding nature of such decisions, when made by a
private entity or adopted as an order of a regulatory agency, raises state
constitutional questions specifically relating to separation of powers
doctrines and (at least in a majority of states) an intertwined concept, the
constitutional right of access to courts.14
In addition, where separation of powers or other state constitutional
concerns are not an issue – where appellate review by a court of the
determination with respect to a particular service exists – a peculiar
conundrum is created by the concepts in Rush: the very existence of
constitutionally-acceptable state-level appeal mechanisms seems to make
clear that such external review laws are not analogous to a second opinion,
that they do something more than incorporate an additional contract term
saved from preemption in insurance contracts. Rather, they arguably create
mechanisms providing for judicial relief at a state level that duplicates,
supplements, or supplants the exclusive remedies under ERISA. That is, if
the course of appeal of an external review decision runs through state
courts, it would appear to displace use of a 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) claim as the
“exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries
asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits.”15
The concern, then, is that separation of powers doctrines / “open
courts” concepts and the Rush decision create a “Catch-22”.16 Simply put,
14
It is at least arguable, as well, that such laws raise state constitutional questions
about a right to trial by jury. Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 797 (1977)
identifies that 48 states provide for a right to trial by jury. The analysis of whether a right to
a jury trial exists usually begins with the question of whether such a right was cognizable
with respect to a claim of the nature at issue under common law at the time the state’s
constitution was adopted. See, e.g., Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 993 (Kan. 1993).
Although actions under ERISA are characterized as equitable actions, “[C]ases involving
ERISA benefits are inherently equitable in nature, and not contractual, and…no right to jury
trial attaches to such claims,” from the perspective of a state-level challenge to denials of
claims under an insurance contract, they more closely resemble simple contract actions for
damages yielding a right to a jury trial. Tischmann v. ITT/Sheraton Corp., 145 F.3d 561,
568 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting DeFelice v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 112 F.3d 61,
64 (2d Cir. 1997).
15
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987).
16
JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1955).The title of Joseph Heller’s novel, Catch-22,
has become a commonplace way of describing a bifurcated choice system in which neither
solution yields the result desired. In the novel, it is captured by this exchange:

There was only one catch and that was Catch-22,
which specified that a concern for one’s safety in the face
of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of
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if the external review law is saved from preemption per Rush, it most likely
violates the state constitution, and if it does not violate the state
constitution, it most likely is not saved from preemption.
PART II. EXTERNAL REVIEW LAWS
Health insurers, including health maintenance organizations, typically
include within their contracts exclusions of services that are not medically
necessary or that are experimental or investigational. The obvious reason
for such exclusions is to avoid paying for services that provide no medical
value, or for services for which the medical value has not yet been
demonstrated.17 Because someone has to determine what constitutes
medical necessity, such exclusions have been a source of continuing
litigation between insurers and their insureds, and challenges to those
exclusions have resulted in insurers adopting increasingly complex
definitions of “medical necessity,” “experimental,” and “investigational.”18
In spite of the efforts of insurers to develop ironclad ways to insulate
themselves from challenges as to the criteria they use for determining
medical necessity, there remains concern about the propriety of insurers
reserving such judgment to themselves, even when the judgmental criteria
contained within the insurance contract is elaborate. Those concerns are
prompted both by recognition that by denying benefits, the insurer’s
financial position is enhanced and by the sense that what services are
needed should be left solely in the hands of the treating physician. The two
concerns are necessarily intertwined – that financial motives are the cause
of insurers looking over the doctor’s shoulder, second-guessing the
a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All
he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no
longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr
would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t,
but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he
was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he
was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by
the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let
out a respectful whistle. ‘That’s some catch, that Catch-22,’
Yossarian observed. ‘It’s the best there is,’ Doc Daneeka
agreed. Id. at 52.
17
See, e.g., Louis S. Reed, Private Health Insurance in the United States: An
Overview, 28 SOC. SEC. BULL. 3, 7 (1965).
18
See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1639, 1645-1647, 1662-1666 (1991-1992).
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appropriate course of treatment, and interfering with the physician’s
delivery of needed, and the patient’s receipt of desired, medical services.
Those concerns have led many states to adopt laws requiring that when
an insurer denies a claim based on lack of medical necessity or on the
service being experimental or investigational, the insured has the right to
external review by an independent review organization, usually specifying
the composition of such an entity and requiring that reviews be conducted
by qualified physicians. The counts of such laws vary – the petitioners in
Rush assert that thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia had
enacted such laws as of 2000,19 while another source asserts that forty-two
states and the District of Columbia had enacted external review laws as of
2002.20 Some such laws call for the independent review organization to be
selected by an insurance commissioner, and others provide for qualified

19
Brief for the Petitioner at 8, Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002)
(No. 00-1021).
20
Lindsey G. Churchill, Comment, Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran: Federal
Intervention Looms as Supreme Court Rules That ERISA Does Not Preempt State Laws
Requiring Independent Review of Medical Necessity Decisions and Lays Groundwork for
Different Independent Review Provisions From All Fifty States, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV.535,
536 (2002). See: ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.050 (2006), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2533
(2002), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1374.30 (West 2005), CAL. INS. CODE § 10169.1
(West 2008), COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-113.5 (2007), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a226c (West
2007), 18 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 332, 6416 (1999), D.C. CODE ANN. § 44-301.07 (LexisNexis
2006), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.511 (West 2005), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.7056 (West 2002),
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-20A-31, 33-20A-40 (LexisNexis 2003), HAW. REV. STAT. § 432E-1
(2005), 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 125/4-10 (West 2000), IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-29-12, 2713-10.1-1 (LexisNexis 1999), IOWA CODE ANN. § 514J.1 (West 2007), KAN. STAT. ANN. §
40-22a13 (2000), KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.17A-600, 304-17A-623 (West 2006), LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22.3070, 22:3080 (2004), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4301-A (2000), MD.
CODE ANN. INS. § 15-10A-05 (LexisNexis 2006), MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 176O § 14
(West 1998), MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 62Q.73 (LexisNexis 2001), MINN. STAT. ANN. §
550.1903 (West 2005), MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1387 (West 2002), MONT. CODE ANN. § 3337-201 (2008), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J:3 (LexisNexis 2004), N.J. STAT. § 26:2S-12
(West 2007), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-57-4 (2007), N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4910
(McKinney 2002), N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §58-50-80 (2002), OHIO REV. CODE § 1751.84
(LexisNexis 2004), OKLA. STAT. TIT. 63, § 2528.6 (2004), OR. REV. STAT. § 743.859 (2007),
40 PA. STAT. § 991.2162 (West 1999), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.12-10 (2001), S.C. CODE
ANN. § 38-17-1920 (2002), TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32210 (2000), TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §
4201.401 (Vernon Supp. 2008), UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-629 (2005), VT. STAT. TIT. 8, §
4089F (2001), VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5900 (2007), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.535
(West 2008), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25C-3 (LexisNexis 2006), WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.835
(West 2004).

2008]

“SEZ WHO?”

93

organizations to bid for the right to perform such external reviews.21 In any
event, the reviewing entity is almost uniformly a nongovernmental entity,
although some have a regulatory official entering an order based on the
review entity’s conclusions.22
The various external review laws differ in multiple ways, including at
least one salient aspect: the finality of a determination by the external
review organization. Some make clear that both the insurer and the insured
have recourse to remedies through the courts, some purport to make the
decision of the external review entity binding on both the insurer and the
insured without recourse to appeal or other legal remedy, and some make
the decision binding on the insurer but give the insured the right to pursue
legal remedies.
To the extent that some of these statutes create binding results without
the capacity to seek legal redress, they raise two interrelated state
constitutional questions: whether the statutes unconstitutionally eliminate a
right to access to courts for redress of grievances and whether such statutes
unconstitutionally confer judicial authority on the executive branch or on
private entities, i.e., whether they violate state separation of powers
doctrines.
A TAXONOMY OF THE BINDING EFFECT OF EXTERNAL
REVIEW LAWS
External review laws vary widely in the extent to which they purport to
make the results of the independent review binding. There are essentially
four main types of laws, with a few additional variations:
1. Type 1 laws23 indicate they are binding on the insurer, but
not on the insured, and provide no suggestion of potential court
review following the decision of the independent review
organization.
2. Type 2 laws indicate they are binding on both the insurer
and the insured, and offer no indication of further court review.
3. Type 3 laws either explicitly or implicitly anticipate
additional court review (generally treating the decision of the
21
See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Independent External Review of Health
Maintenance Organizations’ Medical-Necessity Decisions, 347 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2178
(2002).
22
Id.
23
A term used herein solely for convenience.
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independent review organization as an agency decision and
following the state’s administrative procedures act), but provide
that notwithstanding any such court review, the decision of the
external reviewer must be implemented.
4. Type 4 laws expressly provide for court review.
5. There are other statutes that simply do not address the
effect of external review or are otherwise unclear.
TYPE 1 LAWS
As noted above, some external review laws purport to make the
decision of an external review entity binding on the insurer, but not on the
insured. New Hampshire has a typical such statute, providing:
The external review decision of the independent review organization
shall be binding on the health carrier and shall be enforceable by the
commissioner [of insurance] pursuant to the penalty provisions of RSA
420-J:14. The external review decision of the independent review
organization shall be binding on the covered person except to the extent the
covered person has other remedies available under federal or state law. The
external review process shall not be considered an adjudicative proceeding
within the meaning of RSA 541-A [the law providing for judicial review of
administrative proceedings], and the external review decision of the
independent review organization shall not be subject to rehearing and
appeal pursuant to RSA 541.24
Apparently of similar effect, but less explicit, is the Kentucky external
review statute:
(9)
The decision of the independent review entity shall
be binding on the insurer with respect to that covered person.
Failure of the insurer to provide coverage as required by the
independent review entity shall:
(a)
Be a violation of the insurance code of a nature to
warrant the executive director revoking or suspending the
insurer’s license or certificate of authority; and
(b)
Constitute an unfair claims settlement practice as set
forth in KRS 304.12-230.25

24
25

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J: 5-e (LexisNexis 2008).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-625 (West 2006).
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Iowa’s external review law is explicit about the lack of symmetry in
terms of insurer and insured rights to court review:
1. The review decision by the independent review entity
conducting the review is binding upon the carrier or organized
delivery system. The external review process shall not be
considered a contested case under chapter 17A, the Iowa
administrative procedure act.
2. The enrollee or the enrollee’s treating health care provider
acting on behalf of the enrollee may appeal the review decision by
the independent review entity conducting the review by filing a
petition for judicial court either in Polk county district court or in
the district court in the county in which the enrollee resides... The
petition for judicial review must be filed within fifteen business
days after the issuance of the review decision. The petition shall
name the enrollee or the enrollee’s treating health care provider as
the petitioner. The respondent shall be the carrier or the organized
delivery system. The petition shall not name the independent
review entity as a party. The commissioner shall not be named as a
respondent unless the petitioner alleges action or inaction by the
commissioner under the standards articulated in section 17A.19,
subsection 10. Allegations against the commissioner under section
17A.19, subsection 10, must be stated with particularity. The
commissioner may, upon motion, intervene in the judicial review
proceeding. The findings of fact by the independent review entity
conducting the review are conclusive and binding on appeal.
3. The carrier or organized delivery system shall follow and
comply with the review decision of the independent review entity
conducting the review, or the decision of the court on appeal. The
carrier or organized delivery system and the enrollee’s treating
health care provider shall not be subject to any penalties, sanctions,
or awards of damages for following and complying in good faith
with the review decision of the independent review entity
conducting the review or decision of the court on appeal.
4. The enrollee or the enrollee’s treating health care provider
may bring an action in Polk county district court or in the district
court in which the enrollee resides to enforce the review decision
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of the independent review entity conducting the review or the
decision of the court on appeal.26
The Illinois law at issue in Rush was not typical of these external
review laws, in that it does not refer to external review but rather uses in its
title the phrase, adopted by the majority of the Supreme Court, “second
opinion”; nonetheless, it falls into this first category:
§ 4-10. (a) Medical Necessity – Dispute Resolution –
Independent Second Opinion. Each Health Maintenance
Organization shall provide a mechanism for the timely review by a
physician holding the same class of license as the primary care
physician, who is unaffiliated with the Health Maintenance
Organization, jointly selected by the patient (or the patient’s next
of kin or legal representative if the patient is unable to act for
himself), primary care physician and the Health Maintenance
Organization in the event of a dispute between the primary care
physician and the Health Maintenance Organization regarding the
medical necessity of a covered service proposed by a primary care
physician. In the event that the reviewing physician determines the
covered service to be medically necessary, the Health Maintenance
Organization shall provide the covered service. Future contractual
or employment action by the Health Maintenance Organization
regarding the primary care physician shall not be based solely on
the physician’s participation in this procedure.27
California law states, “The Commissioner shall immediately adopt the
determination of the independent medical review organization, and shall
promptly issue a written decision to the parties that shall be binding on the
insurer.”28 Likewise, the Georgia statute provides that “[a] decision of the
independent review organization in favor of the eligible enrollee shall be
final and binding on the managed care entity and the appropriate relief shall
be provided without delay.”29 That statute goes on to reflect the
asymmetrical position of the parties, contemplating appeal by the insured to
court of a decision in favor of the managed care entity by providing, “A
26
27
28
29

IOWA CODE ANN. § 514J.13 (West 2007).
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
CAL. INS. CODE § 10169.3 (West 2005).
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-37 (West 2003).

2008]

“SEZ WHO?”

97

determination by the independent review organization in favor of the
managed care entity shall create a rebuttal presumption in any subsequent
action that the managed care entity’s prior determination was
Indiana provides simply, “A determination made
appropriate….”30
under […] this chapter is binding on the insurer,”31 and Maine, equally
brief, states, “An external review decision is binding on the carrier.”32
TYPE 2 LAWS
Some states make the results of external review binding on both the
insurer and the insured without providing any mechanism for appeal. For
example, Louisiana statutes provide:
B.
An external review decision made pursuant to this
Chapter shall be binding on the MNRO and on any health
insurance issuer or health benefit plan that utilizes the MNRO for
making medical necessity determinations.
C.
An external review decision shall be binding on the
covered person for purposes of determining coverage under a
health benefit plan that requires a determination of medical
necessity for a medical service to be covered.33
30

Id. § 33-20A-37(b); presumably the reason for making a decision in favor of the
managed care entity a rebuttable presumption is to discourage appeal.
31
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-29-16 (Supp 2007) (LexisNexis).
32
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4312 (Supp. 2007). For other “Type 1” laws, see
also N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914 (McKinney 2008) (“[The determination of the external appeal
agent shall] be binding on the plan and the insured….”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-84 (2002)
(“(a) An external review decision is binding on the insurer. (b) An external review decision
is binding on the covered person except to the extent the covered person has other remedies
available under applicable federal or state law.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-1990 (2002)
(“(A) An external review decision is binding on the health carrier. (B) An external review
decision is binding on the covered person except to the extent the covered person has other
remedies available under applicable federal or state law.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089f
(Supp. 2007) (“The independent review organization shall issue to both parties a written
review decision that is evidence-based. The decision shall be binding on the health benefit
plan.”). But see Schulman v. Group Health Inc., 816 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (2006), (an insured
may seek administrative review and judicial review of an external agent’s decision, despite a
provision in the law describing the decision of an external review agent as binding on both
the plan and the insured), aff’d 833 N.Y.S.2d 62 (2006); Nenno v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Western New York, 757 N.Y.S.2d 165, 167 (2003), aff’d 841 N.Y.S.2d 916
(2007); Vellios v. IPRO, 764 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570, aff’d 765 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (2003).
33
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:3085 (2004).
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Massachusetts states the bilateral nature of the effect of the external
review decision simply: “The decision of the review panel shall be binding.
The superior court shall have jurisdiction to enforce the decision of the
review panel.”34 Less succinct are statutes in Virginia and Washington.
Virginia provides, “The Commissioner or his designee, based upon such
recommendation [of the external review entity], shall issue a written ruling
affirming, modifying, or reversing the final adverse decision within 10
working days after his receipt of the recommendation of the impartial
review entity….”35 Unlike the other statutes mentioned, rather than giving a
private entity the power to issue a binding determination, this confers such
power on a regulatory agency, but the statute makes clear that such a
determination is not treated in the same fashion as an order from an agency
appealable under the state’s statutes allowing for judicial review of
administrative agency actions:
Such written ruling shall not be construed as a final finding,
order or judgment of the Commission, and shall be exempt from
the application of the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et
seq.). The written ruling of the Commissioner or his designee shall
affirm the recommendations of the impartial health entity unless
the Commissioner or his designee finds in his ruling that the
impartial health entity exceeded its authority or acted arbitrarily or
capriciously. The written ruling of the Commissioner or his
designee shall bind the covered person and the utilization review
entity to the extent to which each would have been obligated by a
judgment entered in an action at law or in equity with respect to
the issues which the impartial review entity may examine when
reviewing a final adverse decision under this section.36
Although opaque, Washington also appears to make external review
binding on both parties without providing for appeal: “Carriers must timely
implement the certified independent review organization’s determination
and must pay the certified independent review organization’s charges.”37
North Dakota provides simply, “A determination by the independent
external reviewer is binding on the parties.”38
34
35
36
37
38

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O § 14 (West Supp. 2008).
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5902 (2007).
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN, § 48.43.535 (West 2008).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-36-44 (2007).

2008]

“SEZ WHO?”

99

TYPE 3 LAWS
Some states allow for judicial review of the decision of an independent
review organization, but as a practical matter make that review moot by
requiring compliance with the decision with respect to the enrollee. For
example, Kansas statutes provide:
The decision of the external review organization may be
reviewed directly by the district court at the request of either the
insured, insurer or health insurance plan. The review by the district
court shall be de novo. The decision of the external review
organization shall not preclude the insured, insurer or health
insurance plan from exercising other available remedies under
state or federal law. Seeking a review by the district court or any
other available remedies exercised by the insured, insurer or health
insurance plan after the decision of the external review
organization will not stay the external review organization’s
decision as to the payment or provision of services to be rendered
during the pendency of the review by the insurer or the health
plan. (emphasis added)39
While Kansas law calls for adherence to the external review decision
only during the pendency of an appeal, as a practical matter, if the decision
called for coverage of a service, in all likelihood the service would be
provided and paid for before any judicial decision could occur.
Other states that expressly address judicial review are less coy about
the effect of such an appeal. For instance, Arizona law provides in pertinent
part:
The decision by the independent review organization is a final
administrative decision pursuant to title 41, chapter 6, article 10
and, except as provided in § 41-1092.08, subsection H, is subject
to judicial review pursuant to title 12, chapter 7, article 6. The
health care insurer shall provide any service or pay any claim
determined to be covered and medically necessary by the
independent review organization for the case under review
regardless of whether judicial review is sought.(emphasis

39

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-22a16 (2000).
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added).40
Delaware law is to similar effect:
If the arbitrator makes a decision in favor of the carrier, that
decision shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption to that effect in
any subsequent action brought by or on behalf of the covered
person with respect to the decision. Should the decision favor the
covered person, the carrier shall have the right to appeal the matter
to the Court, in accordance with Court rules. The outcome of that
appeal, however, shall have no effect on the covered person, as to
whom the decision of the arbitrator shall control. (emphasis
added).41
Likewise, Pennsylvania statutes indicate, “The managed care plan shall
authorize any health care service or pay a claim determined to be medically
necessary and appropriate [by an external review entity] whether or not an
appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction has been filed.”42
It is unclear why a health plan would appeal a decision by an
independent reviewer that a service should be covered in cases such as
these. Independent review organizations are clearly not courts of record;
there would be no element of precedent, of stare decisis, in their decisions,
and it would seem unlikely that adherence by a carrier to such decisions
would be argued in other cases as a basis for estoppel or would form the
basis for an assertion, when the carrier is resisting a similar claim in the
future, of arbitrary decision-making. In addition, if the service has already
been covered, the potential for a court dismissing an appeal as moot would
seem to be very strong, especially given the relatively unique
circumstances surrounding many cases of questionable medical necessity.
The practical effect of this type of law, then, might be no different than
laws described as Type 1 and 2.
TYPE 4 LAWS
Some states expressly provide for judicial review of external review
decisions without giving immediate effect to the decision. Michigan
40
41
42

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2537 (2002).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 332 (1999 & Supp. 2006).
PA. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162 (West 1999).
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provides a particular example:
An external review decision and an expedited external review
decision are the final administrative remedies available under this
act. A person aggrieved by an external review decision or an
expedited external review decision may seek judicial review no
later than 60 days from the date of the decision in the circuit court
for the county where the covered person resides or in the circuit
court of Ingham county.43
Some statutes are less explicit but of equal effect either by making the
external review advisory only, allowing for alternative approaches to
dispute resolution including litigation, or in providing for judicial review of
external review decisions without giving effect to the decision. The District
of Columbia provides, “The decision of the independent review
organization shall be nonbinding on all parties and shall not affect any
other legal causes of action.”44
In several cases, the apparent capacity for judicial review or a separate
contract action is only implicit. Some states provide that the external
review decision forms a rebuttable presumption in any subsequent
litigation, or otherwise provides for its admissibility, thereby implying the
right to a judicial decision.45 Other state laws, while indicating the results
of the external review are binding on the insurer and insured, provide that
external review is not the only remedy available to the parties, indicating
that external review does not eliminate other remedies under state or
federal law, or specifically indicating that judicial review is available.46
Several statutes do not speak to appealability or to the binding nature of an
external review decision, but provide for the decision being an order of the
insurance regulatory official;47 it seems reasonable to believe that such an
43

MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 550.1915 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 44301.07 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2006).
45
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-113.5 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23.17.12-10
(LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007) (“The decision of the external appeal agency shall be
binding; however, any person who is aggrieved by a final decision of the external appeal
agency is entitled to judicial review in a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
46
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-629 (Supp. 2005) (“Nothing in this section may
be construed as….altering the legal rights of any party to seek court or other redress in
connection with: (i) an adverse decision resulting from an independent review…”).
47
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.7056 (Supp. 2007) (after issuance of the review
entity’s recommendation, the regulatory agency may adopt the recommendations or findings
of fact as a proposed order) HAW. REV. STAT. § 432E-6 (2005) (the commissioner shall issue
44
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order, like other orders of an administrative agency, would be appealable
under the state’s laws regarding judicial review of administrative actions.
New York, where the external review law states it is binding on the parties,
has the most fully developed case law on the subject of appeal of external
review decisions. Section 4914(b)(4)(A)(iv) of the New York Insurance
Laws provides that the determination of an external appeal agent shall be
“binding on the plan and the insured,” but part (v) that sections provides
that the external appeal agent’s determination shall “be admissible in any
court proceeding.”48 And, the statute introducing external review, section
4907, provides that “[t]he rights and remedies conferred in this article upon
insureds and health care providers shall be cumulative and in addition to
and not in lieu of any other rights or remedies available under law.”49
Based on this language, in three separate cases in which the effect of the
“binding” reference was considered, New York courts have concluded the
legislature intended for appellate review of external review agency’s
decision.50
STATUTES OF OTHER KINDS
In addition to the laws captured by the above taxonomy, there are some
statutes that are either sui generis or are simply unclear about the effect of
an external review decision. Oregon is the primary representative of the
former, allowing an insurer to choose between being bound or not by the

an order affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the review entity within thirty
days); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10A-05 (Supp. 2006) (“[T]he Commissioner may select
and accept and base the final decision [of whether a health care service is medically
necessary] on the professional judgment of an independent review organization or medical
expert.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1387 (West 2002) (the decision of an independent review
organization, while binding on the enrollee and the carrier, shall be considered a final
agency decision within the discretion of the director of insurance, subject to a judicial
review based on the record and involving consideration of whether the action of the director
is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or involves an abuse of
discretion or is in excess of the authority of the director).
48
N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914(b)(4)(A)(iv) to (v) (McKinney 2008).
49
Id. at § 4907.
50
Schulman v. Group Health Inc., 816 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807, aff’d 833 N.Y.S.2d 62,
63 (2006); Nenno v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Western New York, 757 N.Y.S.2d 165,
167 (2003), aff’d 841 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2007); Vellios v. IPRO, 1 Misc.3d 487, 764 N.Y.S.2d
568, 570 (2003) (where the court concluded that an external review agent functions as an
agent of the state, thus making the laws governing judicial review of administrative actions
applicable), aff’d 765 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (2003).
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Oklahoma52 and
decisions of independent review organizations.51
Wisconsin53 appear to be unclear about the effect of external review.
PART III. RIGHTS TO ACCESS TO COURTS AND SEPARATION
OF POWERS
A. “OPEN COURTS” PROVISIONS
At least thirty-seven states have an “open courts” provision in their
constitutions.54 Such constitutional provisions typically provide that all
courts shall be open and that every person shall have a remedy by due
process of law for any injury done to him or his property.55 Those
constitutional provisions have figured prominently in challenges alleging
that a variety of statutes limit appropriate access to courts, including caps
on damages in legislation addressing medical malpractice,56 statutes of
repose in legislation dealing with medical malpractice or products
liability,57 or the opportunity for voluntary arbitration in consumer
protection statutes such as “Lemon Laws”,58 among others.
Given the analogy of the Illinois second opinion statute to arbitration
offered by Justice Thomas in Rush,59 specific consideration of the

51

OR. REV. STAT. § 743.859 (2007).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.6 (2004).
53
WIS. STAT. § 632.835 (WEST 2004).
54
Lankford v. Sullivan et al., 416 So. 2d 996, 999 (Ala. 1982).
55
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
56
Columbia Rio Grande Reg’l Healthcare, L. P. v. Hawley, 188 S.W.3d 838, 866
(Tex. App. 2006).
57
Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1000.
58
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n of the U. S. v. State of New York, 550 N.E.2d 919, 920
(1990); see generally 1 ADR § 6:16 (3d ed.).
59
For a keen analysis of the discussion about the arbitral-like nature of the Illinois
external review law, see Hunter, supra note 3, at 125-27. Hunter observes that although
both parties, as well as amici, uniformly described the law as “arbitration-like,” as did the
four Justices in dissent, the majority’s conclusion of nonpreemption hinged on its rejection
of the arbitration analogy, thereby changing the framing of the law as a dispute resolution
procedure. Hunter describes this result as arriving at “the right decision for the wrong
reason,” suggesting that the Court should instead have reconsidered the provisions of Pilot
Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987), which, in her opinion, gave ERISA enforcement
mechanisms overly-broad reach. Of course, had the Court pursued that path, it might well
not have decided Rush as it did, for the votes may not have been there for a majority. See
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 220 (2004), a unanimous decision by the Court
decided shortly after Rush, re-emphasized the exclusive remedies available under ERISA.
52
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challenges to the Uniform Arbitration Act60 as foreclosing access to courts
is worth brief consideration. The statute at issue in Rush was not, of course,
the UAA; still, consideration of how courts have treated the UAA, and
more precisely why they have treated it that way, should provide some
suggestion about how they would treat laws giving a binding effect to
external review.
Arbitration agreements are a matter of contract, enforceable according
to their terms, absent compelling circumstances such as
unconscionability.61 In fact, the UAA itself, although broadly worded,
applies to circumstances where there is an agreement to arbitrate, which
assumes a meeting of the minds and other conditions necessary to satisfy
the constituent elements of a contract (hence the limited review by courts
of arbitral decisions, i.e., that there was an agreement and that there was no
fraud or duress involved in the process).62
Not all arbitration is the result of an agreement. In some cases, it may
be mandated by statute rather than agreed upon by the parties to a dispute.
In such circumstances, there are a few cases in which the claim that
mandatory arbitration would violate a state’s “open courts” constitutional
requirement has been recognized. The primary example of this is State v.
Nebraska Ass’n of Pub. Employees.63 Relying on a history of Nebraska
60

The Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”) was adopted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform Laws in August, 1955, and amended August, 1956. UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT, INTRODUCTION, http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=2509 (last visited
September 21, 2008). The UAA has been adopted in 35 states, and substantially similar
arbitration statutes exist in 14 other jurisdictions. Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual
Analysis of ADR Agreements by Curing Bipolar Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).
61
See, e.g., Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 996 (Mont. 1999), where the
court refused to enforce a contract term, including an agreement to arbitrate, where the
contract is one of adhesion and where the provision was either not within the weaker party’s
expectation or where the term was unduly oppressive, unconscionable, or against public
policy. See also Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2001), following
the Iwen logic.
62
As a generalization, arbitration involves parties to a dispute voluntarily
contracting to select an impartial third party to decide the matter based on arguments and
evidence presented to that third party, primarily to avoid the time, expense and uncertainty
of litigation. 1 MARTIN DOMKE & GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 1:1 (rev. ed. 2008). As discussed infra p. 20 and n. 66, that voluntary aspect
does not apply in external review circumstances, but understanding the issues surrounding
the acceptability of statutorily mandated arbitration is of paramount relevance to the
weaknesses in such external review laws.
63
477 N.W.2d 577, 578-79 (1991). The Nebraska constitution was subsequently
changed to recognize binding arbitration agreements and allow for their enforcement, NEB.
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cases holding arbitration provisions entered into before a dispute to be
invalid as ousting courts from their constitutional jurisdiction in violation
of the open courts provision, the Nebraska Supreme Court declared invalid
the UAA and, as a result, provisions of state employee contracts calling for
mandatory binding arbitration.64
More frequently, courts find no constitutional conflict between
arbitration agreements and a state constitution’s open courts provision.65 As
discussed below, if there is a qualitative, constitutional difference between
voluntary agreements to arbitrate and statutorily mandated arbitration,66 it
is possible that in the Nebraska case the court, concerned about the
legislature dictating the source of adjudication (i.e., calling for mandatory
binding arbitration rather than for arbitration based on voluntary
agreement), was expressing a concern about separation of powers cloaked
in the language of access to courts.
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The separation of powers doctrine is, at least in some circumstances, of
a piece with constitutional requirements for access to courts: when the
capacity to determine individual rights with finality is vested in a nonjudicial entity without mutual agreement of the parties to do so, the result is
both a lack of access to courts and a delegation of complete judicial
authority to an agency or private entity, resulting in the vesting of power in
either the executive or in another, nongovernmental agency acting on
behalf of the state.

CONST. art. I, § 13. See also Huntington Corp. v. Inwood Construction Co., 348 S.W.2d 442,
445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
64
State v. Nebraska Ass’n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Neb. 1991).
65
See, e.g. Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1033, 1036 (Okla.
1996), determining that the open courts provision of the constitution did not bar
enforcement of arbitration agreements, and noting that most states considering the question
have upheld arbitration in the face of claims of unconstitutionality.
66
Nenno v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Western N. Y., 757 N.Y.S.2d 165, 168
(2003), aff’d 841 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2007), involved, among other things, a claim that the
external review process violated New York constitutional requirements relating to access to
courts and to separation of powers. One defense raised in that case was that the external
review was not different than binding arbitration, a position with which the court disagreed:
“Finally, we reject defendant’s contention with respect to appeal No. 2 that the external
appeal constitutes a binding arbitration to which the parties agreed in the insurance contract.
The insurance contract does not contain an agreement to arbitrate . . . in clear, explicit, and
unequivocal language.” Id. at 168.
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All state constitutions embrace the concept of separation of powers –
that there are three branches of government (executive, legislative and
judicial) and that each has powers vested in it as a separate magistracy,
preventing another branch from encroaching on the powers of another.67
Separation of powers calls for courts to possess the entire body of judicial
power, and their powers may not be assigned to another branch either by it
nor assumed by another branch. 68 That generality does not mean that such
creates independent islands, however. It is well-accepted that some overlap
may occur, e.g., through empowering administrative agencies to make
quasi-judicial decisions.69
The conditions surrounding such an overlap were thoughtfully explored
in Board of Education v. Harrell.70 There, the court considered a statute
requiring mandated, binding arbitration of teacher disputes regarding
discharge. The statute restricted judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision
to issues regarding fraud or corruption of the arbitral process. In
considering Harrell’s claim that this limited the power of the judiciary by
vesting an arbitrator with sole authority to determine all issues of fact and
law, the New Mexico court considered the rationale underlying the
separation of powers principle at length. It observed that the theory of
separation of powers is derived from concerns that concentrating judicial,
legislative, and executive power into a single entity would create a system
with inherent tendencies toward tyranny.71 The court noted that a hermetic
sealing off of the three branches was not contemplated by separation of
powers, that the doctrine was not an absolute, that separation of powers
does not prohibit every exercise of judicial power by persons outside the
judiciary, and observed that rather than maintaining a strict separation,
constitutional law requires instead the assurance that adequate checks exist
to keep each branch free form the control or coercive influence of the other
branches.72
Applying that concept to the exercise of judicial power by quasijudicial tribunals, the New Mexico court declared that the judiciary must
67

16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 8 (1998); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 246 (1998).
68
16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 8 (1998); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 246 (1998).
69
16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 8 (1998); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 246 (1998).
70
882 P.2d 511, 524 (N.M. 1994).
71
Id. at 514-15, 524.
72
Id. at 524-25.

2008]

“SEZ WHO?”

107

maintain “the power of check” over such tribunals’ exercise of the essential
attributes of judicial power, defined as “the final authority to render and
enforce a judgment.”73 That principle of check, the court said, requires that
courts have an opportunity to review decisions of arbitrators in statutorily
compelled arbitrations.74 In Harrell, the statute called for the arbitrator’s
decision to be binding and non-appealable except where the decision was
procured by corruption, fraud, deception or collusion (and not, the court
observed, where the decision was arbitrary or capricious). The court
considered Illinois case law regarding the need for judicial review75 and
concluded that both due process and separation of powers considerations
require that parties to statutorily mandated arbitration be offered
meaningful review of the arbitrator’s decision.76 The court explained that to
be meaningful, the review must consist of determinations of whether the
litigant received a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal, whether the
decision was supported by substantial evidence, and whether the decision is
in accordance with the law.77 The New Mexico statute at issue, limiting

73

Id. at 525.
Id., citing to Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Ky.
1981); Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 724 F.2d 1247, 1277 (7th Cir. 1983); Republic
Indus. Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83, 718 F.2d 628, 640 (4th Cir. 1983); Bayscene
Resident Negotiators v. Bayscene Mobilehome Park, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626, 634 (1993),
among others.
75
City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd., 311 N.E.2d. 146, 152 (Ill. 1974):
74

76
77

As a general rule, delegation to administrators or
agencies of the quasi-judicial power to adjudicate rights or
to revoke privileges such as licenses is not invalid so long
as there is an opportunity for judicial review of the
administrative action. Such judicial review normally
permits an aggrieved party to contest the fairness of the
procedure used, the constitutionality of the substance of the
regulatory statute and implementing rules and regulations,
the correctness of the administrator’s interpretation of the
statute under which he operates, and whether or not his
decision was arbitrary. In short, if the judiciary is given an
adequate opportunity to review what has been done, the
principle of separation of powers-or due process of law, if
you will-is generally satisfied.
(internal citations omitted).
Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511, 525-26 (N.M. 1994).
Id. at 526.
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court review, was thus struck down as both lacking in due process and as
an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power.78
The Harrell court’s analysis offers an important distinction about
arbitration. Consensual agreements between two parties, it says, are
enforceable according to their terms, and raise no constitutional issues, a
position consistent with the overwhelming majority of courts that have
considered whether arbitration “ousts” the judiciary of its authority in an
unconstitutional manner.79 On the other hand, and critically, the Harrell
court recognizes that statutorily mandated arbitration is not an agreement at
all, but a determination by the legislature of the adjudicative structure to
govern disputes.80 Under such a circumstance, just as in circumstances of
reference of disputes by the legislature to administrative agencies in the
first instance, both separation of powers doctrine and due process
considerations require that there be a meaningful review by a court of
whether the attributes of due process – a fair hearing involving notice and
opportunity to be heard, a decision supported by substantial evidence, and a
decision in accordance with the law – are present.81
The Harrell decision is not unique in finding that statutory binding
arbitration without a right of judicial review violates a state separation of
powers constitutional safeguard. In a Texas case, both landowners and the
78

Id.
Id. at 516-517.
80
Id. at 523. See supra note 66, at 22, regarding the attitude of the court in Nenno v.
Blue Cross to a claim that an external review law was a form of arbitration; in the same
way, contra the comparisons of external review laws to arbitration discussed in Rush,
external review requirements are a determination by the legislature of the adjudicative
structure to govern disputes regarding medical necessity.
81
See Harrell, 882 P.2d at 526. Indeed, as the Harrell Court observes:
79

The similarity between compulsory arbitration and an
administrative adjudication thus makes caselaw on the
constitutional validity of administrative adjudications
instructive in assessing the validity of Section 22-10-17.1.
As noted by the New York Court of Appeals, “[T]he device
of [sic] arbitration is a substitute for a determination of the
dispute by an administrative or regulatory agency. As a
substitute device, however, its objective may not be
accomplished under lower constitutional standards than
would be required of an administrative or regulatory
agency.”
Id. at 518 (quoting Mount St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Catherwood, 260 N.E.2d 508, 516
(N.Y. 1970)).
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county were required to accept the result of binding arbitration when there
was a dispute about valuation of property for tax purposes.82 The law
provided for such an arbitration award to be enforceable by the district
court.83 The county asserted the statute not only violated the separation of
powers doctrine but also the state open courts requirement.84 The court
agreed, noting that the unconstitutionality consisted of denying the
reviewing court any meaningful method of ascertaining the lawfulness of
the arbitration award the court was expected to enforce.85 That expectation
exists in some external review laws as well, as noted with respect to Iowa
in Part II.86
In an extensively-cited article considering the constitutional position of
binding arbitration, Jean R. Sternlight identifies eight critical factors
necessary for a state-compelled binding arbitration scheme to meet the fair
hearing demands of due process.87 Although some of those elements may
be missing from some external review statutory processes, a discussion of
each in the context of the multiple state external review laws is beyond the
scope of this paper. The final element she identifies, however, is critical:
the right to judicial review. Sternlight observes, “Where arbitration is
imposed on parties, either by an explicit statute or by a ‘preference’
enunciated by the courts, the parties are arguable entitled to judicial review
of the arbitrator’s decision to ensure that the decision is adequately founded
in both law and fact.”88 Sternlight notes that while this rule has not been
explicitly enunciated by the Supreme Court, it is a logical extension of the
Court’s logic in closely-related issues.89 Moreover, Sternlight argues that
the minimal appellate review required by the Federal Arbitration Act –
requiring a court to enforce arbitral awards unless they are shown to be the
product of corruption, fraud, or arbitrator misconduct - is constitutionally
insufficient. Sternlight asserts that rather than a cursory review of the
nonjudicial decision, a more extensive de novo review of the decision

82

Hays County Appraisal Dist. v. Mayo Kirby Springs, Inc., 903 S.W.2d 394, 394395 (Tex. App. 1995).
83
Id. at 396.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 397.
86
See supra Part II, at 94-97 (discussing Type 1 Laws).
87
Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 87-98 (1997).
88
Id. at 95.
89
Id.
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under a “weight of the evidence” standard should apply.90 Sternlight
reasons: “If judicial review is required of decisions by administrative
agencies, surely it is required of private arbitration decisions as well, to
ensure that such decisions reflect law and not merely whim or bias.”91
Although Sternlight’s observations are cast in terms of due process,
they apply equally, as the Harrell court observes,92 to the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers. That is, if separation of powers concerns
require that a court engage in meaningful review and require that the court
is also the final authority to render and enforce a judgment in the case of
statutorily-mandated binding arbitration, then both of those concerns apply
equally to binding external review processes. There is no principled basis
for a distinction that would treat the binding result of decisions of an
external review entity any differently than statutory binding arbitration. If
that is so – if an external review agency exercises the same power as an
administrative agency acting in a quasi-judicial capacity – then the same
constitutional considerations should apply to the processes and decisions of
state- required external review, including consideration of separation of
powers. As one court observed, “[U]nder the separation of powers clause of
our state constitution, judicial review must be provided for administrative
agency decisions involving the exercise of quasi-judicial powers.”93
It appears from the taxonomy of external review laws discussed above
that only a minority provide for any court involvement, other than the
ability to enforce the decision of the independent review organization.94
Some merely describe the decision of the external review entity as binding,
either on the insurer or on the insurer and insured.95 At least some expressly
describe external review as not being an administrative decision under the
state’s particular administrative procedures act,96 which appears to
foreclose access to courts for subsequent review under state laws governing
judicial review of administrative decisions. Those external review laws that
allow for court review of the decision of an independent review
90

Id. at 95-97.
Id. at 96.
92
Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511, 526 (N.M. 1994).
93
Meath v. Harmful Substances Comp. Bd., 550 N.W.2d 275, 282 (Minn., 1996)
(Anderson, J., concurring specially).
94
See supra Part II, at 91-97.
95
See supra Part II, at 93.
96
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J:5e (2004) (“The external review process shall
not be considered an adjudicative proceeding within the meaning of RSA 541-A, and the
external review decision of the independent review organization shall not be subject to
rehearing and appeal pursuant to RSA 541.”).
91
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organization, but make that decision binding with respect to the particular
insured’s benefits, lack any meaningful access to a court. In all three such
circumstances, an appropriate initial inquiry would be whether placing the
adjudicative power in the hands of a private entity or in the hands of a
regulatory official (by calling for an order from the commissioner, for
example, adopting or rejecting the external review entity’s conclusion)
without an opportunity for meaningful appellate review violates the
separation of powers doctrine (or the logical consequence of such a
violation, the violation of an “open courts” provision). Certainly in such
cases the rationale applied in Harrell to statutorily-mandated binding
arbitration would seem readily to apply.97
Even when an external review statute provides for judicial review, state
constitutional concerns may still exist, and have been raised in at least one
instance in which the external review law explicitly provided for appellate
review. Michigan law provides, “A person aggrieved by an external review
decision . . . may seek judicial review no later than 60 days from the date of
the decision in the circuit court for the county where the covered person
resides or in the circuit court of Ingham county.”98 In English v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield,99 Blue Cross argued that the independent review act did not
provide the insurance commissioner or the independent review
organization with standards for reviewing the adverse determination and
did not announce a standard for an appellate court to apply to the decision
when appealed, violating the insurer’s right to substantive due process.100
The court recharacterized this claim as “one attacking the Legislature’s
delegation of power to an administrative agency and rooted in the
separation of powers doctrine.”101 That is, the court understood the heart of
the complaint to be that overly-broad and unconstrained authority had been
given to an administrative agency without any judicial check thereon.102
Reviewing the provisions of the statute, the court concluded that adequate
97

See supra notes 79-81, at 108 and accompanying text.
Patient’s Right to Independent Review Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
550.1915(1) (Lexis Supp. 2008).
99
688 N.W.2d 523 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
100
Id. at 534.
101
Id. at 534. The court explained, “When a legislative body chooses to vest an
administrative body with the power to regulate public conduct, the legislative body must
provide adequate standards to protect the public form the exercise of uncontrolled, arbitrary
power.” Id. (quoting Natural Aggregates Corp. v. Brighton Twp., 539 N.W.2d 761, 770
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995)). See also Ross v. Blue Care Network of Michigan, 722 N.W.2d 223
(Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (elaborating on the standards for judicial review).
102
English, 688 N.W.2d at 534.
98
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standards did, in fact, exist for the exercise of judgment by the
commissioner and the independent review organization, and that, while the
act was silent on the standard for judicial review, the Michigan constitution
adequately specified the standard to be used in review of final agency
determinations.103
PART IV. THE RUSH CONUNDRUM WHEN APPEAL IS
AUTHORIZED
In the taxonomy of external review laws noted above, one group would
appear to be safe from claims of violation of the separation of powers
doctrine or of “open courts” constitutional provisions, those providing for
appellate review of the external review decision before it becomes
effective. As noted above, New York courts have addressed this issue at
least three times.104 Even though the New York statute described the result
of an external review to be binding on the insurer and the insured, the
statute was interpreted to mean that appellate review was proper.105 Under
such a circumstance, the potential that an external review law runs afoul of
state constitutional concerns is considerably diminished.106
On the other hand, when judicial review of an external agency decision
occurs – when one appeals an external review decision to a state court for
review – the court is placed in a position of making a determination
regarding a dispute over a claim for benefits. At least one court has seen
this as creating a dilemma in light of the Rush decision. Hawaii
Management Alliance Association v. Insurance Commissioner107 involved
103

Id. at 535.
See cases cited supra note 50.
105
Schulman v. Group Health Inc., 833 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). The
Schulman court described the claim that no appellate review was available thusly:
“Defendant’s interpretation provides no mechanism for review of either erroneous or
arbitrary determinations by external review agents, a result that is not only inconsistent with
the purpose of these statutory provisions, but would be detrimental to both insureds and
insurers.” Id.
106
That is not to say that there may not be other state, or even federal, constitutional
concerns with the external review procedure, depending on the structure of the law. See
English v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 688 N.W.2d 523 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); see
also Bd. of Educ. of Carlsbad v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511 (N.M. 1994) (where issues were
raised about whether the niceties of due process were met, i.e., whether an in person hearing
was required, whether the ability to cross-examine witnesses or challenge the fact-finder for
bias existed, and whether the decision was based on a record and used procedures that
adequately documented the basis in law and in fact for the decision.)
107
100 P.3d 952, 966-67 (Haw. 2004).
104
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the Hawaii Supreme Court considering a lower court affirmation of orders
of attorney fees and costs arising out of the successful appeal of the denial
of a claim under that state’s external review law. In defending, the
appellants asserted that the law was preempted by ERISA, and that hence,
the claim for attorney fees and costs was void.108
The Hawaii statute provided for the insurance commissioner to enter an
order affirming, modifying or vacating the decision of the external review
panel and incorporated the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act, which,
among other things, provided “[a]ny person aggrieved by a final decision
and order in a contested case…is entitled to judicial review thereof….”109
The court found that this access to court review was fatal to a Rush-style
claim that the statute was not preempted by ERISA. In its analysis, the
court, mindful of Rush as well as of Aetna v. Davila110 and of Kentucky
Association of Health Plans v. Miller,111 determined that the statute
regulated insurance under the test set forth in the latter case and hence was
saved from express preemption.112 However, the court did not stop there,
but went on to consider in detail the concepts of field preemption and
conflict preemption as they related to the Hawaii statutes.113 ERISA, the
court unremarkably concluded, does not impliedly preempt the entire field
of HMO regulation – indeed, its express preemption clause coupled with
the savings clause makes clear that the preemptive reach of ERISA does
not extend to all state laws affecting employee benefit plans.114 On the
other hand, merely because Congress did not intend to preempt the entire
field of state law affecting employee benefit plans does not mean that some
such laws, otherwise saved from preemption as regulation of insurance,
may not be preempted if they present a conflict with ERISA’s remedial
scheme.115 In observing that, the court pointed to Aetna Health in its
discussion of conflict preemption:
“[U]nder ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption,…even a
state law that can arguably be characterized as ‘regulating
insurance’ will be pre-empted if it provides a separate vehicle to
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 954.
Id. at 966, quoting from HAW. REV. STAT. § 91-14 (1993).
542 U.S. 200 (2004).
538 U.S. 329 (2003).
Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n, 100 P.3d at 959-960.
Id. at 960-67.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 962.
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assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA’s
remedial scheme.”116
Aetna considered the availability of litigation under a Texas statute
authorizing claims against health plans for failure to use due care in claims
processing. Whether such a claim was preempted by ERISA depended on
the remedial scheme in 29 U.S.C. 1132(a).117 Justice Thomas, writing for a
unanimous court, emphasized the exclusivity of federal enforcement
actions:
The pre-emptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is still stronger. In
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66, 95
L.Ed.2d 55 (1987), the Court determined that the similarity of the
language used in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(LMRA), and ERISA, combined with the “clear intention” of
Congress “to make § 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by participants or
beneficiaries federal questions for the purposes of federal court
jurisdiction in like manner as § 301 of the LMRA,” established that
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)’s pre-emptive force mirrored the preemptive force of LMRA § 301. Since LMRA § 301 converts state
causes of action into federal ones for purposes of determining the
propriety of removal, see Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557,
so too does ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Thus, the ERISA civil
enforcement mechanism is one of those provisions with such
“extraordinary pre-emptive power” that it “converts an ordinary
state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Metropolitan Life,
481 U.S. at 65-66, 107 S.Ct 1542. Hence, “causes of action within
the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) [are]
removable to federal court.” Id. at 66.
It follows that if an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of
coverage for medical care, where the individual is entitled to such coverage
only because of the terms of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan,
and where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or the plan
terms is violated, then the suit falls “within the scope of” ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B). Metropolitan Life, supra, at 66. In other words, if an
116
117

Id.
Id.
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individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty
that is implicated by a defendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause of
action is completely pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).118
The Rush court recalled its determination in Metropolitan Life that
Congress had so completely preempted the field of benefits law that an
ostensibly state cause of action for benefits was necessarily a creature of
federal law removable to federal court,119 and indicated that under the
decision in the instant case, enforcement of the medical necessity
determination would require a civil action under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B)
to recover benefits due the beneficiary or to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan.120 The concern of the Hawaiian Supreme Court, then,
was that the structure set up under its state law resulted in an enforcement
action – an adjudicatory action – not under ERISA but rather in state
courts. The Rush opinion had considered this: “To be sure, a State might
provide for a type of ‘review’ that would so resemble an adjudication as to
fall within Pilot Life’s categorical bar.”121
The Hawaii Management court considered whether Rush survived the
strong language of Aetna emphasizing the preemptive power of ERISA,
concluding that Aetna did not overrule Rush but allowed the Hawaii
legislature to regulate insurance so long as the legislature did not create a
“cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil
118
119
120
121

Aetna Health Inc, 542 U.S. at 209-10.
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 378 (2002).
Id. at 380 n.10.
Id. at 381. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) had stated:
The Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus
curiae, argues that Congress clearly expressed an intent
that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a) be
the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan
participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing
of a claim for benefits, and that varying state causes of
action for claims within the scope of § 502(a) would pose
an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19. We agree.
The conclusion that § 502(a) was intended to be exclusive
is supported, first, by the language and structure of the civil
enforcement provisions, and second, by legislative history
in which Congress declared that the pre-emptive force of §
502(a) was modeled on the exclusive remedy provided by §
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Id.
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enforcement remedy.”122 Reading the two together, the court determined
that the Supreme Court meant to distinguish between state laws that create
a state law claim for relief against an employee benefit plan (as in the case
of Aetna) and state laws that require insurers to provide certain procedural
protections to insureds.123 Further, it understood the status of the law to be
that a state statute is preempted by ERISA if it provides “a form of ultimate
relief in a judicial forum that added to the judicial remedies provided by
ERISA” or that “duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil
enforcement remedy.”124
The Hawaii statute, the Hawaii Management court observed, is very
similar to the Illinois statute at issue in Rush: both provide for an
independent review of an insurer’s denial of benefits, both require the
reviewing entity to consider the medical necessity of the procedure at issue,
both allow the reviewer to overturn the insurer’s denial of coverage, and
neither creates a claim for relief upon which a beneficiary can file a lawsuit
(unlike in Aetna) or enlarges a beneficiary’s claim for benefits beyond what
the beneficiary could obtain in an action under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a).125
However, the court determined that the Hawaii and Illinois statutes have
salient differences: first, the Hawaii statute provides for appellate review
under the state’s administrative procedures act and sets forth the procedural
requirements for contested cases, including, importantly, the availability of
judicial review. Second, while the Illinois statute charged the reviewing
physician to determine whether the procedure was medically necessary, the
Hawaii statute charged the review panel to determine whether the actions
of the HMO were “reasonable.” 126
These distinctions, the court held, were fatal to the survival of the
Hawaii law under conflict analysis.127 First, since the Hawaii statute did not
seek a medical opinion per se but instead raised a broader question, i.e.,
whether the HMO’s actions were reasonable, the nature of the external
review itself “more closely resembles ‘contract interpretation or evidentiary
litigation before a neutral arbiter’ than ‘a practice (having nothing to do
with arbitration) of obtaining another medical opinion.”128
Beyond that and more damaging, according to the court, was the right
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n, 100 P.3d at 964.
Id.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 966.
Id.
Id.
Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n, 100 P.3d at 966.
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of the parties to seek judicial review.129 Such review, in the court’s opinion,
was precisely the type of adjudication barred by Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, which held that an action under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) is the
exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries
asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits.130 The creation of a
state-level judicial forum for asserting a claim for benefits under an ERISA
plan resulted in duplication of ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme.131
The result of the Hawaii Management case taken together with the
Rush / Aetna analyses is that to avoid preemption, an external review law
should not allow for judicial review of the decision of the independent
reviewer.132 Allowing for court review, Hawaii Management says, results
in preemption of the external review law.133 On the other hand, not
allowing for such review likely violates state constitutional constraints
relating to separation of powers. In such a circumstance, the external
review law might not be preempted, but it may well be unconstitutional.
PART V. IS THERE A WAY TO CUT THIS GORDIAN KNOT?
If the Hawaii Management analysis is correct, but if at the same time
lack of integration into legal adjudicatory systems violates separation of
powers or “open courts” constitutional protections, the result would seem
to be either that an external review system is preempted by ERISA or that it
is constitutionally invalid – that there can be no valid state-level external
review system applicable to ERISA plans. Of course, that would have been
the result had the minority in Rush prevailed, and it does not yield an
unthinkable or cataclysmic result; rather, it would identify and clarify
federal policy choices, legislative action or inaction, in its wake. In the
alternative, the Supreme Court could sharpen its diction and its message
surrounding what it means when it speaks of exclusive remedies under
ERISA. Hunter’s suggestion - that the Court made the right decision for
the wrong reason in Rush, and that the Court should instead reconsider
what she believes to be an overly broad reach of ERISA enforcement
129

Id.
Id.
131
See id. at 966-67.
132
That concern led to the introduction of legislation in Hawaii subsequent to the
Hawaii Management case that would eliminate judicial review of external review decisions.
Zachary Antalis, Hawaii’s Patients’ Bill of Rights: Saving the Right to External Review, 28
U. HAW. L. REV. 295, 314 (2005).
133
Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n, 100 P.3d at 966-967.
130
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mechanisms134 - is a different approach to the conundrum. Which course
is best depends on values and biases. One might believe that uniformity in
approaches to claims administration and adjudication is desirable for multistate employers, a belief that informed the heart of ERISA’s preemption
provisions to begin with, either on the grounds that such is what the
employers bargained for (either in their contracts or, more broadly
speaking, in their influence on the legislation, in Posnerian135 terms) or on
the simpler grounds of efficiency, in which case one would not seek
contraction of the “exclusive remedy” concept. Those same persons (or
others) might believe that state-enforced external review is unneeded, that
markets will punish errant health insurers and HMOs that too often appear
to be determining claims to be lacking in medical necessity to the benefit of
the insurer or HMO. On the other hand, one might believe that the potential
for an insurer or HMO to deny claims too readily is strong enough that it is
necessary to have what are, in the end, judgments about medical practice
being made by a party not associated with the insurer, and that sufficient
structural elements can be built into the identification of external reviewers,
the standards to be used for review, and the appellate rights of parties
involved to assure fairness to all. It would be an extraordinary waste, given
the pressures of health care costs and the fundamental integrity of most
insurers and HMOs, if, faced with this dilemma, legislators were to adopt a
third approach, one clearly safe from any claim of ERISA preemption in
taking the form of a mandated benefit, calling for insurers and HMOs to
unquestioningly pay for any service a doctor might provide, order or
recommend.

134

Hunter, supra note 3, at 127.
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has described legislation as
a bargained-for good among interest groups: “The ‘interest group’ theory asserts that
legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative
protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall
social welfare…” Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and
the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).
135

ARE STATE COURT GARNISHMENT ACTIONS AN
EFFECTUAL IMPEDIMENT TO FEDERAL DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT JURISDICTION: IS TIMING EVERYTHING?
Steven Plitt
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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the efficacy of state court garnishment actions in
comparison with federal declaratory judgments, particularly the issue of
timing for such decisions in insurance coverage disputes. Jurisdiction of
Constitutional Article III courts are largely governed by precedents found
in either the Brilhart or Wilton analyses, and it is responsible for deciding if
garnishment actions are removable to federal courts in such disputes.
Federal abstention doctrine is also discussed as a discretionary response to
ideas of comity, equity, and federalism under various precedential cases
from the mid-twentieth century to the current decade. State court
garnishments may serve as impediments to federal jurisdiction, and
removability for insurance cases is in dispute. Such uncertainties present
difficulties for insurers. Abstention doctrine therefore pushes insurers to
take declaratory judgment filing actions early in the two situations of
removable or non-removable garnishment actions.
The abstention doctrine provides the backdrop for a recurring juridical
controversy that arises out of insurance coverage disputes. An insurance
claim can produce two nascent suits: one in state and one in federal court.1
*
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1
There have been historical exceptions to the dueling state and federal suits. Prior
to 1964, a discrete number of states (most notably Louisiana) had legislation permitting an
injured person to bring suit directly against a liability insurer without joining the insured.
This made it possible for a state citizen who had been injured by a citizen of that same state
to litigate his or her suit in federal court if the state-citizen tortfeasor was insured by an out-
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Typically, an injured plaintiff will bring suit against the tortfeasor and
litigate liability and damages in state court. At the conclusion of the
liability lawsuit through judgment, the plaintiff creditor will initiate a state
court garnishment action. Where coverage has been declined, the
insurance company, seeking the benefits of federal forum,2 will bring a
separate declaratory judgment action in federal court. Oftentimes, the
insurance company will initiate a federal declaratory judgment action as the
state court liability proceedings conclude. Once judgment is entered, the
state court plaintiff will bring a second state court action seeking a writ of
garnishment against the insurer. The unfortunate insurer then finds itself at
an intersection of jurisdictional complications and doctrinal contradictions.
The varied courts’ holdings on abstention provide that a federal court may
decline to exercise federal jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action any

of-state insurer. See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954). An
overwhelming number of suits were brought in federal court until 1964 when Congress
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) to allow federal jurisdiction only when the insurer defendant
in a direct action was a citizen of the insured’s state as well as its own. See Donald T.
Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity Amendment: Congressional Indirect Action Against State
“Direct Action” Laws, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 268 (1965) (criticizing Congress’s amendment of
the statute).
2
It is commonly recognized that plaintiffs prefer to litigate in state court, whereas
defendants prefer federal court. This preference is said to result, in part, from the
overburdened federal docket and federal judges’ alleged preference for early case
dispositions. See Abner J. Mikva, It’s Time to “Unfix” the Criminal Justice System, 20
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 825, 829-830 (1993) (the so-called war on drugs has so
overburdened the federal judiciary such that getting a civil case tried in federal courts is
almost impossible). One commentator has noted that federal judges, in order to reduce their
compressed dockets, have increasingly engaged in stringent control of discovery, have
aggressively encouraged settlement, and have more frequently granted summary judgment.
See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27,
39-41 (2003). Federal court is also perceived as more expensive and time consuming. See
Gregory M. Cesarano and Daniel R. Vega, So You Thought a Remand was Imminent? PostRemoval Litigation and the Waiver of the Right to Seek Remand Ground on Removal
Defects, 74 FLA. B. J. 22, 23-24 (2000).
Moreover, the forum for litigation may in fact impact the plaintiff’s chance for success.
Two Cornell law professors authored a study in 1998 which concluded that the plaintiff win
rate in removed federal civil cases was 36.7% compared to the overall win rate in federal
civil cases generally 57.9%. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case
Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal
Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998). The win statistics in diversity cases is
more startling. The win rate in original diversity cases was 71% compared to a 34% win
rate in removed cases. Id. This disparity may be the result of forum impact. Generally,
“removed plaintiffs fare relatively worse before judges than before juries.” Id. at 601.
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time there is a parallel state court proceeding;3 and, a non-forum defendant
cannot remove an action to federal court if it is supplemental or ancillary to
another action.4 Thus, the question insurance companies and the courts
must both wrestle is: can a garnishment suit – a derivative of a concluded
state court liability and damages claim – be removed to federal court
attendant with a federal declaratory judgment action? Or, can a state court
garnishment effectively impede litigation of coverage questions in federal
court because an Article III court will be compelled to exercise its
discretion and decline jurisdiction in lieu of the state court garnishment
action?
Effective procedural impediments may exist which preclude removal of
the state garnishment action to federal court to unify both the garnishment
and federal declaratory judgment proceedings. In this situation, the United
State Supreme Court’s decision in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Company
of America,5 provides the analysis to be applied by the federal courts in
exercising their discretion to deny jurisdiction where concurrent state and
federal cases exist. Invariably, the defense to the garnishment proceedings
rests upon the insurance company’s ability to establish that it is not a debtor
because its insurance policy does not provide coverage for the events which
produced the garnishable judgment. Where the garnishment action is nonremovable, the insurance company’s declaratory judgment action is in
jeopardy under federal abstention principles. Where the garnishment
action is properly removable, it is unclear whether federal abstention can be
avoided. The Supreme Court in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.6 failed to
delineate the outer boundaries of district court discretion to abstain in cases
in which there are no parallel state proceedings. Can a state garnishment
action, properly removed to federal court, be used as a basis for a federal
3
See, e.g., Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 803-804 (9th
Cir. 2002) (refusing removal when the possibility exists that the insured may bring an
analogous declaratory judgment action in state court).
4
Unless federal question jurisdiction can be invoked, an action cannot be removed
if any named defendant is a citizen of the forum state.
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the
parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
5
316 U.S. 491, 495-96 (1942).
6
515 U.S. 277, 290 (1995).
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district court judge to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction under the
discretionary Federal Declaratory Judgment Act?
This article will proceed in four parts. Part I will recount the abstruse
history of the jurisdiction of Article III courts. Part II will trace the
evolution of the variegated iterations of the abstention doctrine. Part III
will examine the procedural and substantive characterization of state
garnishment actions to assess whether the garnishment action is removable.
Where the state garnishment action is not removable, the Brillhart analysis
will prevail. Where the state garnishment action is removable, the silence
of the Wilton court on the question of abstention when there is no parallel
state court proceeding will be brought into focus. Part IV will analyze the
application of federal abstention in cases involving state garnishment
actions.
I.

THE JURISDICTIONAL HISTORY OF ARTICLE III COURTS

Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power of
the United States in the Supreme Court “and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”7 This devolution of
discretion to Congress, resulting from the Madisonian compromise,8 has
been interpreted as affording Congress authority to not only create or
decline to create inferior federal tribunals, but to define the contours of the
jurisdiction the lower federal courts will enjoy.9 “All federal courts, other
than the Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise
of the authority to ‘ordain and establish’ inferior courts ....”10 Congress’s
power to create lower federal courts therefore includes the “power ‘of
7

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM.
L. REV.1002, 1033 (2007) (describing the “Tribunals Clause” as a “huge grant of power to
Congress, made necessary by the Madisonian compromise.”); John Eidsmoe, The Article III
Exceptions Clause: Any Exceptions to the Power of Congress to Make Exceptions?, 19
REGENT U. L. REV. 95, 134 (2007) (noting that Madison’s Notes, which were released in
1837 demonstrate that Article III, Section 2 was a “Madisonian compromise” to give
Congress the choice of creating inferior federal courts.).
9
Congress cannot, however, confer upon the lower federal courts jurisdiction
greater than that contemplated in the Constitution. In Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, the
Supreme Court held Congress was limited by, inter alia, the Eleventh Amendment. 517 U.S.
44, 65 (1996) (stating it is “fundamental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of
the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III”).
10
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943) (Chief Justice Stone writing for a
unanimous court).
8
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withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character
which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.”‘11
Congress has never deemed it “proper for the public good” to grant to
the Article III courts jurisdiction coterminous with that permitted by the
Constitution. Rather, every grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal courts
has been a gift wrestled from the hands of Congress. The Judiciary Act of
1789,12 for example, did not provide for federal jurisdiction in cases
“arising under [the] Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made….”13 Rather, federal question cases had to fall under a more
specialized grant of jurisdiction or be litigated in a state court, subject to
review in the United States Supreme Court.14 It was not until 1875 that a
Reconstruction Congress provided an enduring grant of general federal
question jurisdiction.15 One commentator referred to the post Civil War
broadening of federal judicial power as the greatest expansion in history,
stating: “In crabbed and obscure jurisdictional statues a hundred years old
we may trace out great shifts of power, shifts that left the nation supreme
over the states….”16 In spite of the magnanimous realignment of power
that occurred in 1875, however, limits on federal question jurisdiction
remain. Under § 1331,17 a federal court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a
case presenting a federal question unless the federal question appears on
the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.18

11

Id.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-78 (1789).
13
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
14
The “Midnight Judges” Bill did provide for federal jurisdiction in cases presenting
federal questions. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 2, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802). See, e.g.,
Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295, 303, 305 (1916); Knights of
Pythias v. Kalinski, 163 U.S. 289, 290 (1896); Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 1012 (1885).
15
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
16
William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875,
13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 333 (1969).
17
28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (2006).
18
Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub L. No. 96-486 § 1,
94 Stat. 2369 (1981) (amending U.S.C. § 1331); Husvar v. Rapoport, 430 F.3d 777, 781 (6th
Cir 2005) (recognizing that “the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that the federal
question must appear on the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing
claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court”); Cal. ex rel.
Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) ( “well-pleaded complaint”
rule…provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when federal question is presented on the
face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint).
12
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Article III courts were granted federal diversity jurisdiction in the
Judiciary Act of 1789,19 however, the authority of the lower federal courts
to hear cases in which there is diversity of citizenship is still, by no means,
unlimited. Despite the constitutional mandate that the federal judiciary
power extend to all cases “between citizens of different states,”20 federal
diversity jurisdiction cannot be exercised by an Article III court unless the
case meets the ever-increasing “amount in controversy” requirement21 and
there exists full diversity among the parties.22 Still, federal diversity
jurisdiction has been deemed necessary to provide a neutral forum for outof-state defendants against perceived local bias by state courts.23 As Chief
Justice John Marshall stated in Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux:
However, true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every
description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains
apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible
fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals

19

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also, THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 305 (Alexander
Hamilton McLean ed., 1787) (noting “[t]he power of determining causes between two
states, between one state and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different
states, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the union than what has just been
examined.”).
21
The Judiciary Action of 1789 set the amount in controversy at $500.00. Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 79. In 1887 it was raised to $2000. See The Judiciary Act of
1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552. And in 1911 it was raised to $3000. See The Judiciary Act of
1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091. In 1958 the jurisdictional threshold was raised to
$10,000. See The Judiciary Act of 1958, PUB. L. NO. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415. In 1988, the
amount was raised a final time to $50,000. See The Judiciary Act of 1988, PUB. L. NO. 100702, 102 Stat. 4646, before reaching the current requirement of $75,000. See The Judiciary
Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847).
22
Strawbridge v. Curtiss held that in federal diversity cases, it is insufficient for
merely some of the opposing parties to be from different states. Rather, no plaintiff may be
from the same state as any defendant. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-268 (1806). Moreover,
Section 1441 of Chapter 28 of the United States Code prohibits removal of an action if a
named defendant is a citizen of the forum state, thereby further divesting the federal courts
of jurisdiction that would otherwise exist under federal diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
23
See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, The Rise
of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 82
(1993) (identifying the historical justifications for federal diversity jurisdiction); see also
Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 49293 (1928) (vulnerability of state courts to local pressure was initial justification for federal
diversity jurisdiction).
20
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for the decisions of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between
citizens of different states.24
Like federal question and federal diversity jurisdiction, the grant of
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to the federal courts was not secured
without substantial effort. Passage of the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act (“FDJA”) of 193425 marked the end of a long-waged campaign for
legal reform.26 Advocates for passage of the FDJA viewed traditional
common law remedies – awards of damages or injunctive relief - as
inadequate.27
Reformers argued social equilibrium can be disturbed not only be
direct violations of rights, but also by actions that leave persons in ‘grave
doubt and uncertainty’ about their legal positions. In their view, the
existing remedial structure failed in three ways. First, it failed to address
the plight of a person embroiled in a dispute who, limited by traditional
remedies, could not have the controversy adjudicated because the opposing
party had the sole claim to traditional relief and chose not to use it. Second,
the traditional system of remedies harmed parties by forcing them to wait
an unnecessarily long time before seeking relief. Third, the reformers
criticized the harshness of damage and injunctive awards. Even when they
could be invoked, they were thought to hamper litigants who did not need
or desire coercive relief. For the reformers the declaratory judgment was
the procedural innovation that would solve these problems.28
However, in spite of widespread support for the FDJA, Congress was
concerned that authorizing the federal courts to entertain suits for
declaratory judgment was tantamount to allowing prohibited advisory
opinions.29 Congressional concerns were quelled when the United States
24

9 U.S. (5 Cranch), 61, 87 (1809).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (2000).
26
Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the
Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded the Federal Judiciary
While the Supreme Court Wasn’t Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529 (1988-1989).
27
Id. at 551, 552-53.
28
Id. at 551-553.
29
The United States Constitution extends the judicial power only to “cases” and
“controversies.” U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. See also, Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff, Co.,
344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952) (“The disagreement [underlying the declaratory relief action] must
not be nebulous or contingent but must have taken on a fixed and final shape so that a court
can see what legal issues it is deciding, what effect its decision will have on the adversaries,
and some useful purpose to be achieved in deciding them.”); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716, 722 (1929) (considering whether “the
proceedings before the Circuit Courts of Appeals or District Courts of Appeals on a petition
to review are and can not be judicial, for they involve ‘no case or controversy,’ and without
25
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Supreme Court first reviewed a suit brought under a state declaratory
judgment provision30 and when it later upheld the federal act.31
The constitutionality of the FDJA was examined in Aetna Life Ins. Co.
of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth,32 where the Supreme Court recognized,
“[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to ‘cases of
actual controversy,’ manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision
and is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the
constitutional sense.”33 The Aetna court explained that the operation of the
FDJA was procedural only, and in providing remedies and defining
procedure, Congress was exercising its authority over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.34 In exercising this authority, Congress is not limited to
traditional forms of relief or remedy. “The judiciary clause of the
Constitution ‘did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789
as the only possible means for presenting a case or controversy otherwise
cognizable by the federal courts.’”35
The Aetna court examined what “controversy” meant in the context of
the FDJA, holding the controversy must be “justiceable,” meaning it must
not be “a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character” or
“academic or moot.”36 Rather, the controversy must be “definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal
interests.”37 “It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.”38 Thus, the Supreme Court held constitutional the FDJA’s
authorization for the federal courts to issue declaratory judgment “in a case
this a Circuit Court of Appeals, which is a constitutional court, is incapable of exercising its
judicial function.”); Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346,356 (1911) (recognizing the federal
judicial power is “limited to require an application of the judicial power to cases and
controversies.”); In re Pacific Railway Commission Ry Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 (1887)
(recognizing the Eleventh Amendment’s modification of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution and the requirement of a “case or controversy.”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
419, 431-32 (1793) (discussing the relationship between criminal cases and the “case or
controversy” requirement of Article III, Section 2.).
30
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249,258 (1933).
31
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-240 (1937).
32
Id.
33
Id..
34
Id. at 240.
35
Haworth, 300 U.S. at 240.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 240-241.
38
Id. at 241 (citations omitted).

2008]

IS TIMING EVERYTHING?

127

of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.”39 The jurisdictional qualifier
incorporated into Congress’s grant of declaratory judgment jurisdiction
raises the question: when is it proper for a federal court to abstain from
entertaining an action that falls within the literal terms of a Congressional
grant of jurisdiction? This question was addressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary40
and Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman,41 and has been answered,
in part, by a number of juridical doctrines that provide the federal courts
with procedural mechanisms whereby they may refrain from exercising
their Congressionally-ordained jurisdiction. These doctrines include the
concepts of justicability,42 ripeness,43 forum non conveniens,44 and
exhaustion of remedies,45 and the rules restricting the exercise of federal
39

Id.
454 U.S. 100, 102, 104-105 (1981).
41
319 U.S. 293, 296-297 (1943).
42
The concept of justiciability allows the court to directly abstain. A federal court
may found its determination regarding abstention in the related doctrines of standing and
mootness. The Supreme Court has recognized that the doctrine of standing has both a
constitutional and a prudential aspect. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94
(1996) (recognizing prudential objectives served by jus tertii limitations on standing);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (recognizing the prudential
limitation that a “litigant must normally assert his own legal interest rather than those of
third parties”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (court addressed the prudential
limitations that were “closely related to Article III concerns but essentially matters of
judicial self-governance”).
43
Discretionary abstention is also reflected in the doctrine of ripeness. A
comparison of Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) makes it difficult to discern whether a particular result rests upon the court’s view of
constitutional necessity or on prudential choice. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947) (challenges to the Hatch Act unripe with the intimation that the
result was constitutionally mandated.) Mootness is an intentionally open-ended concept of
justiciability. In an action for equitable relief, for example, the reasonable expectation of
repetition cannot render the matter moot despite a defendant’s voluntary discontinuance of a
challenged practice. See, e.g., United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33
(1953).
44
Another aspect of indirect abstention comes in the form of forum non conveniens.
See e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that “the principle of
forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even
when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.”).
45
The federal courts may abstain when a plaintiff has not exhausted alternative
routes of relief before seeking a federal forum. As an example, “[a] refusal to enjoin a state
criminal proceeding is, in effect, a holding that a federal court will consider the federal
claim only on direct review or on habeas corpus, after the state proceeding has come to an
end. And Pullman abstention represents a decision that a federal court will not consider the
constitutionality of a state statute until the plaintiff has sought a clarification of state law . . .
40
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jurisdiction in probate and domestic relations matters.46 The federal courts
have embraced with ever-increasing latitude, the judicially created doctrine
of abstention,47 as a basis for declining jurisdiction.
Application of the abstention doctrine was traditionally restricted to
cases arising in equity;48 however, the doctrine has distended through
application and is now applied to “all cases in which a federal court is
asked to provide some form of discretionary relief.”49 And the federal
courts have, over the years, amassed a collection of jurisprudential defenses
from which a federal judge may select a predicate for his or her decision to
abstain. These include “equitable discretion, federalism and comity,

from a state court.” David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
558 (1985). See also Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 245 (1886) (a prisoner, about ready to
be tried in a state court, sought federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that the state
statute was unconstitutional). Id. at 245. In the opinion, Justice Harlan, observed that the
federal court had jurisdiction over the case and that in special circumstances it might be
appropriate for a court to grant relief before the conclusion of the state proceedings. Id. at
245-50. However, the court held that the state court should typically be permitted to
proceed without federal interference so long as the state court was competent to consider the
federal claim at involved. Id. at 251.
46
The view that Article III excludes jurisdiction in domestic relations cases was
originally supported by the assertion that certain matters were beyond the historical scope of
law and equity. In Fontain v. Ravenel, Chief Justice Taney argues in his dissent that the
federal courts lacked power to enforce a charitable bequest, as the “chancery jurisdiction” of
the federal courts conferred by Article III extended only to matters of which chancery had
jurisdiction “in its judicial character as a court of equity,” and not the “prerogative powers,
which the king, as parens patriae, in England, exercised through the courts,” which
remained with the sovereign states. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 391-93 (1854). Taney’s analogy
to the chancery courts was subsequently attacked by Judge Weinstein, who, in Spindel v.
Spindel, criticized the development of the federal domestic relations exception. 283 F.Supp.
797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Judge Weinstein challenged the historical premise, noting that
matrimonial matters were handled by the ecclesiastical courts and not in chancery acting in
its judicial capacity. In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, Justice White eschews any mention of the
historical arguments about the scope of chancery jurisdiction, instead relying on judicial
precedent and Congress’s failure to object to them. 504 U.S. 689, 700-01 (1992).
47
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-18, 722 (noting the
“abstention doctrine is of a distinct historical pedigree . . . .”).
48
Id. at 717. The Quackenbush court stated that “it has long been established that a
federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it ‘is asked to
employ its historic powers as a court of equity.’” Id.
49
Id. at 730. The abstention doctrine is oft used in spite of Justice O’Connor’s
notation in Quackenbush, that it requires “rare circumstances” for the federal courts to
“relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.” Id. at 722. See, e.g., Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297 (1943); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66, 69-70, 72-73 (1971).
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separation of powers, and judicial administration.”50 Regardless of the
doctrinal justification invoked in a given case, the propriety of an Article
III court’s voluntary divestiture of the jurisdiction conferred by Congress is
a matter of broad debate.
One side of the debate has ostensible origins in Chief Justice John
Marshall’s opinion in Cohen v. Virginia,51 in which Justice Marshall stated,
“[w]e have no more right to decline the exercise of a jurisdiction which is
given than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution.”52 This is the position championed by Professor
Martin H. Redish of Northwestern University School of Law. Professor
Redish views a federal court’s invocation of the abstention doctrine as an
usurpation of congressional power to define the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, which is fundamentally incompatible with basic premises of
constitutional democracy.53 Redish argues:
“[t]he fact that Congress theoretically could delegate to the
court the power to modify otherwise unlimited legislation [] does
not mean that Congress has actually done so. It is this improper
leap from theoretical possibilities to assumed fact that ultimately
undermines any defense of the [] abstention model from a
separation-of-powers attack.”54
In The Federalist No. 80, however, Alexander Hamilton, writing on the
extent of the power of the judiciary outlined in Article III, stated, “[i]f there
are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a
government being co-extensive with its legislative, may be ranked among

50
Shapiro, supra note 45, at 579. See also, Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism without
Politices – A Half Measure of Authority for Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 767, 768, 797, 803 (1991) (arguing abstention is appropriate when based on concerns
about judicial administration, but not when based on matters requiring “political choices”).
51
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
52
Id. at 404.
53
Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE. L.J. 71, 77-79 (1984). See also, Anthony J. Dennis, The Illegitimate
Foundations of the Younger Abstention Doctrine, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV 311, 312
(1990); Donald L. Doernberg, “You can Lead a Horse to Water . . . “: The Supreme Court’s
Refusal to Allow the Exercise of Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 999, 1000-02 (1989-1990).
54
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL
JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 59-60 (1991).
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the number.”55 Indeed, the federal jurisdiction decisions seem to suggest
that the Supreme Court plays at least as great a role as Congress in defining
boundaries of jurisdictional authority.56 Legal commentators who address
the issue have described the process as a “dialogic process of congressional
enactment and judicial response.”57 “[A]s experience and tradition teach,
the question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a
controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible, to answer in gross.
And the courts are functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary
fine tuning than is the legislature.”58
While opinions on the propriety of abstention proliferate, the federal
courts continue to utilize the doctrine as a weir constructed to regulate their
case loads. In doing so, the federal courts have sullied the litigation
process with an ever-increasing number of externally inconsistent and
internally under-justified opinions in which discretionary abstention is
exercised.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
The abstention doctrine is a byproduct of the coherence of principles of
comity and federalism.59 The abstention doctrine may also be surmised as
a judicial effort to balance conflicting goals: militating on one side is the
desire to eschew premature constitutional determinations, to defer to state
55

THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982) (adopting a “total”
exhaustion rule); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85, 90-91 (1977) (changing procedural
default test from “deliberate bypass” to “cause and prejudice” without any evidence of
changed Congressional intent); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 449-52 (1986)
(discussing Congressional adoption of judicially crafted “ends of justice” standard).
57
Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and
Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990).
58
Shapiro, supra note 45 at 574. See also Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch,
Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate
and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1337-38 (1986)
(arguing that, at best, abstention can be seen as fine tuning the implicit intent of Congress
that is reflected in jurisdictional grants).
59
See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4241 (3d ed. 2007), for a brief comparison of abstention doctrine. In justifying federal
abstention, the Supreme Court has expressed concern for comity and federalism interests.
The relationships between coordinate state and federal judicial systems is often referred to
as “comity.” The relationships between state and federal sovereigns is often referred to as
federalism. See also, Randall P. Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation
of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1151 (1974) (asserting abstention is the highest
form of cooperative judicial federalism).
56
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courts on state law questions, to avoid duplicative proceedings, and to
interfere as little as possible with state processes.60 Competing interests
include upholding a litigant’s choice of a federal forum, respecting the
policies of the jurisdictional grants, and effectuating timely vindication of
federal rights.61
While there are many types of abstention,62 the principle variants are
Pullman abstention, to allow resolution of unsettled questions of state
law;63 Burford abstention, exercised in deference to state sovereignty and
policies;64 and Younger abstention, which avoids interference with state
These types of abstention “are not rigid
criminal proceedings.65
pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they
reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent
in a system that contemplates parallel judicial processes.”66 The Pullman,
Burford, and Younger doctrines are, however, supplemented by a more
general requirement that the federal courts yield discretionary jurisdiction
when judicial economy demands.67
60

See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3d §
4241 (2007).
61
The federal court’s application of the abstention doctrine has, in some cases,
prevented the federal issue from ever being heard. In United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc.,
for example, the federal court abstained from hearing the federal issue in deference to state
authority, and then dismissed the matter as moot when it returned to the federal court eight
years after the abstention doctrine was originally invoked. 381 U.S. 413 (1965).
62
Many concepts can be labeled as part of the abstention doctrine. A case in point is
exemplified by so-called Rooker-Feldman abstention which originated from Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983). Under Rooker-Feldman abstention, the court recognizes that Congress has
conferred original jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction on the federal district courts.
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. Rooker-Feldman abstention prevents a
state court party from having two bites at the apple: one through the state courts with a
petition to the U.S. Supreme Court and the other through a subsequent collateral attack
originating in the federal courts. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486.
Where a party begins litigating a constitutional matter in state court and stops short of
petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court, and then initiates litigation in federal court regarding
the same constitutional matter, the federal district court can abstain. Rooker-Feldman
abstention essentially holds that the federal district court does not have appellate jurisdiction
over the state court. The state court party should continue through the state court
proceeding up through the U.S. Supreme Court.
63
See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
64
See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 319 (1943).
65
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971).
66
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987).
67
See, e.g., Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)
(discussing abstention based on concerns of judicial economy and federalism); Will v.
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A. PULLMAN ABSTENTION
The Pullman abstention doctrine68 arose out of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co..69 It is to be applied
by the federal courts in cases presenting federal constitutional issues and
questions of state law, provided that the federal court finds that the federal
question presented may be made moot or will otherwise be substantively
implicated by a state court determination of the relevant state law question
involved in the case.70 “When a federal constitutional claim is premised on
an unsettled question of state law, the federal court should stay its hand in
order to provide the state courts an opportunity to settle the underlying
state-law question and thus avoid the possibility of unnecessarily deciding
a constitutional question.”71 Thus, the Pullman abstention doctrine has
traditionally been touted as a reflection of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal
goal of constitutional avoidance.72 Pullman abstention may, however, be
Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 663-64 (1978) (endorsing the Brillhart reasoning in a
federal declaratory judgment action).
68
See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997);
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9 (1983); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1979);
Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477 (1977); Harris County
Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975); but cf. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32
n.1 (1993) (stating that while the Pullman doctrine is referred to as a form of abstention,
“[t]o bring out more clearly, however, the distinction between those circumstances that
require dismissal of a suit and those that require postponing consideration of its merits, it
would be preferable to speak of Pullman ‘deferral.’ Pullman deferral recognizes that federal
courts should not prematurely resolve the constitutionality of a state statute... .”).
69
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
70
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)
(quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)).
71
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 285 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Sims, 442
U.S. at 427-28 (stating “that a federal action should be stayed pending determination in state
court of state-law issues central to the constitutional dispute.”); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S.
647, 662 (1978); Hodory, 431 U.S. at 477 (stating that Pullman abstention “involves an
inquiry focused on the possibility that the state courts may interpret a challenged state
statute so as to eliminate or at least to alter materially, the constitutional question
presented.”); Boehning v. Ind. State Employees Ass’n., Inc., 423 U.S. 6,8 (1975); Askew v.
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 4787 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970); Dresner
v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136, 136-38 (1964); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S.
207, 211-12 (1960); City of Meridian v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 640 (1959);
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); R.R. Comm’n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-501 (1941).
72
See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930) (constitutional
questions will not be decided unnecessarily). The roots of Pullman abstention cannot be
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founded more on concerns relating to the preservation of federalism than
on constitutional avoidance. By its own statement, the Pullman holding
was crafted with the intent to avoid “‘needless friction’ between federal
pronouncements and state policies.”73
fully understood without reference to the historical context in which the opinion was issued.
Justice Frankfurter suggests in the Pullman opinion that the constitutional question
“touche[d] on a sensitive area of social policy.” Pullman, 312 U.S. 498 (1941) (emphasis
added). The “sensitive” area to which Justice Frankfurter refers is the same divisive issue
that at one time threatened to dissolve the union of the United States. As Professor Resnik
points out:
The testimony [in the record] in Pullman is filled with
discussion of how white women feel ‘a little bit safer ...
with a white man conductor in charge of that car’ * * *
Further, in an effort to prop up the porters’ claims, the
record also includes testimony aimed at distinguishing ‘the
Pullman porter[s]’ as ‘pretty high-classed colored men,’
from those other kids of ‘colored men.’
In 1941 it was [] not obvious how federal
constitutional law would decide [the equal protection]
question [that Pullman presented]. It was not easy because
national norms did not readily trump local customs and
prejudices, indeed because national norms may well have
shared such prejudices. Thus the case was ‘sensitive,’ the
engagement between federal and state law fraught with
anxiety, and if some other point of law could determine the
outcome without having to consider announcing federal
constitutional rules about discrimination based on race,
more the better.
Judith Resnik, Rereading “The Federal Courts”: Revising the Domain of Federal
Court Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1039
(1994). It often goes unnoted that Pullman’s predecessor, Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., held that if a controverted question of state law was presented in an action that
also presented a federal constitutional question, the federal district court should decide the
state question first. The doctrine of Pullman abstention, therefore, may have been a result of
the judiciary’s unwillingness to interfere in race relations in the southern states. See, e.g.,
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (affirming Louisiana statute providing separate
railway carriages for “the white and colored races,” thereby establishing “separate but
equal” requirement); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899)
(refusing to interfere in state operation of segregated high schools); Berea College v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (affirming conviction of private college that violated
Kentucky law requiring separation of the races); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927)
(allowing Mississippi to exclude a child of Chinese ancestry from attending school reserved
for whites).
73
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970) (citing Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500).
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Pullman abstention is an equitable doctrine74 and, therefore, cannot be
formulaically applied.75 Rather, the court must make a sui generis
determination as to whether the proper combination of elements exist in a
given controversy.76 In order to exercise Pullman abstention, a case must
present two conjunctive77 elements or “special circumstances.”78 There
must be an unanswered question of state law79 and the unsettled question of
state law must be susceptible80 to a construction that will moot, limit, or
74
Despite the doctrine’s equitable foundations, the court has applied the doctrine,
without discussion, to actions at law in several significant cases. See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool
Co., 400 U.S. 41, 44 (1970); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134,
135-36 (1962); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
75
See Gonzales v. Gonzales, 536 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1976); Ahrensfeld v.
Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating abstention is a discretionary, judgemade doctrine to be applied on a case-by-case basis only where special circumstances exist);
Muskegon Theaters, Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d. 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1974)
(abstention is equitable doctrine turning on case-by-case facts).
76
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964).
77
See, e.g., Id. at 375-76 (1964) (abstention not automatic merely because doubtful
issue of state law exists); and Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943)
(absent a potential limiting of a constitutional issue, abstention is inappropriate because a
challenged state law is difficult or uncertain).
78
See Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234 (describing the two constituent elements as
“exceptional circumstances”). The Supreme Court has not been consistent in its
determination of when the special circumstances warranting Pullman Abstention are
present. Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (abstention inappropriate
because no ambiguity existed in state statute), with Reetz, 397 U.S. 82, 86-87 (abstention
appropriate because it was “conceivabl[e]” that a state court would interpret the state statute
at issue contrary to its clear import, thus avoiding a constitutional question).
79
Federal courts should avoid making forecasts of state law. R.R. Comm’n of Tex.
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941). The court in Baggett noted that Pullman
abstention was generally appropriate only when state law issues are complex, unsettled, or
unclear. Baggett, 377 U.S. at 375 (citing Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949)) (when
federal court has been granted jurisdiction, abstention should not impede normal course of
action). Under Baggett, the federal courts pre-abstention analysis should take into
consideration the nature of the unsettled question.
80
Similar inconsistencies exist in the Courts’ articulation of whether an unsettled
state law question is subject to a limiting construction which is dispositive of the federal
question. One articulation requires a challenged statute to be “obviously susceptible to a
limiting construction.” Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 n.14 (1967) (where state
statute not obviously susceptible of a limiting construction, abstention is inappropriate). A
different articulation focuses on whether the state statute is “fairly” susceptible to such a
construction. See, e.g., Harman v. Forsinius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965) (where state
statute not fairly susceptible to limiting construction, abstention inappropriate). A third
articulation finds abstention appropriate where it is “conceivable” that the challenged state
statute is amenable to a limiting construction. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 4344 (1970) (abstention appropriate where “conceivable” that phrase in state statute amenable
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otherwise alter the consideration the federal court will give to the federal
question.81
While the federal courts may have enjoyed application of Pullman
abstention at the outset, the Court’s enthusiasm for the doctrine seemed to
wane once the judiciary was faced with the reality of the resultant delay
caused by the prescribed procedure.82 Critics argue for abolition of the
doctrine on that basis.83 The viability and value of abstention as a judicial
construct has ever been criticized by members of the Supreme Court whose
reasoning gave form to the doctrine.84 The Pullman abstention doctrine
to limiting construction). The Court has suggested that these articulations of susceptibility
are interchangeable. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
81
Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499-501. See also Harris County Comm’rs v. Moore, 420
U.S. 77, 84 (1975) (where resolution of unclear state law question would avoid or
significantly modify the federal constitutional question, abstention is appropriate); Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1973) (where state statute is susceptible of a construction by
the state judiciary that would avoid or modify necessity of reaching a federal constitutional
question, abstention is appropriate).
82
See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (eight year
delay in federal court’s adjudication of issue); United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 381
U.S. 413 (1965) (dismissed as moot eight years after abstention was ordered).
The delay associated with Pullman abstention merits particular consideration
where a state statute is challenged on grounds that it inhibits first amendment freedoms.
Baggett, 377 U.S. at 378-379. Because the delay from abstention would seriously inhibit
the realization of first amendment rights, these claims are exempt from Pullman abstention.
See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251-252 (1967). See also Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) (where first amendment challenge involved, abstention was
inappropriate). Cf. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 308-09
(1979) (Court abstained from deciding first amendment challenge to an ambiguous state law
limiting deceptive union publicity aimed at consumers of agricultural products). The
Court’s concern over the heightened cost of abstention involving first amendment rights has
also been expressed in cases involving basic civil liberties. See, e.g., Harman, 380 U.S. at
537.
83
See, e.g., Philip P. Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The
Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 488-491 (1959); Marth A. Field, The
Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 605-606 (1976-1977); David P. Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 317
(1969).
84
See, e.g., England v. La. State Bd. Of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 425 (1964)
(Douglas, J. concurring), Justice Douglas urged reconsideration of the doctrine:
I was a member of the Court that launched Pullman
and sent it on its way. But if I had realized the creature it
was to become, my doubts would have been far deeper than
they were.
Pullman from the start seemed to have some qualities
of a legal research luxury. As I said in Clay v. Sun Ins.
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enjoyed a healthy resurgence, however, under the Burger Court.85 In fact,
in 1970, the Supreme Court arguably expanded Pullman abstention in Reetz
v. Bozanich86 where the Court addressed whether constitutional challenges
to state law were appropriately decided by state or federal courts.87
Office, 363 U.S. 207, 228, 80 S.Ct. 1222, 1234, 4 L.Ed.2d
1170 (dissenting opinion):
‘Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can
hardly afford one lawsuit, let alone two. Shuttling the
parties between state and federal tribunals is a sure way of
defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice is not
an academic exercise. There are no foundations to finance
the resolution of nice state law questions involved in
federal court litigation. The parties are entitled-absent
unique and rare situations-to adjudication of their rights in
the tribunals which Congress has empowered to act.’
As recently stated by the late Judge Charles E. Clark
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, ‘As a result of this
doctrine, individual litigants have been shuffled back and
forth between state and federal courts, and cases have been
dragged out over eight- and ten-year periods.’ Federal
Procedural Reform and States’ Rights, 40 TEX. L. REV.
211, 221 (1961).
Professor Charles A. Wright described the results that
occurred when this doctrine was applied to a suit to enjoin
the enforcement of a state statute restricting the rights of
state employees to join unions: ‘* * * after five years of
litigation, including two trips to the Supreme Court of the
United States and two to the highest state court, the parties
still had failed to obtain a decision on the merits of the
statute.’ The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L.
REV. 815, 818 (1959).
Id.
Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger served as chief justice from 1969 to 1986. See,
e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979); Harris County
Com’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975); Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S.
498 (1972).
86
397 U.S. 82, 85 (1970). In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, however, the Court
upheld the decision of a lower federal court which invalidated a Wisconsin statute providing
for public posting, without notice or hearing to the person affected, the name of any person
whose excessive drinking produced specified social problems. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).The
statute “forbid the sale or gift of intoxicating liquors to one who ‘by excessive drinking’
produces described conditions or exhibits specified traits, such as exposing himself or
family ‘to want’ or becoming ‘dangerous to the peace’ of the community.” Id. at 434. It
was argued that the statute violated both state and federal law. Id. Upon review, the United
States Supreme Court declined to abstain, stating, “the naked question, uncomplicated by an
unresolved state law, is whether that Act on its face is unconstitutional.” Id. at 439.
85
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The Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the Reetz and Constantineau decisions
in Harris County Commissioners Office v. Moore, in which the high Court ordered a federal
court in Texas to abstain in order to allow a Texas state court to construe relevant provisions
of the Texas Constitution. 420 U.S. 77 (1975). In Moore, a number of displaced justices of
the peace and constables, along with voters who had lived in their precincts, brought an
action for injunctive relief based on claim that the Texas statute pursuant to which they had
been removed violated due process and equal protection clauses of Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. The Texas statute provided for removal of justices of the peace and constables when
boundaries are changed and, as a result, more than the allotted number of justices or
constables reside within a changed district. Id. The Moore court noted that in Constantineu,
it had declined to order abstention because the “the federal due process claim was not
complicated by an unresolved state-law question, even though the plaintiffs might have
sought relief under a similar provision of the state constitution.” Id. at 85 n.8. However, the
Court continued, “where the challenged statute is part of an integrated scheme of related
constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations, and where the scheme as a whole calls
for clarifying interpretation by the state courts, we have regularly required the district courts
to abstain.” Id. (citing Reetz).
87
Reetz, 397 U.S. at 85. Federal litigants are not prohibited from litigating
constitutional claims in state court. The litigant who submits the claims to state court will
be bound by the state court decision and will not be able to avoid a contrary decision by relitigating the claims in federal court. England v. La. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411,
419 (1960).
Commentators have criticized this procedure because the “shuttling” of cases
between federal and state courts exacerbates the potential for delay already inherent in
Pullman abstention. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 at 305-06
(4th ed. 1983); Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1085 (1974) (where author observes
that substantial delay occurs due to “shuttling” between federal and state court). However,
the Court in England justified this delay because the federal plaintiff had the option of
avoiding the delay by submitting all issues to the state court. 375 U.S. at 418 (plaintiff may
waive the right to federal court and submit his entire case to the state courts, thus avoiding
much of the delay and expense associated with the abstention process).
Reetz involved a federal suit for declaratory judgment regarding the
constitutionality of Alaska fishing laws and regulations, which limited eligibility to receive
certain commercial fishing licenses. 397 U.S. at 83. The Reetz plaintiffs argued these
regulations violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as well as
provisions of the Alaska Constitution – one reserving fishing rights to the people and the
other proscribing exclusive fishing rights. Id. at 84. The case was decided by a federal
three-judge court, from which there was direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 85.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the federal court with directions to
abstain. Id. at 87. The Reetz Court cited Pullman’s doctrinal aim of avoiding “needless
friction” between federal pronouncements and state policies. Id. The Court stated, “[t]he
instant case is the classic case in that tradition, for here the nub of the whole controversy
may be the state constitution. Id. The constitutional provisions relate to fish resources, an
asset unique in its abundance in Alaska. Id. The statute and regulations relate to that same
unique resource, the management of which is a matter of great state concern.” Id.
Certification of unsettled state law issues to the state’s highest court may be effective
alternative to Pullman Abstention. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976)
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B. BURFORD AND THIBODAUX ABSTENTION
In its paradigmatic application, the Pullman doctrine involves
challenges to state action in which resolution of an unsettled question of
state law may eliminate or narrow a corresponding federal question.
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,88 and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux89 establish an alternative theory of abstention, sometimes
referred to as “administrative” abstention. Burford abstention recognizes
and gives deference to the sovereignty of state governments in carrying out
domestic policy, and endeavors to preempt conflict between state and
federal judiciaries.90 Burford abstention is intended to facilitate the federal
courts giving “proper regard for the rightful independence of state
governments in carrying out their domestic policy.”91
(certification saves time, energy and resources and aids in developing cooperative judicial
federalism).
88
319 U.S. 315 (1943).
89
360 U.S. 25 (1959).
90
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727-28 (1991).
91
Burford, 319 U.S. at 318 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185
(1935)). The Supreme Court applied Burford abstention, rather than Pullman, in Ala. Pub.
Serv. Comm. v. Southern R.R., and in doing so, provided the first glimpse of the doctrinal
juggernaut abstention would become. 341 U.S. 341 (1951). Chief Justice Vinson, writing
for the Court, conceded that there was no unsettled question of state law and there was no
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute; however, he reasoned:
This Court has held that regulation of intrastate
railroad service is ‘primarily the concern of the state.’. . .
.Statutory appeal from an order of the Commission is an
integral part of the regulatory process under the Alabama
Code. . . . And, whatever the scope of review of
Commission findings when an alleged denial of
constitutional rights is in issue, it is now settled that a
utility has no right to relitigate factual questions on the
ground that constitutional rights are involved. . . . As
adequate state court review of an administrative order
based upon predominantly local factors is available to
appellee, intervention of a federal court is not necessary for
the protection of federal rights. Equitable relief may be
granted only when the District Court, in its sound discretion
exercised with the ‘scrupulous regard for the rightful
independence of state governments which should at all
times actuate the federal courts,’ is convinced that the
asserted federal right cannot be preserved except by
granting the ‘extraordinary relief of an injunction in the
federal courts’. . . .
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Thibodaux involved a proceeding by the City of Thibodaux to take the
property of Louisiana Power & Light by eminent domain.92 Louisiana
Power & Light removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity

92

Id. at 346-50. The Supreme Court has not, however,
invoked the Burford abstention doctrine since Southern
Railroad. In McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., for example, the
Court refused to abstain in a school desegregation case in
which the state presented evidence of an administrative
procedure available to handle the dispute. 373 U.S. 668,
673-674 (1963). The majority opinion distinguished
McNeese from Burford, stating the federal right at issue
was not “in any way entangled in a skein of state law that
must be untangled before the federal case can proceed.” Id.
at 674. Moreover, the Court held, “it is immaterial whether
respondents’ conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state
law”. Id. Since Southern Railroad, the Court’s continued
recognition of the Burford abstention doctrine is limited to
discussion of the doctrine each time it eschews its
application. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1976)
(finding Burford abstention inappropriate because the state
law was settled and although a federal decision might
conflict with that of a state tribunal, it would not
impermissibly impair state water policy); Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705-06 (1992) (recognizing that
Burford abstention would be appropriately applied in a
domestic dispute that presents “difficult question of state
law bearing on the policy problems of substantial import
whose importance transcends the result in the case then at
bar,” but holding this is not that case); New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362
(1989) (refusing to apply Burford abstention and holding,
“[w]hile Burford is concerned with protecting complex
state administrative processes from undue federal
interference, it does not require abstention whenever there
exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a
‘potential for conflict’ with state regulatory law or
policy.”); Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 731 (1996)
(overturning Ninth Circuit’s application of Burford, stating
“federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases
based on abstention principles only where the relief being
sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary. Because this
was a damages action, we conclude that the District Court’s
remand order was an unwarranted application of the
Burford doctrine.”).
360 U.S. 25.
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of citizenship.93 The core issue addressed in the case was whether, as a
matter of Louisiana law, municipalities had authority to condemn public
utility properties.94 The action was stayed by the federal district court
pending a state declaratory judgment action and a decision by the Louisiana
Supreme Court.95 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court, but was in turn reversed by the United States Supreme Court.96
While the Supreme Court’s opinion in Thibodaux dedicates some time
to discussing competing views on the propriety of federal abstention,97 the
Court’s holding is foreshadowed in the opening lines of the opinion, which
incorporate a quote from Justice Holmes.98 “The fundamental fact is that
eminent domain is a prerogative of the state, which on the one hand, may
be exercised in any way that the state thinks fit, and, on the other, may not
be exercised except by an authority which the state confers.”99 Justice
Holmes words are no less than an oracle, for the Supreme Court directs the
lower federal courts to abstain, and the majority opinion concludes
extolling the wisdom of the district court judge who saw fit to stay the
matter.100 The Court’s holdings in Thibodaux and Burford, as well as those
later cases in which Burford abstention was not applied,101 reveal how
unpredictably the doctrine can be invoked.
93

Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
95
Id. at 30.
96
Id.
97
The Court notes, “[w]e have increasingly recognized the wisdom of staying
actions in the federal courts pending determination by a state court of decisive issues of state
law.” Id. at 27. However, the Court also recognizes, “that the mere difficulty of state law
does not justify a federal court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favor of state court
action.” Id.
98
La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26 (1959).
99
Id. (quoting Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239,
257 (1905).
100
Caught between the language of an old but uninterpreted statute and the
pronouncement of the Attorney General of Louisiana, the district judge determined to solve
his conscientious perplexity by directing utilization of the legal resources of Louisiana for a
prompt ascertainment of meaning through the only tribunal whose interpretation could be
controlling-the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The District Court was thus exercising a fair
and well-considered judicial discretion in staying proceedings pending the institution of a
declaratory judgment action and subsequent decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
See id. at 30.
101
See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996);
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 706 (1992); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.
Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 (1976).
94
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Regardless of the consistency in application, however, the ambition of
the abstention doctrine crafted in Burford and Thibodaux is a laudable one.
The doctrine seeks to secure the sovereignty of the states from federal
intrusion.102 A federalist system that mediates the dual sovereignty of the
state and federal governments is a defining feature of our system of
government.103 The concurrent sovereignty of the states is only limited by
the supremacy clause of the Constitution,104 and the federal government is,
by constitutional grant, a government of limited powers.105 Thus, the states
102

See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 33 (1959); Burford
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943).
103
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). For the advantages and
disadvantages of the dual sovereignty system see generally Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491 (1987);
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988).
Originally, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress could not directly
legislate the American people; it could only do so with the approval of the states. New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992) (“Congress could not directly tax or legislate
upon individuals; it had no explicit ‘legislative’ or ‘governmental’ power to make binding
‘law’ enforceable as such.”) (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty & Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425, 1447 (1987). The inadequacy of the federal government to directly
legislate was responsible in part for the Constitution Convention. Id. The Constitutional
Convention sought to restructure Congress and give it the power to legislate without the
need of state legislatures. Alexander Hamilton addressed this issue in The Federalist No. 16
by stating:
[the new national government] must carry its agency
to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no
intermediate legislations ... the government of the Union,
like that of each State, must be able to address itself
immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
During the Constitutional Convention, delegates debated two different plans – the Virginia
and New Jersey Plans – by which the federal government could exercise its powers. New
York, 505 U.S. at 164. Under the Virginia Plan, Congress could exercise legislative
authority directly without employing the states as intermediaries. Id. The New Jersey Plan
mirrored the status quo and Congress would continue to require the approval of the states
before legislating. Id. A repeated objection to the New Jersey Plan was that it might require
Congress to coerce the states into implementing legislation. Id. Consequently, the
Convention adopted a constitution in which Congress would exercise its legislative
authority directly over individuals, rather than over states. Id. at 165. One reason for
adopting the Virginia Plan was to avoid coercing states as separate sovereign entities.
Instead, Congress would be able to legally coerce individuals. Id.
104
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
105
U.S. CONST., amend. X.
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concede their sovereign authority only where the Constitution recognizes
the supremacy of federal authority.106
In essence, Burford abstention acknowledges that the state court
systems have been created by independent state legislatures as an integral
part of an administrative system that regulates activities of substantial
interest to the many states.107 State courts are given broad discretion to
participate in the development of regulatory policy,108 and Burford
abstention gives due recognition to this discretion by limiting federal
participation in any case in which exercise of federal jurisdiction may
interfere with a state’s development of a consistent regulatory policy.109
C. YOUNGER ABSTENTION: EQUITABLE RESTRAINT
The doctrine of equitable restraint established in Younger v. Harris110
has its origins in the English Courts of Chancery.111 It was a venerable
maxim of the Chancery Courts that equity will not enjoin a criminal
prosecution.112 The Chancery Courts also embraced the notion that equity
will not provide relief unless there is no adequate remedy at law and the

106

See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457.
See Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the
Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 4243 (1998) (discussing separation of powers issues raised by the administrative code of state
courts).
108
See id. Oftentimes state legislatures make the state courts an integral part of an
administrative system that regulates activities of substantial interest to the state. When
states grant regulatory power to their courts they grant two forms of discretion. First, they
grant discretion to devise remedies that are appropriate given the particular facts at issue.
Second, they vest in the courts the discretion to decide whether to grant relief at all.
109
Courts are divided on whether Burford abstention must be premises upon the
existence of prior state administrative agency action. Compare Quackenbush v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 733 (1996) (Kennedy J. concurring) (“[t]he fact that a state
court rather than an agency was chosen to implement California scheme provided more
reason, not less, for the Federal Court to stay its hand.”); Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497,
500-01 (7th Cir. 1995) (agencies role in dispute was not essential to Burford abstention) and
Friedman v. Revenue Mgmt., 38 F.3d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1994) (Burford abstention
appropriate in absence of agency action) with St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 589
(5th Cir. 1994) (“[t]he concerns of governing the Burford abstention doctrine are not present
in the instant case. St. Paul’s lawsuit does not involve a state administrative proceeding.”).
110
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
111
Id. at 44.
112
Shapiro, supra note 50, at 550 n. 37.
107
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plaintiff is threatened with irreparable injury.113 These principles were
adopted in the states in the First Judiciary Act, which stated, “suits in
equity shall not be sustained in ... the courts of United States, in any case
where plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law.”114 This
provision, however, precluded equitable relief only if the remedy was
available in law in a federal court; it did not alter a criminal defendant’s
right to a federal forum.115
The doctrine of Younger abstention116 holds, “a federal court should
not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the
federal suit except in very unusual situations, where necessary to prevent
immediate irreparable injury.”117 The Younger doctrine speaks to the
relationship between the courts of the United States and those of its former

113
Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court
Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REV. 591, 598.
114
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 16, 1 STAT. 82 (1789).
115
Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 569 (1939).
116
See generally Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 689; New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc.,, 491
U.S. 350 (1989); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988). The Younger doctrine has
been criticized by scholars. See, e.g., Owen W. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103,
1117-1120 (1977); Judge Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 10871088 (1978); Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for
Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 194; Aviam Soifer & Hugh C. MacGill, The
Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1141-1143
(1977).
117
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68 (1971). See also Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 816 (1976) (observing that “abstention is inappropriate
where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction
has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings.”). Although the
Younger doctrine has equitable origins, the Supreme Court has, in large part, abandoned the
equitable foundation in cases subsequent to Younger. See George D. Brown, When
Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide – Rethinking the Younger Abstention 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 114, 120 n.56 (1990) (post Younger cases have strayed form the equitable
rationale); Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co.,
v. Texaco Inc., 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1007 (1989) (Younger’s progeny toppled the
equitable pillar in favor of federalism and comity); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeus
Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1042 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court has eroded the
equitable foundation to the doctrine). Numerous lower court cases have addressed Younger
as a case based on comity and federalism as opposed to equity. See, e.g. Warmus v.
Melahn, 62 F.3d 252, 255 (8th Cir. 1995) vacated 116 S. Ct. 2493 (1996) (Younger
Abstention has its roots in comity and federalism); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1084
n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (Younger doctrine is founded in federalism and comity); Gwyned
Properties v. Lower Gwyned Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1199-2000 (3d Cir. 1992) (Younger
abstention arose primarily from the notion of comity).

144

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

colonial master. It is also yet another iteration of the federal courts mantra
to avoid “undue interference” with state court proceedings.118
The Supreme Court subsequently extended the application of Younger
abstention to “civil enforcement proceedings,119 [including] civil
proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the
state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”120 The Supreme
Court, in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,121
articulated a three part test for Younger’s application: (1) the proceedings
must be ongoing;122 (2) the proceedings must implicate important state
interests;123 and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state court
proceeding to raise constitutional challenges.124
Prior to the Court’s decision in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,125 there existed, however, a question as to whether Younger abstention
was appropriate when a state court defendant sought legal relief.126 Before
118

Several federal courts have concluded that adjudication of damages actions does
not “unduly” interfere with state proceedings to a level contemplated by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995).
119
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368
(1989) (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)); Trainor v. Hernandez,
431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). In Huffman v. Pursue
Ltd. the court expanded Younger to encompass quasi-criminal cases. 420 U.S. 592, 607
(1975). In Moore v. Simms the court applied Younger to a Texas child welfare agency case
involving the loss of custody of a child based on allegations of child abuse. 442 U.S. 415,
431 (1979). See also, Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447 (1977) (applying Younger
to attachment proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1977) (applying Younger
to appeals of contempt of court and judgment creditor actions). Younger has also been
applied to non-judicial cases. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian
Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 622 (1986); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237-38
(1984).
120
New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 368 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
336, n.12 (1977) (civil contempt order); Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13 (1987) (requirement for
the posting of bond pending appeal).
121
457 U.S. 423 (1982).
122
Id. at 432.
123
Id.
124
Id.; see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch. Inc., 477 U.S.
619, 619-620, 628-629 (1986) (holding that even if complainants in an administrative
hearing could not raise First Amendment objections, it was sufficient that the objections
could be raised in judicial review of the administrative hearings by the state courts).
125
517 U.S. 706 (1996).
126
Id. at 719 (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202, & n.6 (1988)
(reserving the question whether Younger requires abstention in an action for damages)); see
also Jeremy D. Sosna, Comment, Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Continuing
Saga of the Younger Doctrine, 82 IOWA L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1996).
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Quackenbush was decided, a considerable number of federal district courts
were applying the Younger doctrine and abstaining from hearing a matter
when legal relief was being sought by the federal court plaintiff.127 A
unanimous court in Quackenbush held that a federal district court does not
have the authority to abstain when the district court plaintiff seeks only
non-discretionary relief.128 While the Quackenbush decision only expressly
spoke in relation to Burford abstention, the context of and equitable
justifications for Younger abstention, support an argument that
Quackenbush may also constrain a federal court’s power to invoke the
principles of Younger in cases at law.129
D. BRILLHART V. EXCESS INSURANCE COMPANY
The exercise of federal jurisdiction under the FDJA is discretionary.130
It is not surprising then that the question of whether a federal court should
127
See, e.g., Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1083-84 n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (electing
to stay proceedings rather than adjudicate a §1983 damages action ), Simpson v. Rowan, 73
F.3d 134, 137-39 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Younger doctrine authorizes the court to
stay the damages action pending the outcome of state court proceedings while not directly
permitting abstention); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1992)
(dictum) (inferring that dismissal of a damages action pursuant to Younger was proper;
however, the court did not address the issue because the parties waived application of the
abstention doctrine), Traverso v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir 1989) (staying the federal
damages action), Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1988) (also staying
federal damages action), Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (where damages
action would “have a substantially disruptive effect upon ongoing state proceedings
Younger abstention may be appropriate”), Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193-194 (2d
Cir. 1981) (staying a damages action pursuant to the Younger doctrine), Parkhurst v.
Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775, 777-78 (10th Cir. 1981) (also staying a damages action); McCurry
v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1979) rev’d on other grounds, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)
(staying a damages action).
128
In Quackenbush, the court did not delineate between broad categories of
“equitable” or legal relief. 517 U.S. 706, 730. The court also reviewed various abstention
doctrines as a function of “the historic discretion exercised by federal courts ‘sitting in
equity.’” Id. at 716-718. After distinguishing all authority to the contrary, the court held
that abstention in damages actions contravened the principles of abstention. Id. at 720-21.
129
See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-97 n.3 (1975).
130
Under the FDJA, a federal court “may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2001) (emphasis added). Federal jurisdiction in
Pullman abstention cases is not discretionary; jurisdiction exists over federal questions
pursuant to the 1875 Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. Federal
jurisdiction in Burford abstention cases likely arises through diversity of citizenship;
jurisdiction in federal diversity cases was granted to the federal courts in the Judiciary Act
of 1789. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 79. Federal jurisdiction in Younger
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abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in suits brought under the FDJA
generated yet another test for application of the abstention doctrine.131 The
question of whether a federal court should abstain from hearing a claim
brought under the FDJA most commonly arises when a parallel case is
pending in state court at the time the federal court is presented with the
declaratory judgment suit.132 Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America
sets forth the analysis to be applied by the federal courts in exercising their
discretion to deny jurisdiction in these concurrent federal cases.133
In fact, Brillhart itself involved a request for declaratory judgment
brought by Excess Insurance Company of America in federal court while a
state suit was pending. Excess asked the federal court to define the extent
and nature of Excess’s obligations in the pending state court proceeding.134
The Brillhart court found that it would “ordinarily be uneconomical as well
as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit
where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues,
not governed by federal law, between the same parties.”135
The Brillhart analysis is designed for consideration of issues of comity,
judicial economy, and federalism.136 These issues arise when a petition for
declaratory judgment is filed in federal court pursuant to the FDJA, and
over which the federal court has discretionary jurisdiction, when there is a
separate pending state court case that involves additional state law issues.137
This is particularly true if the state action includes non-removable state
court claims or a forum defendant is named in the state action, precluding
its removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
The Brillhart Court declined to establish a test for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction, however, the lower federal courts have developed from
the holding a three-pronged test for determining whether jurisdiction is
abstention cases arises from the grant in the First Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, 1 Stat. 82.
131
In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Supreme Court found that the
various forms of the abstention doctrine had been extended to “certain classes of declaratory
judgments…, the granting of which is generally committed to the court’s discretion.” 517
U.S. at 718. It is interesting to note that in Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297298 (1943) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69, 72-73 (1971) the Supreme Court
recognized that the actions were brought pursuant to the FDJA but did not exercise
discretion under this statute; rather, it applied a different form of the abstention doctrine.
132
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Knight, 96 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996).
133
316 U.S. 491, 495-96 (1942).
134
Id. at 492-93.
135
Id. at 495.
136
Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d, 1220 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1998).
137
See id. at 1224.
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appropriately exercised. The lower federal courts have identified some
variation of the following three factors: (1) a district court should avoid
needless determination of state law issues; (2) it should discourage litigants
from filing declaratory judgment actions as a means of forum shopping;138
138

This factor really asks whether the parties are “forum shopping.” The term
“forum shopping” typically refers to a party’s act of seeking the most advantageous venue in
which to try a particular case. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whiteford, Venue
Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 14 (1991) (attempting to have a case heard in a forum
where it has the greatest chance of success is commonly defined as “forum shopping”); see
also Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 268 (1996) (when a party attempts to have its action tried in a
particular court or jurisdiction where the most favorable judgment or verdict may be
rendered is “forum shopping”). Although “forum shopping” has a pejorative connotation,
various courts have recognized the place of forum shopping as part of potential sound
litigation strategy. See, e.g., Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987)
(“there is nothing inherently evil about forum shopping”). The court in Celotex called
forum shopping a “spectre, or ... strawman depending on whose ox is being gored.” Id. at
512. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779
(1984), approvingly refers to the forum shopping strategy, calling it “no different from the
litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable substantive or
procedural rules for sympathetic, local populations.” See generally Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815,
825-26 (1987) (recognizing that once two different courts are available in which to litigate
disputes, there is an incentive to forum shop). Indeed, selecting a forum is part of the social
fabric. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevancy of the Duty of Care
Standard and Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1990) (documenting the
reincorporation of many firms in Delaware to seek the protection of a new statute limiting
directors’ liability). Convenience of counsel may be a strong motivator in the choice of
forums. See Neal Miller, An Emperical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 400 (1992).
Commentators have written about the abuse of forum shopping. See Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Isenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1507, 1508 n.1 (1995) (discussing examples of plaintiffs seeking venues in certain
south Texas counties where judges are sympathetic and juries are generous). See also Coast
Mfg. Co, Inc.. v. Keylon, 600 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In that case, the court refused
Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs’ forum shopping efforts:
[I]t is understandable that litigants will do a small
amount of artful conniving to gain access to the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts, and for a long time such
efforts have been tolerated. It is our duty to protect the
diversity jurisdiction from abuses of the sort attempted
here. In doing so, we need not become punitive.
Id. at 698.
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and (3) its should avoid duplicative litigation.139 These factors are not,
however, exhaustive. An Article III court may also consider, for example,
whether a subsequent declaratory judgment action (either in federal or state
court) is filed merely for the purposes of procedural fencing.140
E. COLORADO RIVER WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT V. UNITED
STATES
The validity of the Brillhart analysis was called into question in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, in which the
Pullman, Burford, and Younger abstention doctrines were summarized by
the Court.141 The Court there identified three situations in which it was
appropriate for a federal court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction,
which correspond to the three abstention doctrines discussed above:
(a) Abstention is appropriate ‘in cases presenting a federal
constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a
different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state
law.’
(b) Abstention is also appropriate where there have been
presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar.
c) Finally, abstention is appropriate where, absent bad faith,
harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction
has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal
proceedings, state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal
prosecution which are directed at obtaining the closure of places
exhibiting obscene films, or collection of state taxes.142 (citations
omitted).
The Colorado River court held that abstaining from exercising federal
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. The court stated that
“[a]bdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under [the
abstention] doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order
139
140
141
142

Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225.
Id. at 1225 n.5.
424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Id. at 814-16.
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to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important
countervailing interest.”143 The court went on to identify the “exceptional
circumstances” that would justify federal abstention as those that exist
when there are concurrent proceedings in the state and federal courts and
considerations of “wise judicial administration, giving regard to
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of
litigation” suggest that the federal court should abstain.144
The “exceptional circumstances” test set forth in Colorado River was
subsequently affirmed and expanded in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp.145 The Moses H. Cone court formulated
two additional factors for the “exceptional circumstances” test: (1) the
determination of which forum’s substantive law would govern the merits of
the litigation; and (2) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the rights
of the parties.146 The Court emphasized the federal courts’ “virtually
unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given to them.147 In spite
143

Id. at 813.
Id. at 817-18.
145
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
146
Id. at 23-27. Five justices in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and four dissenters) supported the consideration of controlling state law as a new
factor. 437 U.S. 665, 667-68 (Blackmun, J. concurring); Id. at 668-677 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
147
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983).
After Moses H. Cone, the circuit courts were divided over which standard governed a
district court’s decision to stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment action where there were
parallel state proceedings. The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth circuits applied the
discretionary standard articulated in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491,
497-98 (1942) and Calvert, 319 U.S. at 663. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm
Bureau Fed’n Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding Colorado River and
Moses H. Cone inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions); Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d
235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1992) (also holding the “exceptional circumstances” test of Colorado
River and Moses H. Cone inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions); Terra Nova Ins. Co.
v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1223 n.12 (3d Cir. 1989); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus.,
947 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1991); Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361,
1366 (9th Cir. 1991) (Colorado River test does not apply to declaratory relief actions
because they have “special status”).
However, other circuit courts applied the narrow exceptional circumstances test
developed in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
813 (1976), and expanded in Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 15-16. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of
Wausau v. Mo. Elec. Works, 23 F.3d 1372, 1374 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994) (following Colorado
River and Moses H. Cone, the district court was not justified in staying or dismissing a
declaratory relief action absent “exceptional circumstances”); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1986) (also holding that district court
should have considered Colorado River and Moses H. Cone applicable). A middle ground
144
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of the Court’s reiteration of this directive, the proposition Colorado
River148 stands for is: if the case does not fall within the narrow holdings of
Pullman, Burford and Younger, there are other principles which may also
be invoked so as to result in the federal court’s abstention.149
F. WILTON V. SEVEN FALLS COMPANY
The disparate standards set forth in Colorado River and Brillhart
resulted in a split in the federal courts regarding the proper test for
abstention in a federal declaratory judgment action.150 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case of Wilton v. Seven Falls Company expressly
for the purpose of “resolv[ing] Circuit conflicts concerning the standard
governing a district court’s decision to stay a declaratory judgment action
in favor of parallel state litigation and the applicable standard for an
appellate court’s review of a district court’s decision to stay a declaratory
judgment action.”151
In determining that Brillhart properly governs the abstention question
in causes of action brought under the FDJA, the Supreme Court noted the
difficulty of reconciling the jurisdictional mandate inherent in the Colorado
River “exceptional circumstances” requirement with the discretionary
nature of federal declaratory judgment jurisdiction.152 The Court reiterated
with approval Professor Borchard’s observation that “[t]here is ... nothing

between these two positions can be found. See, e.g., Fuller Co. v. Ramon I. Gil, Inc., 782
F.2d 306, 308-11 (1st Cir. 1986) (where the state court has expended significant resources
through the adjudicatory process of the state law claims, federal courts may decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action).
148
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814-17.
149
Id. at 817 (stating that “[a]lthough this case falls within none of the abstention
categories, there are principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional
adjudication and regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the
contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state
and federal courts.”).
150
Compare Employers Ins. of Wausau, 23 F.3d at 1374, n.2 (applying “exceptional
circumstances” test of Colorado River and Moses H. Cone), and Lumbermens, 806 F.2d at
413 (2d Cir. 1986) (also applying Colorado River and Moses H. Cone), with La. Farm
Bureau, 996 F.2d at 778 n.12 (the “exceptional circumstances” test of Colorado River and
Moses H. Cone is inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions), and Mitcheson, 955 F.2d at
237-238 (also holding that there are no reasons to apply Colorado River in declaratory
judgment cases).
151
515 U.S. 277, 281 (1995) (citations omitted).
152
Id. at 286-89.
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automatic or obligatory about the assumption of ‘jurisdiction’ by a federal
court”153 to hear a declaratory judgment action. Rather, the Court declared:
By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a remedial
arrow in the district court’s quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a
duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants. Consistent with
the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in the
sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a
declaratory judgment before trial or after all arguments have drawn to a
close. In the declaratory judgment context, the normal principle that federal
courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to
considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration.154
Thus, the Wilton court concluded that the principles of comity, judicial
economy, and federalism incorporated into the Brillhart test are those that
are determinative of the federal courts’ exercise of jurisdiction in
declaratory judgment actions.155
The Wilton Court left open, however, an important question of
jurisdictional procedure. The Court specifically narrowed application of its
holding, stating, “[w]e do not attempt at this time to delineate the outer
boundaries of that discretion in other cases, for example, cases raising
issues of federal law or cases in which there are no parallel state
proceedings.”156 Relevant to the insurance coverage context is the question
of abstention when an insurer has brought a federal suit for declaratory
judgment while the injured plaintiff litigates the defendant tortfeasor’s
liability in an underlying state court suit. On the face of it, two such cases
do not meet requirements of Brillhart, that is, they do not “present[] the
same issues ... between the same parties.”157 Brillhart’s application to an
insurance coverage issue becomes slightly more convoluted, however, once
the liability and damages claim is concluded and the injured state court
plaintiff files an action for garnishment against the insurer.158
G. FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS POST-WILTON
Federal circuit court decisions answering the Wilton question have
yielded inconsistent results. On the one hand, there is a disheartening trend
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 288.
Id.
Id. at 289-90.
Id. at 290.
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id.
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among the circuit courts to inflate the boundaries of Brillhart abstention in
insurance coverage actions and to view the “parallel state proceeding” as
only a factor to be considered in applying Wilton, rather than a predicate to
Wilton’s application.159 The circuit courts’ movement toward unjustified
and mechanical invocation of the abstention doctrine is most poignantly
reflected in the recent decisions of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal in
Travelers Indemnity Company v. Bowling Green Professional Associates,
P.L.C.160 The Bowling Green decision demonstrates that, in practice, some
federal courts have moved so far from the origins of the abstention doctrine
that the juridical policies once mirrored in the doctrine are now reflected
only as a tarnished doubt as to the propriety of the federal courts’ actions.
There are, however, other federal decisions to consider. There are
opinions out of the Eighth,161 Tenth,162 and Fourth163 circuits that mitigate
the impact of decisions like Bowling Green. These courts recognize that
159

See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 423 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding “[t]here is no requirement that a parallel proceeding be pending in state court
before a federal court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment
action ... the existence or nonexistence of a state court action is simply one consideration
relevant to whether to grant declaratory relief.”); Polido v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
110 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he dispositive question is not whether the pending
state proceeding is ‘parallel,’ but rather, whether there was a procedural vehicle available to
the insurance company in state court to resolve the issues raised in the action filed in federal
court.”); Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cos., 95 F.3d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the existence of a parallel state court proceeding is a “major factor” in the
determination, but “the absence of a parallel state proceeding is not necessarily dispositive;
the potential for such a proceeding may suffice.”); Employers Reins. Corp. v. Karussos, 65
F.3d 796, 799-801 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that district court erred in accepting jurisdiction
in insurance coverage declaratory judgment action on duties to defend and indemnify state
court suit, where the state court action was purely a tort action and did not involve issues of
coverage). Polido, Golden Eagle, and Karussos have all been overruled on other grounds
by Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
when district court has constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to hear case under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, district court may entertain action without sua sponte addressing
whether jurisdiction should be declined). See also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes
County, 343 F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2003) (“This court finds that a per se rule requiring a
district court to hear a declaratory judgment action is inconsistent with the discretionary
Brillhart and Wilton standard.... The lack of a pending parallel state proceeding should not
automatically require a district court to decide a declaratory judgment action, just as the
presence of a related state proceeding does not automatically require a district court to
dismiss a federal declaratory judgment action.”).
160
495 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2007).
161
Scottsdale v. Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 2005).
162
United States v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 2002).
163
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 422 (4th Cir. 1998).
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the parallel state court proceeding is a prerequisite to application of the
broad discretionary standard of Wilton.164 These courts hold that, in the
absence of a parallel state court proceeding, an alternative analysis has to
be applied to determine whether the federal court should exercise or abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction.165 Emblematic of these courts reasoning is
the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Scottsdale v. Detco Indus., Inc.166
1. Bowling Green
Bowling Green involved a Kentucky state court suit for wrongful death
and an action for declaratory judgment brought in the Kentucky District
Court.167 The state court suit for liability and damages was brought against
Bowling Green Professional Associates, an out-patient drug treatment
facility in Kentucky, after Bowling Green allowed one of its patients, Jonas
Wampler, to drive after receiving a methadone treatment.168 Mr. Wampler
navigated his vehicle into the oncoming traffic lane and collided head on
with another vehicle, driven by Stephanie Caudill, causing the death of
both Mr. Wampler and Ms. Caudill.169 Both Mr. Wampler and Ms. Caudill
brought a wrongful death action against Bowling Green.170 The federal
declaratory judgment action was brought by Bowling Green’s insurer,
Travelers Indemnity Company.171
Bowling Green’s other insurer,
Evanston Insurance Company, cross-claimed, seeking declaratory
164

Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 996-998 (broad discretion granted in Wilton does not apply
when there are no parallel state court proceedings); Las Cruces, 289 F.3d at 1182-84
(requirement that district courts first determine whether the federal and state proceedings are
parallel before considering Colorado River abstention analysis is consistent with the
narrowness of the doctrine); Aetna Casualty, 139 F.3d at 423 (noting the existence of a
parallel state court proceeding should be a significant factor in the district court’s
determination).
165
Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 998 (applying a six factor test to determine whether
abstention by the district court would be appropriate in a declaratory judgment action in
which there are no parallel state court proceedings); Las Cruces, 289 F.3d. at 1183
(applying Mhoon five factor analysis in absence of parallel proceedings); Aetna Casualty,
139 F.3d at 423 (holding that even in the absence of a state court proceeding, the criteria
outlined in Quarles, as well as the considerations of federalism, continue to be factors which
the district court should balance when determining to assert jurisdiction over a declaratory
judgment action).
166
426 F.3d 994 (2005).
167
495 F.3d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 2007).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 269.
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judgment on the coverage issue as well.172 The Kentucky District Court
granted the insurers’ motions for declaratory judgment and Bowling Green
appealed.173 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sua sponte
raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.174
In considering whether the federal district court abused its discretion in
exercising jurisdiction under the FDJA, the Bowling Green court
considered the five factors enumerated in Grand Truck W. R.R. Co. v.
Consol Rail Co.175 Namely:
(1)
whether the declaratory action would settle the
controversy; (2) whether the declaratory action would serve a
useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations in issue; (3) whether
the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of
“procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race for res
judicata;” (4) whether the use of a declaratory action would
increase friction between our federal and state courts and
improperly encroach on state jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is
an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.176
The Sixth Circuit supplemented its analysis with three additional
factors it previously recognized in Scottsdale Insurance Company v.
Roumph.177 These include:
(1)
whether the underlying factual issues are important to
an informed resolution of the case; (2) whether the state trial court
is in a better position to evaluate those factual issues than is the
federal court; and (3) whether there is a close nexus between the
underlying factual and legal issues and state law and/or public
policy, or whether federal common law or statutory law dictates a
resolution of the declaratory judgment action.178
172
173

Id.
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Prof’l Assoc., 495 F.3d 266, 269 (6th Cir.

2007).

174
175

Id. at 271.
Id. (citing Grand Truck W. R.R. Co. v. Consol Rail Co, 746 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.

1984)).

176
177
178

Id. at 271.
Id. (citing Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Roumph, 211 F.3d 964, 967 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Id.
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As to the first two factors, the Sixth Circuit took exception to the
District Court’s finding that these factors favored an exercise of
jurisdiction, holding instead that because the “district court’s decision
could not settle the controversy in the underlying state court litigation,”
these factors weighed in favor of abstention.179
The appellate court recognized that the declaratory judgment action
would clarify the legal obligations of the two insurers, however, it held that
the declaratory judgment action did nothing to settle the controversy or
clarify the legal relationship between the other parties.180 As to the third
179

2007).

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Prof’l Assoc., 495 F.3d 266, 269 (6th Cir.

180
Id at 272. The court noted that the two individuals that had brought wrongful
death suits against Bowling Green, Mr. Wampler and Ms. Caudill, were not named as
defendants in the declaratory judgment action, and as non-parties, they would not be bound
by the entry of declaratory judgment. Id.
However, had the claims of Mr. Wampler and Ms. Caudill been consolidated with
the declaratory judgment action, they could have been heard in federal court. Id. The
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear state law claims brought jointly
with a federal claim in federal court wherein a case is removed to federal court, even though
the state law claims could not have been brought separately in federal court because by
themselves they do not have an independent basis in federal jurisdiction. See Richard D.
Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34, 34
(1987); Arthur R. Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEXAS L.J. 1, 1 (1985);
Note, Problems of Judicial Power and Discretion in Federal Pendent Jurisdiction Cases, 7
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 689, 690 (1981). In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725-27 (1966), the Supreme Court constructed a two prong test for pendent jurisdiction.
The state law claims must be closely related to the action which is within the court’s
statutory jurisdiction. First, “power” exists to hear the state claim brought with the federal
claim if both claims derive from a “common nucleus of operative facts: and the claims are
such that plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding . . .
.” Id. at 725. This power need not be exercised in every case because its justification lied in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not
present a federal court should dismiss the claims without prejudice. Id. at 726-27. An
intermediate part of the test was added after Gibbs which requires the court to determine
whether the exercise of jurisdiction would violate a particular federal policy or whether it is
an attempt by plaintiff to manufacture federal jurisdiction when it is otherwise foreclosed by
statute. Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 989-90 (3d Cir. 1984).
Both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are judicial doctrines that permit a Federal Court to
exercise jurisdiction over a party or claim normally not within the scope of federal judicial
power. Bradford Gram Swing, Federal Common Law Power to Remand a Properly
Removed Case, 136 U.PA. L. REV. 583, 584 n.9 (1987). Pendent jurisdiction concerns the
resolution of a plaintiff’s federal and state law claims against a single defendant in one
action while ancillary jurisdiction, on the other hand, typically involves claims by a
defending party hauled into court against his will, or by another person whose rights might
be irretrievably lost unless he can assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court. Owen
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factor, both courts agreed that there was no evidence that the declaratory
judgment action brought by the insurers was an attempt at “procedural
fencing” or a “race to judgment.”181
As to the forth factor, the Court of Appeals once again took issue with
the District Court’s holding, concluding instead that the Kentucky state
court was in a better position to evaluate the terms and exclusions in the
insurance contracts because they involved pure questions of state law.182 In
particular, the Court of Appeals held that Kentucky law would govern the
determination of whether Bowling Green’s act of allowing Mr. Wampler to
leave the facility and drive his car was part of Mr. Wampler’s medical
treatment and therefore constituted “medical negligence.”183 The Court of
Appeals held, “[n]egligence questions are largely reserved to the states,”
and “[h]ere, it appears that the issue has not been squarely resolved under
Kentucky law.”184
The Sixth Circuit further explained that the fourth factor did not fall in
favor of exercising federal jurisdiction because “insurance contract
interpretation are questions of state law with which the Kentucky state
courts are more familiar and, therefore, better able to resolve.”185 In a
statement that is reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court’s holdings
in Burford and Thibodaux, the appellate court noted, “states regulate
insurance companies for the protection of their residents, and state courts
are best situated to identify and enforce the public policies that form the
foundation of such regulation.”186

Equipment Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370, 376 (1977). Ancillary jurisdiction often arises
in the context of counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims and interpleaders. Id. at
375.
181
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Prof’l Assoc., 495 F.3d 266, 272 (6th Cir.
2007).
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 273.
186
Id.; See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Roumph, 211 F.3d 964, 968-69 (6th Cir. 2000);
Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Danis Bldg. Constr. Co., No. 99-3987, 2000 WL 1234321, at *2
(6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2000); Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 923 F.2d 446, 448 (6th
Cir. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mercier, 913 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1990); Am. Home
Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir. 1986); Manley, Bennett, McDonald &
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 460, 462 (6th Cir. 1986).). But see, Gov’t
Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that “there is no
presumption in favor of abstention in declaratory actions generally, nor in insurance
coverage cases specifically.”).
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The court further noted that the “lack of clearly-settled Kentucky
precedent on the issue is compounded by the lack of a factual record.”187 It
then compressed its analysis of the supplemental Roumph factors into a
brief consideration of the fourth factor articulated in Grand Truck.188 The
court noted that the fifth factor weighed in favor of state court jurisdiction,
and then concluded by vacating the District Court’s judgment and
remanding189 the matter with instructions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.190
As the Bowling Green court’s analysis demonstrates, if a federal court
is inclined to decline jurisdiction by invoking the abstention doctrine, the
abstention analysis is fluid enough to allow it to do so.191 The Bowling
Green court predicated its decision to abstain on 1) the existence of a
dispute regarding the proper interpretation of the insurance contract and 2)
a question of negligence, both of which the Court held were appropriately
reserved for the states.192 The existence of a dispute regarding insurance
contract interpretation is, however, the sine qua non of this genus of
declaratory judgment action. And, the coverage dispute that involves some
question of negligence is by no means a legal anomaly. If these are
appropriate grounds for federal abstention, it is difficult to imagine a
declaratory judgment action that would be appropriately heard by a federal
court. The Kentucky District Court simply did not reach very far into its
reserve before selecting an excuse upon which to base its decision to
abstain. This type of irresponsible invocation of abstention is what makes
the doctrine such a juridical vice.

187

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Assoc., 495 F.3d 266, 273 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id.
189
Id. Orders denying remand are interlocutory in nature and, thus, are not
reviewable except as part of an appeal from final judgment. See Cervantez v. Bexar County
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 99 F.3d. 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1996) (reviewing denial of remand as part
of review of final judgment).
“An order remanding a case to the State Court from which it was removed is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §1447(d) (1994). The span on appellate
review is limited to remand based on the two grounds enumerated in §1447(c). See Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1975) (“section 1447(d) must be read in
pari materiai with section 1447(c) . . . .”).
190
Bowling Green, 495 F.3d at 273-74. Abstention results in either a stay or
dismissal of the federal actions. See, e.g., La. Power and Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S.
25, 30-31 (1959) (stay); Harris County Comm’r Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1975)
(dismissal).
191
Bowling Green, 495 F.3d at 271-74.
192
Id. at 272-73.
188
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2. Scottsdale v. Detco Indus., Inc.
Detco Industries, Inc., which was insured by Scottsdale Insurance
Company, was named as a defendant in multiple class action lawsuits in
Arkansas state court stemming from a 2004 explosion at its facility in
Conway, Arkansas.193 Subsequent to the commencement of the state court
actions, Scottsdale sought a federal declaratory judgment from the
Arkansas District Court that it was not obligated to indemnify or defend
Detco in the state court actions.194 Detco argued for federal abstention, and
the District Court granted Detco’s motion. Scottsdale appealed the matter
to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.195
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion opens with citation to the “exceptional
circumstances” mandate set forth by the Supreme Court in Colorado
River.196 The Court noted, however, that in Wilton, the Supreme Court held
that “a federal district court has much broader discretion in determining
whether to exercise jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action during the
pendency of parallel state court proceedings.”197 The Court of Appeals
recognized that Wilton expressly left unanswered the question of whether
abstention was appropriate in cases in which there is no parallel state
proceeding.198
The threshold question the court turned to then was whether there was
a parallel proceeding pending in state court at the time Scottsdale brought
its action for federal declaratory judgment.199 The Eighth Circuit answered
that question in the negative, relying in large part on the requirement that
the parallel suit involve the “same issues … between the same parties,” as
set forth by the Supreme Court in Brillhart and later reiterated by the
Fourth Circuit in New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers of America.200 The court noted that Scottsdale was not a
defendant in the state court suit and the state court matters did not involve
the same issues as the declaratory judgment action, which was limited to a
determination of coverage.201
193

Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 997.
200
946 F.2d 1072, 1073 (4th Cir. 1991); Scottsdale v. Detco Indus. Inc., 426 F.3d
994, 997 (8th Cir. 2005).
201
Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 997.
194
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Having determined there was no parallel state proceeding, the court
then inquired into whether abstention may be appropriately exercised by a
federal court entertaining jurisdiction under the FDJA.202 The Court of
Appeals read Wilton as granting the federal courts greater latitude in
exercising or abstaining from exercising their jurisdiction only when there
is a parallel state proceeding.203 While the court declined to return to the
“exceptional circumstances” standard of Colorado River when no parallel
proceeding exists, it did hold that the considerations of practicality and
wise judicial administration that allow a district court to exercise greater
discretion than otherwise granted by the FDJA were diminished and
abstention would, accordingly, be inappropriate.204 Thus, the court struck a
balance between the standard of Colorado River and Wilton by “allowing
the federal district court some, but not complete, discretion in determining
whether to dismiss or stay declaratory judgment actions when there are no
parallel state court proceedings.”205

202

Id.
Id.
204
Id. at 999. As the Court notes in Scottsdale, the holding concurs with the holdings
of a number of other circuit court holdings. See, e.g., United States v. City of Las Cruces,
289 F.3d 1170, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002) (establishing a five factor test for cases in which there
is no pending parallel state action: (1) whether a declaratory action would settle the
controversy; (2) whether it would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at
issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of procedural
fencing or to provide an arena for a race to res judicata; (4) whether use of declaratory
action would increase friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach
upon state jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or
more effective); Scottsdale, 211 F.3d at 968 (examining the question of federal abstention
when there is no parallel state proceeding under the same factors as articulated by the court
in Las Cruces); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Electric Co., 139 F.3d 419, 422 (4th
Cir. 1998) (per curium) (defining a six part test for cases in which there is no parallel state
court proceeding: (1) whether the declaratory judgment sought “will serve a useful purpose
in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue”; (2) whether the declaratory judgment
“will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise
to the [federal] proceeding”; (3) “the strength of the state’s interest in having the issues
raised in the federal declaratory judgment action decided in the state courts”; (4) “whether
the issues raised in the federal action can more efficiently be resolved in the court in which
the state action is pending”; (5) “whether permitting the federal action to go forward would
result in unnecessary ‘entanglement’ between the federal and state court systems, because of
the presence of ‘overlapping issues of fact or law’ “; and (6) “whether the declaratory
judgment action is being used merely as a device for ‘procedural fencing’–that is, ‘to
provide another forum in a race for res judicata’ or ‘to achiev[e] a federal hearing in a case
otherwise not removable.’”).
205
Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 998.
203
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The Eighth Circuit then applied the six-factor test articulated by the
Fourth Circuit in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Electric
Company206 – in substance, the same test that the Sixth Circuit applied in
Bowling Green. That test considers: (1) whether the declaratory judgment
sought “will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal
relations in issue”; (2) whether the declaratory judgment “will terminate
and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving
rise to the [federal] proceeding”; (3) “the strength of the state’s interest in
having the issues raised in the federal declaratory judgment action decided
in the state courts”; (4) “whether the issues raised in the federal action can
more efficiently be resolved in the court in which the state action is
pending”; (5) “whether permitting the federal action to go forward would
result in unnecessary ‘entanglement’ between the federal and state court
systems, because of the presence of ‘overlapping issues of fact or law’”;
and (6) “whether the declaratory judgment action is being used merely as a
device for ‘procedural fencing’-that is, ‘to provide another forum in a race
for res judicata’ or ‘to achiev[e] a federal hearing in a case otherwise not
removable.’”207
The appellate court quickly found the first, second, third, and fourth
factors weighed in favor of exercising federal jurisdiction.208 The court
determined that the declaratory judgment action would “clarify and settle
the legal relations at issue and would afford relief from the uncertainty,
insecurity, and controversy between Scottsdale and Detco.”209 The court
further held that the record does not reflect any particular state interest in
having the issues decided in state court, and that judicial economy would
be served by having the coverage issues decided in federal court – the only
court in which the matters had been raised for resolution.210
The court looked more critically at the fifth factor – whether the federal
action would result in any unnecessary entanglement between the federal
and state court systems.211 Here, the Eighth Circuit recognized a distinction
that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals could not seem to find.212 The
Eighth Circuit carefully delineated between the factual determinations that
were necessary for resolution of the state court tort action against Detco
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

139 F.3d at 422.
Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 998.
Id. at 999.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 999-1000.
Id.
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and the factual determinations required in deciding the coverage issue.213
The Eighth Circuit importantly recognized that the coverage issue was
properly resolved based on the allegations on the face of the complaint, not
on the judicial determinations made as to the validity of those
allegations.214 Thus, the court held the fifth factor also weighed in favor of
the federal district court exercising its discretionary jurisdiction.215 As to
the sixth factor, the Scottsdale court was unable to glean any improper
motive from Scottsdale’s federal filing.216 Accordingly, the decision of the
district court was overturned and the matter remanded to federal court.217
III. CAN A STATE COURT GARNISHMENT SUIT SERVE AS AN
EFFECTIVE IMPEDIMENT TO FDJA JURISDICTION?
Section 1441 of Chapter 28 of the United States Code, Subsection (a)
allows any civil action over which there is federal jurisdiction to be
removed from state to federal court.218 A suit which is merely ancillary or
supplemental to another action, however, cannot be removed to federal
court under this statute.219 The federal courts are divided on the question
of whether a garnishment proceeding is an ancillary proceeding or an
independent civil action.220 According to one district court “the prevailing
standard among the circuits is to permit removal of a garnishment
action.”221 There are, however, a number of district and circuit courts that

213

Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 999-1000.
Id.
215
Id. at 1000.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
219
Fed. Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1969)
(recognizing that “[u]nder the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, only independent
suits are removable.”); Adriaenssens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1958)
(addressing challenge to removal based on argument that garnishment action was
supplemental to the suit determining liability).
220
See.,e.g., Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F. Supp. 235, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(noting “[t]here is no controlling precedent or consensus among the federal courts on the
question of whether garnishment actions should be treated as ancillary or independent civil
actions.”); Bridges v. Bentley, 716 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (D. Kan. 1989) (recognizing that
the federal courts are divided on the question of whether a garnishment action is
independent or ancillary to the primary action.).
221
Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Koal Indus. Int’l, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 399, 400 (S.D. Ind.
1991).
214
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have adopted the opposing view.222 As the Pennsylvania District
Courtnoted in International Organization Masters, Mates & Pilots of
America, Local No. 2 v. International Organization Masters, Mates and
Pilots of America, Inc., “[t]he garnishment cases constitut[e] the most
numerous category of ‘ancillariness’ decisions ... [and] the courts are
hopelessly divided in their results and reasoning.”223
In answering the question of whether a garnishment action is
removable, the federal courts are confronted with a separate and related
question on which they are also divided – whether the nature of a
garnishment proceeding should be determined by state or federal law.224
Those courts that hold the state characterization of the garnishment action
is determinative base their position on the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.225 The Erie doctrine from which it
derived, provides that the substantive law of the state is to be applied when
the claim is brought in federal court based diversity of citizenship and
amount in controversy.226 The question of whether state or federal law
governs the characterization of a proceeding is in some sense determinative
of the answer to whether a garnishment proceeding is ancillary or
independent. Accordingly, the courts’ holdings on whether state or federal

222

Compare, e.g., Barry v. McLemore, 795 F.2d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1986); Butler v.
Polk, 592 F.2d 1293, 1295 (5th Cir. 1979); Swanson v. Liberty Nat. Ins. Co., 353 F.2d 12,
13 (9th Cir. 1965); Randolph v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 260 F.2d 461, 464
(8th Cir. 1958); Adriaenssens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888, 889-90 (10th Cir. 1958);
Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co. of Des Moines, 185 F.2d 96, 99 (8th Cir. 1950); Smotherman v.
Caswell, 755 F. Supp. 346, 348 (D. Kan 1990) (garnishment is an independent civil action
and removable) with Am. Auto Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.2d 613, 616-17 (7th Cir. 1939);
Murray v. Murray, 621 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1980); W. Med. Prop. Corp. v. Denver
Opportunity, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D. Colo. 1980); Overman v. Overman, 412 F.
Supp. 411, 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Hoagland v. Rost, 126 F. Supp. 232, 234 (W.D. Mo.
1954); Toney v. Md. Cas. Co., 29 F. Supp. 785, 786 (W.D. Va. 1939); Oppenheim v. Cir.
Ct. of Eleventh Jud. Cir., 438 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ill. 1982) (garnishment is ancillary to the
original judgment and non-removable).
223
342 F. Supp 212, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
224
Compare, e.g., Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F. Supp. 235, 237 (E.D. Pa.
1985); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580 (1953); Graef v.
Graef, 633 F. Supp. 450, 452; Swanson, 353 F.2d 12, 13; Bridges, 716 F. Supp. at 1391
(character of garnishment to be determined by federal law) with Overman, 412 F. Supp. at
412; Toney, 29 F. Supp. 785, 786; Oppenheim, 438 N.E.2d at 179 (applying state law to
determine whether garnishment action is independent or ancillary).
225
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
226
Id. See Swanson v. Sharp, 224 F. Supp. 850, 851 (D. Alaska 1963) (noting
application of Erie doctrine to removal of garnishment actions).
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law governs the characterization of a garnishment action will be discussed
first.
A. SHOULD STATE OR FEDERAL LAW GOVERN THE
CHARACTERIZATION OF A GARNISHMENT ACTION?
The Supreme Court has held that the right of removal under the federal
statutes is to be determined under federal law by the federal courts, and that
classification by the state courts can neither limit nor enlarge that right.227
This is the position that has been adopted by a majority of the federal
courts.228 In Swanson v. Liberty Nat. Ins. Co., for example, the Ninth
Circuit held that “separability, so far as it affects removal, is in the end a
federal question.”229 In Swanson, the Ninth Circuit noted that, while the
state court’s characterization of a garnishment proceeding should “be
entitled to great weight,” the Ninth Circuit subscribes to the view that the
removal issue is a matter of federal law.230 Similarly, in Randoph, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “[t]he question of whether a civil
action is removable and has been properly removed is one for the
consideration of the federal court and is not controlled by State law.”231
In spite of the Supreme Court’s holding in Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railroad v. Stude,232 and the federal court holdings that followed, a
discrete minority of federal and state courts still apply state law in
determining whether a garnishment action is independent of or ancillary to
another proceeding. Some courts that allow state law characterization of a
garnishment action to control removal turn to the applicable state statute,
recognizing that “if a state characterizes its garnishment as a distinct ‘civil
action,’ it is removable, but if the state fashions the proceeding as just
supplemental to the underlying cause of action, then it is not removable
under 1441(a).”233 The Tenth Circuit, for example, has looked to
Oklahoma’s garnishment statute in order to determine whether a
227

See, e.g., Stude, 346 U.S. at 580; Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S.
100, 104 (1941); Comm’rs of Rd. Improvement Dist. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 257 U.S.
547, 548 (1922); Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R.R., 232 U.S. 318, 319 (1914).
228
See, e.g., Randoph v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir.
1958); Paxton v. Weaver, 553 F.2d 936, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1977); Federal Savings and Loan
Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir. 1969).
229
353 F.2d 12, 13 (9th Cir. 1965).
230
Id.
231
260 F.2d at 463.
232
346 U.S. 574 (1953).
233
Graef v. Graef, 633 F. Supp., 450, 452 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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garnishment action is a separate or ancillary proceeding.234 The courts of
Colorado,235 Maryland,236 and Tennessee237 have, similarly, examined the
governing statutes of their respective states in making the characterization
determination. Elsewhere, courts applying the state law characterization
have done so based on application of an “ancillariness” test.238 These
courts have considered “(1) whether a separate issue of fact might be raised
in the garnishment proceeding, and (2) whether the proceeding was
adversarial, calling for judgment independent of the underlying cause.”239
A number of courts, however, have eschewed the question of whether
state or federal law governs all together by simply developing an
“ancillariness” test and applying it to the garnishment action in question.
In Scanlin v. Utica First Ins. Co., for example, the court posed three
questions to determine whether the garnishment action at issue there was
removable: (1) whether the garnishment proceeding was substantially a
continuation of the prior state court suit; (2) whether the issue in the
garnishment action was completely separate from the central issue in the
state court proceeding; and (3) whether the “true” defendant was the same
in the garnishment action.240 This three part test was also adopted by the
Pennsylvania federal court in Haines by Midlantic Bank, N.A. v. Donn’s
Inc.241
In Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, the Delaware
federal courtset forth four considerations in making its determination that a
234

Fleeger v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1972) (looking to
Oklahoma law to determine the nature of a garnishment action); London & Lancashire
Indem. Co. of Am. v. Courtney, 106 F.2d 277, 281 (10th Cir. 1939) (used Oklahoma law to
resolve a garnishment action).
235
W, Medical Prop. Corp. v. Denver Opportunity, Inc., 482 F. Supp., 1205, 1207
(D. Colo. 1980); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bonebrake, 320 P.2d 975, 976 (Colo. 1958); Wright v.
Nelson, 242 P.2d 243, 247-48 (Colo. 1952).
236
Toney v. Md. Cas. Co., 29 F. Supp., 785, 786 (W.D. Va. 1939).
237
Overman v. Overman, 412 F. Supp. 411, 412 ( E.D. Tenn. 1976); Rowland v.
Quarles, 100 S.W.2d 991, 994 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).
238
See Scanlin v. Utica First Ins. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 243, 249–50 (M.D. Penn.
2006); Conn. Bank of Commerce. v. Rep. of Congo, 440 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350 (D. Del.
2006); Silverman v. China Nat’l. Native Produce & Animal By-Products Imp. & Exp.
Corp., No. 06cv1710, 2007 WL 518605, at *6 (W.D.Pa.. Feb. 12, 2007); Nat’l Ass’n. of
Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. F.C.C., 533 F.2d 601, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
239
Moore v. Sentry Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D. Miss. 1975); Smotherman
v. Caswell, 755 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D. Kan. 1990); Graef v. Graef, 633 F. Supp., 450, 452
(1986).
240
Scanlin v. Utica First Ins. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 243, 249 (M.D.Pa. 2006).
241
No. 95-1025, 1995 WL 262534, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 27, 1995).
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state court garnishment action was a separate and independent civil
action.242 In particular the Delaware Court considered (1) whether
Delaware garnishment proceedings present a “separate process to which the
original debtor is not a party and the purpose of which is to determine the
legality of the attachment”; (2) whether the garnishment action present
substantive “issues for resolution that are distinct from the original state
action”; (3) whether the “true” defendant in the garnishment action was the
garnishee; and (4) whether the federal court would have to engage in any
“duplicate” function of the state court in adjudicating the garnishment
action.243
B. CAN A STATE COURT GARNISHMENT ACTION BE REMOVED
TO FEDERAL COURT IF A FEDERAL ACTION RELATING TO THE
LIABILITY UNDERLYING THE GARNISHMENT IS PENDING?
While there is no consensus among the courts regarding whether a
garnishment proceeding is in fact removable or whether state or federal law
appropriately governs the issue of characterization, there are some strong
trends with respect to the question of removal. The most pronounced of
these by far seems to be the removal of garnishment actions brought
against an insurer after the underlying issues of the defendant tortfeasor’s
liability and damages have been litigated in state court. There are a number
of federal court opinions addressing this recurring issue. Regardless of
whether state or federal law or an “ancillariness” test is applied to the
characterization issue, the courts have found, with rare exception, the
garnishment action is independent and the proceeding is, therefore,
properly removed to federal court.
In Swanson v. Liberty Nat. Ins. Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a garnishment action against an insurer is an independent civil
action, and therefore removable.244 In that case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska,
which denied a request for remand after a garnishment action brought
against an insurance company was removed to federal court.245 The Ninth
Circuit rested its holding on the fact that the only parties in the case were
the insurance company and the judgment creditor.246 The court noted,
242
243
244
245
246

440 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351-352 (D. Del. 2006).
Id.
353 F.2d 12, 13 (9th Cir 1965).
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
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however, “[w]e may get some interesting problems in diversity when the
judgment defendant debtor stays on, seeks in, or is brought into the
garnishment proceedings.”247
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits have made similar holdings. In
Butler v. Polk, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that a garnishment action brought
by a judgment creditor against the judgment debtor’s liability insurer was
properly removed to federal court because “garnishment actions against
third-parties are generally construed as independent suits, as least in
relation to the primary action.”248 In Randolph, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held a garnishment action against an insurance company was
separable from the underlying liability action.249 The Eighth Circuit
reasoned, “[t]he only issue is the liability of the garnishee on its insurance
contract.250 If the garnishee is liable, the amount of such liability has been
established by the judgment against [the insured] in the state court
action.”251 Likewise, in Adriaenssens, the Tenth Circuit held a garnishment
action against an insurer was removable, relying on that Court’s earlier
holding in London & Lancashire.252 The court noted that the action in
question was an “original and independent actions between the holders of
the judgments and the insurer.”253 Because the requisite diversity of
citizenship and amount in controversy was present, the matters were,
accordingly, open to removal.254
In Scanlin, discussed above, the Pennsylvania District Courtheld that a
garnishment action brought against an insurer was properly removed.255
The Scanlin court found that the issue to be resolved in the garnishment
action - whether the defendant’s parents’ insurance policy would provide
coverage for their son’s judgment - was distinct from the issues of the
defendant’s liability in the initial personal injury action.256 The court
further found that the tortfeasor defendant in the personal injury suit was no
247

Id. at 13.
592 F.2d 1293, 1295-1296 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Swanson v. Liberty Nat. Ins.
Co., 353 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1965); Randolph v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 260 F.2d
461 (8th Cir. 1958); Adriaenssens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1958); and
Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co, 185 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1950)).
249
260 F.2d 461, 464-465 (8th Cir. 1958).
250
Id. at 464.
251
Id.
252
258 F.2d 888, 890 (1958).
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
426 F. Supp. 2d 243, 250 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
256
Id.
248
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longer a party in the garnishment litigation; only the garnishee, Utica First
Insurance Company, was a named party, and the tortfeasor defendant had
assigned his rights against Utica to the garnishment plaintiff.257
The court therefore concluded that the garnishment action, as an
independent civil action, was appropriately removed.258 The Scanlin
decision is consistent with the result set forth by the Pennsylvania District
Court in Graef as well.259 The Graef court made observations similar to
those made by the Scanlin court: “the only issue is the liability of the
garnishee on its insurance contract ... Moreover, in the present controversy
we have only one defendant, the garnishee.... “260
In a case involving a garnishment action and allegations of bad faith,
the federal court in Kansas held that, under federal law, the garnishment
action brought against the insurer was separate and distinct from the
underlying liability claim.261 The Smotherman court rested its holding on
the fact that:
“[t]he issues in the garnishment action are whether [the
insurance company] acted negligently or in bad faith in refusing to
settle within the limits of the policy prior to trial and exposing its
insured [] to an excess judgment, and whether because of its
negligence or bad faith the [insurance company] is liable to the
plaintiff for the entire judgment and not just the policy limits.”262
The Pennsylvania courts reached a like conclusion in Shearer v.
Reed,263 and the Kansas District Court denied a motion to remand in
Bridges for Bridges based on a similar analysis.264
Garnishment actions against an insurer have not, however, always been
granted.265 In Richmond, for example, the federal district court considered
whether it would be called upon to re-examine in the garnishment action
257

Id.
Id. at 251
259
Graef v. Graef, 633 F. Supp. 450, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
260
Id. at 453.
261
Smotherman v. Caswell, 755 F. Supp. 346, 348 (D. Kan. 1990).
262
Id.
263
428 A.2d 635, 640 (Pa. 1981) (the garnishment action subsequent to a tort
judgment permitted a new claim for bad faith against the defendant’s insurer).
264
Bridges v. Bentley, 716 F. Supp. 1389, 1389 (D. Kan. 1989).
265
Toney v. Maryland Cas. Co., 29 F. Supp. 785, 787 (W.D. Va. 1939) (A
garnishment action brought against an insurer subsequent to a liability suit was also
dismissed).
258
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issues of fact contested in and “inseparably tied to” the initial state
action.266 In remanding the matter back to state court, the court addressed
several policy concerns, including (1) the federal court having to re-litigate
the same issues of fact as those litigated by the state court, (2)
unnecessarily bifurcating the trial by allowing execution of the judgment to
take place in a different court, (3) wasting federal resources in executing
the judgment of a state court’s action, and (4) burdening the federal court
with “minor” matters.267 The court concluded that the garnishment action
against the tortfeasor defendant’s insurer was supplemental to the original
personal injury action because the insurer had raised the issue of payment
in the state action, and it would be a “duplication of the function performed
by the state court” to further determine whether defendant’s insurer had
previously paid the full proceeds permitted by defendant’s policy.268 In
addition, the Richmond court foresaw that it would be called upon to
determine the facts giving rise to the defendant’s liability in order to
ascertain the extent of coverage.269 Therefore, the court determined that the
garnishment action was not a distinct civil action.270
C. THE INSURER’S DILEMMA: ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF
LITIGATING IN FEDERAL COURT OR THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS
The holding of the Pennsylvania District Court in Richmond reflects
the quandary the insurer faces. If the insurer raises any defense in the state
court action, it hazards a subsequent finding by the federal court that the
garnishment action is supplemental to the personal injury action and
cannot, therefore, be removed.271 The Richmond court also predicated its
decision on the concern that within the context of the federal declaratory
judgment action, the court would be required to make a determination on
the liability issue – an issue within the province of the state court.272 There
is, however, a reciprocal jurisdictional intrusion that has yet to be
recognized by a court addressing the issue. In granting the injured
plaintiff’s request for garnishment against the insurer, unless the insurer is
266
267
268
269
270
271
272

Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F. Supp. 235, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Id. at 237.
Id. at 237-38.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 236-37.
Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F. Supp. 235, 237-38 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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afforded the right to challenge the extent of its liability within the
garnishment action, the state court is making a de facto finding of
coverage. The garnishment assigns financial liability to the insurer without
full hearing on whether the insurer actually owes a duty of indemnification
to the state court defendant tortfeasor.
While it has long been recognized that issuance of a pre-judgment writ
of garnishment that does not afford notice and hearing violates fundamental
principles of due process,273 the Supreme Court did not rule until some
eighty-four years ago on the constitutionality of post-judgment garnishment
actions.274 In Endicott-Johnson v. Encyclopedia Press, the high court held
due process did not require notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
issuance of a writ to garnish a judgment-debtor’s property.275 The Court
reasoned that the judgment debtor, who “has had his day in court” in the
action on the merits must “take notice of what will follow.”276 An insurer
against which garnishment is sought while a federal declaratory judgment
action is still pending has not, however, had its “day in court.”277 The
underlying state suit for liability and damages may have afforded the
insured the required notice and opportunity, but when the issue of coverage

273
See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 602-03
(1975) (Georgia garnishment statute permitting writ of garnishment to be issued in pending
suits by court clerk without participation by judge on affidavit of plaintiff or his attorney
containing only conclusory allegations deprived garnishee due process of law); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 338-39 (1969) (holding Wisconsin statute
that “sets in motion the machinery whereby wages are frozen” before trial and without any
opportunity for the garnishee to be heard or otherwise tender any defense he might have
violates due process); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 59-60 (3rd Cir. 1980) (Pennsylvania
post-judgment garnishment procedure did not require hearing with sufficient promptness to
satisfy requirements of due process); Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198, 203 (E.D. Ark.
1986) (Arkansas post-judgment garnishment procedure did not contain sufficient procedural
safeguards to satisfy due process); Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp 1272, 1278 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (Illinois garnishment statute violates due process of law because statute fails to
provide a means of determining whether or not the particular debtor knowingly and
intelligently executed the judgment note waiving right to hearing).
274
Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 290 (1924).
275
Id.
276
Id. at 288.
277
See Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 89 P.3d 573, 581 (Kan. 2004) (upholding
garnishment against insurer, noting insurer “had the means by which it could have protected
itself. It chose not to enter the fray in defense of the [insured tortfeasor] or to file a
declaratory judgment action to define its contractual obligations”); Baldridge v. Kirkpatrick,
63 P.3d 568, 572 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (refusing to enter judgment against insurer which
had no opportunity to present a defense).
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has yet to be determined, that notice and opportunity does not necessarily
transfer to the insurer.278
There are a number of states that insure due process by allowing,
pursuant to state statute, an insurer to test the validity of the judgment in a
garnishment action.279 Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Brillhart
suggested it would have been stratified with the proceedings below had the
District Court considered whether “under applicable local law, the claims
sought to be adjudicated by the respondent in th[e] suit for a declaratory
judgment had either been foreclosed by Missouri law or could adequately
be tested in the garnishment proceeding pending in the Missouri state
court.”280 Despite the Supreme Court’s comfort with such a determination,
however, it alone does not resolve the issue for the insurer. The insurer’s
dilemma remains because the states that allow the insurer to test the
validity of the judgment in the garnishment action also consider the
garnishment action to be an ancillary or auxiliary proceeding.281
Insurers seeking judicial determination of coverage issues are,
therefore, faced with bleak alternatives. If the insurer fails to act in the
state court action, either by defending the insured or asserting defenses to
coverage, such as the insured’s failure to pay the premium,282 then the
insurer may be found to have forfeited its only opportunity to secure due
process of law.283 However, if the insurer acts in the state court action, then
278

Crist, 89 P.3d at 581.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Leslie, 55 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D. Ill. 1944) (noting
Illinois garnishment action may be properly used to test the liability of an alleged insurer on
its policy); Carpenter v. Superior Court, 422 P.2d 129, 136 (Ariz. 1966) (holding insurer
had the opportunity to test its liability in the garnishment action); Sandoval v. Chenoweth,
428 P.2d 98 (Ariz. 1967) (insurer was not deprived of due process where the insurer had the
opportunity to set aside the default judgment, but failed to act promptly); Baldridge, 63
P.3d at 572 (insurer had right to due process and present its case in court, and that it could
do so in an equitable garnishment action following a judgment against its insured).
280
316 U.S. 491, 495-96 (1942).
281
Standard, 55 F. Supp. at 138 (recognizing in Illinois that a garnishment action is
an ancillary proceeding provided by statute); City of Phoenix v. Collar, Williams & White
Eng’g, Inc., 472 P.2d 479, 481 (Ariz. App. 1970) (“a garnishment proceeding is always
ancillary to the main or principle action”); Spears v. Preble, 661 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Okla.
1983) (holding garnishment action against insurer is in aid of an ancillary to the main action
against the insured).
282
Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F.Supp. 235, 236-37 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding
garnishment action ancillary to state court liability and damages action when insurer raised
issue of insured’s failure to pay premiums in the state court action).
283
See Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 89 P.3d 573 (Kan. 2004) (allowing garnishment
action against insurer in spite of due process concerns where insurer could have defended
state suit, but choose not to).
279

2008]

IS TIMING EVERYTHING?

171

the subsequent garnishment action may be found to be ancillary to the state
court damages and liability suit.284 If ancillary to the damages and liability
suit, removal of the garnishment action would be precluded.285 Once the
state court plaintiff has sequestered the garnishment action in state court by
defeating removal, the garnishment proceeding may then serve as an
anchor, utilized to pull the federal court declaratory judgment action into
state court and the insurer loses the benefits of litigating the coverage issue
in federal court.286
IV. STATE GARNISHMENT ACTIONS AND FEDERAL
ABSTENTION
A. SURVEY OF CASE LAW WHERE GARNISHMENT AND
ABSTENTION WERE ADDRESSED
There are only a handful of cases that address the propriety of
abstaining in a federal declaratory judgment action when there is a
garnishment proceeding pending in state court.287 Brillhart v. Excess
Insurance Company,288 of course, is chief among them. In Brillhart,
Excess Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action in federal
court to determine its rights under a reinsurance agreement it entered into
with Central Mutual Insurance Company of Chicago.289 Central had issued
a public policy liability policy to Cooper-Jarrett, Inc.290 While the federal
action was pending, a state court wrongful death action was brought against
Cooper-Jarrett, and Central refused to defend.291 Central and CooperJarrett encountered financial difficulties and Central was liquidated and all
284

Richmond, 624 F. Supp. at 237-38.
Id. at 236-37 (refusing to remove garnishment action).
286
See Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802-3 (9th Cir. 2002)
(refusing to exercise discretionary diversity jurisdiction when possibility of state court
action existed).
287
See, e.g., W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. Gallup, No. 06-4165-CV-C-WAK, 2007 WL
62696 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2007); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carter Enterprises, Inc., No.
04-0933-CV-W-JTM, 2005 WL 3310467 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 6, 2005); Nw. Pac. Indem. Co. v.
Safeway, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (D. Kan. 2000); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Sprigg Lane Inv.
Corp., 915 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Lewis v. Blackmon, 864 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Miss.
1994).
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316 U.S. 491 (1942).
289
Id. at 493.
290
Id.
291
Id.
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claims against it barred; Cooper-Jarrett filed bankruptcy, pursuant to which
any judgment entered against it was discharged.292 Because Central and
Cooper-Jarrett were both insolvent, the state court plaintiff initialed a
garnishment proceeding against Excess Insurance Company through
service on the Missouri superintendent of insurance.293 Brillhart moved for
dismissal of the suit, which the district court granted.294
The matter was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which remanded the
matter to the federal court for adjudication on the merits.295 The ruling of
the Tenth Circuit was then appealed to the Supreme Court. 296 The
Supreme Court, like the Tenth Circuit, remanded the matter to the district
court.297 The Supreme Court noted that the motion to dismiss was
predicated in its entirety on the assertion that there was a parallel state court
suit pending, in which the issues between the parties could be fully
resolved. 298 The Court noted, “[t]he correctness of this claim was certainly
relevant in determining whether the District Court should assume
jurisdiction and proceed to determine the rights of the parties.” 299 While
the Brillhart court expressed some concern about the federal courts making
a determination regarding the adequacy of a state garnishment proceeding
to address the issues in the declaratory judgment action, the court
ultimately held that the District Court erred in granting the motion to
dismiss, and issued a remand. 300
In contrast to Brillhart, in the majority of the other cases to consider
abstaining in deference to a state court garnishment action, the federal court
has abstained from exercising its jurisdiction.301 In Western Heritage Ins.
Co. v. Gallup, for example, the Missouri federal court considered whether
abstention was proper under Brillhart.302 The court gave a truncated
292

Id.
Id at 492-493.
294
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 493 (1942).
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Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1942).
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See, e.g., W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. Gallup, No. 06-4165-CV-C-WAK, 2007 WL
62696, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2007); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carter Enter., Inc., No.
04-0933-CV-W-JTM, 2005 WL 3310467, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 6, 2005); Nw. Pac. Indem.
Co. v. Safeway, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1122 (D. Kan. 2000); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Sprigg Lane
Inv. Corp., 915 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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No. 06-4165-CV-C-WAK, 2007 WL 62696, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2007).
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consideration of four factors: (1) whether the garnishment involved the
same issues between the same parties; (2) whether all issues could be
resolved in the garnishment; (3) whether it would be inefficient to require
duplicative litigation; and (4) whether the parties were amendable to
process in the state proceeding.303 The Gallup court then concluded by
noting that even though “the federal declaratory judgment action was filed
prior to the state equitable garnishment proceeding ... the timing does not
outweigh the other considerations favoring abstention.”304
A federal court in Kansas also elected to abstain from exercising its
discretionary federal jurisdiction in Northwestern Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Safeway, Inc..305 The Kansas District Court considered two of the four
Brillhart factors addressed in Gallup, electing not to consider (1) whether
the state court proceeding involved the same issues between the same
parties, and (2) whether abstention would avoid duplicative proceedings.306
The Kansas District Court added to that analysis one additional Brillhart
factor, whether the necessary parties have been joined in the state
proceeding, and five supplemental factors articulated by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.307 Northwestern urged the federal district court to
decline from abstaining because, Northwestern argued, it had no means of
303

Id., at *2.
In Carter Enterprises, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri applied a similar analysis, and again determined that abstention was appropriate.
2005 WL 3310467, at *1. In Carter Enterprises, however, the court only considered the
first three of the four factors articulated in Gallup. Id. at *2. The Carter Enterprises court
weighed these factors against American Family’s choice of forum, but still held in favor of
abstention. Id. at *3.
304
Gallup, 2007 WL 62696, at *2.
305
112 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1122 (D. Kan. 2000).
306
Id. at 1118.
307
Id. (citing Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 189 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1999)
and St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Runyon, 53 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1995) as
setting forth the following five factors:
[1] whether a declaratory action would settle the
controversy; [2] whether it would serve a useful purpose in
clarifying the legal relations at issue; [3] whether the
declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of
“procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race to
res judicata”; [4] whether use of a declaratory action would
increase friction between our federal and state courts and
improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and [5]
whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or
more effective.)
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testing the validity of the judgment entered against it in the garnishment
proceeding.308 The Kansas District Court discussed some state case law on
the matter, and then suggested that, “affidavits with documentation could
be offered to support the amounts of the claims ... [and] independent expert
testimony evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ positions
could be presented.”309 In sum, the Kansas District Court held that the state
garnishment action would provide an adequate opportunity for
Northwestern to present its case, regardless of what that opportunity
entailed.
In the only case to address both removal of a state court garnishment
action and abstention from hearing a federal declaratory judgment action,
the federal court entertaining the issues held removal was proper and
abstention was not warranted.310 In Lewis v. Blackmon, the plaintiff argued
that the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action based on Pullman and Burford abstention and
a Fifth Circuit case, United Services Life Insurance Company v. Delaney.311
The federal court in Mississippi disagreed, holding that the concerns
articulated in Pullman, Burford, and Delaney were not present in the
declaratory judgment action, in which the insurer sought a declaration of
the insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify its insured.312 After deciding
that it would not abstain from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, the
federal court then turned to the issue of removal.313 The court held the
garnishment action was not ancillary to another state court action, and was
properly removed under federal law.314
B. NON-REMOVABLE GARNISHMENTS
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Brillhart and Wilton provide a broad
tower of abstention over federal declaratory judgment actions where there
308

Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1119-20 (quoting Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.v. Americold Corp.,
934 P.2d 65, 87 (Kan. 1997). The Safeway court went on to note that, “[a]s the Supreme
Court of Kansas has directly remanded this issue for the district court’s determination, the
court has no doubts that the state court proceeding will provide an adequate forum for the
determination of the propriety of the settlement amount.” Id.
310
Lewis v. Blackmon, 864 F.Supp. 1, 2 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
311
Id. at 3 (citing United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir
1964)).
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are pending parallel state actions. These decisions, however, left a glaring
void in relation to the proper and valid application of the abstention
doctrine when the parallel state action is no longer pending because it has
been removed. In those cases where the insurance company denies a claim
for coverage in a liability context, the insurance company must assess the
timing of coverage litigation to minimize the risk of abstention.
It is not uncommon for insurance companies to decline to defend or
indemnify its insured and then close the file, which results in the insured
defending against the liability claim. Such a decision by the insurer can
have dire consequences, not the least of which may be a liability judgment
against the insured which the injured plaintiff will attempt to enforce
A final judgment creates a creditor/debtor
against the insurer.315
relationship which is the foundational predicate for a garnishment action
being initiated against the debtor policyholder. The presence of a
garnishment action filed in state court may foreclose federal jurisdiction to
the insurance company.
Where a non-removable garnishment action has been filed in state
court, federal court jurisdiction can be challenged through the abstention
doctrine because of the presence of a parallel state court garnishment
proceeding. In this situation the Brillhart analysis asks whether another
case involving the same parties would be able to also address the
controversy in the declaratory judgment action.316 The question of
coverage is typically litigated in the garnishment action. The insurance
company will object to the writ of garnishment claiming that it has no
“indebtedness” to the insured because its policy does not provide coverage
for the underlying claim. Thus, the essential subject matter of the
garnishment litigation will focuses upon the question of coverage which
makes the scope of the garnishment proceeding co-extensive with the scope
of the declaratory judgment action. There will also be a similarity of the
315
Depending on the state in which the insurer is operating, a wrongful denial of a
defense or indemnification can result in the insurer being held liable either up to policy
limits, or for the full amount of the judgment. In New Mexico, for example, the courts have
held that an insurer who wrongfully denies its insured a defense may be precluded from
later asserting policy defenses, and may be held liable up to the full amount of the judgment
in the liability action. See, e.g., Valley Imp. Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Corp., 129
F.3d 1108, 1125 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding, “[b]ecause we have affirmed the district court’s
holding that USF & G breached its duty to defend, USF & G will not be heard to complain
that the claims might not have been within the coverage”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Price, 684 P.2d 524, 531 (N.M. App. 1984) (holding insurer was liable up to policy limits
for its refusal to defend).
316
See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282-83.
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parties in both the garnishment and declaratory judgment actions. In order
to bind the judgment creditor to a determination of no coverage, the
insurance company oftentimes will name the judgment creditor as a party
defendant in the declaratory judgment action. The insured is also named as
a party defendant.
The Supreme Court has not specifically delineated a set of factors to be
applied pursuant to Brillhart. However, the lower courts have done so.
One of the essential factors to be considered is duplicative litigation.317
Another factor focuses on whether the adjudication of the case by a federal
court “would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy
with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.”318
Whether the federal action would be duplicative of an action already
proceeding before a state court, stems from the concern expressed by the
Supreme Court that, “[g]ratuitous interference with the orderly and
comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided.”319
Essentially, this Brillhart factor is focused on federal interference with
ongoing state litigation.320 This factor is present when there is a pending
parallel state garnishment proceeding.
A broad reading of the factor involving disruption of state efforts to
establish a coherent policy can be applicable in the liability insurance
context where many states have expressed a general public policy concern
that victims of tortious conduct be fairly compensated.321
317

See Gov’t Emp.’s Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998); Cont’l
Cas. Co. v. Robsac Ind., 947 F.2d 1367, 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1991).
318
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1975).
See also, Lehman v. City of Louisville, 967 F.2d 1474, 1478 (10th Cir. 1992); Ripplinger v.
Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989).
319
Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991).
320
Id.
321
Armstrong v. Land & Marine Applicators, Inc., 463 So.2d 1327, 1328-29 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding the proper approach for resolving choice of law problems regarding
insurance policies written in other states is the interest analysis theory; it is good public
policy meant to allow state courts to apply situations requiring choice of law where state
interest is sufficient to require that result); Richards’ Realty Co., L.L.C. v. Paramount
Disaster Recovery, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622-24 (E.D. La. 2007) (holding under
Louisiana choice-of-law rules, Louisiana law, not law of California where the contract was
entered, applied to validity of contingency fee contract between Louisiana insured and
California adjuster for adjustment of insurance claims in Louisiana, despite adjuster having
much business in California, because Louisiana’s interest in regulating insurance industry in
state and strong public policy against private adjusters receiving contingency fees); Transp.
Ins. Co. v. Protective Ins. Co., 696 F. Supp. 870, 871-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (concluding that
Truckmen’s Endorsement in occupational comprehensive liability and comprehensive
physical damage policies, denying coverage to insured vehicle use to carry property in any
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Another Brillhart factor which must be taken into consideration is
whether the declaratory judgment action is being filed as a means of forum
shopping.322 Whether the declaratory action was filed as a means of forum
shopping “[u]sually is understood to favor discouraging an insurer from
forum shopping. For example, filing a federal court declaratory action to
see if it might fare better in federal court at the same time the insurer is

business or used in the business of any person to whom the vehicle was rented, was against
New York public policy and therefore unenforceable regarding an accident in New York,
even though the endorsement was valid in Ohio, where the insurance contract was entered
into, especially where the policy provided for interpretation to give the broader coverage
required by the financial responsibility or compulsory insurance laws of other states); U.S.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 681, 682-83 (N.D. Ill. E. Div.
1988) (holding that Illinois law was to determine the legality of purpose of a Minnesota
corporation’s commercial umbrella policy issued in Minnesota; the claim against the
corporation arose in Illinois, and if Illinois public policy forbade insurance against liability
for insured’s claims, Illinois courts would not permit the parties to evade this policy by
contracting for insurance in a state that allows such coverage.); Am. States Ins. Co. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 922 A.2d 1043, 1052-53 (Conn. 2007) (holding Connecticut driver’s
personal umbrella liability insurer could make a sufficiently compelling showing necessary
to overcome the presumption favoring Florida law validating automobile policy’s household
exclusion of liability coverage for injury to named insured, only if insurer demonstrated that
applying Florida law would violate a fundamental public policy of Connecticut); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So.2d 1160, 1163-65 (Fla. 2006) (recognizing that in the
context of insurance contracts, the public policy exception of lex loci contractus requires a
Florida citizen in need of protection, a paramount Florida public policy, and that the insured
is on reasonable notice that he is a Florida citizen.); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Am.
Red Ball Transit Co., Inc., 938 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Kan. 1997) (noting that the law of the
state where it was made normally determines the validity of an insurance contract and its
construction, but that there is an exception when the contract violates public policy of the
state whose tribunal is to enforce the contract.); Daniels v. Nat. Home Life Assur. Co., 747
P.2d 897, 898-99 (Nev. 1987) (concluding life insurance policy bought by Nevada resident
from Pennsylvania insurer, that did not provide for notice prior to termination for failure to
pay when due, was against public policy of Nevada and therefore unenforceable, despite
insurer’s argument that policy was a group policy that should be governed by Missouri law
because the master policy was delivered in Missouri); Demir v. Farmers Tex. County Mut.
Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1111, 1115-16 (N.M. App. 2006) (holding Texas law requiring physical
contact to recover uninsured motorist benefits for injuries caused by unknown driver did not
apply to Texas insured’s claim to recover uninsured motorist benefits from New Mexico
accident under policy issued in Texas; Texas law would violate New Mexico’s public policy
as expressed in its uninsured motorist statutes).
322
The term “forum shopping” was first used in a judicial opinion in 1951. See
Covey Gas & Oil Co. v. Checketts, 187 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1951). Earlier, the phrase
“shopping for a forum” was used by the court in Miles v. Ill. Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698,
706 (1942) (Jackson, J. concurring). The concept was targeted in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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engaged in a state court action.”323 Federal courts generally decline
jurisdiction in “reactive” declaratory judgment actions.324 In the insurance
law context, declaratory judgment actions are routinely used by insurance
companies and insureds to anticipate each others claims and, therefore,
may be viewed as reactive.325 Thus, a declaratory judgment action by an
insurance company against its insured during the pendency of a “nonremovable”326 state court garnishment action presenting the same issues of
state law can be seen as a “reactive” litigation.327 In situations where the
insurance company waits until the garnishment action is initiated, the filing
of the declaratory judgment action in federal court at that point runs the risk
of being considered a “reactive” litigation.
In those jurisdictions where a garnishment action is considered to be
ancillary or supplemental, a declaratory judgment action should be initiated
at the earliest point in time while the state court liability lawsuit is
occurring. If the federal declaratory judgment action can be advanced
substantially prior to the entry of judgment against the policyholder, it will
be difficult, as a practical matter, for a judgment creditor to establish an
abstention challenge to the federal declaratory judgment action through the
offensive use of a garnishment proceeding to create a parallel state court
proceeding.328

323
Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Penn. v. Krieger, 181 F.3d, 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court has denounced state and federal forum shopping on grounds of comity
and parity. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980).
324
Gov’t Emp.’s Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998).
325
See Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1246 n.11 (11th Cir.
2000) (declaratory judgment actions are “routinely used by potential litigants”).
326
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248
(5th Cir. 1996), and therefore any case which is removed must be one which, at the time of
removal, could have been brought in federal court initially. See, e.g., Cervantez v. Bexar
County Civil Serv. Comm’n, 99 F.3d. 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1996).
327
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Robsac, Ind., 947 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
allowing declaratory judgment action to proceed while there is a non-removable state action
would circumvent diversity jurisdiction).
328
As a technical matter, however, abstention may be raised by the parties or the
court at any time during the federal court or federal appellate court proceedings. See, e.g.,
Columbia Basin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing the Younger doctrine may be raised sua sponte at any time in the appellate
process); Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 588 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding Burford abstention can be raised at any time); Mountain Funding Inc. v. Frontier
Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 994, 997 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (stating abstention principles can be
raised and revisited at any time during a proceeding); Cal. Prolife Council Pol. Action
Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (holding abstention by federal
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C. ELIMINATION OF THE PARALLEL STATE COURT GARNISHMENT
PROCEEDING THROUGH REMOVAL
Generally there is a judicial recognition that the use of the abstention
doctrine to remand cases that have been removed on the basis of diversity
should be done cautiously.329 Where federal diversity jurisdiction can be
established, removal of a state garnishment action eliminates the parallel
state court proceeding which is the predicate for the exercise of federal
abstention. While Wilton set the standard for applying the abstention
doctrine where there was a pending parallel state action, it did not establish
the exact boundaries of discretion when there was no pending state court
action achieved through removal.330 The modern trend is to view the
existence of a pending parallel state court proceeding as only one factor in
the overall abstention analysis.331 Thus far, the Fourth Circuit,332 the Ninth
Circuit,333 and the Fifth Circuit334 have found that the lack of a pending
parallel state court proceeding is not dispositive in the abstention analysis
under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
A significant case of concern for the insurance company is Huth v.
Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest.335 In the district court, Hartford
Insurance brought an action pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act.336 Approximately one week after Hartford filed the suit under the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, Huth filed an identical action in
Arizona state court pursuant to Arizona’s Declaratory Judgment Act.337
Because diversity jurisdiction existed, Hartford removed the state
court from considering constitutionality of state statute under the Pullman doctrine can be
raised by the parties or the court at any time).
329
Minot v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F.3d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The possibility of
prejudice to out-of-state litigants, which provides whatever diminishing justification for
federal diversity jurisdiction remains, suggests that courts should be wary of using
judicially-crafted abstention doctrines to deny out-of-state litigants a federal forum that they
prefer”).
330
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290.
331
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2003).
332
See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Electric Co., 139 F.3d 419, 423
(4th Cir. 1998).
333
See, e.g., Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802-803 (9th
Cir. 2002).
334
See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co., 343 F.3d at 394.
335
298 F.3d 800.
336
Id. at 802.
337
Id. Unlike the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, Arizona’s Declaratory
Judgment Act is not discretionary. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1832 (2003).
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declaratory judgment action to the Arizona District Court and the state and
federal actions were then consolidated.338 Following removal, Huth filed a
motion to remand the state portion of the consolidated action and to
simultaneously stay the federal portion of the consolidated action.339 The
District Court granted both the motion to remand and the motion to stay.340
The District Court found that despite the fact that the Arizona declaratory
judgment action had been properly removed to federal court, that action
still was a “pending” state action and could thus be remanded pursuant to
the court’s discretion under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.341 The
District Court in Huth explained its decision to apply the abstention
doctrine in a footnote:
[T]here is no state court action as it has been removed to
federal court. The court does not find this argument persuasive.
Clearly [the original state action] began in state court. Once this
court decides to remand the action the case will proceed in state
court rather than federal court. Hartford cannot avoid the court’s
jurisdictional discretion under the FDJA by removing a state court
action and then arguing no state court action exists.342
The authority by which the District Court in Huth remanded the state
court action and thereby revested by federal decision a parallel state court
proceeding, may be supported by recent amendments to 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c).343
338

Huth, 298 F.3d at 802.
Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 2002).
340
Id.
341
Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. CIV 00-2067-PHX-MSM, No. CIV
00-2345-PHX-MHM, Slip. Op. at 5 n.4 (D.Ariz. April 5, 2001).
342
Id.
343
Commentators have noted that the 1988 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) have
allowed courts to recognize other basis for remand other than jurisdictional and procedural
defects. See, e.g., David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1447, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1447 (1994 & Supp. 2006), H.R. REP. 100-889 at 72 (1988), a reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033. The 1996 amendment to the statute has solidified this viewpoint.
The 1996 amendment changed the basis of removal from “any defect in removal procedure”
to “any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) (supp. II
1996). By using the phrase “any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” it has
been argued that Congress implicitly recognized situations that are neither procedural nor
concerned with subject matter jurisdiction. David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision
of Section 1447, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (Supp. 2006). Following these amendments, courts
recognized the possibility of non-statutory justifications for remand. See, e.g., Stevo v. CSX
339
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V. CONCLUSION
State court garnishment actions can be a formidable impediment to
coverage litigation initiated by insurance companies in federal court.
Where the garnishment action is non-removable, the insurance company
should initiate its declaratory judgment action early while the state court
tort litigation is being litigated. At that point, the two actions are
significantly differentiated so that they are not identical or substantially
similar regarding their scope of issues. The early filing of a declaratory
judgment action will allow the federal court proceedings to advance
sufficiently to make the exercise of abstention by the federal court
unpalatable when the garnishment action is ultimately initiated after the
liability lawsuit is resolved through judgment against the policyholder.
In those situations where the state garnishment action is removable, the
abstention doctrine still presents a formidable impediment to sustaining
federal jurisdiction. There is substantial elasticity in the Brillhart factors to
permit a federal court to abstain by staying the federal declaratory
judgment action and remanding the state declaratory judgment action under
a broadened view of abstention exemplified in Huth. In this situation, the
early filing of a declaratory judgment action, while the state court liability
case is being litigated, will also allow the insurance company to
substantially advance the federal declaratory judgment action before the
ultimate judgment creditor can initiate a state garnishment action, which
can only be brought after a final judgment is secured in the state liability
lawsuit.

Transp., Inc., 940 F.Supp. 1222, 1224-25 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (collecting cases). A significant
number of courts held that remand based on the abstention doctrine was proper. Id. at 1225
(collecting cases); see also, IMFC Prof. Servs. of Florida., Inc. v. Latin American Home
Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1982); Todd v. Richmond, 844 F. Supp. 1422,
1425 (D. Kan. 1994).

182

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM INSURANCE
Thomas Russell∗
Jeffrey E. Thomas+
ABSTRACT
This article examines the recent market for terrorism insurance,
detailing the history and goals of the United States Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act (TRIA) in all its iterations. Reinsurance, coverage,
reimbursement, and liability are discussed in the context of the Act, as well
as benefits and consequences of government-support terrorism insurance.
The market reactions to the September 11th, 2001 terrorism attacks are
presented to discuss imperfect capital markets. Additionally, the future of
Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological (CNBR) terrorism and its
impact on insurance programs and markets is also discussed.
Federal government support for the terrorism insurance industry has a
very brief history. The terrorist attack(s) on September 11, 2001, radically
altered the way the United States insurance industry perceived terroristrelated risks. Prior to the September 11th attack, terrorist-related losses
were sufficiently small and infrequent that insurers did not take them into
account when underwriting risks.1 The industry did not even conceive of
an attack that could generate such significant losses.2 This dramatic shift in
perception has caused many to suggest that terrorism risks are
“uninsurable” from an underwriting perspective.3 Some claim that
∗
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He is the co-recipient of the 2007 Robert J Mehr award of the American Risk and Insurance
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+
Jeffrey E. Thomas is Associate Dean for International Programs and Professor of
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1
See MUNICH RE, 11TH SEPTEMBER 2001, §§ 3.3-3.4 (2001); Economic Impact of
the Lack of Terrorism Risk Insurance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigation of the H. Comm on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Mark
J. Warshawsky, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy) available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/economic-policy/press/testimony_terrorism_risk_insurance.pdf
[hereafter Warshawsky].
2
See MUNICH RE, supra note 1, § 3.4.
3
See MUNICH RE, supra note 1, at 1. For a specific analysis of insurability, See INS.
INFO. INST., TERRORISM, INSURANCE AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 3-4 (2004).
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uncertainty about the probability of a future attack and amount of damages
caused by such an attack makes it impossible to calculate an appropriate
premium for such coverage.4
The notion that terrorism risk was “uninsurable” was part of the
rationale advanced for government intervention. When the initial efforts at
legislation failed, the industry began to withdraw from the market for
terrorism insurance by adding exclusions for terrorism-related losses to
their policies.5 Reinsurers were the first to adopt such exclusions, in part
because they bore about two-thirds of the losses from the September 11th
attack.6 Because they are subject to more limited governmental regulation,7
reinsurers were able to exclude terrorism risk without governmental
approval. A majority of reinsurance contracts were up for renewal in
January 2002,8 and most of the renewed contracts excluded coverage for
terrorist-related losses.9

4

See Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to Attacks Heightens
Potential Economic Vulnerabilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigationsof the H. Comm on Financial Services, 107th Cong.3 (2002) (statement of
Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment) available at
www.gao.gov/news.items/d02472t.pdf [hereinafter Hillman]; see also Terrorism
Uninsurable, INS. DAY, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1.
5
See What Makes Terrorism Different?, 23 VIEWPOINT No. 3, Winter 2002
(available at http://www.aais.org).
6
See Hillman, supra note 5, at 8.
7
See Hillman, supra note 5, at 3-4.
8
The majority of reinsurance policies expired in January, and by some reports
could account for as much as 70% of reinsurance. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 4 n.2.
9
“Industry sources confirm that little reinsurance is being written today that
includes coverage for terrorism.” Hillman, supra note 5, at 4; see also Warshawsky, supra
note 1, at 2 (“[T]he reinsurance industry has almost entirely stopped assuming terrorism
risk.”). This trend was confirmed in surveys. The New York Insurance Department
received responses from companies that represented 89% of commercial insurance writings
in NY state, and 83% of those companies reported that their reinsurers were excluding or
limiting coverage for terrorism. Testimony of New York State Insurance Department:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Financial Services, 107th Cong. 20-21 (2002) (statement of Gregory V. Serio,
Superintendent of Insurance, New York State Insurance Department) available at
www.ins.state.ny.us/speeches/pdf/testimony.pdf. Similarly, the AAIS found that “[m]ore
than 80% of the 37 personal lines companies [surveyed] indicated that ‘their current or
upcoming reinsurance contracts exclude or in some way limit coverage for loss caused by
terrorism.’” AM. ASS’N OF INS. SERV., AAIS WEIGHS ACTION IN WAKE OF NAIC DECISION
ON PERSONAL LINES TERRORISM EXCLUSIONS (2002) available at http://www.aais.org.
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The reinsurers’ withdrawal from the terrorism market left the primary
insurers at risk of insolvency in the event of a major terrorism loss.10
According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(“NAIC”), a $25 million loss for a single primary property/casualty insurer
in 2001 would have threatened the solvency of 886 companies, or 44% of
the companies writing commercial property/casualty insurance.11
Consequently, the regulators endorsed a terrorism exclusion for
commercial property/casualty insurers.12 As of February 2008, “45 states
and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico” had approved a standard
terrorism exclusion drafted by the Insurance Services Organization,13
which provides many standard form policies and endorsements used by the
industry.
It is unclear whether the difficulty in obtaining terrorism insurance
alone would have been enough to motivate Congress to adopt the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”), but when Congress decided that reduced
availability of terrorism insurance was causing a “drag” on the U.S.
economy,14 TRIA was adopted. It was originally a “temporary” measure set
to expire in 2005,15 but Congress first extended it for two years,16 and then
extended it again in 2007 for another 7 years.17
WHAT ARE TRIA’S ESSENTIAL FEATURES?
10
See Press Release, Insurance Information Institute, Terrorism Coverage is a
Taxpayer – Not Insurance Company – Responsibility, Industry Forum Told (Jan. 23, 2002)
available at www.iii.org/media/updates/press.599963; California, New York take Big Risks
on Terrorism Policies, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Jan. 27, 2002, at 24.
11
Hillman, supra note 5, at 17.
12
News Release, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC
Members Come to Agreement Regarding Exclusions for Acts of Terrorism (Dec. 21, 2001).
13
Hillman, supra note 5, at 5.
14
STAFF OF J. ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM
INSURANCE 8 (2002); Session Dates of Congress, http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/
house_history/Session_Dates/100tocur.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). The White House
suggested that the absence of terrorism insurance caused 300,000 jobs to be lost in construction
alone. The source of this number was not given and detailed analysis suggests that actual job loss
was an order of magnitude smaller. Thomas Russell, Dept of Econ., Santa Clara Univ., The
Costs and Benefits of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research
Presentation (2002).
15
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 108(a), 118 Stat.
2322, 2336.
16
Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-44, §2(a), 119
Stat. 2660, 2660.
17
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11060, § 3(b), 121 Stat. 1839, 1839-40.
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TRIA has been described as creating a Federal “backstop” for terrorism
insurance. The “backstop” is a statutory mechanism that provides Federal
financial support for payment of terrorism claims in the event of a fairly
large terrorism incident. This financial support is similar to reinsurance in
that it provides reimbursement to insurers18 after they pay claims to a
specified level (the insurer deductible). It is also similar to reinsurance in
that insurers retain a proportion of the risk (a “co-pay). But the “backstop”
is different from reinsurance because insurers don’t pay any premiums to
be eligible, and the government does not establish any reserves or
“underwrite” particular risks or books of business.19 Instead, the costs of
the program are borne by the tax payer with some or all of those costs
subject to being recouped after the payments through a premium tax on
property and casualty insurance.
A. SCOPE OF COVERAGE
The backstop was made available for specific lines of property and
casualty insurance in the event of an attack by foreign terrorists. TRIA
covered commercial property and casualty insurance, including excess
insurance, workers compensation insurance and surety insurance. It did not
include Federal crop insurance, private mortgage insurance, financial
guaranty insurance, insurance for medical malpractice, health or life
insurance, flood insurance, or reinsurance.20 TRIA originally only covered
acts of terrorism in the United States by foreign terrorists. The Act defined
terrorism as a violent act or an act dangerous to life, property or
infrastructure that resulted in damage in the United States.21 To be covered,
the acts must be committed “by an individual or individuals acting on
behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to
18
See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §§103-04, 118
Stat. 2322, 2327-29. It should be noted that the Secretary of Treasury has authority to pay
policyholders directly rather than reimbursing insurers, but that is likely to be an exceptional
circumstance.
19
See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §103(a)(3), 118
Stat. 2322, 2327 (showing that all insurers are eligible for reimbursement, regardless of
premium payment or specific risks). In this regard the TRIA program in the US differs from
the equivalent program in the UK. The British program, Pool Re, essentially replicates a
market based reinsurance program up to a threshold beyond which the UK government
covers all loss. See Pool Reinsurance Company Limited (2008), available at
http://www.poolre.co.uk/Introduction.html.
20
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §§ 101(b)(1),
102(12),118 Stat. 2322, 2323, 2326.
21
§ 102(1)(A). Including an air carrier or vessel or a U.S. mission. §102(1)(A)(iii).
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coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy
or affect the conduct of the U.S. Government by coercion.”22
B. MANDATORY OFFERING
Insurers for those lines covered by the Act are required to participate.
They must offer terrorism coverage on the same conditions as coverage for
non-terrorist losses.23 This means that the covered policies cannot have
exclusions, limitations or conditions specifically for terrorism (as defined
by TRIA). However, insurers were allowed to maintain certain exclusions
applicable to all losses that might apply to some terrorism activity. For
example, because most policies exclude or limit coverage for nuclear
incidents, that exclusion would still be applicable to a terrorism event. In
addition, insurers were allowed to set the price for terrorism coverage
(within the parameters of state regulation for pricing).
C. GOVERNMENTAL REIMBURSEMENT FOR CERTIFIED ACTS OF
TERRORISM
If a policyholder chooses to buy terrorism coverage, the Act provides
that the government will reimburse for terrorism losses once aggregate
insured losses for a certified terrorism event exceed a specified threshold.
The original threshold was $5,000,000.24 The Secretary of Treasury
decides, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General, whether to certify an event as an “act of terrorism.”25 This
determination is final and not subject to judicial review.26 After the
triggering event, the government will pay a portion of terrorism losses
above the deductible. The original proportion paid by the government was
90% of terrorism losses.27 During the first year of TRIA, the insurer
deductible was 7% of an insurer’s direct earned premium from the previous
year for property and casualty insurance eligible for the program covering
losses in the United States. The insurer deductible was increased to 10% in
the second year of TRIA and then to 15% in the third year.28
D. GOVERNMENTAL RECOUPMENT
22

§ 102(1)(A)(iii)(I).
§ 103(c)(1).
24
§ 102(1)(B).
25
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(A), 118
Stat. 2322, 2323.
26
§ 102(1)(C).
27
§ 103(e)(1)(A).
28
§ 102(7)(C)-(D).
23
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Federal government payments are subject to being recouped from the
industry through a premium tax on eligible property and casualty insurance.
The Act required a mandatory recoupment for amounts above the insurers’
share and deductible up to a maximum of $10,000,000,000 the first year of
the program, which was increased to $12,500,000,000 in the second year
and to $15,000,000,000 in the third year.29 If aggregate insured losses
exceed mandatory recoupment amount, the Secretary of Treasury had
discretion to recoup more than the mandatory amount, up to a maximum
3% premium tax on property and casualty insurance.30 While 3% of
premiums will not recoup a large loss in a single year, the duration of the
tax is not specified in the Act, so the process of recoupment could continue
for a number of years after the loss should the Secretary of Treasury require
it. In exercising discretion for recoupment, the Secretary is to take various
factors into account and may set different taxes for different lines of
insurance or smaller policyholders.31
E. CAP ON LIABILITY
The program has a $100,000,000,000 cap. The original cap was a “soft
cap” because it could easily be lifted. The Act in 2002 provided that
payments made by the Secretary of Treasury under the program were
limited to no more than $100,000,000,000. If that amount is likely to be
exceeded, the Secretary is to notify Congress, which “shall determine the
procedures for and the source of any payments for such excess insured
losses.” 32 Thus, if there were a $150 billion loss, Congress could decide to
fund the additional $50 billion. It is somewhat unclear how supplemental
Congressional action might affect insurers. On the one hand, the original
Act provided that “no insurer that has met its insurable deductible shall be
liable for the payment of any portion of that amount that exceeds
$100,000,000,000.”33 On the other hand, since that provision is only in
reference to the $100 billion cap, if Congress chooses to fund beyond the
cap amount, perhaps it will decide that Insurers should bear some of those
costs.
F. AMENDMENTS TO TRIA
29

§ 103(e)(6).
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 103(e)(7)-(8), 118
Stat. 2322, 2329-30.
31
§ 103(e)(8)(D).
32
§ 103(e)(3).
33
§ 103(e)(2)(A)(ii).
30
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The 2005 extension made relatively minor changes in the lines of
insurance covered by the act and some of the numbers. Directors and
officers liability insurance was added to the Act’s coverage while
commercial automobile, burglary and theft insurance, surety insurance,
professional liability insurance and farm owners multiple peril insurance
were removed.34 The trigger for coverage was changed from $5,000,000 to
$100,000,000.35 The government’s obligation for reimbursement was
lowered from 90% to 85% (after insurer deductibles),36 and insurer
deductibles were raised to 17.5% of direct earned premium for the first year
of the extension, and then to 20% for the second year.37 The extension also
raised the mandatory recoupment levels from $15,000,000,000 to
$25,000,000,000 for the first year of the extension and to $27,500,000,000
thereafter.38
The 2007 extension also made relatively minor changes, but also made
the notable change of extending the scope of the act to include domestic
terrorism. This was done by striking the reference to “foreign” terrorism in
the definition.39 Insurer deductibles remained the same (20% of direct
earned premium), as did the portion of losses to be paid by insurers
(15%).40 The cap remained at $100 billion, but language suggesting that
Congress might raise the cap was removed41 so that the limitation on
liability for insurers is more definite. The recoupment numbers were
changed somewhat to address the Congressional Budget Office analysis
suggesting that the program was too costly to comply with Congressional
spending rules.42 Under the 2007 extension, the mandatory recoupment is
133% of the difference between the industry retention (which was left at
$27.5 billion) and the amount that insurers have to pay due to their
34

Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-144, 119
Stat 2660, 2660-61.
35
§ 6(2)(B)(i).
36
§ 4(1)(B).
37
§ 3(c)(3)(E)-(F).
38
§ 5(3)(D)(i), (E)(i).
39
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110160, §2, 121 Stat. 1839 (providing that the definition of an act of terrorism was amended by
“striking ‘acting on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest’”).
40
See Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-144, §4,
119 Stat. 2660, 2661.
41
§ 4(a)(1)(A).
42
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., COST ESTIMATE, TERRORISM RISK
INSURANCE PROGRAM REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2007 1-2 (2007) [hereinafter COST
ESTIMATE].
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deductibles and copayments.43 For example, suppose that there was a $25
billion loss, and that industry retentions and copays amounted to a total of
$7 billion. Mandatory recoupment would be 133% of the difference
between these two figures, or about $24 billion (25 b - 7 b = 18 b x 1.33 =
23.94). The 3% surcharge is still part of the program, but it is the maximum
that can be allowed under discretionary recoupment. These changes will
increase the amount of recovery that Treasury will be able to obtain from
the industry after an event, which will reduce the cost of the program. The
other noteworthy change in the 2007 extension is the requirement for
Treasury to adopt allocation and recoupment regulations within a specified
timeframe.44
G. SUMMARY: CURRENT STRUCTURE
The following bullet points summarize the terms of the Act:
• Scope. The Act covers commercial property and casualty
insurance, including excess insurance, workers compensation and
directors and officers insurance; insurers selling those lines of
insurance are required to participate;
• Mandatory offering. Terrorism coverage must be offered
on the same on the same conditions (but not at the same price) as
non-terrorism coverage;
• Certified act of terrorism. A terrorist event causing more
than $100,000,000 in insured losses certified by the Secretary of
Treasury will trigger the Act’s provisions;
• Insurer deductibles and co-payments. Insurers must first
pay 20% of their previous year’s direct earned premium for the
losses, after which they will be reimbursed by the government for
85% of additional covered losses;
• Cap. The maximum to be paid under the Act is $100
billion; and
• Recoupment. The government is required to recoup 133%
of the first $27.5 billion paid out under the act (less the amount
that insurers pay that is not subject to reimbursement) by imposing
a premium surcharge on all eligible insurance, and may impose an
additional surcharge of up to 3% in the Secretary’s discretion.
43

Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11060 § 4(e)(1)(A), 121 Stat. 1839, 1841.
44
See §§ 4(c), 4(e)(1)(B)(I).
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A graphical depiction of the program is provided in the Figure below,
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office:

WHY SUPPORT TERRORISM INSURANCE?
The recent renewal of TRIA raises a number of important issues with
regard to the structure of regulation of the terrorism insurance industry.
First among these is the question of why the industry needs any support at
all. With government support now guaranteed through 2014, all pretense of
a need for “temporary” or “short term” assistance has been dropped.
Instead it is now argued that private market provision of terrorism
insurance is permanently compromised, uninsurability being a consequence
of two features:
1)

The size of potential loss.

2)

The lack of precise underlying probabilities of terrorist attack.

Given that TRIA and its extensions set up a potential transfer from the
tax payer to otherwise profitable enterprises, both of these arguments for
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intervention require detailed scrutiny. With respect to the size of the loss, it
is true that some potential terrorism losses, particularly those associated
with Chemical, Nuclear, Biological, and Radiological (so called CNBR)
attacks are of an order of magnitude greater than any losses experienced by
the insurance industry to date. As an illustration, Table 1 shows the
estimates of loss for various scenarios as developed by the American
Academy of Actuaries.45 Other loss estimates, for example by Risk
Management Solutions, are of the same order of magnitude.46
Table 1: Estimated Terrorism Losses

Source: American Academy of Actuaries: 2006
As a point of reference, the total surplus (reserves) of property/casualty
insurers in the US in 2007 was $687 billion.47 This surplus is required to
45
Open Letter from Michael G. McCarter, Chair, Terrorism Risk Insurance
Subgroup of the American Academy of Actuaries, to the President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets: Terrorism Risk Insurance Analysis (April 21, 2006), available at
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/tris_042106.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Open Letter].
46
See RISK MGMT SOLUTIONS, INC., A RISK-BASED RATIONALE FOR EXTENDING THE
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT (2005), available at http://www.rms.com/Publications/
A%20Risk%20Based%20Approach%20for%20Extending%20TRIA.pdf. .
47
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM.15.1(C)&(D) , INSURERS MAINTAIN RECORD PROFITS IN
2007 BY OVERPRICING POLICIES AND UNDERPAYING CLAIMS (2008), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/2008_INSURANCE_RELEASE_FINAL.pdf.
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pay all property casualty losses, not just terrorism loss. Clearly a large
CNBR attack in New York City could wipe out the whole property casualty
insurance industry in one blow.
The cost of damages from CNBR attacks, however, is not a relevant
benchmark to justify TRIA, because, as already noted, under the current
Act, mandatory offering is limited to requiring only that insurers offer
terrorism coverage on the same terms and conditions as non-terrorism
insurance.48 Non-terrorism insurance already excludes nuclear risks,
pollution and contamination. As a consequence, even though the Treasury
would support CNBR loss in exactly the same way as it supports
conventional terrorism loss, CNBR coverage is typically excluded from
standard terrorism insurance contracts. The one exception to this is workers
compensation, where regulation permits no exclusions.49 This and other
issues related to CNBR coverage will be addressed later in the article, but
within the context of current insurance practice and legislative parameters
the only question is whether or not a conventional terrorist attack could
cause such large damages that it would present any real capacity problem
for the private sector. From that point of view, even such a dreadful event
as a truck bomb in Manhattan ($12b estimated loss) represents a mere 2%
of current surplus.50 Events of this magnitude clearly do not threaten the
viability of the private sector and of course such events occur infrequently.
How infrequently? The second argument for continued government
intervention goes to the difficulty in answering this question. Unlike, say
auto or life insurance, there are no precise actuarial tables of terrorism
attacks from which profit guaranteeing premiums can be calculated.
But this is not to say that anything can happen. The Congressional
Budget Office, for example, is charged with estimating the costs to the
Government of new legislation, and for the most recent TRIA extension
they used expert opinion to estimate the probability of loss. As they state:
Although estimating losses associated with terrorist events is difficult
because of the lack of meaningful historical data, the insurance industry has
experience setting premiums for catastrophic events—namely, natural
disasters. Setting premiums for hurricanes and earthquakes, for example,
involves determining areas that could sustain damage, the value of the

48

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
2006 Open Letter, supra note 45, at 3.
50
Again to calibrate the size of the loss, note that AIG lost $1b in the 9/11 attacks
and in January 2008 wrote down $11.1 billion of guarantees sold to fixed-income investors.
49
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losses that could result from various types of events with different levels of
severity, and the frequency of such events.
Similarly, estimating premiums for losses resulting from terrorist
attacks involves judgments regarding potential targets and the frequency of
such attacks. Because there is a very limited history of terrorist attacks in
the United States, many of the parameters needed by the insurance industry
to set premiums are based on expert opinion regarding terrorist activities
and capabilities rather than on historical data.51
Given the argument that losses are too large for the private sector to
bear on its own, it is somewhat surprising that the CBO estimates that the
new Act, which the industry argued was necessary for its survival, would
only increase direct Government spending by $3.1 billion over the entire
2008-2012 period and by $6.6 billion over the 2008-2017 period. Clearly
the removal of a subsidy this small does not threaten the viability of the
private terrorism insurance industry.52
It is true that, however, that in general insurers dislike imprecise
estimates of risk. When it is difficult to attach a precise number to the
probability of attack, risk becomes “ambiguous” in the sense identified by
Ellsberg.53 It is well known that insurers are “ambiguity averse,”54
preferring to insure risks with known probabilities which are subject to
actuarial calculation. As Kunreuther et al noted,55 managers of insurance
companies facing ambiguous probabilities demand a large premium over
expected loss to write these lines.
Notwithstanding this ambiguity aversion, in the absence of price
regulation, there is no reason why the ambiguity cannot be handled by
setting larger premiums. As the CBO notes, other lines with uncertain risk
parameters, notably earthquake insurance, are provided by the private
sector.56 So again it is puzzling why insurers continue to assert that
terrorism is uninsurable.

51

COST ESTIMATE, supra note 42, at 5.
Id. at 4. The bill contains a provision that limits payments to no more than $100
million, which helps to preserve private sector viability. We discuss this provision later.
53
See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643
(1961).
54
See Howard Kunreuther, J. Meszaros, R. Hogarth & M. Spranca, Ambiguity and
Underwriter Decision Processes, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 337 (1995); R. Hogarth &
Howard Kunreuther, Risk, Ambiguity and Insurance, 2 J. RISK & INS. 5(1989).
55
See Howard Kunreuther, J. Meszaros, R. Hogarth & M. Spranca, Ambiguity and
Underwriter Decision Processes, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 337 (1995).
56
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 5.
52
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The market reaction to the September 11th attacks, while generally one
of withdrawal and higher prices, is consistent with the theoretical
explanation given above. Although many insurers excluded terrorism from
standard coverages, the Treasury study found that significant terrorism
coverage was still available in the market during 2002, prior to the
enactment and effective date of TRIA.57 Treasury found that “roughly 73
percent of commercial property and casualty insurers wrote some terrorism
coverage in TRIA-eligible commercial property and casualty lines
(excluding workers’ compensation) in 2002.”58 This coverage was provided
in approximately 60% of commercial property and casualty policies that
year.59
While this coverage was significant, it was far from universal. The
Treasury study also found that while some 40% of insurers offered
terrorism coverage in all of their policies (and many times without separate
premium charges),60 in 2002 about 27% of insurers offered terrorism
insurance coverage in none of their policies, and about another 5% offered
terrorism in 50% or less of their policies.61
Consistent with the ambiguity aversion, prices for terrorism insurance
were quite high after September 11th, especially compared to the price
prior to September 11th (zero, as it was not a separately considered risk),
but those prices came down as the market was able to develop models to
address the ambiguity and with the adoption of TRIA. Immediately after
September 11th, insurers were worried that another attack could be
imminent; as concerns subsided, prices dropped by 50-75% within the first
nine months of 2002.62 But even in 2003, terrorism insurance could add
10% to the average property insurance premium for small to medium-sized
properties, up to 20% for large properties, and considerably more for
landmark properties in major urban areas.63 By the third quarter of 2004,
the typical price for terrorism coverage was about 4% of total premiums for

57

See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ASSESSMENT: THE
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 3, 27 (2005).
58
Id. at 57 (2005).
59
Id. at 58 (2005).
60
U.S. Department of Treasury, Assessment: the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002, at 60 (2005).
61
See Figure 4.3, U.S. Department of Treasury, Assessment: the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002, at 59-60 (2005).
62
Congressional Budget Office, Federal Terrorism Reinsurance: An Update, at 6
n.18 (2005).
63
Id. at 6.
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property coverage.64 By 2006, the median rate for terrorism insurance was
down to $47 per $1 million compared to $56 per million in 2003.65
As prices declined, more policyholders purchased terrorism coverage.66
According to a study conducted by Wharton Risk Management and
Decision Processes Center at the University of Pennsylvania, by 2005
“about 50% of commercial enterprises had purchased TRIA-line terrorism
insurance.”67 The take-up rate climbed to 64% in the first half of 2007.68
Without TRIA support, prices would likely rise and take-up rates decline.69
While lower prices are certainly welcomed by consumers, lower prices
and higher take up rates alone do not justify TRIA. If consumers are
unwilling to pay the market price for terrorism insurance, one may
conclude that they should bear the risk of terrorism. However, there are
some social benefits from terrorism insurance. In particular, use of
terrorism insurance makes available the insurance industry’s underwriting
and claims apparatus. The claims process after September 11th, which at
the time was the “largest single insured event in history,” went relatively
smoothly.70 Of the nearly 20,000 insurance claims filed two months after
the attack, the New York Insurance Commissioner’s Office only received
63 complaints.71 The Insurance Commissioner concluded that consumers
were generally “satisfied” with the claims handling, and that the industry
approached its claims obligations “responsibly.”72 This is a dramatic
64
Chalk, Peter; Hoffman, Bruce; Reville, Robert; & Kasupski, Anna-Britt; Trends in
Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
(RAND Corp. 2005).
65
Congressional Budget Office, Federal Reinsurance for Terrorism Risks: Issues in
Reauthorization, at 16 (2007) (available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/
doc8761/TRIAsenate.pdf).
66
Chalk, Peter; Hoffman, Bruce; Reville, Robert; & Kasupski, Anna-Britt; Trends in
Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
(RAND Corp. 2005).
67
Wharton Risk Management and Decision Process Center, TRIA and Beyond, at 2
(Wharton School of Business 2005).
68
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 62, at 15.
69
Dixon, Lloyd; Lempert, Robert J.; LaTorrette, Tom; Reville, Robert T.; Terrorism
Insurance: Evaluating Alternatives in an Uncertain World at 30 (RAND Corp. 2007)
(noting that “studies suggest that the take-up rate would fall by 25 to 75 percent if TRIA
were to expire, resulting in take-up somewhere between 14 and 49 percent”).
70
Jeffrey Thomas, Insurance Implications of September 11 and Possible Responses,
34 URB. LAW. 727, 730-31 (2002).
71
Jeffrey E. Thomas, Insurance Implications of September 11 and Possible
Responses, 34 Urb. Lawyer 727, 732 (2002) (citing testimony of Gregory V. Serio, New
York Commissioner of Insurance).
72
Id.
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contrast to FEMA’s handling of Federal Assistance claims in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina. The Government Accountability Office identified
significant problems in the processes used by FEMA, and estimated that
more than $1 billion in payments were improper and/or fraudulent.73
Moreover, because it seems likely that the government will step in to
provide disaster relief to victims of a terrorist attack, terrorism insurance
provides for private payment of at least part of the claims, which reduces
the cost to the government even when the insurance is subsidized.
UNINSURABILITY AND IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS
If the conventional arguments do not explain uninsurability, why did
firms withdraw from this market following 9/11? In previous works it is
argued that the failure of the terrorism and other catastrophe insurance
markets is a consequence of imperfections in the market for capital.74 The
difficulty of raising external capital is documented in several works.75 Gron
and Lucas, for example, document that insurers raise premiums following a
loss of surplus but make surprisingly little use of the external capital
market.76 This strategy will not work for catastrophic losses. In general, for
infrequent, high loss events, it is not possible to guarantee payment of
losses out of pre accumulated premiums. Suppose that a one in a hundred
year event occurs soon after an insurance line has been established.
Because sufficient time will not have elapsed in which to accumulate
adequate reserves from premiums, an insurer will then be forced to raise
capital in external capital markets. This can be a very difficult task.
Consider the analogy with the banking sector. A bank may be a
perfectly solvent business going forward, but if there is a run (a type of
catastrophe) or indeed any situation in which the bank is forced to liquidate
73

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-300, HURRICANE KATRINA AND
RITA DISASTER RELIEF; CONTINUED FINDINGS OF FRAUD, WASTE AND ABUSE 1-4 (2007).
74
See Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Markets Under Stress: The Case of
Extreme Event Insurance, in ECONOMICS FOR AN IMPERFECT WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 35, 41-43 (Richard Arnott et al. eds., 2003); Dwight M. Jaffee and
Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 RISK
& INS. 205, 227-228 (1997).
75
See Anne Gron & Deborah Lucas, External Financing and Insurance Cycles, in
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 5 (David F. Bradford, ed., 1998);
Anne Gron, Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-Casualty Insurance Markets, 25
RAND J. ECON. 110 (1994); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Insurance Market, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 115 (1991).
76
See Gron & Lucas, supra note 75.
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assets, the bank may find that the market’s appetite for cash is so strong
that even safe assets cannot be liquidated. This preference for cash may not
be rational, but it is part of the environment of financial intermediation, and
in the banking industry the institution of central banking exists to provide
liquidity in just such circumstances. As one central banker has noted:
[P]olicy practitioners operating under a risk-management
paradigm may, at times, be led to undertake actions intended to
provide insurance against especially adverse outcomes . . . When
confronted with uncertainty, especially Knightian uncertainty,
human beings invariably attempt to disengage from medium to
long-term commitments in favor of safety and liquidity. . . The
immediate response on the part of the central bank to such
financial implosions must be to inject large quantities of
liquidity.77
Providers of terrorism insurance are not as fortunate as bankers. Not
only is there no central bank to provide liquidity following a large loss,
insurance companies have no hard assets to use as security against a capital
inflow. The insurer may well be solvent in the sense that the future flow of
premiums (over perhaps a century or longer) would cover the loss and
provide profits, but few counterparties, having just witnessed an event such
as 9/11, will agree to provide capital against these future flows. Given that
post loss capital is so difficult to obtain, a contract of terrorism insurance
which relies on such external capital is not credible, and so insurers refrain
from writing it. This analysis suggests a very different approach to
terrorism insurance regulation, but before turning to this, it is useful to
consider what, if any, private arrangements might reduce the reliance on
external capital.
One obvious approach is to arrange in advance for capital injections
following a loss. This is the “Lloyd’s solution.” Lloyds of London was
originally organized as a syndicate of rich investors (names) who pledged
their capital with unlimited liability “down to their last shirt button.”
Lloyd’s itself held only operating capital, but in the event of a large loss,
the capital of the names was subject to a “call,” this internal capital
removing the need to access external markets.
77

Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary
Policy (Jan. 3, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/
Speeches/2004/20040103/default.htm.
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Indeed given the efficiency of English capital markets, there was no
need even for the names to hold liquid capital. Many names were rich
landowners who could meet a call by pledging their land as a security for a
loan. In this way the capital of the names, land, which was pledgeable, was
substituted for the future premium stream of the syndicate which was not.
When this structure was in place, Lloyds fulfilled the function of a central
bank for primary catastrophe insurers who could lay off their risks in the
London market.
This solution, however, is no longer available. A series of financial
reversals has made the names no longer willing to accept unlimited
liability, and Lloyds, moving towards the organizational form of most of
the world’s major re-insurers, is in the process of becoming a limited
liability joint stock company. With this organizational form, Lloyds too
will face the problem of raising external capital ex post.
Given the difficulties which this entails, it is natural to look for
alternative mechanisms to pre-capitalize the premium stream. Recently a
number of creative ways of tapping into capital markets have been
developed. Known collectively as Insurance Linked Securities, (ILS) the
most notable instruments are catastrophe bonds (“cat bonds”), and
“sidecars.”78 Cat bonds are loans whose principal is forfeited to the
borrower in the event of a triggering loss. Sidecars are a type of insurance
book- of- business based hedge fund.
Some market participants have high hopes that this market will grow
large enough to pre fund even mega catastrophes. For example,
extrapolating past growth, Jacques Aigrain, CEO of Swiss Re, predicted a
size of between $250 billion and $710 billion by 2016.79 Obviously if even
the low end of this forecast were to be realized, the need for government
intervention would evaporate.

78

Morton N. Lane, See Of Sidecars and Such, LANE FINANCIAL TRADE NOTES (Lane
Financial, Wilmette, IL), Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://www.lanefinancialllc.com/
images/stories/Publications/2007-01-30_Of_Sidecars_and_Such.pdf (providing an excellent
overview of the history and current state of the sidecar instrument).
79
Jaques Aigrain, Chief Executive Officer, Swiss Re, UBS Swiss Alpine Summit
(Jan. 19, 2007), available at http://www.swissre.com (follow “Investor Relations”
hyperlink, then follow “Presentations” hyperlink, then follow “2007” hyperlink, scroll down
to January 19th Presentation).
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Figure 2: Growth of the ILS Market: Source Aigrain 2007.
However, extrapolation of past trends is a dangerous game, especially
from a low base, and this predicted scenario seems to be particularly rosy.
It is true that following the 2005 hurricane losses due to Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma, (KRW) the ILS market proved remarkably resilient. Despite the
fact that investors in one cat bond issue (Kamp Re) lost their entire
principal, $6.2 billion dollars was raised in the cat bond market in 2006,
and $6.3 billion was raised in sidecars. This growth has gone on into 2007.

Figure 3: Post Katrina Financing: Source Lane Financial
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It should be pointed out, however, that these sums fall far short of the
KRW losses of $56.5 billion. More worrying, the sub-prime problems have
cast a shadow over the whole structured investment/special investment
vehicle market, and it is unlikely that the ILS market will escape this pall.
POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TRIA
In the absence, then, of a multi billion ILS Market, what is the
appropriate role for government in regulating the conventional terrorism
loss insurance industry? Based on the analysis here, several conclusions
emerge.
1)
TRIA may be justified as a way of limiting industry loss. A
fixed cap on loss limits the size of the needed recapitalization following an
event and thus reduces reliance on external capital markets. In light of the
$687 billion in total reserves, the current loss cap of $100 billion, ($70
billion after tax) seems more than adequate. There is evidence from other
catastrophe lines (for example, earthquake insurance in California),80 that
private insurers will write insurance if they know that the maximum
possible loss is limited to a manageable sum. As reserves increase, this
upper limit could be increased. TRIA further limits industry losses through
the reimbursement of 85% of losses after the insurer deductible has been
met. Within the liability cap, this reinsurance seems unnecessary.
2)
With a manageable total loss cap in place, there seems no
reason why, within the overall $100 billion limit, the government should
provide the industry with any subsidy. As noted above, the expected value
of this subsidy is in any case small, and with total loss capped, the industry
seems quite capable of paying claims without any co-payments from the
government. The more the industry is required to bear its own risk, the
more incentive there will be to discover creative financing arrangements
such as the ILS discussed above. It is little wonder that some insurers such
as Swiss Re are reluctant to enter the terrorism insurance market when they
must compete with an agency, the federal government, which makes
reinsurance available at zero cost.
3)
TRIA may be justified as a way of reducing the price for
terrorism insurance. Although insurers have the capability to pay claims,
because of uncertainty about the probability of the losses, ambiguity
aversion drives up the price of terrorism insurance. While it is beyond the
80
Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell, Should Governments Provide Catastrophe
Insurance?, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Apr. 2006 at 2.
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scope of this paper to explore in detail, it may be that without TRIA the
price of terrorism insurance will be higher than many policyholders are
willing to pay.81 In the absence of insurance it seems likely that Federal
and State governments would be obliged to make ex post payments
following a terrorist attack, and the larger the share of these losses covered
by insurance, the smaller the burden on the taxpayer.82 TRIA also helps to
address ambiguity aversion through the recoupment process, which uses
actual costs of a terrorism incident rather than trying to model and predict
what those costs would be. Public policy reasons (such as ex ante planning
and ex post claims adjusting expertise) may justify the program to improve
take-up rates and to reduce prices.
All of this said, the parameters of government intervention in the
conventional terrorism insurance industry have now been set till 2014, so
reforms are not imminent. There does remain the question of what to do
about CNBR risk, and since the extension of TRIA requires the
Comptroller General to study “the availability and affordability of
insurance coverage for losses caused by terrorist attacks involving nuclear,
biological, chemical, or radiological materials” and issue a report by
December 2008,83 this question remains of some current interest.
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT CNBR RISK?
In the original House version of what became the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, the “mandatory offer”
provision was extended to acts of CNBR terrorism. Although at least parts
of the industry supported this provision, which was supplemented by lower
deductibles and other provisions favorable to insurers (such as the so-called
“reset” provision), the final version did not expand TRIA’s coverage to
include CNBR risks. The administration and some Senators opposed the
inclusion of CNBR risks as an inappropriate expansion of TRIA. In the
81

Take-up rates have gone from about 24% to 60% since TRIA was first enacted.
These take-up rates are at least in part because of lower pricing under the program, and
without TRIA it is reasonable to expect that prices would rise and take-up rates would fall.
See PETER CHALK ET AL., TRENDS IN TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE
FUTURE OF THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT 7-8 (2005).
82
This view informs the RAND study. See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CTR FOR
TERRORISM RISK MGMT POLICY, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN TERRORISM INSURANCE: EVALUATING
ALTERNATIVES IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
37-41
(2007)
available
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG679.pdf.
83
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110160, § 5(a), 121 Stat. 1839, 1841-42 (2007).
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show-down between the House and Senate versions the Senate version
won, in significant part because of a threatened veto, and so the CNBR
provision was not included, leaving only the requirement for the
Comptroller General study.
Although in many ways the issues raised by CNBR terrorism are the
same as those raised by conventional terrorism (except with larger loss
estimates), the risk of large losses combined with even less experience and
data about such attacks makes it less likely that the private market will
provide significant insurance coverage for NBCR risks. In its September
2006 report on insuring NBCR risks, for example, the GAO notes that
“insuring NBCR risks is distinctly different from insuring other risks
because of the potential for catastrophic losses, a lack of understanding or
knowledge about the long-term consequences, and a lack of historical
experience with NBCR attacks in the United States.”84 The GAO
concluded that, “[g]iven the challenges faced by insurers in providing
coverage for, and pricing, NBCR risks, any purely market-driven
expansion of coverage is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.”85
As noted above in Table 1, some scenarios of CNBR attacks are
estimated to cause losses that approach $700 billion. Under the current
TRIA structure, however, this would present no marginal threat to the
surplus positions of private insurers. Even with CNBR coverage included,
private insurance losses would remain capped at $100 billion ($70 billion
after tax). 86
For insurers, then, the real question is the extent to which the addition
of CNBR risk would increase the probability of payouts below the $100
billion cap. To answer this question, it is necessary to estimate the
probability of a CNBR attack, and, because we have little clear data on how
close terrorists are to developing weapons of mass destruction,87 this is
even more difficult than estimating the probability of a conventional
terrorism attack.
84

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1081, TERRORISM INSURANCE:
MEASURING AND PREDICTING LOSSES FROM UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IS DIFFICULT, BUT
SOME INDUSTRY EXPOSURE EXISTS 4 (2006).
85
Id. at 4.
86
See McCarter, supra note 45, at 30 tbl. 1.
87
E.g., WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE ATOMIC BAZAAR: THE RISE OF THE NUCLEAR
POOR (2007) (providing an interesting discussion of the challenges which terrorists face in
obtaining highly enriched uranium, the heart of a nuclear bomb). For a qualitative
assessment of CNBR risks based on current terrorism threats, see PETER CHALK ET AL.,
TRENDS IN TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE FUTURE OF THE TERRORISM
RISK INSURANCE ACT 11-38 (2005).
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Experts are deeply divided on this issue. On the one hand, there are
those who see a CNBR attack on the US in the near future as all but
inevitable. For example, William Frist, the former United States Senate
majority leader in 2005 stated, “The greatest existential threat we have in
the world today is biological” and would come “at some time in the next
10 years.” 88
On the other hand, there is much data suggesting that terrorism risk is
in fact very low. As Mueller has pointed out:
Even with the September 11 attacks included in the count,
however, the number of Americans killed by international
terrorism over the period [1975-2003] is not a great deal more than
the number killed by lightning--or by accident-causing deer or by
severe allergic reactions to peanuts over the same period. In almost
all years the total number of people worldwide who die at the
hands of international terrorists is not much more than the number
who drown in bathtubs in the United States--some 300-400.89
Attempts to reach scientific estimates of probability are bedeviled by
the well known judgmental bias called by Tversky and Kahneman, the
availability heuristic.90 Events such as a suitcase nuclear bomb attack on a
US city are vivid and easy to imagine, a fact reinforced by the frequent use
of such events in popular fiction. Because such events are “available,” they
are believed to occur more frequently than the data suggests. When the
availability heuristic is combined with the fact that inducing fear of an
invisible enemy is often a powerful political instrument, the divergence of
views is easy to understand.
Insurers are caught in the middle of this debate, and thus find it very
difficult to know what premium would be appropriate for CNBR coverage.
So even though extending the “must offer” requirement within the $100
billion cap would not threaten the viability of insurers, it would require an
increase in premiums to cover the ambiguity in the estimates of likelihood.
88

Kevin McElderry, US Senate Leader Urges Research Push Against Bio-terrorism,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, January 27, 2005. For a more scholarly assessment of CNBR risks
from Al-Qaeda, see CHALK ET AL., supra note 81.
89
JOHN MUELLER, REACTING TO TERRORISM: PROBABILITIES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
THE PERSISTENCE OF FEAR (2007), http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/
ISA2007T.pdf.
90
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207 (1973).
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To offset this premium increase, some form of special subsidy for CNBR
terrorism may be needed. The government payment of 85% of losses (after
insurer deductibles) would help reduce the price for such coverage.
Industry representatives have argued that for CNBR coverage to be
affordably priced, the industry deduction for CNBR terrorism loss should
be lower than for conventional losses.91 This kind of special treatment of
CNBR loss was a feature of the House version of 2007 extension of TRIA
(which was not accepted by the Senate or the Administration).92
CNBR AND WORKERS COMPENSATION
The workers compensation line faces two special challenges with
respect to CNBR risks.
1)
With the exception of Pennsylvania,93 workers compensation
statutes permit no exclusions for CNBR risks.
2)
The benefits payable under workers compensation are preset
by statute. For some injuries likely to be associated with CNBR attacks, for
example skin grafting following burns, these individual benefits may
exceed $15 million.
Thus, private insurers who offer this line have substantial exposure. For
example, some 5.7% of total 9/11 losses (approximately $2 billion) was
due to workers compensation claims, and the estimates of the workers
compensation loss from a New York City CNBR incident given in Table 1
approach one half trillion dollars.
To be sure, not all of this risk is written by the for- profit private sector.
In four states and two territories,94 workers compensation insurance is

91
See Hearing on Terrorism Risk Insurance Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial
Servs., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Brian Dowd, CEO, Insurance-North America).
92
Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007, H.R. Res.
2761, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007).
93
In Pennsylvania, workers compensation statutes explicitly exclude acts of war.
See 77 PA STAT. ANN. § 431 (West 2002). Other jurisdictions are silent on this class of risk.
Since acts of war may therefore be included in workers compensation contracts, TRIA and
its extensions provide that the Federal program includes acts of war as well as acts of
terrorism.
94
North Dakota, Ohio, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Washington, Wyoming.
See Carl Hammersburg, Benefits of Adding Workers’ Compensation Data to the Public
Assistance Reporting Information System (PARIS), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/paris/
state_info/worker_white_paper.html.
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provided by a state run monopoly, and in thirteen other states95 a not- forprofit state enterprise competes with the private sector. In New York State,
the state exposed to the half trillion dollar estimate of Table 1, the top five
writers of workers’ comp insurance in 2006, according to A.M. Best Co.
were: the State Insurance Fund of New York, a not–for- profit state agency,
with 40.4% market share; American International Group Inc., with 18.7%;
Liberty Mutual Insurance Cos., with 9.1%; Hartford Insurance Group, with
4%; and Zurich Financial Services North America Group, with 3.6%.
Clearly, the exposure of the private sector in this state (60%) is
significant,96 and for private insurers who write this line, the argument
that, because of its size and non predictability, CNBR risk is uninsurable,
apparently does not apply.
Obviously when given the all or nothing choice to offer CNBR
insurance or quit the workers compensation line, many companies have
found a way to stay in business. How did they do it? In the first place,
many companies scrutinized their book of business to make certain that
they had no accumulation of geographic risk. This statement by the CEO of
New York Mutual describes the policy:
With respect to workers’ compensation coverage, as long as employee
counts were not too concentrated, our company considered offering
coverage. We also implemented a computer system to geo track risk
accumulations to the street level as well as the number of employees in a
given building, and risk concentrations by zip code.97
Concentration of risk is clearly a major issue. If an insurer were to
write workers compensation insurance in the District of Columbia (where
the death benefit is worth approximately $1.8 million) for a company
which lost 300 employees as a result of a terrorist attack, the total claim
95
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah. See id.
96
In California, the share of the risk taken by the state enterprise, State
Compensation Insurance Fund, fell sharply between 2005 and 2006 (from over 42% to 31%)
and the state is actively campaigning to attract further private capital. Apparently investors
in this state are not put off by the fact that their capital is exposed to CNBR risk. See 2006
ANNUAL REPORT, STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND 5 (2006), available at
http://www.scif.com/pdf/2006AnnualReport.pdf.
97
Hearing on the Need to Extend the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Warren Heck, Chairman
and CEO, Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company, Insurance Company of Greater
New York and Strathmore Insurance Company), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/
list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/htheck030507.pdf.
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would equal $500 million. It would clearly not be prudent for one company
to cover all these employees.
Given the obvious benefit of regional diversification, it might be
thought that there would be benefits to the development of an industry pool
to share workers compensation risks.98 A 2004 private market sponsored
study by Tillinghast Reinsurance, however, concluded that such a pool
would do little to add to capacity, and the industry opted instead to rely on
the federal program. As the study states,
In the face of catastrophic events (the type that threaten the viability of
the industry), the pool could not provide the industry any meaningful
protection for the foreseeable future. This is true even under the most
optimistic of assumptions including, notably, that the pool could achieve
favorable tax treatment that enables it to accumulate capacity more
quickly.99
Secondly, though it is true that forecasting terrorist attack is more art
than science, if a premium rate must be developed, assumptions can be
made, and a rate brought forth. Following 9/11 this was done by the
National Council on Compensation Insurance for insurers in the states for
which they develop rates. 100 Details of how it was done are available at
NCCI (2002).
In any case, we simply note that conventional and CNBR terrorism risk
is currently provided by the private sector under the workers compensation
line. The private sector has clearly concluded that the federal backstop
provides adequate reinsurance in the event of a major loss. If, the
Comptroller General report on CNBR insurance recommends that CNBR
events be added to the must offer provision in TRIPRA, it seems likely that
property /casualty insurers would react in much the same manner as
providers of workers compensation insurance. Indeed, as with AIG, in
many cases the same companies are involved.

98

In the UK, all terrorism risks are shared via an organization called Pool Re with
the UK Government providing a backstop. Details may be found on the Pool Re webpage
http://www.poolre.co.uk/.
99
TOWERS PERRIN, WORKERS COMPENSATION TERRORISM REINSURANCE POOL
FEASIBILITY STUDY 3
(2004),
available
at
https://www.towersperrin.com/
tillinghast/publications/reports/WC_Terr_Pool/WC_Terr_Pool_Study.pdf
100
The NCCI is the workers compensation rate making body rate for 35 states (AL,
AK, AZ, AR, CO, CT, DC, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MS, MO, MT,
NE, NV, NH, NM, OK, OR, RI, SC, SD, TN, UT, VA, and VT), see NCCI State Map,
https://www.ncci.com/nccimain/IndustryInformation/TerrorismWC/Resources/Pages/default
.aspx.
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CONCLUSION
In this article we have deliberately discussed terrorism insurance
regulation within the context of the recently passed Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007. Since this Act provides
the regulatory framework for the next seven years, this seems appropriate.
Recognizing that the original Terrorism Risk Insurance act of 2002 was
passed in some haste, the question may be raised as to how terrorism
insurance would be optimally regulated if we started with a clean slate.
To the extent that this article correctly identifies the fundamental
problem of terrorism insurance (indeed of all catastrophe insurance) as
being the near impossibility of obtaining adequate capital in the aftermath
of a large loss, there is clearly an argument for maintaining some limit on
the industry’s aggregate loss. The Comptroller General is charged with
examining this question, but in the context of lowering the limit after a loss.
Given the growth in size of reserves since the $100 billion limit was set
five years ago, there would seem to be an argument in the opposite
direction for raising the limit, keeping it to some fixed fraction of industry
reserves. Certainly experience with the California Earthquake Authority
and with the Price Anderson Act governing the insurance of nuclear
accidents suggests that if the industry knows its liability is limited to a
manageable amount, it will be more willing to continue to offer this line.
Beyond that, it may be time to recognize a fact of which bankers have
been aware since at least the time of the 19th century English writer on
capital markets, Walter Bagehot.101 From time to time, capital markets fail
to act rationally in their evaluation of streams of future payments. During
these periods markets fail to provide liquidity, so it is necessary to have
liquidity provided by a government agency. In the case of banking this role
is played by the central bank.
By making it difficult to raise capital, a catastrophe such as a terrorist
attack has much the same effect on an insurance company as does a run on
a bank during a period of illiquidity. In both cases, external capital is
needed, and in both cases external capital is not available. To a limited
extent, TRIA provides this needed liquidity by providing government
support to pay terrorism claims (followed by recoupment of some or all of
the government payments). Perhaps the time has come to address this
liquidity problem more systematically by extending to insurers the same
101
WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET:
(Charles Scribner’s Sons 1897).
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courtesy which the Federal Reserve System extends to banks, namely
giving them temporary access to public capital until such times as the
liquidity crisis passes.102
In addition to addressing the capital problems associated with terrorism
risk, TRIA provides a mechanism to address the ambiguity problem in two
ways: First, by limiting the amount of risk faced by insurers to their
deductible and co-payments (even within the $100 billion cap); and second,
by providing for a ex post assessment of the risk based on actual costs
passed on to insureds through the recoupment mechanism. This reduces the
price of terrorism insurance, and increases the take-up rates. Wider use of
terrorism insurance has social benefits of providing access to the insurance
industry claims apparatus and at least marginally reducing the government
cost of compensating victims of a terrorist attack.

102

More details of such a scheme may be found in Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell,
NBCR TERRORISM: WHO SHOULD BEAR THE RISK, IN GLOBAL BUSINESS AND TERRORISM
(Harry Richardson, ed., forthcoming 2008).
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THE SCOPE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN INSURANCE BAD
FAITH CASES: CAN THE EXPERT TESTIFY ON THE
MEANING OF THE INSURANCE POLICY?
Charles Miller*
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the use of claims handling experts in bad faith
insurance claims and the admissibility of their testimony in legal
malpractice cases. While a duty of good faith has been established in
insurance case law, insurance claims experts are used in court to provide
information and analysis on training, policy, and interpretation by various
insurance claims handlers and their subsequent decisions in covering or
denying situations. Such experts minutely examine the training and
preparation regimes of the claims handlers, but their testimony is
sometimes limited based on concerns over invading the court’s province
and whether policies are ambiguous. This article argues that such concerns
are invalid and unworkable, and that such expert testimony, analogous to
testimony for cases in legal malpractice, is both acceptable and helpful to
legal proceedings.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The use of claims handling experts in insurance bad faith cases has
dramatically increased in the past several years. Claims handling experts
are used to provide testimony on whether the insurance company handled
the claim properly, in bad faith, or in accordance with insurance industry
practices and standards. Claims experts can also provide the trier of fact
with an important understanding of how the insurance claims business
works—i.e., what an insurance adjuster does and what they are supposed to
do.
*

Mr. Miller is a licensed attorney in California. Since 1990 Mr. Miller’s practice
has been devoted to insurance law. Prior to 1990 Mr. Miller was employed in the insurance
industry for 18 years where he worked as an insurance claims representative and claims
manager. Mr. Miller has been retained in over seventeen states and territories, including
Canada, as an expert on insurance industry practices and standards and various insurance
policy coverage issues. Mr. Miller can be reached at cmiller.ilc@earthlink.net.
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Expert testimony in insurance bad faith cases can be extremely
important to both sides. Indeed, expert testimony may be the key factor
that sways the trier of fact. For example, in the trial of Campbell v. State
Farm in Utah, the expert testimony of two claims experts was a significant
factor in the $145 million punitive damage award.1
Although insurance claims experts are being increasingly used by both
plaintiff and defense in insurance bad faith cases, the testimony of such
experts has, however, been limited to whether the insurer’s conduct
complied with the practices and standards in the insurance industry for
claims handling.2 Many courts have precluded insurance claims experts
from testifying on whether the insurer properly interpreted and applied an
1
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), rev’d in
part, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
To rebut State Farm’s “honest mistake” defense, the Campbells called experts
Stephen Prater and Gary Fye. These men were intimately acquainted with the intricacies of
the insurance industry and with State Farm’s practices in particular. Their qualifications as
experts were not challenged by State Farm. Their testimony focused upon explaining State
Farm’s PP & R policy and demonstrating its far-reaching effects. State Farm now argues
that much of this testimony was without foundation and was prejudicial. In particular, State
Farm challenges the experts’ testimony concerning the company’s excess liability
handbook, its failure to maintain statistics on excess verdicts, the profits it derived from
improper claims handling and the effects of its PP & R policy and related practices in the
insurance industry in general. State Farm also argues that Mr. Prater impermissibly testified
to legal conclusions.
Id at 1159.
We have reviewed the entire transcript of both Prater’s and Fye’s trial testimony.
With the exception of the argument concerning legal conclusions, we find it unnecessary to
address with particularity State Farm’s specific challenges. That the experts’ testimony was
helpful is evident. State Farm conceded the witness’ qualifications. Although the rule does
not require that the issue to which an expert testifies be arcane, the issues raised in this case
were in fact quite difficult for the average person to understand. The experts’ familiarity
with the insurance industry in general, and State Farm in particular, must have greatly aided
the jury’s understanding of the issues. Moreover, our review of the record satisfies us that
the experts’ testimony, given its relevance and its helpfulness, did not raise any concerns
under rule 403 sufficient to warrant exclusion. Thus, because the experts’ testimony was
helpful to the jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under rule 702.
Id. at 1160.
2
Experts in insurance bad faith cases frequently testify on the standards and
practices in the insurance industry for the handling of claims. See, e.g., Hanson v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 783 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1985); Tricor Cal. Inc. v. State Comp. Ins.
Fund, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 551-552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d
565, 569, 574 (Ariz. 1986) (insurance claims expert permitted to testify that insurer’s
conduct breached insurance industry custom and practice). However, an insurer may not
excuse its treatment of the insured by proving that it conformed to industry standards.
Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1109 (Cal. 1974).
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insurance policy provision.3 The courts have usually reasoned that the
interpretation of a contract provision is the domain of the court and not
expert testimony.
The purpose of this article is to examine whether insurance claims
experts should be permitted to testify on the meaning of insurance contract
provisions in evaluating whether the insurer acted reasonably in applying a
policy provision to a given claim. In the article I will argue that the courts
have too narrowly limited the scope of insurance claims experts’ testimony
in insurance bad faith cases. Insurance claims experts should be able to
testify on whether an insurance claims handler has properly interpreted and
applied insurance policy provisions. Admissible expert testimony should
not only include insurance industry claims handling standards pertaining to
the interpretation and application of insurance policy provisions, but also
testimony regarding the applicable case law. This is necessary because
insurance claims handlers, in applying an insurance policy provision, have
been trained to consider and apply both industry standards and case law
when making a coverage decision. Accordingly, expert testimony
concerning not only insurance industry practices but also the applicable
case law is needed in insurance bad faith cases where there is a coverage
issue in order to provide the trier of fact with all the relevant facts and
testimony concerning the insurer’s conduct.
The first section of the article will summarize the development of bad
faith law and how it relates to the handling of claims. To find that the
insurer has breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing, the trier of fact
must, in most jurisdictions, find that the insurer’s conduct was not only
unreasonable but also in reckless disregard for the interests of the
policyholder.4 In spite of this broad standard, insurance claims handling
experts have often been prevented from testifying as to whether the claim
handler investigated and resolved insurance coverage issues in accordance
with insurance industry standards, including the applicable case law. This
is in spite of the fact that the claims handler almost daily addresses and

3

See, e.g., McHugh v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 164 F.3d 451, 454-55, 457 (9th
Cir. 1999); Flintkote Co. v. Gen. Accident Assurance Co., 410 F.Supp.2d 875, 876, 885
(N.D. Cal. 2006).
4
Although this article focuses on expert testimony on insurance contract
interpretation with regard to the bad faith cause of action, the same testimony would be
helpful, and should be considered, with regard to the breach of contract claim. Any
reference herein to bad faith cause of action should also be read to include the breach of
contract cause of action.
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makes important decisions concerning the application of coverage, which
themselves involve consideration of the applicable case law.
The second section of the article will examine what insurance claims
personnel do in their day to day handling of claims. Here, it will be noted
that insurance claims personnel receive a wide range of training and
experience in the interpretation of insurance policy provisions, and are
called upon, on a daily basis, to interpret and apply insurance policy
provisions to an equally wide variety of insurance claims. Further, there is
substantial literature in the insurance industry regarding the interpretation
and application of insurance policy provisions. This literature is available
to insurance claims personnel to assist them in the interpretation and
application of insurance policy provisions. This training and education,
along with the available literature, constitutes, at least in part, the insurance
industry’s standards for insurance claims handling with regard to the
interpretation and application of insurance policy provisions. Such
information is relevant in both insurance contract and bad faith actions in
order for the trier of fact to determine, first, the meaning of the contract
provision, and second, in the bad faith cause of action, whether the insurer
has complied with those standards.
The third section of the article will address the current status of case
law as it applies to the admissibility of expert testimony on the
interpretation of insurance policy provisions in insurance bad faith cases.
Here, it is noted that the courts have articulated two principle reasons for
restricting expert testimony when it comes to insurance contract
construction: First, the rules of evidence preclude such testimony absent a
finding of ambiguity, and second, such testimony invades the province of
the court. Both of these limitations fail to recognize the nature of insurance
claims handling, including insurance industry publications and materials on
insurance policy interpretation and that claims handling routinely involves
consideration of the applicable case law. Further, these limitations have
proved to be unworkable either because they are fraught with exceptions or
they are artificial and fail to offer sufficient guidance on how to determine
what expert testimony is admissible and what is not.
The fourth section will turn to a discussion of expert testimony in legal
malpractice cases. A discussion of expert testimony in legal malpractice
cases is appropriate because of the similarities between the legal and claims
handling professions. A consideration of expert testimony in legal
malpractice cases also offers a possible approach to the admissibility of
expert testimony on the meaning of insurance contact provisions in
insurance bad faith cases. In this regard it will be noted that expert
testimony in legal malpractice cases can extend to legal issues, or in other
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words, matters that may normally be considered to be in the province of the
court. Here, it will be argued that insurance claims handling is a quasilegal profession with regard to the interpretation and application of
insurance contract provisions. Accordingly, insurance claims experts
should be given the same latitude of testimony that is granted to experts in
legal malpractice cases. Without such latitude the trier of fact will be
precluded from hearing relevant evidence concerning the conduct of the
insurance claims handler.
The article will conclude that expert testimony on the interpretation of
insurance contracts should be permitted on both insurance industry
practices and standards and applicable case law. By expanding insurance
expert testimony to include the interpretation and application of insurance
policy provisions the trier of fact will be permitted to hear relevant
evidence concerning the insurer’s conduct. Any concern that such
testimony will amount to instructing the jury on the law can easily be
obviated by appropriate procedural mechanisms.
II. INSURANCE BAD FAITH LAW AND THE ROLE OF THE
INSURANCE CLAIMS EXPERT
Most courts have held that every insurance contract contains an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing “that neither party will do anything
which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement.”5 In the seminal case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., the
California Supreme Court held that, “in every insurance contract there is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The duty to so act is
imminent in the contract whether the company is attending to the claims of
third persons against the insured or the claims of the insured itself.” 6
Having held that insurance contracts contain a duty of good faith the
courts were then required to address how that duty was to be established.
Several courts have adopted a two pronged test, under which the insured
has the burden (1) “[t]o show…the absence of a reasonable basis for
denying the benefits of the policy; and (2) the insurer’s “knowledge or

5

See, e.g., Commuale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958);
see also, Dougals G. Houser, Good Faith As a Matter of Law: The Insurance Company’s
Right to be Wrong, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 665, 666 (1991-1992).
6
510 P.2d 1032,1038 (Cal. 1973).
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reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.” 7
It appears that two jurisdictions, Hawaii8 and Ohio9, have adopted only the
first prong of this test.
The first part of the two prong test requires a determination of whether
the insurer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, whereas the second prong
addresses the mental state of the claims handler and asks whether he/she
acted “deliberately and consciously rather than negligently.”10
Insurance claims experts are frequently called upon to provide
testimony on both prongs of the bad faith test. The expert may provide
testimony of whether the insurer’s conduct was reasonable (the first prong)
in light of insurance industry claims handling standards and practices.
Similarly the expert may be asked to testify on whether insurance company
programs or policies created, in the expert’s opinion, improper incentives
such that the claims handler was motivated to handle the claim to the
insurer’s benefit and the detriment of the policyholder.11
The insurance claims expert may also be asked to testify on whether
the insurer reasonably interpreted and applied a particular policy provision.
For example, where the insurer denies coverage on a first party water loss
because of a policy exclusion for long term seepage,12 the claims expert
may be asked not only for his/her opinion on the adequacy of the insurer’s
investigation but also on whether, based on the facts, the insurer was
reasonable in its denial of coverage. Such expert testimony may not only
7

Regal Homes, Inc. v. CNA Ins., 171 P.3d 610, 621 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Picket
v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J. 1993); Anderson v. Cont’l. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368,
376 (Wis. 1978).
8
Best Place, Inc. v. Penn. America Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 347 (Haw. 1996).
9
Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 399-400 (Ohio 1994).
10
Vandeventer v. All American Life & Cas. Co., 101 S.W.3d 703, 721 (Tex. App.
2003) (citing Colley v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Group, 691 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998)).
11
Courts have found that certain insurance company programs or policies create
such improper claims handling motivations. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court in
Zilisch v. State Farm, 995 P.2d 276, 280 (Ariz. 2000), called attention to these practices
when it wrote: “There was sufficient evidence in this case from which a jury could find that
State Farm acted unreasonably and knew it. There was evidence that State Farm set arbitrary
goals for the reduction of claims paid. The salaries and bonuses paid to claims
representatives were influenced by how much the representatives paid out on claims.”
12
Homeowners’ insurance policies may commonly contain an exclusion for “loss
caused by continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam from within a
plumbing, heating or air conditioning system or from within a domestic appliance which
occurs over a period of weeks, months or years.” See Fidelity Casualty & Surety Bulletins,
Personal Lines Volume, Dwellings HIB-3, Nov. 1994.
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involve consideration of the policy language, but also insurance industry
publications which provide guidance generally on the interpretation of
insurance policies as well as industry publications concerning the meaning
of the operative policy provision itself. In addition, the reasonableness of
the insurer’s conduct in interpreting and applying the policy provision may
also depend on whether the insurer properly considered the applicable case
law.13 Some courts have precluded expert testimony on insurance industry
policy interpretation, excluding testimony on the applicable case law on the
grounds that such testimony invades the court’s domain.14
The limitations on the scope of an insurance claims expert’s testimony
appear artificial when considered in context with how insurance claims
handlers are trained and what they are asked to do on a daily basis; that is,
make coverage decisions. The limitation also fails to recognize the
extensive insurance industry literature on the interpretation of insurance
policies, which are relied upon frequently by insurance claims handlers to
adjust claims. In other words, the limitations on the scope of testimony of
experts concerning insurance policy interpretation issues are not tied to the
real world. In order to appreciate this disconnect between the rules
concerning admissibility of expert testimony and the real work of insurance
claims handlers it is necessary to examine that “real world.”
III. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF INSURANCE
POLICY PROVISIONS IN THE INSURANCE CLAIMS
HANDLING PROCESS
Insurance claims handling not only involves the proper investigation,
evaluation and settlement of claims, but also, and frequently on a daily
basis, the interpretation and application of insurance policy provisions. In
the real world of insurance claims handling, insurance claims handlers are
trained in policy interpretation; provided resources on how to interpret and
apply policy provisions, and then required to interpret and apply insurance
policies to specific fact situations. Any evaluation of whether the insurer’s
conduct in applying and interpreting a policy provision must, therefore,
13
See, e.g., Redies v. Attorneys Liab. Prot. Soc’y, 150 P.3d 930, 938 (Mont. 2007);
Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162, 174 (Okla. 2001);
Transcontinental Ins. v. Wash. Pub. Utilities Districts’ Util. Sys., 760 P.2d 337, 347 (Wash.
1988).
14
See, e.g,. McHugh v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 164 F.3d 451, 454-55, 457 (9th
Cir. 1999). McCrink v. Peoples Benefit Life Ins. Co., 2005 WL 730688, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
March 29, 2005).
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consider the resources and training available to insurance claims handlers
and whether those resources and training were utilized and followed.15
Insurance claims handlers are trained on how to interpret and apply
insurance policies. This training includes educating the claims person on
the insurance industry rules for the interpretation of insurance policies.
These include the following: (a) exclusions are to be interpreted
narrowly,16 (b) insuring agreements are to be interpreted broadly,17 (c) the
insurance company must resolve doubts concerning coverage in favor of
the policyholder,18 (d) policy language should be given its plain, ordinary
and popular meaning;19 (e) ambiguous policy provisions should be
interpreted against the insurer and in favor of coverage,20 (f), and that the
insurance company has the burden of proving the application of an
excluded peril.21
There are also several texts which have been used to train insurance
industry claims handlers on not only proper claims handling but also on the
interpretation and application of insurance policy provisions.22 A partial
list of such insurance texts would include the following: 23
15

At least one commentator has contended that there is no such thing as insurance
industry standards and that the expert’s opinion in insurance cases should “be based upon
the same three things that a court’s opinion would be based upon: the policy language,
judicial precedent and any relevant statutes.” ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS &
DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES & INSUREDS § 9:26A (4th ed. 2001 &
Supp. 2006) (hereinafter “WINDT”) Such a view ignores the vast amount of material used in
the insurance industry, other than case law, to assist in the interpretation and application of
insurance policies.
16
KENNETH S. WOLLNER, HOW TO DRAFT AND INTERPRET INSURANCE POLICIES 19
(1999) (“Exclusions and other limitations are strictly construed against the party seeking to
impose the limitation.”).
17
ERIC A. WIENING & DONALD S. MALECKI, AM. INST. OF CPCU, INSURANCE
CONTRACT ANALYSIS 76 (“[I]nsuring agreement provides a broad statement of coverage.”).
18
DONNA J. POPOW, AM. INST. OF CPCU, PROPERTY LOSS ADJUSTING § 5.34 (2003).
19
PRENTISS REED & PAUL THOMAS, ADJUSTMENT OF PROPERTY LOSSES 48 (McGraw
Hill 1977).
20
Id. at 50.
21
Insurance claims handlers have testified that these standards are used in the
insurance industry to interpret and apply insurance policies. See Deposition of Stephen
Hinkle at 166, Illing v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No.: 1:06cv513-LG-RHW (So. Dist.
Miss., Feb 9, 2007) (Stephen Hinkle, a State Farm claim consultant, testified at his
deposition that it is a basic tenant of insurance claims handling that the insurer must prove
the application of the exclusion).
22
In addition to texts, there are a number of insurance industry publications which
may provide invaluable information. Possibly the most important such publication is the
magazine, “Claims,” published by the National Underwriter Company. This magazine,
which is published monthly, contains articles on a wide variety of insurance claims
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PRENTISS REED & PAUL THOMAS, ADJUSTMENT OF PROPERTY LOSSES
(McGraw Hill 1977).
JANE S. LIGHTCAP, INT’L CLAIM ASSOC., MANAGING CLAIM DEPARTMENT
OPERATIONS (1997).
JAMES J. MARKHAM ET AL., INS. INST. OF AM., THE CLAIMS
ENVIRONMENT (1993).
DONNA J. POPOOW, AM. INST. OF CPCU, PROPERTY LOSS ADJUSTING
(2003).
JAMES R. JONES, AM. INST. OF CPCU, LIABILITY CLAIM PRACTICES
(2003).
DONALD J. HIRSCH, CASUALTY CLAIM PRACTICE (McGraw Hill 1996).

Some of these texts have been cited by several courts,24 and may be
admissible as evidence of insurance industry standards.25 These texts
frequently contain advice on how a claims handler should interpret an
insurance policy. For example, Thomas and Reed in their book,
Adjustment of Property Losses, which has been used in the training of
insurance claims handlers,26 sets forth 16 standard rules for the construction
of insurance policies.27

adjusting issues, including the investigation and adjustment of mold claims, catastrophic
injury claims, and workers compensation claims, among others. The magazine provides
additional information on insurance industry standards, including the state of the art on
insurance industry claims handling practices. See Claims Magazine, available at
http://www.claimsmag.com/cms/claims/website.
23
Frequently, the insurer’s counsel will argue that such publications should not be
admissible because they are parole evidence, which should not be allowed to change the
agreed terms to a contract. In the insurance contract context, however, many courts have
allowed the introduction of extrinsic evidence as an aid in contract interpretation. See, e.g.,
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. 897 P.2d 1, 14 (Cal.1995).
24
For example, REED & THOMAS, supra note 19, has been cited by several courts.
See, e.g., Willhite v. Marlow Adjustment Co., 623 S.W.2d 254, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
Los Angeles Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cawog, 106 Cal. Rptr. 307, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Creole
Explorations, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, Inc., 161 So.2d 768, 775 (La. 1964).
25
The Federal Rule of Evidence permits the admittance of such texts as substantive
evidence. “[S]tatements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a
subject of history, medicine or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the [expert] witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial
notice.” FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
26
In the preface, the authors note that the text “provides guidance and information to
enable the claim representative to perform his or her duties in an effective and professional
manner,” and “[t]his…is a text for both student and instructor; it is a reference for all
property claim personnel.” REED & THOMAS, supra note 19, at iii, iv.
27
Id. at 47-50.
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Insurers often require that their claims handlers be trained in how to
interpret and apply insurance policies. For example, State Farm mandates
that its claims personnel attend claim training courses in which they are
taught “[h]ow to read a policy, [and] how to determine coverage.”28
In addition to insurance industry texts, insurance claims handlers make
use of a wide range of publications that provide guidance on the
interpretation of insurance policies. 29 For example, the Fidelity, Casualty
and Surety Bulletins (FC&S Bulletins”), published by the National
Underwriter Co., has been used in the insurance industry for decades to
provide guidance on the interpretation and application of insurance
policies.30 The FC&S Bulletins have also been widely cited in court
opinions. As one court noted:
The FC & S bulletin, which is published by the National
Underwriters Association, is used by insurance agents and brokers
to interpret standard insurance policy provisions. (Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Reeder (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 961, 972, 270
Cal.Rptr. 719.) “[R]eliance on [an] FC & S bulletin is appropriate
under Civil Code section 1645 which provides: ‘Technical words
are to be interpreted as usually understood by persons in the
profession or business to which they relate, unless clearly used in a
different sense.’” (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Reeder, supra, at p.
973, fn. 2, 270 Cal.Rptr. 719; American Star Ins. Co. v. Insurance
Co. of the West (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1320, 1331 & fn. 8, 284
Cal. Rptr. 45.) “[I]nsurance industry publications are particularly
persuasive as interpretive aids where they support coverage on
behalf of the insured. Ultimately, the test is whether coverage is
‘consistent with the insured’s objectively reasonable expectations.’
[Citation.]” (Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Reliance Ins.
Co. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1512-1513, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d
841.)31
28
Deposition of Mike Porterlance at 88, Davis v. State Farm, No.: 1:06cv638-LTSJMR (quoting Mike Porterlance, a State Farm claims department employee).
29
See Maryland Cas. v. Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722-723, 725 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990). The court also found that the insurance industry’s own interpretation of the broad
form endorsement and certain exclusions precluded application of the exclusions in
plaintiff’s policy. Id. at 725-726.
30
See FC&S Bulletins Homepage, http://cms.nationalunderwriter.com/cms/fcsbulletins/
public+website/ (last visited Oct 13, 2008).
31
Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of the West, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
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Similarly, the International Risk Management Institute publishes
several volumes, which are used in the insurance industry, among other
subjects, on the interpretation and application of personal and commercial
lines policy forms and provisions.32
In addition to being knowledgeable regarding insurance industry policy
interpretation standards and rules, insurance claims handlers need to be,
and are often familiar with the applicable law in the jurisdictions in which
they work. This includes the law of tort and contracts, as it applies to
insurance contracts. In the book, The Claims Environment, Markham
points out that “claims representatives should have expert knowledge of
insurance policy coverages, the law, and determination of damages.”33
Insurance claims personnel are commonly trained in the applicable law of
the jurisdictions in which they work. For example, Stephen Hinkle, a State
Farm Claim Consultant, has testified that, “over the course of [my] tenure
as a claim consultant I’ve become familiar with the law in all four states
that I’m involved in.”34 Without such training and knowledge, an
insurance adjuster would not be able to handle properly many of the claims
assigned to him or her.
Insurers also publish their own written guidance documents on the
interpretation and application of the insurance policies that they sell. For
example, State Farm publishes a number of Operation Guides, which
provide guidance to claims personnel on the handling of first party property
claims. These Operation Guides frequently provide information on how
particular policy provisions are to be interpreted. For example, State Farm
Operation Guide 75-100, entitled “Claim Interpretations-Losses Insured
First Party,” is “[t]o provide the Company interpretation of selected Section
I-Losses Insured.”35 With regard to Hurricane Katrina, Stephen Hinkle of
32
The International Risk Management Institute (“IRMI”) publishes several volumes
on various types of insurance policies, including commercial liability, commercial property,
and personal property policies. These volumes are also used widely in the insurance
industry to assist claims personnel in the interpretation and application of insurance policies.
33
JAMES J. MARKHAM ET AL., INS. INST. OF AM., THE CLAIMS ENVIRONMENT 12
(1993). (Markham, the director of Curriculum, General Counsel, and Ethics Counsel of the
Insurance Institute of America, was previously employed by State Farm.).
34
Deposition of Stephen Hinkle at 121, Illing v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No.
1:06 CV 513-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Mar. 16, 2007). Mr. Hinkle, who was responsible for
consulting on State Farm claims in several southern States, testified that he actually kept a
“folder that says Georgia law, Alabama law, South Carolina law, and Mississippi law.” Id.
at 123.
35
State Farm Operation Guide 75-100, entitled “Claim Interpretations-Losses
Insured First Party” (on file with author).
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State Farm drafted the Wind-Water Protocol, which provided guidance to
State Farm claims personnel on how to apply State Farm policies to Katrina
related claims.36 These training materials are consistent with State Farm’s
requirement that one of the responsibilities of a claims representative is to
“determine if the cause of that loss is covered [under] the contract.”37
An insurance claims handlers’ obligation to interpret and apply
properly insurance policy provisions is required by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners Model Unfair Claims Practices
Act (“Act”) and Model Unfair Claims Practices Regulations
38
(“Regulations”). Over 45 states have adopted the Act either in its original
form or in a modified form. 39 Likewise, many state insurance
commissioners have adopted the Regulations.40
The Act and the Regulations are two of many important sources of
information for insurance industry standards for the proper handling of
claims.41 The requirements set forth in the Regulations address an
36
Memorandum from Stephen Hinkle, State Farm, State Farm Wind-Water Protocol
(Sept. 13, 2005).
37
Deposition of Mike Porterlance at 51, Davis v. State Farm, No. 1:06cv638-LTSJMR (S.D. Miss. Date?); see also Porterlance Dep. at 116 (adjusters are expected to make a
coverage determination on the loss).
38
NAIC UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT, vol. 6, § 900-1 (2008); NAIC
UNFAIR PROPERTY/CASUALTY CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES MODEL REGULATION , vol. 6,
§ 902-1 (2008). Regulations or statutes which govern insurance claims handling can be used
as standards against which the insurer’s conduct can be measured. Wailua Assocs. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1221 (D. Haw. 1998) (the Hawaii Supreme Court, in
adopting a common law remedy for bad faith, expressed its concern that the administrative
remedies provided in H.R.S. § 431:13-103(a) were inadequate to “‘provide sufficient
incentive to insurers to perform their obligations in good faith’ . . . [a]lthough H.R.S. §
431:13-103 does not provide for a private cause of action, the insurance industry should not
be encouraged to commit the types of unfair practices contained therein. Therefore, the
Court finds that violations of the unfair settlement provision, § 431:13-103(a), may be used
as evidence to indicate bad faith.” (citation omitted)). See also Spray, Gould & Bowers v.
Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552,560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (where the court
observed that “[t]he [Insurance] Commissioner’s Regulations establish the standard of
conduct for insurers in California”); Peiffer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 940 P.2d 967,
971 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (expert permitted to testify that insurer violated provisions of the
Colorado Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act).
39
NAIC UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT, vol. 6, § 900-1 (2008).
40
For example, in California the Act is codified at CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)
(2005), and the Regulations, which have been adopted by the California State Insurance
Commissioner, can be found at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2695.1 (2008).
41
Markham has pointed out that, “insureds are frequently permitted to introduce
evidence of violations of the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act and Model
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations “because the model act is a nationally
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insurer’s obligations when it comes to interpreting and applying insurance
coverage provisions. For example, the Regulations require:
Every insurer shall disclose to a first party claimant or
beneficiary, all benefits, coverage, time limits or other provisions
of any insurance policy issued by that insurer that may apply to the
42
claim presented by the claimant.
It is difficult to imagine an insurer complying with this
requirement without knowing how to interpret and apply the
applicable policy provisions. Similarly, the Regulations set forth
detailed requirements with regard to denial letters, which would
also mandate knowledge on how to interpret and apply the
insurance policy.
Where an insurer denies or rejects a first party claim, in whole
or in part, it shall do so in writing and shall provide to the claimant
a statement listing all bases for such rejection or denial and the
factual and legal bases for each reason given for such rejection or
denial which is then within the insurer’s knowledge. Where an
insurer’s denial of a first party claim, in whole or in part, is based
on a specific statute, applicable law or policy provision, condition
or exclusion, the written denial shall include reference thereto and
provide an explanation of the application of the statute, applicable
43
law or provision, condition or exclusion to the claim.
Many insurers have inserted the Act and Regulations into their claims
44
manuals. State Farm, in its 1997 Catastrophe Claims Manual, sets forth
45
the Act.
Similarly, Farmers’ Regional Claims Manual States: “In all
recommended standard of care. It was developed [by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners] as a guide for insurance regulators in every state to establish reasonable
claim practices. Since the NAIC [National Association of Insurance Commissioners] is
made up of insurance “experts,” juries should consider their opinion of what constitutes
unfair claim practices when evaluating the behavior of an insurer in a bad faith case. Thus,
although the model [Unfair Claims Settlement Practices] act may not allow insureds or
claimants who have been treated unfairly by an insurer to file a private action, it has been
used indirectly for the benefit of many plaintiffs.” MARKHAM, supra note 33, at 397.
42
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2695.4(a) (2008).
43
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2695.7(b)(1) (2008).
44
Insurers may be required to have manuals or written claims handling standards.
For example, The Act required insurers to “adopt and implement reasonable standards for
the prompt investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.” CAL.
INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(3) (2005).
45
State Farm Catastrophe Claims Manual, P. 1.1 (on file with author).
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cases, the applicable state’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
46
Act/Regulations take precedence over anything in this manual.
The
principles defined are so basic to good claims practice that we adhere to
them throughout our operating territory as a matter of company policy.
The Unfair Claims Practices Regulations of some states are more restrictive
than the Model Regulations. If that is the case, those regulations will take
precedence over anything in this manual.”47
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE INSURANCE CLAIMS EXPERT’S
TESTIMONY48
Ignoring the real world of insurance claims handling, many courts have
held that an insurance claims expert cannot testify on the insurer’s
interpretation of an insurance policy because such testimony either invades
the court’s province as the sole interpreter of contract provisions,49 or is
barred by rules of evidence concerning contract interpretation.50 These two
barriers to expert testimony on the meaning of insurance policies have

46

Farmers’ Regional Claims Manual (on file with author).
Farmers’ Regional Claims Manual, p. IV-1 (on file with author). Similarly,
Farmers’ Claims Representative Field Manual sets forth the same standard as in the
Regional Claims Manual, and, in addition, requires that “[e]ach claims representative be
thoroughly familiar with the model act and their states’ specific regulations.” Similar
requirements are set forth in Farmers’ Branch Claims Office Procedure Manual. Randy
Sommers, a Farmers’ claims supervisor, who was deposed in the matter of Farmers Ins. Co.
of Ariz. v. Stanley Wirick, Ariz., Case No. 2004-0201, pp. 19-20 & 34, testified that the
unfair claims practices act sets forth Farmers’ minimum standards for claims handling.
48
For further discussion of expert testimony in insurance bad faith cases see Joel S.
Feldman et al., Expert Witnesses in Insurance Class Actions and Individual Cases – Defense
Perspective, 2000 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 249 (2000).
49
See Devin v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992); Elder v. Pac. Tel. and Tel. Co., 136 Cal. Rptr. 203, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (expert
opinion testimony inadmissible where the issue is one of law for the court); G & G Servs.,
Inc. v. Agora Syndicate, Inc., 993 P.2d 751,762 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to let
insurer’s expert witness, an attorney, testify generally concerning insurance law in suit for
breach of duty to defend); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Group,
343 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1015 (D. Kan. 2004) (excluding testimony of claims expert on whether
allegations in complaint fell within policy definition of “occurrence,” that insurer had no
basis to apply exclusion for “expected and intended” injury, that insurer was inconsistent in
its claims handling, and that insurer is barred by estoppel from denying coverage).
50
Nonetheless, even under this limited approach to expert testimony in insurance
bad faith cases, the expert may refer to facts in legal terms. Peiffer v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 940 P.2d 967, 971 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
47
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proved either unworkable or are so fraught with exceptions as to be
virtually meaningless.
A. LIMITATIONS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY IN INSURANCE CASES
BASED ON CONCERN THAT TESTIMONY WILL INVADE THE
COURT’S PROVINCE HAVE PROVED UNWORKABLE AND FAIL
TO RECOGNIZE THE REALITY OF INSURANCE CLAIMS
ADJUSTING.
The admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, as well as the rules of evidence for many states, is governed by
whether the testimony will “assist the trier of fact.”51 The Federal Rules
permit experts to testify on ultimate issues.52 While many courts have held
that an expert cannot testify on legal matters, including the interpretation of
insurance policies,53 courts will permit experts to testify on mixed
questions of law and fact.54 Some commentators have noted that the
distinction between purely legal testimony and testimony on mixed

51

FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”); see Soutiere v. Soutiere, 657 A.2d 206,
208 (Vt. 1995).
52
“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” FED.
R. EVID. 704. At least one commentator has noted that, “[e]arly cases rejected expert
testimony couched in terms of the ultimate issue—whether there is bad faith. These cases
suggested that the testimony was inadmissible because it invades the province of the jury.
Because of the latitude afforded trial courts by the Federal Rules of Evidence and similar
state rules, however, this objection may be difficult to sustain today.” Timothy J.
Muldowney & Robert A. Zupkus, Bad Faith Claims: The Role of the Expert, 64 DEF.
COUNS. J. 226, 231 (1997) [hereinafter Muldowney & Zupkus] (citations omitted).
53
See, e.g., Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1065 n.10 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an
opinion on an ultimate issue of law.”) (emphasis omitted).
54
See, e.g., Nimely v. City of N.Y., 414 F.3d 381, 397 (2nd Cir. 2005); U.S. v.
Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 229 (9th Cir. 1977) (allowing expert testimony on defendant’s sanity);
Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 595, n.17, 600-01 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (allowing testimony on
the dangerousness of a mental patient); U.S. v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 520, 522-23 (D. Mass.
1968) (noting general permissibility of expert testimony on the mixed question of patent
infringement).
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questions of law and fact has not been workable.55 A lawyer can frame the
question as a matter of fact in order to get admitted expert testimony which
otherwise would be excluded as testimony on the law.56
Despite the inherent problems with distinguishing between fact and
legal testimony, many courts have held that expert testimony regarding the
meaning of an insurance policy is admissible under the guise that such
testimony is limited to insurance industry practices and not the law.57 As
one District Court noted:
The Court alone determines the legal effect and construction of
the USF&G policy. But the Court was not seeking expert
testimony to determine the ultimate legal issue of coverage under
the policy. Instead, the Court was seeking the testimony solely to
determine what general understanding, if any, the insurance
industry has as to the meaning of certain provisions in USF&G’s
policy. While resolution of this factual question affects the legal
issues involved, the factual issue of industry custom is distinct
from the legal issue of construction.58
At the very least, this approach comports, to some degree, with what
actually occurs in the insurance industry. That is, the industry has adopted
its own interpretation of what policy provisions mean, if not provided its
claims handlers with protocols on how to interpret and apply insurance
policies.59 Despite the statement that factual issues are distinct from legal
issues, it is apparent that the distinction cannot always be easily
determined.
55

Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARV. L. REV. 797, 798 (1983-1984); Wilburn
Brewer, Expert Witness Testimony in Legal Malpractice Cases, 45 S.C. L. REV. 727, 761
(1993-1994) [hereinafter Brewer].
56
Brewer, supra note 56, at 767; see also, North River Ins. Co. v. Employers
Reinsurance Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 972, 982-84 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Prof’l Consultants Ins.
Co. v. Employers Reinsurance Co., 2006 WL 751244, at *21-22 (D.Vt. Mar. 8, 2006)
(noting that expert opinions regarding policy meaning are admissible where opinion based
on documents and depositions in the case, the course of conduct of the parties, and the
experts knowledge of industry custom and practice).
57
See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 676 F. Supp. 123, 126 (E.D. La.
1987).
58
Id. at 126 (footnote omitted).
59
Expert testimony on the meaning of a policy provision may be particularly
appropriate where the court determines that the provision is of a “specialized nature,”
Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d 1074, 1076-77 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).
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An ample demonstration of the difficulty, if not the artificiality, of
determining whether an expert opinion is based on law or fact is found in
the District Court’s decision in Professional Consultants Ins. Co. v.
Employers Reinsurance Co.60 The case presented the court with an issue of
whether a reinsurance agreement limit was “an annual, or per policy, limit
or a single limit for the life of the agreement.”61 The insured, Professional
Consultants, in its opposition to the insurer’s motions for summary
judgment, submitted an affidavit from Waterman, an expert on reinsurance
matters, in which Waterman provided three opinions, which were
challenged by the insurer as inadmissible legal conclusions. Waterman’s
opinions were:
1. “It is my opinion that the plain language of the 1993
Agreement stipulates emphatically that the reinsurance coverage
pertains to each policy issued by PCIC that became effective after
the effective date and prior to the termination date of the 1993
Agreement.” (Paper 121 ¶13.)
2. “[I]t is my opinion that the 1993 Agreement affords, and in
accord with reinsurance industry custom and practice should be
understood to provide reinsurance indemnity for all policies issued
to each insured during the period the 1993 Treaty Agreement was
in effect.” (Paper 121 ¶ 13.)
3. “It is also my opinion that ERC’s [Employers’ Reinsurance
Company] argument that the dates of claim assigned to the
LACERA and Raytheon claims are improper because they should
have been assigned to later policy periods, which it raised for the
first time in October 2003---over 5 ½ years after PCIC had first
notified ERC of the claims and assigned the dates of claims---is
contrary to the reinsurance custom, practice, and standards and
does not conform with ERC’s obligation of utmost good faith to
PCIC.” (Paper 121 ¶ 16.)62
These would appear to be impermissible legal opinions, because they
offer legal conclusions, such as whether the insurer acted in “utmost good

60

See Prof’l Consultants Ins. Co., No. 1:03-CV-216, 2006 WL 751244 (D.Vt. Mar.

8, 2006).
61
62

Id. at 2.
Id. at 21.
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faith,” and provided an interpretation of the policy. Nonetheless, the court
found the opinions admissible.
Mr. Waterman’s statements appear not to be based on case law
or legal standards but rather on his knowledge of the facts of the
case, his experience, and his understanding of industry custom.
(Paper 121 ¶ 9) The first bulleted statement [number 1 above] . . .
might be read as a legal determination that the contract is
unambiguous. See Luneau, 750 A.2d at 1033-34 (question of
whether a contact term is ambiguous is a matter of law for the court
to decide). Mr. Waterman made the statement, however, in the
middle of a paragraph in which he opined that if ERC intended
more limited coverage, ERC would have been required by industry
custom to make such restrictions explicit to PCIC. (Paper 121 ¶
13). Insofar as the statement is intended as a factual statement
concerning prevailing reinsurance practices, the statement is an
admissible factual description. To the extent that it may be read as
an opinion on the ultimate legal issue, it is not admissible. See N.
River Ins., 197 F. Supp. 2d at 982-84.63
In the second and third bulleted statements [numbers two and
three above] above, Mr. Waterman explicitly discusses “industry
custom” as it applies to the parties here. To the extent that the
statements are intended as facts concerning prevailing reinsurance
customs, they are admissible as expert opinion testimony. To the
extent that they may be read as opinions on the ultimate legal
issues before the Court, they are not admissible. In accordance
with the findings above, ERC’s motion to strike on this ground is
DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.64
The Court’s opinion is troublesome because the Court offers no
guidance on how the parties are to determine what portions of the expert
opinion are based on legal conclusions and what are based on industry
63

In support of its position, the court cited the opinion in North River Ins. Co. v.
Employers Reinsurance Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 972 (S.D. Ohio 2002), noting that the
“North River court excluded the testimony where the parties based their opinions on case
law and legal standards, but allowed the testimony where the experts based their opinions on
facts of the case, experience in the industry, and their own research of reinsurance
practices.” Prof. Consultants Ins. Co. v. Employers Reinsurance Co., No. 1:03-CV-216,
2006 WL 751244, at *22 (D. Vt. Mar. 8, 2006).
64
Id. at 22.
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standards. What if the law and industry standards are the same? The Court
does not address this issue either. It would appear that to be admissible all
that an expert has to do is label otherwise inadmissible legal opinions
“insurance industry standards.” Thus, form conquers substance.65 Finally,
nowhere do we see any evidence of industry standards. Indeed, the court
concedes that “Waterman does not appear to base his testimony on any
reference materials or treatises.”66
The weaknesses in the court’s approach may be addressed by simply
admitting that the issues addressed by the expert are both legal conclusions
and opinions of insurance industry practice. Where the law and industry
practice are consistent the opinion should not be disregarded.67 The court
could, therefore, make a determination of whether the opinions are
consistent with the law, and where they are admit them even though they
might also be legal opinions. By taking this approach the court avoids the
near impossible task of dividing up the opinions into legal and non-legal
opinions and provides clearer guidance to the parties on what is admissible
and what is not.68
Despite the apparent artificiality between legal conclusions and
insurance industry standards, some courts have persisted in their view that
the testimony of insurance claims handling experts should be limited to
industry standards, even when the expert is testifying on the meaning of a
policy provision. Therefore, the court in Aetna Insurance Co. of Hartford,
Conn. v. Loxahatchee Marina, Inc.69 held:

65

“The prohibition of expert legal testimony often seems to be an elevation of form
over substance.” Expert Legal Testimony, supra note 56, at 800.
66
Prof. Consultants Ins. Co., No. 1:03-CV-216, 2006 WL 751244, at *21 (D. Vt.
Mar. 8, 2006).
67
North River, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (noting that where insurance industry
standards and the law are the same the expert’s opinion should not be disregarded).
68
The Court should also require the expert to provide support for his or her opinions
on industry practice, with citations to either texts or other materials. See North Star Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1148 (D. Minn. 2003) (noting that it is
important that expert’s opinion be “tethered to…independent authority”). Absent such
supporting evidence the opinions are merely general statements of practice, which may not
be admissible. See Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assoc. v. Assoc. Int’l. Ins. Co., 108
Cal. Rptr. 2d. 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding two page conclusionary expert report on
insurance company’s claims handling practices inadmissible). In other words, the expert’s
opinion should not be based solely on the law. See North River, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 981
(noting that an expert opinion is inadmissible where it is based on “settled principles of
indemnity law.”).
69
236 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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On the final question, the expert in the insurance business
testified as to the customs and usages in the insurance business,
types of policies, premium rates, exclusions and other matters and
also answered hypothetical questions. Aetna did not question the
qualification of the witness but contends his testimony invaded the
province of the trial judge to interpret the insurance contract. This
contention is not tenable. Obscure connotations of an insurance
policy can be greatly illuminated by knowledge of custom and
usage in the industry as well as the expert’s knowledge of terms
which take on a different hue in the specialized field than in the
filed of general knowledge.” 70
Permitting an insurance expert to testify on the meaning of the policy
based on insurance standards may comfortably avoid the legal testimony
issue, but what then is the court to do when the issue is whether the
insurer’s coverage decision was reasonable in light of all considerations
normally considered in making a coverage decision, such as case law?71
Equally troubling is whether the coverage dispute is reasonably debatable.72
Courts may dismiss the insured’s bad faith claim if it can be shown that the
insurer’s position is reasonably debatable. Whether the position is
reasonably debatable may depend not only on insurance industry standards,
but also on applicable case law.73 Finally, what are the courts to do where
70

Id. at 14. See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Scor Reins. Co., 62 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir.
1995) (permitting testimony about reinsurance industry practice where testimony was
relevant to interpret ambiguous policy provision), and North River Ins. Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d
at 983 (permitting an expert to construe a certification of reinsurance to the extent it
“constitutes a statement of fact concerning industry custom and practice”).
71
Some courts, in apparent recognition of the need to allow expert testimony of the
law, have allowed “[an expert] witness to give an opinion on the ultimate issue of whether
the duty of good faith and fair dealing was breached. The witness is allowed to describe
industry standards and their historical basis, including a description of reported cases, statute
or insurance commissioner regulations that shaped claim handling practices. Such
testimony is less truncated and usually more beneficial and easily understood by jurors. It
captures for the jury the complete claim universe, how standards were established, what
they are and the significance of compliance or non-compliance with them.” Timothy J.
Muldowney & Robert A. Zupkus, Bad Faith Claims: The Role of the Expert, 64 DEF.
COUNS. J. 226, 232 (1997).
72
“The mistaken [or erroneous] withholding of policy benefits, if reasonable or if
based on a legitimate dispute as to the insurer’s liability under California law, does not
expose the insurer to bad faith liability.” Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 31 Cal. Rptr.
2d 433, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
73
See Delgado v. Interinsurance Exch. Of Auto. Club of So. Cal., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d
799, 811-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the determination of whether an insurer had
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the insurer has invoked the defense of reliance on counsel? The insurer
may have a defense to a bad faith claim where it can show that it obtained a
coverage opinion from its counsel and reasonably relied on that opinion.74
But how is the insurer’s reasonable reliance to be determined without
consideration for not only insurance industry standards, but also applicable
case law.75 In other words, the courts’ formulation that expert testimony
must be limited to insurance industry standards is not only artificial, but it
also does not address very real issues that face the courts every day in
insurance bad faith cases.
Excluding expert testimony on the law is also contrary to the widely
held rule that insurance claims handling experts can testify on whether the
insurer complied with or violated applicable statutory standards for claims
handling.76 If an expert can testify on statutory standards then what can be
the justification for precluding the expert from testifying on applicable case
law, where consideration of that case law is pivotal to determining whether
the insurer acted reasonably? The same should be the case where the expert
testifies with regard to the interpretation and application of insurance
policies.

reasonable basis to deny a duty to defend may turn on a question of law applicable to the
facts).
74
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court ex rel. Johnson Kinsey, Inc., 279
Cal. Rptr. 116, 117-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding good faith reliance on advice of
counsel is factor in determining whether insurer acted in bad faith).
75
George F. Hillenbrand, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586, 608
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding reliance on counsel is not a defense if insurer did not have
probable cause to file a declaratory relief action).
76
Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1089 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (“It would be reasonable for experts in bad faith insurance practices to look to the
relevant statutory and regulatory requirements in examining the reasonableness of an
insurer’s actions.”); Kraeger v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 95-7550, 1997 WL
109582, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“[Expert] [t]estimony about how insurance claims are
managed and evaluated and the statutory and regulatory standards to which insurance
companies must adhere could be helpful to the jury in evaluating whether the claim in the
instant case was handled in bad faith.”); Peiffer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 940 P.2d
967, 971 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (“[W]hile we agree with State Farm that an expert witness
should not dictate the law that the jury should apply, an expert witness is permitted, in the
trial court’s discretion, to refer to the facts of the case in legal terms.”); Crum & Forster, Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., 887 S.W.2d 103, 134 (Tex. App. 1994) (“An expert . . . may offer his or
her opinion as to a mixed question of law and fact . . . .”); accord Century Indem. Co. v.
Aero-Motive Co., 254 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677 (W.D. Mich. 2003); and see Deposition of
Stephen Hinkle, supra note 34.
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B. PRECLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON INSURANCE POLICY
INTERPRETATION BECAUSE POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOUS IS NO
LONGER AN EFFECTIVE LIMITATION ON EXPERT TESTIMONY.
Courts are also reluctant to allow expert testimony on the meaning of
contract provisions unless the court first finds that the operative contract
provision is ambiguous.77 This rule, however, is fraught with numerable
exceptions. Courts have, held that it is proper to consider facts extrinsic to
the contract in determining whether the contract is ambiguous. 78 Similarly,
evidence of industry custom and practice is admissible even where there is
no ambiguity where it is shown that the parties to the contract were
presumed to have known of the practice.79 Courts will also consider expert
testimony on the purpose of insurance and the history of a particular policy
even though there is no issue of ambiguity.80 Drafting history may also be

77

See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 386 F. Supp. 2d, 1272,
1277 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (“[I]ntroduction of extrinsic evidence regarding the drafting history
or intent behind an insurance policy is “inappropriate and unnecessary” when the policy
language is unambiguous.”) (citation omitted), but see Prof’l Consultants Ins. Co. v.
Employers Reins Co., No. 1:03-CV-216, 2006 WL 751244, at *20-22 (D. Vt. Mar. 8, 2006);
Tapatio Springs Builders, Inc. v. Md. Cas. Ins. Co., 82 F. Supp. 2d 633, 649 (W.D. Tex.
1999) (admitting testimony by insurance claims expert that an insurance policy was
ambiguous); MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1217 (Cal. 2003) (holding
history and purpose of pollution exclusion “may properly be used by courts as an aid to
discern the meaning of disputed policy language”); and Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v.
Admiral Ins. Co. 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 670-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding drafting history
and similar insurance industry materials “may be of considerable assistance in determining
coverage issues.”).
78
See, e.g., Tapatio, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 641 (“[T]he contract may be read in the light
of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether an ambiguity exists.”); Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (holding
extrinsic evidence is relevant when it is offered to prove the meaning to which the contract
language is reasonably susceptible); Feurzeig v. Ins. Co. of the West, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629,
632-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding expert testimony is admissible to show that a
provision of a policy is or is not ambiguous); Imbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 556 A.2d 81,
84 (Vt. 1988) (noting a number of courts have held “circumstances surrounding the making
of the agreement, [including] the “object, nature, and subject matter of the writing,” can be
considered when the court is inquiring into whether the contract is ambiguous); and see
Prof’l Consultants Ins. Co. 2006 WL 751244, at *3 (permitting a look at circumstances
surrounding the making of the agreement when inquiring into contract ambiguity).
79
Lambourne v. Manchester Country Props., 374 A.2d 122, 123-24 (Vt. 1977).
80
Playtex FP, Inc., v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d 1074, 1077-78 (Del. Super. Ct.
1992).
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considered, even in the absence of any ambiguity in the policy.81 Indeed,
some courts have held that expert testimony is admissible regarding
insurance industry understanding or usage to assist the court in interpreting
the relevant policy provisions without any determination that the policy is
ambiguous.82 Sometimes courts may also preclude expert testimony on the
grounds that it presents impermissible evidence of a party’s subjective
intent,83 but even then expert testimony has been admitted on what an
insurer intended when it wrote the policy.84 Given these many exceptions
it would appear that the rules regarding the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence are of little practical use in providing guidance on how and when
expert testimony on the meaning of an insurance policy should be admitted.

81
Fireguard Sprinkler Sys., Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 648, 651-52 (9th
Cir. 1988) (relying on explanatory information contained in an ISO circular and excerpt
from a Fire Casualty & Surety Bulletin about the intended scope of a standard completed
operations exclusion); Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 105
(D.N.J. 1990) (holding interpretation of policy language and establishment of whether
policies are ambiguous, policyholder “must be allowed to explore the creation of the
language and whether the intent of the drafter(s) is inconsistent with its application.”); Md.
Cas. Co. v. Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he concomitant
availability of interpretative literature is of considerable assistance in determining precisely
what risks the Maryland policies cover.”); Eaton Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. No.
189068, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1992), reprinted in 8 MEALEYS LIT. REP. (INS.) 44,
at F-1 (allowing drafting history because it might reveal admissible evidence concerning
“ambiguity, meanings(s) of language, breath of coverage, intent, risks assumed and
impeachment”); 1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION §1:15 (David
L. Leitner et al. eds., 2005) (“drafting history evidence may used to (a) establish ambiguity,
by demonstrating that the provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation; (b) provide extrinsic evidence to interpret the provisions; and/or (c) preclude
the insurer from disputing the meaning advanced when approval for the clause was sought
from the relevant regulatory authorities, irrespective of the policyholder’s reliance on, or
even awareness of, that meaning (so-called ‘regulatory estoppel’).”). But see U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., v. Treadwell Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 77, 100-101 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (excluding
drafting history because insurer did not participate in drafting of policy and because drafting
history did not unambiguously support insured’s position).
82
Gerawan Farming Partners, Inc., v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. CIV F
05-1186 AWI DLB, 2008 WL 80711, at *19-20 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008).
83
Winet v. Price, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
uncommunicated subjective intent prior to the execution of the contact is not admissible to
interpret the meaning of the contract).
84
U.S. Elevator Corp. v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 760, 764-65 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989) (holding testimony of insurer’s underwriter may be offered to establish that a
policy provision is or is not applicable to the issue before the court).
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Courts may need to look elsewhere for guidance if they are to
recognize the true nature of insurance claims handling and adopt an
approach to expert testimony that reflects that handling.
V. EXPERT TESTIMONY IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASES: A
MODEL FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY IN INSURANCE BAD
FAITH CASES.85
Expert testimony in legal malpractice cases offers a model for how
courts may approach similar expert testimony in insurance bad faith cases.
Like the legal profession, the insurance industry considers claims handling
a profession.86 Insurance claims handlers, like lawyers, are required to
have extensive knowledge concerning legal matters.87 As with the legal
profession,88 insurance claims handlers are subject to professional ethical
standards.89 Given the nature of an insurance claims handler’s work, it is
85
For further discussion of expert testimony in legal malpractice cases see
Ambrosio, Michael P., and McLaughlin, Denis F., “The Use of Expert Witnesses in
Establishing Liability in Legal Malpractice Cases,” 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1351.
86
MARKHAM, supra note 33, at 373 (“As professionals, claim representatives should
use their position, knowledge and expertise for the benefit of their customers. Claim
representatives must have a professional attitude towards providing customer
service…There are ethical obligations that arise out of the professional duties of claims
representatives.”).
87
Id. at 389 (“Claim representatives should be expert in matters of insurance
coverage, legal liability, damages and methods of repair.”). Granted the scope of a claims
handler’s legal knowledge will be more limited than a lawyers. For example, claims
handlers will need to be informed on the law concerning tort liability and damages as well
as applicable contract law but not, as with a lawyer, the law of estates or tax law.
88
See Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund and Belom, 392 N.E.2d 1365,
1371 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), aff’d, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980) (Violations of rules of
professional responsibility or ethical standards may be admitted as evidence or legal
malpractice. The court observed: “It is true that the present action is one for malpractice
and not a disciplinary proceeding, but it would be anomalous indeed to hold that
professional standards of ethics are not relevant considerations in a tort action, but are in a
disciplinary proceeding. Both malpractice actions and disciplinary proceedings involve
conduct failing to adhere to certain minimum standards and we reject any suggestion that
ethical standards are not relevant considerations.”). See also Brewer, supra note 56, at 767;
see also KATHERINE J. MCKEE, ANNOTATION, Admissibility and Effect of Evidence of
Professional Ethics Rules in Legal Malpractice Action, 50 A.L.R.5th 301 (1997).
89
MARKHAM, supra note 33, at 381-386. For example, the Society of Special
Investigation Units, the National Association of Public Adjusters, and the National
Association of Independent Adjusters all publish ethical standards for their members. One
of the most well-known of these organizations is the American Institute of Chartered
Property Casualty Underwriters (“CPCU”), which publishes a Code of Professional Ethics.
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not surprising that courts have long recognized that insurance claims
handlers often act in the capacity of a lawyer.90 Insurance claims adjusters
have been found to be acting as a lawyer when they complete settlement
and release forms, or advise the claimant regarding the claim process.91 In
such circumstances the insurance claims adjuster may be subject to the
standard of care of a practicing lawyer.92 Further, at least one court has
held that an insurer’s standard of care is “analogous to the standard of care

Canon 3 of the CPCU Code contains the following ethical standards: “R3.1 In the conduct
of business or professional activities, a CPCU shall not engage in any act or omission of a
dishonest, deceitful, or fraudulent nature. R3.2 A CPCU shall not allow the pursuit of
financial gain or other personal benefit to interfere with the exercise of sound professional
judgment and skills.” CODE OF THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR
CPCU, Canon 3 (2007).
90
See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 130 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Mo. 1939).
91
Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Wash. 2002); Blinston v. Hartford
Accident and Indem. Co., 441 F.2d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that the standard of
care for a practicing lawyer may not apply to an insurance claims handler where the claims
handler is providing his/her employer with an appraisal of the company’s legal position,
even though the claims handler is not a member of the bar); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 130
S.W.2d at 961 (However, an insurance claims handler may not be engaging in the practice
of law when he (1) “investigates…the facts and circumstances relating to a casualty or claim
arising under a policy of casualty insurance issued by his employer, and reports to his
employer the facts ascertained in such investigation”; (2) “determines for his employer the
pecuniary limit which his employer will be willing to offer or pay in settlement of any claim
arising under a policy of casualty insurance issued by such employer”; (3) state in his or her
report to his or her employer “the opinion…given by the company’s counsel on any
question of liability upon any given claim”; and (4) during “the negotiation and settlement
of a claim arising under a policy of casualty insurance issued by his employer, truthfully
states to the claimant or claimant’s representative what the company’s attorney has
advised.”); see also Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The
Standard of Care for the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 88 (2007) (“A
majority of courts have held that one who provides legal services, regardless of whether
licensed or authorized, should be held to the standard of care applicable to attorneys
providing those same services.”).
92
Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d at 1075 (“[W]e hold that insurance claims adjusters,
when preparing and completing documents which affect the legal rights of third party
claimants and when advising third parties to sign such documents, must comply with the
standard of care of a practicing attorney.”). See also JAMES MCLOUGHLIN, ANNOTATION,
Activities of Insurance Adjusters as Unauthorized Practice of Law, 29 A.L.R.4th 1158
(1984) (“[T]he courts have held that adjusters for insurers who gave legal advice, made
legal recommendations, appeared in court, or engaged in other activities requiring a
lawyer’s training or status were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.); see also
Jeffrey A. Parness, Civil Claim Settlement Talks Involving Third Parties and Insurance
Company Adjusters: When Should Lawyer Conduct Apply?, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 603,
604-606 (2003).
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owed by other professionals to their clients and [which] is elucidated by
expert testimony.”93
As with insurance claims handlers, expert testimony is commonly used
in legal malpractice cases to establish the standard of care. Courts will
require expert testimony in legal malpractice cases unless the breach of the
standard is so obvious that jurors can rely upon their common knowledge
to determine if there has been malpractice.94 Expert testimony in legal
malpractice cases may be limited to only factual issues, in the same way
such testimony is limited in insurance bad faith cases. One commentator
has noted that, “[e]xpert legal testimony is frequently permitted (and
sometimes required) on the issue of the standard of care in legal
malpractice actions. Even in jurisdictions which generally exclude expert
testimony about the law, the testimony of legal experts about the ordinary
knowledge and skill of members of the legal profession is admitted on
grounds that it concerns a question of fact, not an issue of law.”95 In some
cases, however, it is practically impossible to separate a lawyer’s standard
of care from the law.96 Courts will, in certain circumstances, permit the
expert to testify on legal matters.97 In other words, to provide an opinion
on the standard of care requires a discussion of the applicable law.
93
See Sullivan v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 788 N.E.2d 522, 536 (Mass. 2003) (citing to
cases in which expert testimony required in legal malpractice cases); see also Lentino v.
Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1979).
94
See, e.g., Ankey v. Franch, 652 A.2d 1138, 1153 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995)
(expert testimony was necessary to establish whether attorney’s decision, in advising client
not to appeal was reasonable); Suritz v. Kelner, 155 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (holding that expert testimony not required where jury alone could determine whether
attorney committed malpractice).
95
See TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 8:28 (2d ed. 2001), and the cases cited
therein.
96
Smith v. Childs, 437 S.E.2d 500, 506 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (citing HAJMM Co. v.
House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 483, 488 (N.C. 1991)) (“When the expert witness
is an expert legal witness, the voidance of testimony regarding legal conclusions can be
problematical since attorneys deal with legal terms of art on a daily basis.”). Expert Legal
Testimony, supra note 56, at 799 (It is evident that “courts have had great trouble parsing the
legal and factual elements in attorney malpractice cases.”).
97
In Mazer v. Sec. Ins. Group, 368 F. Supp. 418, 422 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1973) aff’d,, 507
F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975), the court said that the general rule “that a witness will not be
permitted to give an opinion as to the ultimate fact in issue…is not followed where the
matters involved are beyond the knowledge of ordinary laymen” and it made “no difference
that this was being tried by a judge without a jury” since, “[o]bviously, not all judges are
experts in all tactical matters which may pertain to all lawsuits.” See also MICHAEL A.
DISABATINO, ANNOTATION, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standards
of Practice and Negligence in Malpractice Action Against Attorney, 14 A.L.R.4th 171
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Similarly, expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of an
insurance claims handler’s conduct will often involve not only purely
factual issues, but also mixed questions of law and fact, as well as purely
legal matters. The latter situation may arise where the issue is whether the
insurance claims handler properly interpreted and applied an insurance
policy provision to the facts of a particular case.98 In such cases a coverage
decision could not be reached without consideration of the insurance
industry standards and publications regarding the policy provision at issue,
as well as applicable case law. Therefore, the claims handler may be asked
not only whether he/she considered insurance industry standards and
publications but also whether they considered the applicable case law, or
whether they sought the advice of counsel on the coverage issue, and if so,
whether they independently reviewed and evaluated that advice.99 Such an
independent review may involve determining whether all the applicable
case law has been considered and properly evaluated. In other words, as
with the legal professional, the claims professional’s conduct in a given
case must consider the applicable case law.
Where the claims professional’s conduct is inseparable from the law it
would be appropriate to allow expert testimony on whether the claims
handler reasonably evaluated the coverage issue, not just in light of
applicable insurance industry standards, but also considering the applicable
case law. Any concern that the expert’s opinions may be contrary to the
law can be addressed by the court hearing the expert’s testimony before it
is heard by the jury.100 Further, the court can require that the expert’s
(1982); Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 100-101 (1st Cir. 1997) (expert
testimony on the law in legal malpractice cases may be admissible in some cases); Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982) (law professor permitted to testify about tax
consequences of an oil drilling venture and about the meaning of the relevant code
provision).
98
See WINDT, supra note 15, § 9:26A (“Case Law can, in many circumstances,
constitute evidence that the insurer’s policy interpretation or understanding of its
rights/obligations was reasonable.”).
99
See Klinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F. Supp. 709, 712 (M.D. Pa.
1995) (testimony regarding the insurer’s reliance of counsel is admissible). Of course, a
review of the case law discussing the operative policy provision would be circumscribed by
other standards applicable to insurance claims handling, such as the insurer’s duty to resolve
any coverage doubts in favor of the policyholder. See POPOW, supra note 18, at § 5.34.
100
Expert Legal Testimony, supra note 56, at 813 (Court can prescreen proffered
expert testimony to determine if testimony on the law is warranted, and if such testimony
will conflict with the court’s instructions); see BREWER, supra note 56, at 761
(“[C]ommentators have suggested that the trial judge should first hear the testimony outside
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opinions not be based solely on the law, but also be grounded in insurance
industry practices and standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
The traditional rules limiting the admissibility of expert testimony on
insurance policy interpretation have proved to be either unworkable or are
fraught with so many exceptions so as to make them of doubtful use. No
longer do courts rigorously adhere to their prior refusal to hear expert
testimony on policy interpretation unless the court first finds that the
operative policy terms are ambiguous. Rather, courts have shown an
increasing willingness to consider a wide range of evidence on the meaning
of policy terms, including insurance industry publications and drafting
history materials, even where there is no determination that the policy is
ambiguous. Similarly, many courts have virtually abandoned the age-old
requirement that expert testimony should not be admitted on the law
because it invades the province of the court. Courts have achieved this
result by agreeing to hear expert testimony on policy interpretation as long
as it couched in terms of insurance industry practices and standards, even
though that same testimony may, for all practical purposes, be nothing
more than the otherwise prohibited testimony on the law.101
The historic limitations on expert testimony concerning insurance
policy interpretation also fail to recognize the reality of insurance claims
handling. Insurance claims handlers are commonly trained in the
interpretation of insurance policy provisions. Those same claim handlers
have access to a wide range of insurance industry publications and
materials that provide further guidance on insurance policy interpretation.
The claims handlers’ training includes training on the applicable insurance
law. Indeed, claims handlers are expected to know the case law that may
be applicable to the interpretation of policies.
In revisiting the traditional limitations on expert testimony in insurance
bad faith cases the courts may gain guidance from decisions in legal
the presence of the jury to determine whether the expert’s legal premises are compatible
with the anticipated jury instructions and then admit only that part of the testimony that the
court finds to be in harmony with its view of the law.”).
101
This is not to suggest that there are no insurance industry standards on the
interpretation of policy terms generally and with regard to specific policy terms. That is
obviously not the case. (See discussion, supra, pp. 6-13) Such evidence of insurance
industry standards concerning policy interpretation has an equal place in the evaluation of
an insurer’s conduct as does the case law.
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malpractice cases. Courts have recognized that expert testimony on the
standard of care in legal malpractice cases must, in certain cases, include
reference to the law. Indeed, without consideration of the applicable law it
may not be possible to determine the standard of care for a lawyer in a
particular specialty or case.
It is appropriate to apply the standards for expert testimony in legal
malpractice cases to expert testimony on the interpretation of insurance
policies. There are many similarities between the legal and claims handling
professions. One important similarity is that, within their respective
realms, the members of each profession are called upon to consider
applicable case law when they make important decisions. Accordingly, in
determining whether an insurer has properly applied its insurance policy to
a given set of facts the trier of fact should take into account whether the
insurer properly considered that relevant case law in its coverage decision.
In addition, at the least, the courts should also permit testimony on
insurance industry standards concerning the interpretation of policy
provisions. Such testimony will assist the court and the trier of fact in not
only better understanding, and therefore interpreting, the operative policy
provision, but also in determining whether the insurer acted in bad faith
when it applied the policy provision to the facts of the claim.
Concerns that expert testimony on insurance industry standards and
case law concerning the interpretation of policy provisions will invade the
province of the court can be addressed by the court hearing, outside the
jury, and the proffered expert testimony in order to determine whether the
testimony will be in accord with the court’s instructions to the jury.
Permitting expert testimony on the interpretation of insurance policy
provisions in both breach of contract and bad faith actions will permit the
trier of fact to hear a broader range of relevant evidence and, thereby, be
better informed on the meaning and application of the operative policy
provision. Such expert testimony will provide for a more informed
judiciary when it comes to the interpretation and application of insurance
policy provisions.
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INSURANCE AND CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS:
SHOULD LIKE THINGS BE TREATED ALIKE?*
Arthur Kimball-Stanley**
ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the potential moral hazards created by the use of
credit default swaps (“CDS”) and argues that perhaps such swaps should be
regulated as analogous to regular insurance regimes. The author discusses
academic mischaracterization of the issue, including arguments that CDS is
not the same as insurance, and refutes this mischaracterization by
comparing original rationales for regulating insurance with moral hazards
created by the use of this credit risk management practice. Several specific
examples are provided to illustrate this argument, including that of
investment banks, scholarship on insurance contracts, control, regulatory
value, and the issues of risk that underlie both regimes. Finally, the author
asserts that, given the similarities and risks involved in CDS as compared
to traditional insurance, regulation possibilities should be investigated.
“…[L]egal rule and economic principle are but the concavity
and convexity of the single lens of general policy. To ignore this
fact is to chance the invidious probability that legal rules will
calcify and become divorced from basic social values.” 1
*

Editor’s Note: This student note was written in February and March 2008,
during the relatively early period of what has become a financial crisis of historical
proportions. Since that time, the credit default swap market has received significant
attention from regulators, including insurance regulators. This note does not discuss the
newfound interest of insurance regulators in the credit default swap market because when it
was written such interest seemed a remote possibility. Given the extent to which the credit
default swap market has changed, much of the argument made by the author can be
considered anachronistic. The note remains as originally conceived to show how much the
regulatory culture and consequently the regulatory landscape has changed in that short space
of time.
**
J.D. Candidate, Boston College Law School, 2010. I would like to thank
Professors Thomas E. Baker, John Day, Thomas Morawetz, and Sanchin Pandya from the
University of Connecticut School of Law for their guidance.
1
Bertram Harnett & John V. Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A SocioEconomic Reevaluation of A Legal Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1162 (1948)
(citations omitted).

242

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

INTRODUCTION
Recent scholarship and journalism on the use of credit default swaps
(“CDS”) provide evidence that these financial products create moral hazard
similar to that created during the early history of insurance contracts. The
insurable interest and indemnity doctrines, as well as other principles of
insurance, created to mitigate moral hazard, provide guidance in dealing
with the moral hazard CDS trading may create.
Compare the following hypotheticals:
An 18th century speculator buys insurance on a British cargo
ship in which he has no interest. The speculator then sends a
message to his cousin in Paris, asking the cousin to inform the
French fleet of the ship’s schedule. A French frigate uses the
information to sink the British vessel. The speculator collects on
his insurance contract. To mitigate this danger, the insured interest
doctrine was created to keep the speculator from profiting on his
insurance contract.
A 21st century hedge fund manager buys millions of dollars in
CDSs that will pay off only if company (x) declares bankruptcy.
The hedge fund manager then organizes the short-term purchase of
creditor voting rights as the embattled company (x) attempts to
borrow money to avert Chapter 11. The hedge fund votes against
allowing further borrowing and company (x) is forced to declare
bankruptcy. The CDS bet pays off and the hedge fund manager
finds herself with a substantial return.
In terms of the moral hazard to be averted, the second hypothetical is
no different from the first as both create new risk through contract. Both
hypotheticals effectively illustrate the moral hazard created by risk
distribution contracts and why mitigation through the insurable interest and
indemnity doctrines is necessary. The growth of risk management products
in the financial industry over the last few decades, in particular the
emergence of a multi-trillion dollar CDS market, merits a reexamination of
the purposes and the history of the insurable interest and indemnity
doctrines.
Since the market’s inception little more than a decade ago, CDS traders
and their attorneys have worked hard to distinguish their new financial
product from insurance to avoid stringent regulatory insurance regimes
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operated throughout the United States and in the United Kingdom.2
Applying the insurable interest doctrine to CDSs requires reevaluating the
chief arguments for treating these contracts differently from traditional
insurance.
The focus of this reevaluation is not whether CDSs are insurance, as
that misstates the problem, but whether CDS trading results in moral
hazard typical of insurance contracts. This paper argues that attempts to
distinguish CDSs from insurance on the basis of regulation rather than on
the resultant risks are mischaracterizations of the issue. Instead, this paper
argues that CDSs create moral hazard similar to insurance such that policymakers should consider whether CDS should be regulated like insurance.3
Part one of this paper defines CDSs and discusses the arguments that
attempt to show CDSs are not insurance as well as the stakes involved in
making those arguments a success. Part two identifies evidence of morally
hazardous uses of CDSs and compares that evidence to the original
rationale for instituting early insurance regulations such as the insurable
interest and indemnity doctrines. Part Three analyzes the arguments used
to differentiate CDSs and insurance in light of this evidence. The
conclusion addresses the need for further research regarding the moral
hazard created by CDSs, and argues that insurance regulators should
examine the costs and benefits of their decision not to regulate CDSs.
I. THE PRODUCT
CDS contracts are used to manage credit risk. They are among the most
popular credit derivative products traded today, having grown into a
multitrillion-dollar business in less than a decade.4 In June of 2007 over

2

See HELENE RAINELLI & ISABELLE HUALT, OLD RISK, NEW MARKET:
CONSTRUCTING THE OVER-THE-COUNTER FINANCIAL MARKET FOR CREDIT DERIVATIVES, 16,
(Multilevel Governance Workshop Papers 2007), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/
fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/conferences/gmorgan/papers/; Paul C. Harding, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS 19 (Euromoney Institutional
Investor Plc 2004); Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution In the Capital Markets: Credit
Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
167, 190 (2007).
3
This paper does not explore the policy implications inherent in the determination
that CDS and insurance are innately alike.
4
Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 405, 409-10 (2007); Rick Hyman & Amit Trehan, Credit Default Swaps: What
You Need to Know Now, THE SECURED LENDER, 26 (2007); See Deutsche Bank AG v.
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$42 trillion in outstanding CDS contracts were recorded by the Bank for
International Settlements.5 Originally designed to meet the needs of
bondholders who did not want to resort to traditional forms of credit
enhancement, these contracts have grown into a freely traded, liquid market
all their own.6 This market, commonly referred to as the over the counter
(“OTC”) derivatives market, is free from regulation or disclosure rules.7
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) does,
however, attempt to standardize CDS contracts and help buyers and sellers
manage transactions.8
A. CDS DEFINED
A CDS contract allows a buyer to purchase credit protection with
respect to one or more referenced entities from a seller. The two parties
agree that the seller will pay a certain amount to the buyer upon the
occurrence of a “credit event” with respect to the referenced entity or
entities—usually some kind of debt obligation such as a bond—in
exchange for the purchase price of the contract.9 The agreement allows the
Ambac Credit Prods., LLC, No. 04 CIV. 5594(DLC), 2006 WL 1867497, at *2 (S.D.N.Y
July 6, 2006) for a brief discussion of the history and use of credit default swaps.
5
Bank forInternational Settlements, Credit Defaults Swaps Market Notational
amounts outstanding at end December 2007, available at http://www.bis.org/
statistics/otcder/dt21.pdf.
6
Hyman, supra note 4 at 20, 22. The authors refer to letters of credit, guarantees
and financial guarantee insurance as more traditional forms of credit enhancement; See also
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1020-1023 (2007).
7
PHILIP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION § 1.02[2][E]
(Aspen Publishers 2004); The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) in
most cases completely bars and in some cases severely limits regulation of the Over-The
Counter Derivatives Market. Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission nor the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission have jurisdiction to regulate OTC CDS trading.
In recent months, regulators have examined the possibility of changing this regime. Such
methods have been resisted by the ISDA. At the time of this writing, there seems to be a
stringent effort to create a clearinghouse for CDS trading. The hope is that a clearinghouse
service would eliminate many of the structural problems created by the Over-The-Counter
CDS market. This paper does not examine those structural market risks. See Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 §1(a)(5), 7 U.S.C.A. §1 (2000).
8
See generally About ISDA, http://www.isda.org/.
9
Deutsche Bank AG v. AMBAC Credit Prods., LLC, No. 04 CIV. 5594(DLC),
2006 WL 1867497, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006); Robert D. Aicher et al., Credit
Enhancement: Letters of Credit, Guaranties, Insurance and Swaps (The Clash of Cultures),
59 BUS. LAW. 897, 954-55 (2004).
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buyer to hedge the risk associated with owning a reference entity that might
suffer a credit event such as bankruptcy or default.10
University of San Diego School of Law Professor Frank Partnoy offers
the following example regarding the typical use of CDS contracts: A bank
lends $10 million to company (y). The bank then enters into a $10 million
dollar CDS with a third party to protect itself in case company (y) defaults
on the loan. If company (y) defaults, the bank executes its CDS, and
recoups the loss. If company (y) does not default payment for the CDS
reduces the profit accordingly. The seller of the CDS purchased by the
bank determines the price of the contract by evaluating the likelihood of the
company’s defaulting on the loan.11
A CDS contract can be settled physically or with cash. In a physical
settlement the CDS buyer delivers to the seller one of the obligations of the
reference entity upon which the CDS contract is based in exchange for the
payout amount.12 CDS contracts may specify a certain obligation of a
reference entity or may accept delivery of any obligation issued by the
refrence entity.13 Alternatively, in a cash settlement the buyer exchanges
the value of a specific defaulted obligation for a predetermined payout
amount.14
The chief difference between CDSs and insurance is that the buyer of a
CDS contract need not own or have any relationship with the reference
entity’s obligation.15 Unlike insurance, CDSs can be and are often used for
speculation and arbitrage.16 These trades are intended to make the CDS
market liquid.17
CDS contracts provide a number of benefits to capital markets. As
discussed above, the primary benefit is that they allow investors to hedge or
reduce their risk. In 2005, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
reminded the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Conference on Bank
Structure that CDS contracts were one of the reasons banks had been able
to shrug off the losses of the 2000 downturn relatively easily.18 The ability
10

Id.
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1021-22.
12
Harding, supra note 2, at 134.
13
David Z. Nirenberg & Richard J. Hoffman, Are Credit Default Swaps Insurance?,
3 DERIVATIVES REP. 7, 14 (2001).
14
Harding, supra note 2, at 134.
15
Aicher et. al., supra note 9, at 955.
16
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1022; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 190.
17
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1022.
18
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Risk Transfer and Financial
Stability, Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-first Annual Conference
11
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to hedge risk using CDSs also injects liquidity into the markets by making
investors more comfortable in taking on risk. Finally, the pricing of CDS
contracts and the result of the spread created by the buying and selling of
CDSs, creates new information helpful in evaluating securities.19
These advantages, however, come at a price. The last several years
are illustrative of how CDS contracts, in Partnoy’s words, might create
incentives to destroy value by allowing profit to be born from loss.
B. THE ARGUMENT THAT CDS ARE NOT INSURANCE
Black’s Law Dictionary defines insurance as “[a] contract by which
one party undertakes to indemnify another party…against the risk of loss,
damage or liability arising from the occurrence of some specified
contingency.”20 This basic definition by itself, is not dispositive of what
should be considered insurance. It is important to note that there is no
consensus regarding the definition of insurance. Some scholars argue that
a short definition of insurance is inherently misleading.21 However,
simplicity has its merits. For example, the argument in favor of treating
CDS like insurance is simple: that for the purpose of insurance regulation,
contracts that create similar moral hazard as traditional insurance should be
treated as insurance.
The literature arguing that CDSs should not be considered insurance is
limited but influential. It has allowed the market for CDSs to remain
regulation-free. In an opinion commissioned by the ISDA, Robin Potts QC,
an English barrister, argued what has become the basis for not treating
CDSs as insurance.22 The so-called “Potts opinion” concluded that credit
derivatives should not be characterized as insurance contracts because they
are structured to pay out on the occurrence of a default or other credit
event, irrespective of whether the buyer suffers a loss.23 Breaking down
this point further, Potts wrote that CDSs “plainly differ from contracts of
insurance” because “the payment obligation is not conditional on the
on Bank Structure (May 5, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/
Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm.
19
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1026-27.
20
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 814 (8th ed. 2004).
21
See 1 ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES’S APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE § 1.4 (2d ed. 1996).
22
Opinion by Robin Potts QC, Erskine Chambers, prepared for the Int’l Swaps &
Derivatives Ass’n (24 June 1997) (on file with author)
23
Id. at 2-3.
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payee’s sustaining a loss or having a risk of loss.”24 The contract is thus not
one which seeks to protect an insurable interest on the part of the payee.
“His rights do not depend on the existence of any insurable interest.”25
According to Potts, these are substantial differences that justify the
dissimilar treatment of CDSs and insurance. Potts’s reasoning was
premised on the British common law which defines an insurance policy as
“a contract to indemnify the insured in respect of some interest which he
has against the perils which he contemplates it will be liable to.”26 Despite
acknowledging “the economic effect of certain credit derivatives can be
similar to the economic effect of a contract of insurance,” Potts concluded
that CDS contracts are not insurance because the contracts lacked an
insurable interest requirement and indemnity requirement.27
ISDA attorneys, scholars and regulators in both the United Kingdom
and the United States have used Potts’ argument, or similar reasoning ever
since. In 2000, an opinion from the New York Department of Insurance,
responding to an inquiry as to whether CDSs constituted insurance, stated
“[i]ndemnification of loss is an essential indicia of an insurance contract
which courts have relied upon in the analysis of whether a particular
agreement is an insurance contract under New York law. Absent such a
contractual provision the instrument is not an insurance contract.”28
Scholarship has also developed in support of the disparate treatment of
CDSs and insurance. In “Are Credit Default Swaps Insurance?,” authors
David Z. Nirenberg and Richard J. Hoffman concluded that though there
were similarities between CDSs and insurance, the objectives of the
financial products were sufficiently distinct to justify differential
treatment.29 They applied three insurance tests set forth in Holmes’
Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice.30 Holmes’ tests are: (1) whether
the contract constitutes the transfer of risk (“Substantial Control Test”); (2)
whether that transfer is the dominant feature of the contract (“Principle
Object Test”); and (3) whether it is in the public interest to regulate the
contract as insurance (“Regulatory Value Test”).31
24
25
26
27
28

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 4-5, (citing Wilson v. Jones, (1867) 2 Exch. Div. 150).
Id. at 7, 10.
Re: Credit Default Option Facility, (NY Dept. of Ins. Gen. Counsel June 16,

2000).

29
30
31

Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 16.
HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at § 1.4.
Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 11-12.
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Based on this analysis, the authors posited: “[t]o facilitate a
determination that a particular credit default swap is not insurance, the
transaction should be structured so that payment to the protection buyer is
not contingent on the protection buyer suffering a loss.”32 In other words,
the authors recommended that CDS trades be structured so that they do not
perform the same function as insurance.
Most recently, a Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law
article argued in favor of the dissimilar treatment of CDSs and insurance.33
The article argued that “CDS[s] are capital market products” and not
insurance.34 In support of this theory, the author Robert F. Schwartz,
outlined six propositions, at least one of which applies to any CDS trade.35
The propositions are:
1) [w]here a party enters into a contract for contingent recovery
possessing no economic interest in protecting the covered property
from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance;…2) [w]hen the
contract for recovery fails to reference property that the purchasing
party has economic incentive to protect from loss or damage, the
contract is not insurance;…3) [w]hen recovery under a contract can
be had without substantiating any actual loss or damage the
contract is not insurance;…4) [w]here a party can recover under a
contract an amount that exceeds expenses caused by loss or
damage, the contract is not insurance;…5) [w]here a contract for
recovery allows physical settlement, the contract is not
insurance;…6) [w]here a contract for recovery provides for crosspayment netting under a master agreement, the contract is not
insurance.36
Failure of one proposition is dispositive of the analysis; meaning the
CDS contract involved is insurance.37
The premise of these arguments is that the insurable interest and
indemnity doctrines are defining characteristics of insurance contracts. This
premise is incorrect. These doctrines are policy responses to the moral
hazard that insurance contracts create. Though they have become defining
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id. at 16.
See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 174.
Id.
Id. at 200-01.
Id.
Id.
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characteristics of insurance in some contexts, distinguishing CDSs from
insurance using these requirements is disingenuous and circuitous. Such
reasoning fails to consider the origins of the doctrines and does not utilize
the appropriate legal framework for evaluating the benefits and costs of the
CDS market.
To date, there has been little work discussing the problems with the
arguments used to distinguish CDSs from insurance. University of North
Carolina Law Professor Thomas Lee Hazen identified the similarity
between early insurance contracts and certain derivatives in a paper
published in 2005. He wrote:
The insurable interest doctrine attempts to provide a basis for
drawing the line with respect to insurance contracts that the law
will tolerate. It is an imperfect measure at best. A significant
problem is whether the insurance limitation is really meaningful
without a comparable control of derivatives contracts? The
derivatives markets may now offer a way around the insurable
interest requirement, unless courts treat the contract in question as
insurance rather than as a derivative investment. If the insurable
interest requirement remains justifiable for insurance contracts,
then there may be good reason to close the gap with respect to
parallel derivatives transactions created by the [Commodities
Futures Modernization Act of 2000]. It would appear appropriate
to either rethink the insurable interest doctrine or attempt to import
something comparable into derivatives regulation.38
Hazen’s argument succinctly highlights the illogical distinction
between CDSs and insurance, and the potential adverse consequences it
may have. This article elaborates on the consequences of the double
standard currently applied to CDSs and traditional insurance, and
emphasizes the flaws of arguments against treating CDSs as insurance.39

38

Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 426 (2005).
39
Id.
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C. THE IMPORTANCE OF A DISTINCTION
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners40 (“NAIC”)
published a Draft White Paper in 2003 arguing that weather derivatives
should be treated similarly to insurance contracts.41 The study noted that
businesses that accept risk transfers for a fee are generally known as
insurers and the fee paid by the entity seeking to transfer risk is comparable
to an insurance premium.42 The same reasoning arguably applies to CDSs,
where coverage in the event of a default is traded in exchange for an
upfront payment.
The NAIC noted: “These weather derivatives and other ‘non-insurance’
products are primarily temperature protection coverages (heating and
cooling degree days) that appear to be disguised as ‘non-insurance’
products to avoid being classified and regulated as insurance products. In
fact, there is evidence that the promoters of these products go to great
lengths to be sure that the energy companies involved do not use terms that
naturally describe what is taking place—namely the transfer of risk from a
business to another professional risk taker.”43
The ISDA quickly responded to the draft white paper in a letter to the
NAIC.44 The letter argued that because weather derivatives do not require
a party to have an insurable interest they are not insurance.45 The ISDA did
not analyze whether weather derivatives or other derivative products, such
as CDSs, create sufficient moral hazard to necessitate requiring the
application of the insurable interest or indemnity doctrines. The ISDA’s
letter also stated that the “Draft White Paper’s logic could extend to a broad
array of derivatives and would create substantial and disruptive regulatory
uncertainty.”46 Such concerns are frequently expressed by the ISDA.
40

National Association of Insurance Commissioners, About the NAIC (2008),
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm. The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners is the organization of insurance regulators for all 50 of the United States,
Washington D.C., and five United States territories.
41
PROP. AND CAS. INS. COMM., WEATHER FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (TEMPERATURE):
INSURANCE OR CAPITAL MARKET PRODUCTS? (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs Draft White
Paper, Sept. 2, 2003).
42
Id. The NAIC included all contracts used to hedge or protect against weather
related risk in defining weather derivatives.
43
Id.
44
Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Executive Dir. and CEO, ISDA, to Ernst N. Csiszar,
President, NAIC and Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Ins. Mkts., NAIC (Feb. 23,
2004) (on file with author).
45
Id.
46
Id at 2.
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In 2006, the ISDA sent a similar letter to the United Kingdom’s Law
Commission addressing the commission reevaluation of British insurance
law. The letter concluded by stating:
There is a range of possible outcomes to such a review. If the
outcome is seen as differing materially from the current market
consensus view, it could create very considerable uncertainty and
damage the [credit derivatives] market itself. Conversely, if the
outcome is not seen as differing materially from the current market
consensus, its value will be low.
In the circumstances, we do not consider that it would be desirable to
proceed with a review in this area. However, should the Commission
decide to proceed regardless, then it will be critical to ensure that there is
extensive consultation at every stage of the review in order to minimize the
risks to the smooth operation of the market.47
CDS traders, as well as the derivative industry in general, have worked
hard to keep government regulation from interfering with their market. The
ISDA has been highly successful in standardizing derivative contracts and
managing potential disputes that arise between parties to a trade.48 Given
that its members include some of the most powerful financial institutions in
the world–J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup49- it is
unsurprising that the industry’s efforts have been sufficient to keep
government regulators at bay.50
Classifying CDSs as insurance has numerous and substantive
consequences. CDS vendors would be required to obtain an insurance
license. Further, those responsible for paying out upon the occurrence of a
credit event would be subject to state insurance regulatory oversight
regarding market operations and reserve requirements.51 These
requirements would complicate the current free market system in which
47
Letter from Richard Metcalfe, Senior Policy Dir., ISDA, to Peter Tyldesley, Law
Comm’n, U.K 2 (Apr. 18, 2006) (on file with author).
48
See Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions
Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211,
229-34 (2001).
49
ISDA Primary Members (Jul. 18, 2008), http://www.isda.org/membership/
isdamemberslist.pdf.
50
See Flanagan, supra note 46, at 246.
51
Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 8; PROP. AND CAS. INS. COMM., supra
note 41.
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CDSs are traded.52 Interestingly, had regulation been implemented from
the beginning, much of the current uncertainty regarding the American
financial system could have been avoided.53 This is because regulation
would limit the amount of risk banks take on and state regulators would
review CDS accounts to make sure sellers could meet their obligations.54
Some argue that much of the ISDA’s work consists of convincing the
world that derivatives’ approach to risk is wholly different from anything
that has come before and that in truth, there are few if any differences from
decades and centuries old financial products, such as insurance, securities
and commodities futures.55 Such questions, however, are beyond the scope
of this paper.
Interestingly, insurance companies have also argued against the
classification of CDSs as insurance. In 2004, the Association of Financial
Guarantee Insurers successfully lobbied New York State to create a
statutory definition of CDSs.56 An amendment to the New York state
Insurance Laws that went into effect October 19, 2004 declared: “the
making of [a] credit default swap does not constitute the doing of an
insurance business.”57 The statute is hardly a convincing analysis of the
legal issues involved in such a statement; but it is effective nonetheless.

52

Insurance companies generally keep more cash on their balance sheets than banks.
For a study of the differences see Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation
for Position Risk in Banks, Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL
ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 15 (Hal S. Scott ed.,
Oxford University Press 2005). Overall, the problem is that capital adequacy requirements
for insurance companies and banks are calculated differently. One financial commentator
put it succinctly when he said: “a dollar of risk in banking is not the same thing as a dollar
of risk in insurance.” Martin Mayer, THE FED: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WORLD’S
MOST POWERFUL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DRIVES THE MARKET 302-303 (The Free Press
2001).
53
See Jenny Anderson &Vikas Bajaj, A Wall Street Domino Theory, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2008, at A1.; Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market is Next to Face Big Credit Test,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at A1.
54
See Hazen, supra note 38, at 416.
55
See HELENE RAINELLI & ISABELLE HUALT, OLD RISK, NEW MARKET:
CONSTRUCTING THE OVER-THE-COUNTER FINANCIAL MARKET FOR CREDIT DERIVATIVES, 16,
(Multilevel Governance Workshop Papers 2007).
56
Letter from Bob Mackin, Executive Dir., Ass’n of Fin Guarantee Insurers, to
George E. Pataki, Governor of the State of N.Y., (Jul. 15, 2004) (on file with author).
57
N.Y. Ins. Law § 6901 (j-1) (2005 & Supp. 1 2008).
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II. THE PROBLEM
The following examples are illustrative of the moral hazard created by
CDSs. This resulting moral hazard has the potential to create negative
economic interests and destroy value.
A. TOWER AUTOMOTIVE AND STRANGE BEHAVIOR
Truck frame supplier Tower Automotive’s declaration of bankruptcy in
2005 may have been caused by speculators interested in profiting on CDS
positions.58 Unable to pass the rising costs of metals and other supplies
onto car-makers, Tower fought the squeeze by turning to the credit markets
for cash.59 Hedge funds bought Tower’s debt in May, 2004.60 By
November, Tower needed more money. The hedge funds refused to
provide approval for the necessary new loans. Without the additional loans
Tower was forced to file under Chapter 11 two months later.61 Some
bankers believe hedge funds purposely triggered the filing in order to
collect on CDS positions.62 The monetary gain for doing so exceeded any
potential profits from the loans to Tower and therefore outweighed any
incentive to maintain those loans.63 “Many hedge funds play in a gray
world,” said Henry Miller, a restructuring advisor quoted in The Journal
article, “[t]hey sometimes do things to make their positions worth more,
which can cause difficulty for others.”64
Tower supports the proposition that a lender with a credit derivative
position may have an incentive to force a default, regardless of costs or the
impact on the value of underlying assets.65 Partnoy argues, that the lack of
required disclosure in the derivatives market makes assessing the adverse
impact of transactions difficult.66
Moreover, Professors Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, both of the
University of Texas School of Law, describe investment positions that
58
Henny Sender, Hedge-Fund Lending to Distressed Firms Makes for Gray Rules
and Rough Play, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2005, at C-1.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1034-35.
66
Id at 1035.
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increase in value if a reference entity’s credit risk rises or suffers a credit
event, as “negative economic ownership.”67 They argue that the use of
CDSs in conjunction with derivatives that allow speculators to purchase the
temporary use of rights that come with ownership of securities without
buying those underlying securities may allow the pushing of a company
into bankruptcy to trigger larger payoffs on CDS contracts.68
While Hu and Black acknowledge that lack of disclosure requirements
in the CDS market makes it difficult to determine the extent to which this
strategy is used, there is evidence that it is used. 69 For example, the market
for CDSs refrencing certain firms has at times been up to ten times larger
than the dollar amount of underlying debt.70 Moreover, CDS contracts have
begun to require buyers to act in the interest of creditors. This change in
contract language suggests, according to Black and Hu, that buyers were
not previously acting in the interest of creditors and might not do so in the
future. How this contract language is enforced without disclosure,
however, remains unclear.71 Further, Black and Hu cite conversations with
bankruptcy judges who say they sometimes see strange courtroom behavior
by creditors.72 One judge “described a recent case wherein a junior creditor
complained of too high a valuation being assigned to the bankruptcy estate,
for reasons the creditor did not offer.”73
B. SPURRING THE DECLINING HOUSING MARKET
CDSs might be partly responsible for inflaming the downturn in the
national housing market. There is evidence to suggest that left unregulated
these derivatives create a disincentive for mortgage service providers to
work out new agreements with homeowners as an alternative to
foreclosure.
In January 2008, Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin S. Bernanke
reported to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Budget
67

Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting
II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 637, 731 (2008).
68
See id. at 730-732. Such a practice is commonly referred to as “equity or debt
decoupling” depending upon the relevant market. “Equity or debt decoupling” include the
full range of rights and obligations typically associated with shareholder status, but reduce a
shareholder’s economic exposure. Id. at 631, 728.
69
See id. at 732-33.
70
Id. at 733 n.265.
71
Id. at 733.
72
Id.
73
Id.
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that the housing market had declined significantly over the last two years
and that the rates of foreclosures have added to an already elevated
inventory of unsold homes.74 “New home sales and housing starts have
fallen by about half from their respective peaks,” he said.75 The
consequences of this market’s decline, Bernanke continued, would
continue to be a drag on the overall economy.76
CDS contracts are often sold by the same banks that package and
service mortgage-backed securities.77 This means that the banks
responsible for evaluating the need for and organizing mortgage
modifications to prevent foreclosures are the same institutions that would
74

The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong.
1 (2008) (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve), available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080117a.htm.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Understanding the causes of this decline means understanding how the mortgage
industry changed over the last several decades. Beginning in the early 1970s mortgage
securitization allowed homebuyers access to the bond market and the deep pools of capital
that came with such access. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2198-2202 (2007). Whereas once mortgagors dealt only with the
bank that held their debt, securitization turned banks into mere service providers. This shift
changed the outlook of banks servicing these mortgages. Instead of profiting on income
from mortgages, banks increasingly profited from fees derived from selling mortgagebacked securities and other financial products related to those securities. Among the
consequences of this change is the complication of a bank’s role as a mortgage service
provider. Owning the debt allowed banks to modify mortgage contracts at will when
payments were missed to prevent foreclosure. Such loan modifications are widely
recognized as an important tool to keep economic downturns and the subsequent likelihood
of late mortgage payments from turning a flood of foreclosures into a deluge that would
speed a declining housing market. See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et
al.’s “Preventive Servicing is Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”:
What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 279, 282, 284 (2007).
Securitization of mortgages turned banks into trustees of mortgage-backed bonds, requiring
approval from bondholders before mortgage adjustments, known as “workouts,” could be
executed. The process of mortgage securitization also created such diversity in terms of
ownership rights that getting requisite bondholder approval became impractical in many
circumstances. At the same time, these workouts were not impossible. Id. at 287. Banks,
acting as trustees, might still be inclined to make them if drops in housing prices became
more than regional. A national drop in housing prices would defeat the risk mitigating
effects of a bond backed by a geographically diverse group of mortgages and give a bank
incentive to attempt to rescue the entire bond. Id. Depending on the precise terms of the
Service and Pooling agreements that created the bonds, the calculus of whether or not to
take the trouble to attempt adjustments begins with comparing the percentage of defaulting
mortgages that are contributing to a bond’s revenue stream with the cost of an adjustment.
See Hu & Black, supra note 66, at 730.
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pay out a CDS contract in the event of foreclosure. Obviously, such a
situation presents a significant conflict of interest for these banks.78
In June of 2007, Bear Stearns, a major trader of both CDS contracts
and mortgage-backed securities, was accused of having such conflicting
interests.79 Hedge fund investors, like John Paulson, speculating on a drop
in the housing market had purchased a large number of CDS contracts.
These investors did not own any of the mortgage-backed securities to
which the CDS contracts were tied.80 Bear Stearns found that it would owe
more in CDS payments than it would lose by making mortgage adjustments
to prevent foreclosures and the resulting bond defaults. Despite the
transaction costs of organizing such adjustments - which include seeking
approval from large numbers of disparate investors with differing interests
the bank began the process. CDS holders cried foul, accusing Bear Stearns
of market manipulation.81 The question, according to press reports, was
what motivared Bear Stearns to renegotiate sub-prime loans and enter into
what Paulson called “uneconomic transactions?”82 Was the brokerage firm
trying to keep homeowners in their houses or save itself from CDS
losses?83
The consequences of the Bear Stearns incident could be dire, though
they merit more research. Mortgage holders who might have been able to
benefit from a mortgage reorganization with the bank lost that chance and
watched their houses go into foreclosure. Sellers saw additional properties
added to the glut of housing on the market, forcing prices further down. It
is arguable that CDS contracts kept workouts, one of the potential failsafe
mechanisms of the mortgage industry, from being executed.

78

See Eggert, supra note 76, at 290-91.
See Gregory Zuckerman, Editorial, Trader Made Billions on Subprime; John
Paulson Bet Big on Drop in Housing Values; Greenspan Gets a New Gig, Soros Does
Lunch, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, at A1; Saskia Scholtes, Editorial, Fears Over Helping
Hand for Mortgage Defaulters, FIN. TIMES (London), May 31, 2007, at 1.
80
Kate Kelly and Serena Ng, Editorial, The Sure Bet Turns Bad: Funds Howl as
Bear Stearns Buys Mortgages, WALL ST. J., JUNE 7, 2007, at c3.
81
Roddy Boyd, Editorial, Hedge Fund Bearish on Sub-Prime Relief, N.Y. Post, June 5,
2007,
at
http://www.nypost.com/seven/06052007/business/hedge_fund_bear_ish_on_
subprime_relief_business_roddy_boyd.htm.
82
Id.
83
Id.
79
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C. INVESTMENT BANKS: WINNING AND LOSING WITH CDSS
The banks themselves may be profiting by betting against their own
securitized mortgages through CDS. Moreover, CDS might have
contributed to the stunning collapse of one of Wall Street’s most powerful
investment banks.
In 2007, Goldman Sachs, another major trader of both CDS and
mortgage-backed securities, made $4 billion by betting that securities
backed by home loans would fall in value.84 While making these bets,
Goldman was also underwriting bonds backed by these mortgages. Did
Goldman keep churning out troubled bonds with the knowledge that it
would profit from their decline in value using CDS?
In March of 2008, Bear Stearns finally succumbed to betting
incorrectly on the housing market.85 The firm’s brokerage and hedge fund
clients began withdrawing their accounts in droves as fear of Bear Stearn’s
lack of liquidity began to spread.86 As a result, Bear Stearns, found itself in
an increasingly precarious position.87 The firm ended up agreeing to sell
itself for $2 (later raised to $10) per share to J.P. Morgan Chase in a deal
organized by the Federal Reserve.88 Some traders speculate whether the
clients withdrawing accounts from Bear Stearns used the CDS market to
profit from the firm’s demise.89 A hedge fund betting heavily that Bear
Stearns will fail has much less incentive to keep its business with Bear
Stearns because withdrawing its business makes it more likely that its CDS
will pay out.90
Some reports also suggested that certain Bear Stearns bond holders
planned to vote against allowing J.P. Morgan Chase to buy the troubled
84

Kate Kelly, Editorial, How Goldman Won Big on Mortgage Meltdown; A Team’s
Bearish Bets Netted Firm Billions; A Nudge from the CFO, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2007, at
A1.
85
Robin Sidel et al., Editorial, The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise
of Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1.
86
Id. See Zuckerman, supra note 78, at A1.
87
See Sidel et al., supra note 82, at A1; Zuckerman, supra note 78, at A1.
88
Sidel et al., supra note 82, at A1; Matthew Karnitschnig & David Enrich,
Editorial, Bear’s Run-up Sets the Stage for Epic Clash; Speculators Ignite Rally, Driving
Shares Up 23%; Disbelief on Deal Price, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2008, at C1; Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Editorial, JP Morgan Raises Bid for Bear Stearns to $10 per share, N.Y. Times,
March 24, 2008.
89
Gregory Zuckerman, Editorial, Hedge Funds, Once a Windfall, Contribute to
Bear’s Downfall, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at C1.
90
Id.
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firm, electing bankruptcy instead in order to allow CDS bets to pay off.91
Why attempt to salvage value when what might be lost to bankruptcy is
less than what will be gained from CDSs as a result of bankruptcy?
D. MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE DOCTRINE
Whether bankruptcies or foreclosures, the potential activities described
in section C all deal with what economists call moral hazard. Moral hazard
can be defined as activity that reduces incentives to protect against loss or
minimize the cost of a loss.92 Financial products that transfer wealth in the
event of a loss give the buyer an incentive to bring about that loss, often in
spite of the societal costs. A CDS potentially creates such an incentive or
moral hazard since it creates awards when bad things –such as bankruptcies
or foreclosures- happen. One way to think about developing policies to deal
with that moral hazard is to evaluate the earliest methods. Those methods
are found in the history of insurance law.
The doctrine of insurable interest invalidates insurance contracts in
which buyers have no interest in the insured entity. It was created to
counter moral hazard. The preamble of England’s Marine Insurance Act of
91

Karnitschnig & Enrich, supra note 85, at C1.
TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 4 (Wolters Kluwer ed., Aspen
Publishers 2d ed. 1959 (2008). Moral hazard is a term and an idea that grew out of the
insurance business. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 237 (1996). To price insurance contracts, insurers borrowed probability
theory used to determine the complicated odds of the dice game known in 18th
century England as “Hazard.” They applied this theory to vital statistics such as births,
marriages, suicide, fires, storms, murder, sickness and calamity at sea. Similarly to
predicting the outcome of a game of “Hazard,” the laws of large numbers allowed
insurers to predict on the aggregate how often a ship would sink, a duke would die, or
a house would be destroyed. The knowledge allowed insurers to sell their product at a
price that would allow them to honor their commitments to customers, turn a profit
and not go broke (at least most of the time). See id.. at 245, 247. Former University of
Connecticut School of Law Professor Tom Baker adds writes that fire insurers
distinguished among physical hazards in two senses of the word. “There were hazards
that caused fires (for example, lightning, short circuits, spontaneous combustion),” he
wrote, “and there were hazards that affected the probability or magnitude of loss by
fire (for example, the type of construction or use of a building).” Id. at 248. Later,
Baker continues, insurers began using the term “moral” to distinguish both of these
types of “hazard” from incentive that caused amoral behavior resulting in loss. Id. at
248. “[F]raud and interested carelessness were moral hazards that caused losses,”
Baker explains, while “[b]ad character or habits, financial embarrassment, poor
business practices and over-insurance were moral hazards that increased the
probability of loss.” Id.. at 248-249.
92
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1746, which first codified the insurable interest requirement for the 18th
century British Empire, lists the concerns of the legislators that passed it. It
reads:
“WHEREAS, it hath been found by experience, that the
making assurances, interest or no interest, or without further proof
of interest than the policy, hath been productive of many pernicious
practices, whereby great numbers of ships, with their cargoes, have
either been fraudulently lost and destroyed, or taken by the enemy
in time of war; and such assurances have encouraged the
exportation of wooll, and the carrying on many other prohibited
and clandestine trades, which by means of such assurances have
been concealed, and the parties concerned secured from loss, as
well to the diminution of the publick revenue, as to the great
detriment of fair traders…”93
Eighteenth Century British law is to a large extent the father of
American common law and the doctrine of insurable interest is no
exception. Nearly every state in the United States has codified insurable
interest rules.94 However, precise requirements of the doctrine often vary
from state to state.95
Closely related to the insured interest doctrine is the principle of
indemnity. Some argue that indemnity is an outgrowth of the insured

93

Marine Insurance Act, 1746, 19 Geo. 2, c. 37 (Eng.).
CHRISTOPHER S. ARMSTRONG, AMERICA’S QUEST FOR A PROPER CONCEPT OF
“INSURABLE INTEREST”: THE PERILS OF IGNORING THE IMPLICATIONS 3, (2002),
http://www.rmstrnglaw.com/publications/Americas_%20Quest.pdf.
95
Id.
There are two basic theories used to articulate the insured interest doctrine: the
legal interest test and the factual expectancy test.
American courts have generally
recognized contract rights, property rights or legal liability to be insurable. See ROBERT H.
JERRY & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 283 (LexisNexis 2007).
Property rights of any nature and quality will usually meet the requirement. In evaluating
insurable interest based on contractual rights, courts usually look for the possibility of
economic loss resulting from a contractual breach. Those subject to liability in the event of
property damage or tort are also considered to have an insurable interest. Id.. at 284-287.
The factual expectancy test is arguably a more generous test of an insured interest.
The test simply inquires into whether the purchaser of insurance can expect a loss if the
insured reference entity ceases to exist or expects a profit if the insured entity continues to
exist. Id.. at 289.
94
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interest doctrine.96 Insurance aims to do nothing more than reimburse. The
principle of indemnity merely states that a contract for insured property
cannot return to the buyer more than his interest in that property is worth. If
a buyer of insurance could collect more than the property is worth, that
additional amount would not be based on an insurable interest and the
moral hazard doctrine attempts to avert that which would not be fully
mitigated.97
96

Daniel Dumas, Insurable Interest in Property Insurance Law, 18 R.D.U.S. 407,
423 (1988); HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at § 3.1 (“The indemnity principle is
dependent upon and interconnected with the doctrine of insurable interest.”).
97
Jerry & Richmond, supra note 92, at 277.
The extent to which insurance doctrine focuses on insurable interest or indemnity
differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and country to country. The United Kingdom’s Law
Commission, a statutory independent body created by Parliament to review the law and
recommend reform, is currently revaluating whether the insured interest doctrine is useful
considering that the indemnity doctrine serves a similar purpose. See The Law Comm. &
The Scot. Law Comm., Insurable Interest, Issue Paper 4 (2008), (available at
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/Insurance_Contract_Law_Issues_Paper_4.pdf).
In reviewing the current status of the insurable interest and indemnity doctrine it is
important not to mistake the changes regarding life insurance as changes that affect
insurance in general. Many jurisdictions have done away with the insurable interest doctrine
as necessary for collecting on a life insurance policy. See Annotation, Validity of assignment
of life insurance policy to one who has no insurable interest in insured 30 A.L.R 2D 1310,
1333. This change allows holders of life insurance to sell their policies before their death,
allowing them to unlock much of the value they have paid into the policy. 30 A.L.R 2D at
1339-1340. The creation of a secondary market for life insurance contracts has been deemed
legal. See BAKER, supra note 89, at 235-246. Also deemed legal is the controversial
practice of employers taking out life insurance contracts on employees. Id. at 238-239.
Courts evaluating this practice have ruled that the employers have an insurable interest in
the lives of those who work for them. Id. at 238-239. Australia abandoned the insurable
interest requirement for life insurance policies altogether in 1995 stating that the doctrine as
a defense against moral hazard no longer holds sway. See The Law Comm. at 53-54.
Many of these changes are due to the differences between life insurance and other
types of insurance. Life insurance is often not considered an indemnity contract because of
the difficulty in valuing human life. HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21. Moreover, courts
deemed the public interest in allowing life insurance policy-holders to collect on their
contracts before death to meet their needs in life outweighed the moral hazard of a buyer of
the policy profiting through murder. See 30 A.L. R. 2d at 1333, 1339.
One recent argument against the insurable interest doctrine focuses on its use by
insurers to invalidate contracts. See Jacob Loshin, Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody: A
Case Against the Insurable Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 475, 479 (2007). This
scholar argues that the insured interest doctrine harms consumers who rely on contracts they
believe are valid but are later found void by courts using a definition for the doctrine that is
“erratic, ambiguous and inconsistent.” Id. at 487. The author argues that doing away with a
legal insurable interest requirement would create more incentive for insurance companies to
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Another insurance doctrine that might also be considered an outgrowth
of the insurable interest and indemnity doctrines is subrogation. This
doctrine seeks to avoid unjust enrichment on the part of the insured by
substituting the insurer in place of the insured in regard to some claim or
right the insured has against a third party regarding the insured’s loss.98
When an insurer asserts a subrogation right he is viewed as “standing in the
shoes” of the insured.99 Application of the doctrine bars the insured from
filing a claim on a loss and then seeking compensation on that loss through
other means, such as a tort suit.100
These doctrines still serve as legal efforts to ensure that insurance helps
cushion the effects of existing risks and does not create new risks. If
applied to CDSs, they would prevent the creation of the negative economic
interests discussed and eliminate the potential profit from the destruction of
value.
III. FAILING TO MAKE A CONVINCING DISTINCTION
Given the similarities between CDSs and traditional insurance and the
context with which the insurable interest and indemnity principles are
applied, it is appropriate to revaluate the arguments that CDSs are not
insurance contracts.

investigate potential moral hazard and not write policies for buyers who are likely
deliberately to bring about the event insured against. Id. at 506-508.
It is also important to remember that the origins of insurable interest are also closely
related to the 18th and 19th century legislative aversion to gambling in Anglo-Saxon
countries and the insurance business’ interest in separating itself from gaming activities. The
history is sufficient to argue - as some of the sources referenced above do- that preventing
gambling was the chief aim of the implementation of insurable interest as a legal doctrine.
For the purposes of this discussion, gambling is considered to be part of the group of moral
hazard that the doctrine seeks to avoid. However, given the changes in much of society’s
views on gambling it is arguable that the premises on which insurable interest is based is no
longer valid. See Dumais, supra note 93 at 410-417.
Despite the ways in which the insurable interest and indemnity doctrines have evolved
in certain parts of the world and criticisms of them, they are both alive and well as legal
principles that discourage the destruction of value in order to collect on a property insurance
contract.
98
HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, §3.1 at 334.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 335-36.
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A. SCHWARTZ’ ARGUMENT
Schwartz’ propositions apply the same reasoning applied in the Potts’
opinion and the advisory letter issued by the New York Department of
Insurance.101 Therefore, challenging Schwartz’ propositions should also
serve to challenge Potts and the New York Department of Insurance’s
analysis.
First, Schwartz argues that “[w]here a party enters a contract for
contingent recovery possessing no economic interest in protecting the
covered property from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance.”102
Thus, according to Schwartz, CDSs should not be labeled insurance
because there is no insurable or economic interest requirement with respect
to CDS contracts.103 Insurance contracts, however, did not always require
that the buyer possess an insurable or economic interest in protecting the
covered property. Rather, the legislative and judicial intent in requiring
insurable interest is to limit the moral hazard insurance contracts create.104
A CDS creates the same kind of moral hazard and therefore should
possibly be regulate as insurance. Using Schwartz’ reasoning, insurance
contracts before the adoption of the insurable interest requirement were not
insurance contracts. Therefore Schwartz’ first proposition does not prove
CDS are not insurance.
Secondly, Schwartz argues that “[w]hen the contract for recovery fails
to reference property that the purchasing party has economic incentive to
protect from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance.”105 Similar to the
first proposition, Schwartz’s second proposition also seeks to define
insurance using the insured interest doctrine. Schwartz acknowledges in
discussing the second proposition that the insured interest doctrine is
intended to mitigate moral hazard.106 CDSs allow buyers to speculate,
according to Schwartz, whether or not they bear any risk related to the
reference entity and consequently are not insurance.107 This feature of
CDSs distinguishes it from insurance only in the sense that modern
insurance law prevents using insurance contracts to create a negative
economic interest in a given entity. As discussed in the preceeding
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

See Schwartz, supra note 2 at 200; see also supra text accompanying notes 21, 27.
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 200.
See id. at 189.
Jerry & Richmond, supra note 92, at 276.
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 200.
See id. at 190.
Id.
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paragraph, this is simply a difference in how two types of contracts are
regulated as opposed to a difference in the contracts themselves. Given the
evidence that CDSs create moral hazard similar to early insurance
contracts, policy makers should consider applying the same regulation to
CDSs as applied to insurance.
Third, Schwartz argues that “[w]hen recovery under a contract can be
had without substantiating any actual loss or damage the contract is not
insurance.”108 Therefore, according to Schwartz, a CDS is not insurance
because a credit event triggering a payout to a CDS buyer does not have to
constitute a loss on the part of the buyer.109 The indemnity doctrine was
instituted to prevent using an insurance contract to create a negative
economic interest in the insured entity. CDSs not being subject to this
requirement does not mean CDSs are not insurance. It only means CDSs
are not regulated the same way as a standard insurance contract.
Fourth, Schwartz argues that where the party can recover an amount
that exceeds expenses caused by loss or damage, the contract is not
insurance.110 CDSs allow a buyer to recoup, upon the occurrence of a
credit event, amounts that bear little or no relationship to the buyer’s loss.
Consequently, Schwartz argues CDSs are not insurance.111 Again, this
argument uses the indemnity doctrine to define insurance when indemnity
is merely a form of regulation restraining the use of insurance.
Fifth, Schwartz argues that where a contract for recovery allows
physical settlement, the contract is not insurance.112 While insurance
contracts usually result in the insurer paying the insured a cash amount
based on the loss, parties to a CDS contract can designate either cash or
physical settlement.113 The possibility of physical settlement, where the
obligation provided by the buyer to the seller in exchange for the payout
amount is different from the reference obligation, would not be allowed in
a standard insurance contract.114 By collecting on an insurance contract,
the insured often hands over to the insurance company any right attached to
the entity he or she had insured. This transfer of rights is called

108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 200.
See id. at 193.
Id. at 200-01.
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 193.
Id. at 200-01.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
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subrogation.115 This difference means CDS cannot be defined as insurance,
according to Schwartz.116 Again, Schwartz has identified a distinction in
the contract’s legal treatment and not in the contract’s effects. If a CDS
contract creates similar effects as an insurance contract that is not subject to
subrogation, then policy-makers must assess whether subrogation should
apply to CDSs.
Sixth, Schwartz argues that where a contract for recovery provides for
cross-payment netting under a master agreement, the contract is not
insurance.117 Under the ISDA Master Agreement, CDS trades between
accounts can be netted, meaning that instead of working through each
transaction, market participants can settle the net balance outstanding
between them.118 This aspect of the CDS market is merely a testament to
the success of the ISDA in organizing consensus among its members. An
insurance company might be able to achieve the same result if it deducted
premiums owed by an insured on one policy from the amount the insured
was scheduled to collect from a different policy. This last characteristic
identified by Schwartz simply describes the manner in which an insurance
exchange, unencumbered by the insured interest, indemnity or subrogation
doctrines, might organize itself to achieve maximum efficiency. It is hardly
a characteristic distinguishing CDS from insurance.
B. NIRENBERG AND HOFFMAN’S ARGUMENT
The analysis presented by Nirenberg and Hoffman, presents a more
subtle argument. It utilizes Holmes’ three tests; (1) Substantial Control; (2)
Principal Object; and (3) Regulatory Value to determine whether CDS
should be classified as insurance.119
Under the Substantial Control Test, insurance is any contract by which
one contracting party (the insurer) for a valuable consideration (the
premium) given by the other party (the insured) assumes the other party’s
fortuitous risk of loss or liability and then distributes the risk or liability

115
See Subrogation Administration, What Subrogation?, http://www.subrogation.com/
what/main.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
116
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 201; See Subrogation Administration, What
Subrogation?, http://www.subrogation.com/what/main.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
117
Id. at 200-01.
118
Id. at 195-96.
119
See infra text accompanying notes 103-107.
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among a similarly situated group of parties pursuant to the same
distribution plan.”120
Applying this standard to CDSs, there is a contract (the CDS
agreement) by which one contracting party (the seller) for valuable
consideration (the contracted payment obligation) tendered by the other
party (the buyer) assumes the other party’s risk of loss or liability (the
reference security becoming substantially devalued or worthless).121 But,
they continue, whether the risk of loss or liability is fortuitous depends on
the facts and circumstances of the transaction.122 Similarly, they argue,
distribution of the risk by the CDS seller among buyers does occur, but not
always.123 Nirenberg and Hoffman conclude that CDSs being deemed
insurance based on the substantial control test depends on the
circumstances of the particular transaction.124
The Principle Object Test inquires whether the elements of risk
transference and distribution of a fortuitous insured event are central to and
a relatively significant feature of the commercial transaction.125 Nirenberg
and Hoffman again find that this determination varies between CDS
transactions as one buyer might be buying to hedge risk, meaning he is
buying insurance, whereas another might be buying to speculate, meaning
he is not buying insurance.126
The Regulatory Value Test inquires whether a particular commercial
transaction should be regulated in the public interest.127 More specifically,
the test makes the following inquiries: 1) What is the private interest sought
to be protected in the commercial transaction? 2) Who is the party
assuming the risk transferred and is the protected interest indigenous to that
party? 3) Is the protected interest indigenous to the state and all its
interests? 4) Does the value of the indigenous interest invoke the purposes
and policies of state insurance regulation for all its citizens?128
Nirenberg and Hoffman provide a similar answer to the first two
inquires as Potts and Schwartz. They reason that because CDSs do conform
to the requirements of the insurable interest and indemnity doctrines they
120

Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 11; HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at

§ 1.4.
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123
124
125
126
127
128

Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 12.
Id. at 10, 12.
Id. at 12
Id. at 10, 12.
Id at 11; HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at § 1.4.
Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 12-13.
HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at § 1.4.
Id.

266

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

are not insurance.129 As argued above, this analysis is faulty as it
distinguishes CDS from insurance based on its purpose rather its effects. In
evaluating the second two inquiries, Nirenberg and Hoffman assume that
CDSs “affect neither the health nor the safety of the public, nor any other
interest indigenous to the state or its citizens.”130 As discussed in part two
of this paper, there is evidence that CDSs create negative economic
interests that give CDS buyers incentive to destroy value in the economy.
Policy-makers decided to check similar incentives created by early
insurance contracts and should think about doing so with regard to CDSs.
CONCLUSION
Arguments against recognizing CDSs as insurance fail to recognize the
moral hazard created by CDSs. These arguments disregard the purpose of
the insured interest and indemnity doctrines. Therefore, the differential
treatment of CDSs and insurance merits review by policy-makers.
The moral hazard created by CDSs described above might only be
potential. Dispositive evidence showing speculators destroy value to profit
on CDS speculation has not been found. However, analysis of the issue is
difficult due to a lack of disclosure requirements in the OTC derivatives
market, through which CDSs are traded. Some argue that simply creating
more disclosure rules would mitigate any potential moral hazard.131 An
alternative or supplemental measure might be the application of an
insurable interest or indemnity requirement.
Given the similarities between an old problem (moral hazard in the
early insurance market) and a potential new one (moral hazard in CDS
markets), policy-makers must analyze the consequences of classifying
CDSs as insurance for regulatory purposes. There are some strong
arguments regarding the benefits of CDSs and the dangers of government
regulation. 132 Given the immense size of the CDS market more research is
needed. Moreover, given the similarities between CDSs and insurance,
more emphasis should be placed on studying insurance law and policy in
evaluating the future of CDSs.
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130
131
132

Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 13-14.
Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 15.
Hu & Black, supra note 66, at 682 - 684.
See Greenspan, supra note 19.

A TAX TREATY THAT DOESN’T TAX?
THE UNIQUE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES-BERMUDA TAX TREATY AND THE
SUBSEQUENT PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED
STATES INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Yelena Tsvaygenbaum*
ABSTRACT
This casenote addresses the history and potential problems of the 1986
US-Bermuda Tax Treaty, which narrowly focuses on the taxation of
insurance premiums. Since Bermuda itself has no income tax, this unequal
treaty gives the island state an advantage over the USA. The original
reasons for entering into such a treaty have been eliminated, and the lack of
tax information and possibility of tax evasion from non-Bermuda residents
present problems for the future of US-Bermuda relations. Renegotiation of
the treaty may be a prudent idea, in order to remedy these problems and
increase taxable incomes. Since Bermuda’s flexible environment for
reinsurance and insurance is attractive globally, its market is a benefit to
the United States, although US reinsurers are bound by higher taxes.
However, domestic concern about Bermuda’s insurance industry include
concerns about tax loopholes in acquisition and corporate inversion, attack
by the IRS under §845(b), and overcharging. Various federal bills have
been proposed to “level the playing field,” appealing for changes in state
legislation on reinsurance may be the best idea to increase economic
activity domestically.
In 1986, Bermuda and the United States signed the United StatesBermuda Tax Treaty. This treaty is unique because unlike all other tax
treaties it does not alleviate double taxation. One of the major goals of tax
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treaties is to alleviate double taxation for companies and individuals that
pay taxes in multiple countries. Bermuda, however, does not tax income,
thus no double taxation is possible. Furthermore, unlike most treaties, the
tax treaty is very narrow in scope - it covers only the taxation of insurance
premiums. Why should the United States have a narrow treaty with
Bermuda? The first part of the article will try to answer that question by
providing an overview of the treaty and reviewing its legislative history.
The second part of the article will discuss the insurance industry in
Bermuda after treaty ratification, specifically the current problems the U.S.
insurance industry faces as a result of the tax environment in Bermuda.
PART I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATESBERMUDA TAX TREATY
A. OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES-BERMUDA TAX TREATY1
Under certain circumstances, the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty
provides for relief from taxation of insurance business profits. The
business profits of a Bermudian insurance company will not be taxed in the
United States unless a company has a permanent establishment2 in the
1

Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (On Behalf of the
Government of Bermuda) Relating to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual
Assistance in Tax Matters, U.S.-Berm., Jul. 11, 1986, T.I.A.S. No. 11,676 [hereinafter U.S.Bermuda Tax Treaty]; Treasury Department Technical Explanation of Bermuda Tax Treaty,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-12.
2
A permanent establishment is defined as:
[A] regular place of business through which the
business of an enterprise of insurance is wholly or partly
carried on. The term “permanent establishment” . . .
include[s] especially a place of management, a branch, an
office, and premises used as a sales outlet. The term
“permanent establishment” . . . also include[s] the
furnishing of services, including consultancy, management,
technical and supervisory services, within a Covered
Jurisdiction by an enterprise of insurance through
employees or other persons but only if:(a) activities of that
nature continue within the Jurisdiction for a period or
periods aggregating more than 90 days in a twelve-month
period, provided that a permanent establishment shall not
exist in any taxable year in which such services are
rendered in that Jurisdiction for a period or periods
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United States. The tax treaty also provides relief from Bermudian taxation
to American insurance companies unless the companies have a permanent
establishment in Bermuda.3 In practice, no relief from taxation is needed
because Bermuda does not tax income.
Even if an American insurance company has a permanent
establishment in Bermuda, it will not incur an income tax in Bermuda.
Thus, the relief from taxation is a concession by the United States, not
Bermuda. Furthermore, by agreeing to only tax a permanent establishment
of a Bermudian insurance company, the United States provides a greater
benefit to Bermuda-based companies than enjoyed by U.S.-based
companies. Under the regular U.S. Code, the business profits of a domestic
insurance company are taxed when the insurer has a trade or business
carried on in the United States and the business profits are effectively
connected with the trade or business.4 In contrast, under the treaty, the
business profits of a Bermudian insurance company are taxed by the United
States when the insurer has a fixed place of business in the United States
and the insurer’s income is attributable to that fixed place of business.5
Thus, a Bermudian insurance company, unlike a U.S.-based company, has
to be more than engaged in a trade or business in the United States before
the United States can tax its business profits. The difference in taxation
between a U.S.-based company and a Bermuda-based company is due to
the fact that foreign companies in the United States are taxed only on their
source income (income earned in the United States), while domestic
companies are taxed on a world-wide basis.
The relief from taxation granted to Bermuda-based companies includes
two exceptions. Relief is only granted if more than 50% of a resident
company’s stock is owned by a U.S. citizen, a U.S. resident, or a Bermuda
resident. The purpose of the qualifying provision is to prevent treaty
aggregating less than 30 days in the taxable year; or (b) the
services are performed within the Jurisdiction for an
associated enterprise.
U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 3. See also Treasury Department
Technical Explanation of Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY , Sept. 29, 1986,
available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-12.
3
U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 4; Treasury Department Technical
Explanation of Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY , Sept. 29, 1986, available at
LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-12.
4
S. FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., TAX CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM (ON
BEHALF OF BERMUDA), S. REP. NO. 100-23, at 14-15 (1988).
5
Id. at 15-16.
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shopping.6 However, it is much lower than the qualifying provision under
the 1981 United States Model Tax Treaty, which requires 75% of a
company’s stock to be held by individuals in the country of residence.7
The second exception which is also meant to prevent treaty shopping
provides for no tax relief on resident’s income when a resident uses the
income in substantial part to make distributions to people who are not U.S.
citizens, U.S. residents or Bermuda residents.8 There is an exception to the
exception – if there is substantial and regular trading on a public stock
exchange, tax relief is allowed for companies where U.S. citizens, U.S.
residents, or Bermuda residents own less than 50% of the stock.9 Thus,
publicly traded companies satisfy the requirements for tax relief. The
treaty also contains a waiver of the U.S. excise tax.10 An excise tax is a tax
imposed on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers.
The treaty also includes a savings clause and a nondiscrimination
clause. The savings clause allows the United States to reserve their right to
tax their own residents and citizens as if the treaty was not in force.11 The
savings clause is traditionally placed into tax treaties to ensure that the U.S.
tax burden for U.S. residents and U.S. citizens is not unintentionally
reduced.12 The nondiscrimination clause provides that neither country may
6
Treaty shopping is a tax avoidance strategy where a company that resides in a
country without a treaty with the United States routes income through a jurisdiction with a
favorable tax treaty with the United States. Thus, the company receives tax benefits under
the tax treaty to which it was not directly entitled. AM. LAW INST., INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX
TREATIES 150-151 (1992).
7
U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 16, ¶ 210.16, Jun. 16, 1981, 1 TAX
TREATIES (CCH). When the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty was ratified, the 1981
Model Tax Treaty was the most recent model tax treaty. Subsequent model tax treaties have
lowered the 75% threshold to 50% making them comparable to the U.S.-Bermuda Tax
Treaty. See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 22, ¶ 210.22Sep. 20, 1996, 1 TAX
TREATIES (CCH); U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 16, ¶ 209.16, Nov. 15, 2006, 1
TAX TREATIES (CCH).
8
U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 16, ¶ 211.16, Jun. 16, 1981, 1 TAX
TREATIES (CCH).
9
Id.
10
The treaty is reciprocal. Any benefit provided to Bermuda is also provided to
United States. Id. at ¶ 211.02. Thus, in theory, there is also a waiver of Bermuda excise
taxes on U.S. insurance premiums. However, Bermuda does not have an excise tax.
11
U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(1); Treasury Department Technical
Explanation of Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at
LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-12.
12
Ernest R. Larkins, U.S. Income Tax Treaties in Research and Planning: A
Primer, 18 VA. TAX REV. 133, 186-187 (1998).
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tax a permanent establishment that is a resident of the other country less
favorably than it taxes its own resident insurance entities that carry on the
same activities.13 Therefore a Bermudian permanent establishment cannot
be taxed more severely in the United States than a similar U.S. insurance
company.
The treaty also provides for mutual assistance on tax matters. The
purpose of a mutual assistance provision is to prevent or decrease tax
avoidance.14 Bermuda agrees to aid United States and vice versa in tax
information gathering. In the past, Bermuda’s bank secrecy laws have
proved to be an obstacle to enforcement efforts in cases involving U.S.
persons with business dealings in Bermuda. The agreement provides a
comprehensive set of exchange of information rules. The mutual assistance
provision, however, is narrower in scope than the 1981 United States
Model Tax Treaty. For example, under the tax treaty, the exchange-ofinformation rules are not effective for taxable years prior to 1977 for
matters other than tax fraud or tax evasion.15 “Matters other than tax fraud
and evasion” are defined as civil tax matters with the exception of civil
fraud.16 Another limitation under the treaty is that Bermuda can refuse to
provide documents that were created after the treaty went into force, if
providing such documents causes a breach of confidentiality.17
Confidential information is defined as information protected by Bermuda
statutory and common law.18 The post-entry-into-force limitation does not
apply when a document is created before the treaty went into force, but is
still relevant after the treaty was ratified.19
Congress ratified the treaty with two reservations. First, the waiver of
the insurance excise tax was set to sunset on January 1, 1990.20 Second,
the treaty permits the U.S. government to impose insurance excise taxes

13

U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(7); See also S. FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMM., TAX CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM (ON BEHALF OF BERMUDA), supra
note 4, at 20.
14
Larkins, supra note 12, at 205.
15
Testimony of Alan L. Fischl on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Joint Tax Committee,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-7.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Metzenbaum Amendment Kills Provisions in Barbados and Bermuda Tax Treaties
to Waive Some Excise Taxes on Insurance Premiums, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 14, 1988,
available at LEXIS, 88 TNT 209-42.
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unless future agreements explicitly override this provision.21 The purpose
of the treaty amendments was to ensure that the waiver of the excise tax
was temporary and would not be granted in the future without explicit
intent to do so.22
B. WHY MAKE THE TREATY?
Tax treaties remove impediments to international investment and to the
free flow of capital generally.23 There are two purposes of a tax treaty: to
prevent tax avoidance and evasion and to reduce international double
taxation. 24 Neither purpose was the primary reasons behind the United
States-Bermuda Tax Treaty.
The Bermuda government sought a tax treaty with the United States
because the United States signed a tax treaty with Barbados. Bermuda
wanted similar benefits that Barbados received from the United States
under the United States-Barbados tax treaty. The United States-Barbados
Tax Treaty eliminated U.S. excise tax imposed on insurance premiums paid
to Barbadian insurers by including the U.S. excise tax in the “Taxes
Covered” section of the tax treaty.25 The inclusion of the U.S. excise tax in
the “Tax Covered” treaty section is not unusual as it is included in the 1981
Model Tax Treaty, (the most recent model tax treaty at the time of the
United States-Barbados Tax Treaty ratification) and subsequent model tax
treaties.26
An insurance excise tax is imposed on premiums which are not subject
to net-basis taxation, but are attributable to U.S.-based risks.27 In other
words, United States imposes an excise tax when a company that does not
21

Id.
See infra Part I.B, for information on excise taxes.
23
Testimony of Alan L. Fischl on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Joint Tax Committee,
supra note 15.
24
Id.
25
Convention Between Barbados and the United States of America for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income, U.S.-Barb., art. 2.1.a, Dec. 31, 1984, T.I.A.S. No. 11,090.
26
See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 2, ¶ 211.02, Jun. 16, 1981, 1 TAX
TREATIES (CCH); U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 2, ¶ 210.02, Sep. 20, 1996, 1
TAX TREATIES (CCH) ; U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 2, ¶ 209.02, Nov. 15, 2006,
1 TAX TREATIES (CCH).
27
U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECT OF U.S.
REINSURANCE CORPORATIONS OF THE WAVIER BY TREATY OF THE EXCISE TAX ON CERTAIN
REINSURANCE PREMIUMS 7 (1990) [hereinafter Treasury Excise Tax Study].
22
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have a trade or business in the U.S. either insures or reinsures risks located
in the United States.28 The purpose of the excise tax is to ensure that all
premiums tied to risks located in the United States are taxed (in this way,
while foreign insurers that insure U.S.-based risks have a U.S. trade or
business are taxed on a net basis, foreign insurers that insure U.S.-based
risks and do not have a U.S. trade or business are taxed via the excise
tax).29
Although, a waiver of the insurance excise tax has been included in
treaties with countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy,30
Barbados was the first country to receive the waiver that did not itself have
an excise tax on insurance premiums. Thus, the waiver of tax was not
needed to alleviate double taxation in Barbados. The Treasury Department
acknowledged that the waiver of the excise tax was an unintended effect of
the Barbados treaty.31 Bermuda, a competitor of Barbados in the insurance
industry, asked the United States to confer a similar benefit on it. Alan
Fischl, a Legislation Attorney, testified before the Joint Committee on
Taxation during a hearing on the proposed United States-Bermuda Tax
Treaty, that because Barbados and Bermuda were competing centers for
insuring non-domestic risks, fairness would indicate that insurance-related
treaty benefits granted to one country should be extended to the other.32
The United States also believed that having a tax treaty with Bermuda
would be beneficial for the United States-Bermuda diplomatic relations.
During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bermuda Tax Treaty
Hearing, Navy representatives spoke in a closed session on the security
benefit of the treaty.33 Non-confidential security reasons for ratifying the
United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty were discussed by James Medas, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for the European and Canadian Affairs in the
Department of State. He testified that there were strong security reasons

28
This is most apparent in reinsurance contracts, where a foreign reinsurer contracts
to indemnify a portion of the insurer’s claims based in the U.S. For reinsurance premiums,
the rate of the excise tax is 1%. I.R.C. § 4371 (2002).
29
Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 7.
30
Testimony of Mindy Pollack on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 19511.
31
Testimony of Alan L. Fischl on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Joint Tax Committee,
supra note 15.
32
Id.
33
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Agenda for Bermuda Tax Treaty Hearing,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-8.
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for the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty. 34 The military bases which
occupy about 10% of the entire island provide an “an excellent vantage
point to observe extremely vital areas of the Atlantic and in conjunction
with bases in Iceland and the Azores make an indispensable contribution to
our security.”35 J. Roger Mentz, the Assistant Secretary of the Tax Policy
Department of the Treasury, agreed with the Department of State, stating
that the important national security interest was a primary motivating factor
leading to the negotiation of the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty.36 He
added that the uniqueness of the treaty is directly attributable to concerns
over national security.37 Furthermore, Mentz stated before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the treaty would be a major step towards
establishing a network for exchange of tax information between the United
States and the Caribbean.38
Due to these reasons, in 1986 the Senate ratified the tax treaty. The
“indispensable contribution” Bermuda made to U.S. security in the mid1980s may be doubtful, however. Less than a decade after the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony from Medas and Mentz, a
government report described the U.S. military bases in Bermuda as rest and
relaxation oases for senior naval officials and their families.39 In 1995,
President Clinton announced that the U.S. bases in Bermuda would close.40
He cited the end of the Cold War, budget deficits, and the bases’ reputation
of being a vacation location for naval officers as reasons for closing the
bases in Bermuda.41 Thus, the claim that Bermuda represented a strong
security interest in the mid-1980s is probably overstated.
Even before the announcement that the U.S. naval bases in Bermuda
would close, the tax treaty was not without controversy. There were three

34

Testimony of James Medas on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 1959.
35
Id.
36
Mentz’s September 25, 1986 Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Concerning Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS,
86 TNT 195-10.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Frank J. Parker, Closing Bermuda’s U.S. Naval Bases, 22 REAL EST. ISSUES 28, 30
(Aug. 1997).
40
Id. at 29.
41
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
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main criticisms of the treaty42 - (1) there was no need to enter into a treaty
because there was no double taxation;43 (2) the exchange of information
clause was not as comprehensive as that in other treaties;44 and (3) the
Treasury Department should study whether the U.S. reinsurance companies
are at a competitive disadvantage to foreign companies due to the waiver of
excise taxes on insurance premiums before the United States ratifies the
United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty.
The last criticism was especially a concern for the Reinsurance
Association of America (RAA). The Assistant General Counsel of RAA,
Mindy Pollack, commented on the impact the Bermuda treaty would have
on the domestic reinsurance market.45 During her testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pollack urged Congress to wait until
the Treasury Department studied the impact of excise tax waivers on the
domestic reinsurance market before ratifying the treaty.46 Subsequently,
Congress passed a tax bill that required the Treasury Department to study
the competitive effect of U.S. treaties on the U.S. reinsurance corporations’
in comparison to foreign reinsurance corporations when the treaties include
a waiver of the excise tax on insurance premiums [hereinafter the Treasury
Excise Tax Study].47 The Treasury planned to renegotiate the Bermuda
treaty if the Treasury Excise Tax Study indicated that waivers of insurance
excise taxes cause a disadvantage to U.S. companies.48
Senator Dodd of Connecticut argued that instead of granting a benefit
to other countries, the inadvertent mistake provided in the tax treaty with
Barbados – the waiver of the insurance excise tax - should be deleted from

42

Rostenkowski Letter to Treasury Secretary Baker Regarding United StatesBermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 22, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 1445.
43
In fact, the U.S. had never negotiated a treaty with a country that did not have
income taxes. Testimony of Alan L. Fischl on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Joint Tax
Committee, supra note 15.
44
Bermuda can refuse to provide documents that were created after the treaty went
into force if providing such documents causes a breach of confidentiality. For discussion on
the Exchange of Information Clause, see supra Part I.A. at 5-6.
45
Testimony of Mindy Pollack on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, supra note 30.
46
Id.
47
Tax Reform Act 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1244, 100 Stat. 2085, 2581 (1986).
For the Excise Tax Study, see infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
48
Comments of Treasury Secretary Mentz on U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Oct. 6, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 200-3.
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the United States-Barbados Tax Treaty.49 Renegotiating the treaty would
remove the competitive disadvantage currently facing the Bermudian
insurance industry.50 The Treasury Department believed that renegotiating
the treaty with Barbados less than a year after the ratification of the United
States-Barbados Tax Treaty would impair American credibility as a treaty
partner.51 The Barbados Ambassador to the United States, Peter Laurie,
urged Congress to await the results of the Treasury Excise Tax Study to see
whether a waiver of the excise tax on the insurance premiums places the
United States at a disadvantage.52 The Barbados ambassador believed that
agreements such as the United States-Barbados Tax Treaty provide
successful examples of cooperation between the United States and
countries in the Caribbean.53 He feared that renegotiating the tax treaty
only a few months after it was ratified would be viewed as a lack of
cooperation between the parties upsetting the relationship between the
United States and countries in the Caribbean.54 On the other hand, Senator
Dodd believed that placing Barbados and Bermuda on equal competitive
positions by extending the excise tax waiver to Bermuda would only
compound the problem because a waiver would only reduce U.S. tax
revenue.55 Congress agreed with the Senator. While ratifying the United
States-Bermuda Tax Treaty in 1988, Congress passed legislation that
sunset the waiver of the excise tax with respect to premiums paid or
credited on or after January 1, 1990 in both Barbados and Bermuda.56
The Treasury released the Treasury Excise Tax Study on the impact of
the waiver of excise taxes on the domestic insurance market in March
1990, after the excise tax on insurance premiums was reinstated in
Bermuda and Barbados.57 The Treasury Excise Tax Study revealed that the
49

Sens. Byrd, Dodd, & Pell Urge Treasury to Renegotiate Barbados Treaty Rather
than Altering Bermuda Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 22, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86
TNT 211-6.
50
Id.
51
Comments of Treasury Secretary Mentz on U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note
48.
52
Barbados Tells Senators that Renegotiating the U.S.-Barbados Tax Treaty Could
Upset the U.S.-Caribbean Policy, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 13, 1986, available at LEXIS,
86 TNT 226-3.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Sens. Byrd, Dodd, & Pell Urge Treasury to Renegotiate Barbados Treaty Rather
than Altering Bermuda Treaty, supra note 49.
56
Metzenbaum Amendment Kills Provisions in Barbados and Bermuda Tax Treaties
to Waive Some Excise Taxes on Insurance Premiums, supra note 20.
57
Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 1.

2008]

A TAX TREATY THAT DOESN’T TAX

277

United States is at a slight disadvantage when it offers a waiver of
insurance excise taxes to foreign jurisdictions which charge low or no tax
on insurance premiums.58 The Treasury Excise Tax Study also pointed out
that depending on the reinsurance market, the cost of the excise tax is
passed down to U.S. consumers that pay the premiums.59 Thus, a waiver of
the excise tax, although it might disadvantage domestic reinsurers, may
actually provide a savings to U.S. consumers.60 The Treasury Excise Tax
Study cautioned, however, that it did not factor in the various regulatory
requirements and non-tax aspects affecting firms in foreign countries.61
C. WHAT TO DO WITH THE TREATY?
The primary reasons motivating the United States and Bermuda to
enter into a tax treaty no longer hold. Bermuda wanted the waiver of the
excise taxes on insurance premiums. The waiver sunset two years after the
treaty ratification. The United States entered into the treaty due to a
concern over security interests in Bermuda. After the end of the Cold War
and the closing of the naval bases in Bermuda, the strong security reasons
no longer exist. The only pertinent aspect of the treaty is the mutual
assistance provision. However as discussed in Part I.A, the provision is
limited because it allows Bermuda to refuse to provide documents that
were created after the treaty went into force, if providing such documents
causes a breach of confidentiality.
As Bermuda has a favorable tax environment, third parties may try to
engage in tax evasion or tax avoidance in their resident country by
transferring income to Bermuda. The United States may try to renegotiate
the treaty to receive better tax information. Renegotiation, however, will
not change the fact that Bermuda does not tax income. The United States
could terminate the treaty completely, sending the policy message that the
United States will not make treaties with countries that do not tax.62
Another possibility is to renegotiate the treaty so that Bermudian
companies that are managed and controlled in the United States will be
taxed (under the treaty only Bermudian companies that have a permanent
58

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES 65 (Comm. Print 2007),
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-85-07.pdf.
59
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establishment in the United States are taxed).63 The “managed and
controlled” test would greatly impact the taxation of captive insurance
companies, which are domiciled in Bermuda due to Bermuda’s historic
expertise and regulatory system, but are managed domestically.64
However, it is politically infeasible to implement the “managed and
controlled” test because the Internal Revenue Code uses the place of
incorporation test to define residence. Thus, implementing the “managed
and controlled” test would require a change in legislation. Furthermore, it
would go against U.S. policy and past precedent.65
Even if the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty is terminated or
renegotiated, companies could still circumvent tax laws. Tax planners
could aid companies to set up insurance entities in such a way that the
companies do not have a permanent establishment or carry on trade or
business in the United States, thus avoiding net income taxation.66
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, terminating the treaty
would have little practical effect on the industry because reinsurance
companies can organize in such a manner that they do not engage in a trade
or business in the United States.67 Thus, the United States should try to
renegotiate the treaty. United States should seek a stronger mutual
assistance provision and a change of how business profits of Bermudian
entities are taxed in the United States. A stronger mutual assistance
provision that allows the United States access to confidential information
from Bermuda would aid United States to track down and prosecute those
companies and individuals that avoid or evade taxes.
The treaty could also allow the United States to tax income of
Bermudian insurance entities that have a trade or business in the United
States. U.S. taxation of foreign entities whose resident country does not
63
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 180 (Comm. Print 2005),
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf; John Kelly, Note, Haven or Hell: Securities Exchange
Listing Standards and Other Proposed Reforms as a Disincentive for Corporate Inversion
Transactions, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 199, 201 (2004).
64
A captive insurance company is a closely held insurance company that is
controlled by its insureds. TOWERS PERRIN, TILLINGHAST, CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY
GLOSSARY
3,
(2004)
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2004/200409/Captive_I
nsurance_Company_Glossary.pdf.
65
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions,
27 TAX NOTES INT’L 225, 229 (2002).
66
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 62, at 13.
67
Id.
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have a tax treaty with the United States is based on a U.S. trade or business
threshold. This threshold provides a greater tax base than provided under
the current tax treaty. Under the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty, the
United States can only tax profits attributable to permanent establishments
of Bermudian insurance companies. A permanent establishment requires a
company to have a fixed place of business in the United States, which is a
higher threshold than requiring a company to have a trade or business in the
United States.68 Although there is a concern that tax planners could even
circumvent the “trade or business” requirement due to the nature of the
insurance industry,69 it would still capture more taxable income than under
the current permanent establishment standard. Another way the United
States could increase taxable income would be to tax profits earned from
insuring U.S. risks by Bermudian companies. The treaty could define
taxable income from a permanent establishment as any income earned that
is attributable to insuring US-based risks. Thus, both domestic and
Bermudian insurance companies would be taxed at the same rate for
insuring US-based risks. Bermuda may not agree to such a provision
because it would greatly increase the tax burden of Bermudian companies.
PART II. POST-BERMUDA TAX TREATY RATIFICATION: THE
REINSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. BERMUDA’S INSURANCE INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW
Bermuda’s insurance industry is divided into insurance, making up
35% of the industry, and reinsurance, making up 65% of the industry.70
Half of all risks insured are of American origin and one third of all risks are
of European origin.71 More than half (about 60%) of the policies sold in
Bermuda are for property insurance and reinsurance.72 Most importantly,
Bermuda is a major global center for reinsurance.73
68

See supra Part I.A; U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3.
Especially in reinsurance, a substantial transaction can be carried out without
having a business location in the U.S. Reinsurance Association Supports Increase in Excise
Tax on Reinsurance Ceded to Foreign Reinsurers, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 22, 1990,
available at LEXIS, 90 TNT 41-47.
70
Donald Kremer, Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies on Impact of Increased
Taxes, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept 27, 2007, available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT 188-35
[hereinafter Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies].
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
The other global reinsurance centers are New York, London, and Zurich. Id.
69
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Reinsurance is a type of insurance arrangement that transfers risk from
an insurer to a reinsurer.74 The relationship between the reinsurer and the
original insurer, known as the cedent, is contractual.75
Policyholders pay premiums to their primary insurer, and that insurer,
as the reinsured, in turn pays to the reinsurer a certain percentage of those
premiums as consideration. Since the reinsurer does not incur the normal
cost of writing primary insurance, such as administrative expenses and
commissions paid to agents, the reinsurer can profitably reinsure the risks
for only a percentage of the premiums paid to the primary insurer.76
Furthermore, the reinsurer pays the original insurer, known as the
cedent, a commission.77 The commission compensates the ceding company
for its acquisition and operating costs.78 It also reflects the anticipated
profitability of the business.79 Through reinsurance, insurance companies
can insure a greater amount of risk, including risk that is less desirable,
providing insurance to a greater number of customers. The transfer of risk
also helps make the coverage more affordable.80 Numerous U.S. insurers
cede more than half of their business to reinsurers. Most of these reinsurers
are domiciled abroad.81
The Bermuda regulatory system allows companies, to form, license and
start underwriting insurance in a matter of a few months.82 In the United
States however, it is very hard to start up an insurance company because
insurance is regulated by states, and each state has its own licensing
requirements.83 Rules between states are often contradictory, and it is
74
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE 1-4 (2d ed. 2000).
75
Id.
76
Bluewater Ins. Ltd. v. Balzano, 823 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Colo. 1992), quoted in
BARRY R. OSTRAGER, supra note 74 at 1-1, 1-5.
77
Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
For certain lines of insurance the proportion between foreign-based reinsurers and
domestic reinsurers is even greater. For example, two-thirds of all hurricane and earthquake
reinsurance purchased by U.S. insurers is from foreign reinsurance companies. Id.
82
Id.; Forming a company in Bermuda imposes very little limitations. There is
limited case law that interprets the meaning and application of the major aspects of Bermuda
corporate law. As of 2002, Bermuda had 12,000 companies, most of which had no assets,
personnel, operations, or substantial economic ties with Bermuda. Orsolya Kun, Corporate
Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 313, 346 (2004).
83
Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70.
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almost impossible to be licensed in all 50 states.84 Bermuda and
Bermudian reinsurers, on the other hand, have a special expertise in
providing reinsurance.85 Bermuda, unlike the United States, is not subject
to regulatory price controls or coverage mandates.86 Capital is not trapped
in “red tape” that limits the insurer’s ability to enter or exit various
markets.87 Thus, Bermuda is a popular choice to purchase reinsurance
from or form reinsurance companies.
Bermuda also provides an utmost favorable environment for
responding to insurance crises, where timeliness is essential.88 For
example, in the mid-1980s, U.S. businesses faced a shortfall in liability
insurance coverage. At the time, it was the biggest insurance industry
crisis of the 20th century.89 In reaction to the crisis, investors tried to form
a new U.S. liability company called the American Slip.90 After three years
of trying to start up a new insurance company, the effort was abandoned
because the company failed to secure enough state licenses to conduct
business on a national level.91 Meanwhile, Bermuda’s flexible regulatory
environment allowed insurance companies ACE and XL to form in a matter
of few months to provide specially crafted, excess liability insurance
products to fulfill the need for liability insurance.92 Since the mid-1980s
liability insurance market crisis, there have been three more crises which
provided a wave of insurance company formations – Hurricane Andrew
and the property insurance crises of 1992-1994; the 9/11 tragedy and the
ensuing financial market turmoil in 2001-2002; and the insurance market
crunch following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005.93
Bermuda’s insurance industry is beneficial to the U.S. insurance
industry because it provides a favorable and readily available marketplace
from which to purchase insurance and reinsurance policies. Over the years
however, the domestic insurance industry has shown concern over the
favorable tax environment Bermuda provides. U.S. reinsurers are subject
to much higher taxes than Bermuda-based reinsurers. U.S. reinsurers pay
income taxes on their premium investment income, while Bermudian
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reinsurers are only subject to U.S. income taxes when they have a
permanent establishment in the United States. Only the income attributable
to the permanent establishment is subject to the U.S. income tax. Unless
there is a permanent establishment in the United States, Bermuda-based
reinsurers are only subject to the 1% excise tax on reinsurance premiums of
U.S.-based risks. Another concern is the tax avoidance transactions
between a Bermuda-based reinsurer and its U.S.-based cedent when the
two parties are related entities. Domestic insurers believe that there is an
industry-wide problem of non-arm’s length premium pricing and tax
U.S. companies
avoidance transactions between related entities.94
complain that the favorable tax treatment for Bermudian companies and
potential for tax avoidance makes it hard to compete with Bermudian
reinsurers.95
B. DOMESTIC CONCERN OVER THE REINSURANCE INDUSTRY IN
BERMUDA: UNITED STATES TAX BASE EROSION
The U.S. insurance companies, such as The Hartford, have shown
concern over the tax practices in the reinsurance industry in Bermuda.96
The first concern is reinsurers overcharging when providing reinsurance to
a related entity. A related insurer agrees to pay above market price for
reinsurance because it routes income from a high-tax jurisdiction, the
United States, to a no-tax jurisdiction, Bermuda. Because the insurer and
reinsurer are related entities, the income remains under control in the same
economic family, while decreasing the amount of income subject to U.S.
taxation. Another concern is that a Bermudian reinsurer and its U.S.
affiliate-cedent can scheme together in a tax avoidance plan where the
transaction shifts income from the United States, a high-tax jurisdiction, to
Bermuda, a no-tax jurisdiction, with minimal risk transfer. Both of these
practices would provide greater tax savings for Bermuda reinsurers that
could provide a competitive advantage over the U.S.-based reinsurers.97
The Bermuda reinsurance industry asserts that such concerns are

94
Jon Almeras and Ryan J. Donmoyer, Insurers Approach U.S. Congress to Fix
Bermuda, 20 TAX NOTES INT’L 1388, 1390 (2000).
95
See id.
96
Id. at 1388.
97
Ben Seessel, Comment, The Bermuda Reinsurance “Loophole” A Case Study of
Tax Shelter and Tax Havens in the Globalizing Economy, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
541, 559-61 (2001).

2008]

A TAX TREATY THAT DOESN’T TAX

283

unfounded due to the requirement under I.R.C. § 482 and I.R.C. § 845(b)
that premiums be charged at arm’s length prices.98
I.R.C. § 482 allows the Secretary of the Treasury to reallocate funds
including gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between
companies that are owned and controlled by the same parent.99 The
purpose of § 482 is to ensure that integrated businesses properly reflect
income attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent tax avoidance
regarding such transactions.100 The principal behind § 482 is the arm’s
length standard – “[i]n determining the true taxable income of a controlled
taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer
dealing arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.”101 Some analysts of
the Bermuda reinsurance industry believe that § 482 is not applicable to the
reinsurance industry because insurance regulators require reinsurance
premiums to reflect an arm’s length price.102 Thus, even if the reinsurer
and the insurer are both owned by the same parent, the insurer would pay a
reinsurance premium at a market price, as if it was a transaction between
unrelated entities. Since the insurance regulators require that reinsurance
premiums be set at market prices, the taxable income of related insurers
and reinsurers escapes § 482 scrutiny.103 U.S. insurers and their supporters,
however, assert that despite the arm’s length requirement, reinsurance is
still sold at non-market rates to related entities.104 Furthermore, they claim
that § 482 does not provide adequate audit techniques to effectively police
an industry-wide problem of undercharging premiums to related entities.105
Section 845 (b) provides the Treasury Department authority to
“reallocate items and make adjustments in reinsurance transactions to
98

Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70.
I.R.C. § 482 (2002).
100
I.R.C. § 482 (2002); Bermuda Triangle: Tax Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C
Insurance Competitiveness, TAX NOTES TODAY, January 8, 2002, available at LEXIS, 2002
TNT 5-24 (2002).
101
Bermuda Triangle: Tax Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance Competitiveness,
supra note 100 (internal quotations omitted).
102
Seessel, supra note 97, at 559.
103
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Comm’r, 617 F.2d 942, 947 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that if a
taxpayer can show that the price he was charged would have been the same in an
independent transaction with an unrelated party, then the taxpayer is free from § 482
allocation despite evidence that suggests that the transaction has shifted tax liability among
related entities); Lee A. Sheppard, Would Imputed Income Prevent Escape to Bermuda, 86
TAX NOTES 1663, 1664 (2000) (“Reinsurers charge the same as an unrelated comparable
price, which is a winning argument under section 482”).
104
Almeras, supra note 94, at 1389-90.
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Id.
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prevent tax avoidance or evasion.”106 Reallocation can occur as a result of
transaction of either related or unrelated parties. Tax avoidance may occur
when the tax benefits received from a transaction is disproportionate to the
risk transferred between parties.107 For example, a Bermuda company in
comparison to its domestic affiliate enjoys greater tax benefits because it
pays no income taxes.108 Tax avoidance may occur when a transaction
between a domestic insurer and its related Bermudian reinsurer transfers
minimal risk but large amounts of income, in the form of a reinsurance
premium.109 The overpayment of premium is a scheme to shift income
from a high-tax jurisdiction to a no-tax jurisdiction.110 “Long-tail” reserves
– insurance policies that incur claims long after the premium is paid – can
also support a finding of tax avoidance because there is a potential for the
reinsurer to earn significantly higher income from the long-term premium
investment while incurring a small amount of risk.111
The Tax Court, however, limited Section 845(b) in Trans City Life
Insurance Company v. Commissioner.112 In Trans City Life Insurance Co.,
Trans City Life entered into a reinsurance agreement with Guardian Life, an
unrelated entity, which ceded some of its insurance policies to Trans City
Life. As a result of this reinsurance agreement, Trans City Life qualified for
a “small life insurance company deduction” under I.R.C. §806.113 The IRS,
however, denied Trans City Life the deduction, concluding that the tax
benefit was disproportionate to the risk transferred under the reinsurance
agreement, causing a tax avoidance effect.114 In its analysis, the IRS
compared the small risk fees incurred by Trans City Life under the
reinsurance agreement to the tax savings claimed under the small life
insurance company deduction.115 The Tax Court disagreed with IRS’s
analysis. The Tax Court claimed that the appropriate comparison is between
the exposure of loss, which Trans City Life acquired under the reinsurance
agreement with Guardian Life and the tax savings claimed under the

106

I.R.C. § 845(b) (2002); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 62, at 21.
Seessel, supra note 97, at 554.
108
Id. at 555; Insurance companies make their profit on investing premiums that are
received many years prior to a claim payment.
109
Id. at 555.
110
Id. at 544-46.
111
Id. at 544.
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Tran City Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 106 T.C. 274 (1996).
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Id. at 278.
114
Id. at 276.
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deduction.116 The exposure of loss was measured by the difference between
the face value of the reinsurance agreement and the loss reserves (the
investment income) backing the reinsurance agreement. Under that
comparison, the Tax Court claimed that the risk incurred was not
disproportionate to the tax savings.117
Due to the Tax Court’s decision in Trans City Life Insurance Co.,
market-priced reinsurance agreements generally will not be subject to
§845(b) attack.118 However, the IRS has officially refused to follow the
Tax Court’s decision in Trans City Life Insurance Co. 119 Its nonacquiescence is due to its disagreement with the Tax Court on the
definition of risk.120 The Tax Court concluded that risk transfers exist
when there is a possibility of loss.121 In contrast, the IRS concluded that no
real risk transfer for tax purposes occurred between parties in a reinsurance
agreement when the possibility of loss is remote to the reinsurer.122 Due to
the IRS’ non-acquiescence, reinsurers may still be subject to attack by the
IRS under §845(b).
The third concern domestic insurers have over the Bermuda insurance
industry is that companies are domiciled in Bermuda in order to avoid
paying U.S. taxes all together. Specifically, they argue that the U.S. tax
code contains a “loophole” that allows for U.S. tax base erosion. The
“loophole” refers to a transaction that restructures U.S.-based insurance
companies into Bermuda-based entities in order to avoid U.S. taxation.
The “loophole,” also referred to as a corporate expatriation, has existed in
the tax code for a long time, but was never used until 1999.123 The U.S.
insurers have appealed to Congress to fix the “loophole” because it allows
companies to move to Bermuda to avoid paying U.S. taxes.124 Reinsurers,
however argue that they are not in Bermuda to avoid taxes, pointing out
that they are subject to the U.S. excise tax on gross premiums regardless of

116

Id. at 308-310.
Id. at 309.
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Seessel, supra note 97, at 557.
119
Action on Decision CC-1997-011.
120
Non-acquiescence is “an agency’s policy of declining to be bound by lower-court
precedent that is contrary to the agency’s interpretation of its organic statute, but only until
the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (8th ed. 2004).
121
Tran City Life Ins. Co., 106 T.C. at 308-10.
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Id. at 310-11
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Bermuda Triangle: Tax Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance
Competitiveness, supra note 100 (internal quotations omitted).
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whether they incur a net profit or a loss.125 Even while paying the excise
tax, a Bermuda-based reinsurer is at a greater advantage than the U.S.based reinsurer because a Bermuda-based company can avoid paying U.S.
taxes on the investment income.
The “loophole,” which facilitates the tax advantage, covers two types
of transactions – expatriation/inversion and acquisition. The inversion
occurs when a U.S.-based insurer reorganizes itself as a U.S. subsidiary of
a Bermuda-based holding company. Shareholders of the former U.S.
parent company (now the U.S. affiliate) receive shares in the Bermudian
corporation in exchange for their old shares of stock.126 Companies such as
PXRE, Folks America Re, and Everest Re, have restructured to become a
subsidiary of a Bermuda-domiciled holding company.127 SEC filings of
companies that re-domesticate in Bermuda make it clear that the tax
advantage was a major benefit.128
There are three forms of inversions – stock inversions, asset inversions,
and drop down inversions.129 Stock inversion transactions occur when a
newly-formed foreign holding company purchases stock of the U.S.-based
parent company and the U.S. parent becomes the subsidiary of the new
foreign parent.130 The shareholders exchange their U.S. parent stock for
new foreign parent stock.131 Asset inversion transaction occurs when a
U.S. parent transfers its assets to a new foreign parent before being
125

Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70.
Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based Multinational Businesses:
Analyzing the Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 551, 553 (2003).
127
Bermuda-domiciled holding companies have been compared to “banks” with
subsidiaries, where each subsidiary borrows from its “bank.” Reinsurance Company CEO
Testifies, supra note 70. Under a bank-subsidiary scenario, there is a potential for earning
stripping. Earning stripping is the practice of moving income from a high tax jurisdiction to
a low or no-tax jurisdiction to avoid paying high taxes. It is achieved when a U.S. company
makes a deductible interest payment to a foreign company. The net tax benefit will be the
difference between the foreign tax imposed on the interest income and the U.S. tax saved by
obtaining the deduction for interest expense. Kun, supra note 82, 338-9. Unlike earning
stripping, reinsurance requires a true transfer of risk and an arm’s length premium price.
Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70. Therefore, under a reinsurance
agreement, a Bermuda-based holding reinsurance company does not engage in earning
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liquidated.132 Shareholders exchange their stock of the U.S. parent for
stock of the new foreign parent.133 The drop down transaction is a
combination of stock inversion and asset inversion transactions.134
An inversion is not a tax-free transaction. Under I.R.C. §357, the
offshore move is treated as a sale or exchange.135 Thus companies that are
restructuring via a corporate inversion must recognize an unrealized gain
on their assets. The offshore move can be very costly, but that depends on
the fair market value of the assets and the company’s adjusted basis in the
assets.136 The inversion is most beneficial for smaller or new U.S.
companies which want to reorganize under Bermuda law.137 U.S.-based
long standing insurance companies cannot invert to Bermuda because they
would be liable for billions of dollars in capital gains taxes.138
The second aspect of the loophole is acquisition. Acquisition works
when a Bermuda based company buys a U.S. insurer.139 For example,
ACE, a Bermuda-based company acquired Capital Re, a U.S. company. If
a U.S. company becomes a domestic subsidiary of a foreign company, by
either inversion or acquisition, it is no longer subject to direct U.S. taxation
on a residence basis. Instead, direct investment income in the U.S. is
subject to a 30% tax at the source, insurance premiums are subject to a 4%
tax, and reinsurance premiums are subject to a 1% tax.140 Tax avoidance
occurs when a domestic affiliate reinsures a premium sold in this country to
their off-shore parent.141 A foreign parent, unlike a U.S. parent, will not
pay taxes on its investment income. The Hartford, and other U.S.-based
insurers are concerned about the unlevel playing field.142
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142
Id. at 1388.
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ILLUSTRATIONS OF CORPORATE INVERSIONS AND ACQUISITIONS
INVERSION
Country

Scenario 1

Scenario 2a

Scenario 2b

United
States

U.S. Insurance Parent
Company, “ABC Co”

U.S. Insurance Parent
Company, “ABC Co”

Bermuda

Unrelated
Reinsurance
Company, “Bermuda RE”

ABC Co Subsidiary,
“ABC RE”

ABC RE Subsidiary,
“ABC Co”
Bermuda Parent
Company, “ABC
RE”

In Scenario 1, a U.S.-based insurance company contracts with an
unrelated reinsurance company domiciled in Bermuda. ABC Co pays
Bermuda RE insurance premiums in exchange for Bermuda RE insuring
part of ABC Co risks. Because Bermuda RE is insuring risks located in the
United States but does not have a trade or business in the United States, it
does not pay the U.S. taxes on the investment income earned from the
insurance premiums on a net basis. Instead, it pays a 1% excise tax on the
reinsurance premium received.
In Scenario 2a, a U.S.-based insurance company sets up a reinsurance
subsidiary in Bermuda. ABC Co pays its own subsidiary ABC RE
insurance premiums in exchange for reinsuring part of its risks. ABC Co
forms a subsidiary in Bermuda for the sole purpose of facilitated the
corporate inversion transaction. Then ABC Co inverts itself (Scenario 2b)
– ABC RE becomes the parent company and ABC Co becomes its
subsidiary. The corporate structure turns upside down - the foreign
subsidiary becomes the parent and the parent becomes the subsidiary. This
results in the reinsurer being subject to only a 1% tax on the reinsurance
premiums via the excise tax.
ACQUISITION
Country

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

United States

U.S.
Reinsurance
Company, “ABC RE”

Bermuda

Unrelated Insurance Company,
“Bermuda Insurance”

Parent

“Bermuda Insurance-ABC RE”
(now with a Bermuda parent)
Parent Insurance Company,
“Bermuda Insurance”

In an acquisition, a Bermuda insurance company which insures U.S.based risks contracts with a U.S. company to reinsurer part of its risk
(scenario 1). The U.S. reinsurance company pays a 30% direct tax on
reinsurance premiums received for risks located in the United States. In the
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second scenario, the unrelated insurance company, purchases the U.S.
reinsurance company. The newly acquired U.S. reinsurance company is
structured so that it is not a permanent establishment and thus completely
escapes U.S. direct taxation.143 Similar to the inversion example above, the
Bermuda-based company is only subject to the 1% excise tax on
reinsurance premiums.
Corporate inversions have been criticized as being “unpatriotic.”144 In
response to criticism of corporate expatriations, as part of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Congress forbade the Department of Homeland
Security to contract with companies that have expatriated through a
corporate inversion.145 The contract ban, however, generally does not
extend to domestic subsidies of newly inverted entities.146 Thus, the
Department of Homeland Security can still contract with an expatriated
company as long as it contracts with the company’s domestic subsidiary.
Furthermore, the statute is limited by three exceptions. The statute allows a
waiver of the contract ban if the waiver is required for the interest of
security, if the waiver prevents the loss of jobs, or if the waiver prevents
the Government from incurring additional costs. 147 After much criticism
that the exceptions made the statute ineffective, Congress amended the
statute by eliminating the “loss of jobs” and “additional costs”
exceptions.148 The “interest in homeland security” exception remains in the
statute. 149 Even with the amendment, the legislation has been criticized as
primarily symbolic – a way for Congress to appear doing something
without actually changing anything. 150 The Homeland Security Act has
little, if any effect on an expatriated corporation’s ability to enter into
government contracts because the Department of Homeland Security can
143

See discussion supra, Part I.A - business profits of a Bermudian company are
exempted from U.S. taxation unless the Bermuda company has a Permanent Establishment
in the U.S. If there is a U.S.-based permanent establishment, the Bermuda Company will be
taxed only on the business profits attributable to the permanent establishment (source-basis
taxation). U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 3-4.
144
Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The
Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24
VA. TAX REV. 475, 482 (2005).
145
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 835, 116 Stat. 2135, 2227
(2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. 395 (2003)), amended by Homeland Security Act
Amendments of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 101(2), 117 Stat. 526, 628 (2003).
146
Kirsch, supra note 144, at 512-13.
147
Id. at 498.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 511-12.
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still contract with an expatriated company by either hiring a domestic
subsidiary of the company or ruling the contract is in the best interest of
homeland security.151
Corporate inversions may also alter the brand image of a company.152
For example a Connecticut based toolmaker, Stanley Works, rejected
reincorporating in Bermuda because of public disapproval.153 Brand image
concerns are unlikely, however, in the reinsurance industry because
reinsurers do not directly deal with the end consumer, the policy holder.
Most policy holders will never know if and by whom their policy has been
reinsured.
C. “LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD” BETWEEN UNITED STATES
AND BERMUDA INSURERS OR COMBATING THE UNITED
STATES TAX BASE EROSION
According to U.S. insurers, the favorable tax treatment in Bermuda
makes it difficult for U.S.-based insurers to compete with Bermuda
companies. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 increased significantly the U.S.
tax burden of domestic property and casualty reinsurers by requiring
insurance companies to discount their loss reserve deductions.154 The
legislation had no effect on foreign reinsurers, who continued to be subject
to a 1% excise tax on premiums paid to reinsure U.S. risks.155 The problem
was temporarily compounded by the United States-Bermuda treaty which
for a short period of time waived the excise tax.156
A more significant change since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the
increase in corporate inversions – U.S. insurance companies becoming
Bermuda-based companies and the formation of new Bermuda-based
insurance companies which directly compete with U.S.-based insurers.
Thus, the difference in tax treatment provides a great disadvantage for U.S.
insurers, especially U.S.-based property and casualty insurers.
Furthermore, U.S.-based companies are concerned about “sham”
151

Id.
Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006).
153
Id. at 1582.
154
Reinsurance Association of America’s Testimony at Ways and Means Hearing on
Foreign Income Tax Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jul. 23, 1992, available at LEXIS, 92 TNT
150-102.
155
Id.
156
See supra Part I.
152
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reinsurance companies, where transactions occur on a non-arm’s length
price.
Congress has debated how to level the playing field between domestic
and foreign insurance companies. The three major proposals are (1) to
increase the excise tax, which is the only tax imposed on foreign reinsurers,
(2) to subject reinsurance transactions between related entities to a greater
tax, or (3) to tax the newly expatriated company as if it were still a
domestic company.
Proposed bill, H.R. 5270, which is supported by the domestic
reinsurers and the RAA increases the excise tax of reinsurance
premiums.157 Foreign companies which (re)insure risk located in the
United States, but do not have a trade or business in the United States are
subject to a 4% excise tax on insurance premiums and a 1% excise tax on
reinsurance premiums. The proposed bill would increase the reinsurance
excise tax to 4% from 1%, to bring it up to par to the insurance premium
excise tax.158 The RAA argues that the Tax Reform Act of 1986
substantially increased taxes on domestic reinsurers, effectively creating a
tax preference for non-resident foreign companies selling reinsurance to the
U.S. market.159 Thus, the RAA concludes, an increase in the excise tax
would neither disadvantage foreign competitors nor interfere with the
international flow of reinsurance corporations.160 The Treasury Excise Tax
Study,161 however, found that raising the excise tax from 1% to 4% would
give U.S. companies a significant advantage over foreign companies that
were located in high-tax jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and
Germany.162 However increasing the excise tax to 4% would not offset the
competitive advantage enjoyed by tax-haven-based reinsurers for long-tail
lines of business.163
157
H.R. 5270, 102d Cong. (1992); Reinsurance Association of America’s Testimony
at Ways and Means Hearing on Foreign Income Tax Bill, supra note 154.
158
Reinsurance Association of America’s Testimony at Ways and Means Hearing on
Foreign Income Tax Bill, supra note 154.
159
Reinsurance Association Supports Increase in Excise Tax on Reinsurance Ceded
to Foreign Reinsurers, supra note 69.
160
Id.
161
For background discussion on the Treasury Excise Tax Study see supra Part I, at
19-21.
162
Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 3; Bermuda Triangle: Tax Havens,
Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance Competitiveness, supra note 100 (internal quotations
omitted).
163
Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 13-14; Bermuda Triangle: Tax
Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance Competitiveness, supra note 100, 80-81 (internal
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Unsurprisingly, foreign reinsurers oppose H.R. 5270. An increase in
the excise tax raises concerns over the diminishing economic stability in
the Caribbean insurance industry.164 The Government of Barbados testified
before the Ways and Means Committee during the hearing on H.R. 5270
that a provision that increases the excise tax would hinder the U.S.
domestic insurance market because the tax would make increase the cost of
insurance in the United States and in turn make it more costly for U.S.
firms to enter into alternative reinsurance markets.165 Barbados further
argued that the excise tax provision is barred by the United States-Barbados
treaty (and tax treaties with most other foreign countries) because it
discriminates against premiums paid to persons in a foreign country as
opposed to those paid to persons based in the United States.166 Not all
differences in tax treatment between foreign and domestic entities,
however, amount to improper discrimination.167 Discrimination only
occurs when similarly situated entities are taxed differently.168 If two
entities are not similarly situated, a difference in taxation does not result in
discrimination.169 In this case, foreign reinsurers and domestic reinsurers
are not similarly situated because domestic reinsurers are taxed on a worldwide basis, while foreign reinsurers are not.170 Foreign reinsurers that have
a U.S. trade or business are taxed on a source-basis, while foreign
reinsurers that do not have a U.S. trade or business are taxed via the excise
tax.171 As the tax base between domestic reinsurers and foreign reinsurers
is different, a difference in taxation does not result in discrimination.
Other proposed bills include H.R. 4192 and H.R. 1755. These bills
modify the tax code so that transactions between related entities are taxed
higher than transactions between unrelated entities. The 106th Congress
quotations omitted). A long-tail line of business refers to insurance coverage for a risk that
is not realized until a significant time has passed. An example of long-tail line of business is
liability coverage for a company, which used asbestos in its product in the 1970s, but didn’t
receive any claims until 1990s. Another example is life insurance, where policy holders
purchase insurance years prior to their death.
164
Government of Barbados’ Testimony at Ways and Means Hearing on Foreign
Income Tax Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jul. 23, 1992, available at LEXIS, 92 TNT 150-103.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Bermuda Triangle:
Tax Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance
Competitiveness, supra note 100 (internal quotations omitted).
168
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 56 (1920).
169
Id. at 56, 57.
170
Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 7.
171
Id.
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proposed H.R. 4192, that provided for an amendment to §845.172 The bill
proposed altering the treatment of a related-party reinsurer. Thus, if a
domestic person directly or indirectly reinsures a U.S. risk with a related
foreign reinsurer (as opposed to an unrelated entity), then the investment
income of the domestic insurer shall be increased and the domestic
company will be subject to a greater tax.173 The proposed plan would not
affect reinsurance arrangements between unrelated parties.174 This will
impede an affiliated transaction whose purpose is to effectively move
money from one entity to another within the same economic family. The
107th Congress proposed the Reinsurance Tax Equity Act of 2001 (H.R.
1755).175 The proposed bill was an amendment to §832(b)(4). The U.S.
tax code allows a property and casualty insurance company to deduct
reinsurance premiums paid from gross premiums written on insurance
The amendment provides under
contracts during the taxable year.176
certain circumstances a denial for the deduction of reinsurance premiums
paid for direct or indirect reinsurance of U.S. risks with “related
Thus if an insurer pays a reinsurer which is also its
insurers.”177
subsidiary, the reinsurance premium, the insurer cannot deduct the amount
when calculating its gross premium amount for tax purposes.
The latest proposed bill is H.R. 3884, which amends §7701 in its
treatment of foreign holding companies.178 If a domestic company through
a corporate inversion becomes a foreign holding company, it will still be
treated as a domestic company for tax purposes provided that after an
inversion more than 80% of the company is still owned by former
shareholders.179
Although Congress has tried to level the playing field between U.S.based and Bermuda-based reinsurers, none of the proposed bills have
become statute. U.S. reinsurers should continue to lobby Congress for a
legislative fix of tax avoidance in the reinsurance industry. However, the
172

H.R. 4192, 106th Cong. (2000); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note

62, at 56.
173

H.R. 4192, 106th Cong. (2000); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note

62, at 56.
174
175
176

Almeras, supra note 94, at 1390.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 62, at 56.
H.R. 1755, 107th Cong. (2001); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note

62 at 56.
177

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 62, at 56.
H.R. 3884, 107th Cong. (2002); Preventing Corporate Inversions, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Apr. 2, 2002, available at LEXIS, 2002 TNT 63-2.
179
Preventing Corporate Inversions, supra note 178.
178
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fix may be worse than the problem of tax avoidance because tax legislation
may provide unintended tax disadvantages to legitimate reinsurance
transactions. Furthermore, legislation that impedes tax benefits enjoyed in
other countries may send a negative message that more powerful countries
such as the U.S. can dictate the tax policy of smaller and less powerful
foreign jurisdictions.
Another approach is for the U.S. reinsurance industry to pressure
insurance regulators to ensure that reinsurance transactions are made under
an arm’s length standard. Furthermore, stricter insurance regulation
practices may decrease the potential for “shell corporations” that try to
operate as reinsurers. An additional approach to limit “shell corporations”
is for the Treasury Department to renegotiate the United States-Bermuda
Tax Treaty to increase greater exchange of information (specifically access
to confidential information from Bermuda).
Lastly, U.S. reinsurers should try to form a favorable regulatory system
domestically for reinsurance companies. As insurance is regulated
individually by each state, U.S. reinsurers may appeal to individual states
to pass legislation favorable to reinsurance companies in exchange for an
increase in economic activity in that state. This is the best approach
because states are always looking to bring in more business. Moreover it
would decrease the domestic insurers’ reliance on the reinsurance market in
Bermuda.

AFRICAN AMERICAN HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE
DREAM DEFERRED: A DISPARATE IMPACT ARGUMENT
AGAINST THE USE OF CREDIT SCORES IN
HOMEOWNERSHIP INSURANCE UNDERWRITING
Latonia Williams*
ABSTRACT
This casenote argues that African-American homeownership is
disparately impacted by the discriminatory use of credit scores in
homeowner insurance underwriting, asserting a violation of § 3604 of the
Fair Housing Act and advocating Congressional action banning this
practice. The history of the “American Dream” of homeownership has
historically been denied to African-Americans as a result of discriminatory
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) policies through homeowner’s
insurance underwriting. While the 1950’s and 1960’s revised such blatantly
racist policies, modern insurance underwriting practices have de facto
replaced official policy, with similar disparate and disenfranchising results.
Risk classification and methods of credit scoring used by insurance
underwriters reinforce historically vulnerable positions of AfricanAmericans in society by denying them opportunities to become
homeowners, a disparate discriminatory impact under the Fair Housing
Act. Congressional action is therefore necessary to correct this impact and
free African-Americans to achieve homeownership.
INTRODUCTION
“Housing is more than shelter; housing helps determine access
to job networks, educational opportunities, and to the extent that
homes are the largest assets most people have, financial security.”1

*

J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2009. I am grateful to
Professors Tom Baker, Karen Demeola, Bethany Berger, and Jon Bauer for their invaluable
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National Urban League Policy Institute, Fair Housing Fact Sheet, Apr. 30, 2007,
http://www.nul.org/publications/policyinstitute/factsheet/2007-Fair-Housing-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
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Many say homeownership is the key to the American Dream. It
represents what many work for in hopes of reaching a certain level of
prosperity
in
their
lives.
Probably
more
importantly,
homeownership/landownership has always represented a level of power
and prestige only held by few in the United States. The importance of
protecting private property has constantly been at the forefront of the
discussion regarding rights of the citizens and the powers of government.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall, “be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .”2 Thus, the
resulting philosophy of property that supports the United States democratic
system rests largely on the importance of individual liberties, limits on
government power, and the right of the people to own property. This broad
notion of property has gone beyond tangible ownership of private property
to include liberty interests and the limits on government intrusion on these
interests.3 Effectively, property ownership creates, “a bundle of rights and
relationships which give rise to entitlements….”4 However, along with
creating rights, property ownership has also created a method of limiting
the rights of minorities, specifically African Americans.
Despite the end of legally-imposed segregation and the expansion of
opportunities for African Americans, there continues to be discrimination
in a broad range of social settings for Blacks.5 Given the history of slavery
and segregation based on law and custom, research has documented that
race-based discrimination has affected and continues to affect a broad
range of social outcomes for African Americans.6
Discrimination against Blacks in America originated with chattel
slavery. Specifically, for two and a half centuries, millions of Blacks were
stripped of their lands, religions, cultural heritage and property to become
the property of white slaveholders.7 Though slavery was formally
abolished through the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments, the
abolition “failed to eliminate the legal vestiges of racial oppression or
redress the devastating consequences of slavery on those who had suffered
2

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Bruce A. Reznik, Property Rights in a Market Economy, ECONOMIC REFORM
TODAY, 29-30 (1996), available at http://www.cipe.org/publications/ert/e19/E19_11.pdf.
4
Id.
5
A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin
M. Williams eds., 1989).
6
Id.
7
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for
Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 742 (2004).
3
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under its regime.”8 Instead, a system of laws was established that accorded
Blacks very few rights.9
In regards to housing, Black Americans were residentially segregated.
Freedom for emancipated Blacks was severely restricted by “laws which
imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and
curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an
extent that their freedom was of little value.”10
It was not until 1968 that Congress passed the Fair Housing Act,
barring racial discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing.11
The effect of the Fair Housing Act should have been to end discrimination
and unfair pricing in the housing market. “However, despite the enactment
of national antidiscrimination laws in the 1960s, Black Americans continue
to experience social and economic disadvantage in significant
disproportion to their numbers.”12 In fact, the social and economic
condition of many poor Blacks is considered to have worsened in many
respects as the twentieth century came to a close.13
The question thus presents itself: how is it possible that African
Americans continue to face disadvantages in housing when federal law
prevents disparate treatment of Blacks in regards to housing? The answer
is clear. Although there are many aspects of the law preventing the
disparate and discriminatory treatment of African Americans, there is very
little legal control over those things that have a disparate impact on African
American homeownership.14
This Note aims look into this issue. Specifically, this note will focus
on homeowners insurance and how risk-based pricing has created a
disparate impact that effectively lessens African American homeownership.
Whereas prior works have focused primarily on measuring racial disparities
in pricing of homeowners insurance policies, here, I seek to demonstrate
8

Id. at 699. Forde-Mazrui also notes that “[h]ad America prohibited all
discrimination and provided the necessary resources and opportunities for the four million
impoverished and illiterate former slaves to uplift their condition, the effects of slavery
might well have dissipated by now.” Id. I disagree with this argument. The effects of
slavery are far reaching and are unlikely—in my opinion—to have been remedied by now,
even with all possible resources.
9
Id. at 700.
10
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 390 (1978) (quoting
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)).
11
42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619.
12
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 7, at 695.
13
Id. at 703-04.
14
The disparities relating to this issue will be discussed in more detail infra Part III.
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how such pricing has structurally prevented African Americans from
reaching the American Dream of homeownership.
Because of the importance of the home to individual net worth,
discrimination involving homeownership is one of the most damaging
forms of inequity.15 “[M]ost conservatives accept or are willing to assume
a causal connection between black disadvantage and past
discrimination…”16 but fail to recognize the role that present disadvantage
plays a role in the failure of the African American to reach the American
Dream. This Note seeks to show the ways that contemporary risk-based
home insurance pricing feeds off this history to continue to impede African
American homeownership.
Part I examines the American Dream and its significance. Part I will
conclude with why housing is the single strongest representation of the
Dream. Part II will look at the African American fight to attain the Dream.
The section will look at the history of housing discrimination in the United
States and how the effect of such discrimination has withstood time.
Part III will evaluate how risk based pricing—although not overtly
discriminatory—has a disparate discriminatory effect on African
Americans. This section will look more in depth into what exactly are the
standards for homeowner’s premium pricing and how statistics show that
credit based pricing has a disparate impact on African Americans. Part IV
addresses the standards of a disparate impact argument under the Fair
Housing Act. Part IV will also argue that disparate impact claims against
the use of credit scores in insurance underwriting can affectively be
brought under § 3604 of the Fair Housing Act. Lastly, Part V will argue
that there should be Congressional action banning the use of credit scoring
in insurance pricing.
BACKGROUND
A HISTORY OF THE DREAM IN THE UNITED STATES
The concept of the American Dream is one that encompasses an ideal
of success and achievement. The term itself was coined in 1931 by James

15
16

National Urban League Policy Institute, supra note 1.
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 7, at 706.
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Truslow Adams.17 In his text, The Epic of America, Adams defines the
American Dream as:
that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer
and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to
ability or achievement. It is a difficult dream for the European
upper classes to interpret adequately, and too many of us ourselves
have grown weary and mistrustful of it. It is not a dream of motor
cars and high wages merely, but a dream of social order in which
each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest
stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by
others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances
of birth or position.18
As Adams notes, the idea of attaining the Dream is based on an ideal of
merit and achievement. It focuses on the ideology that individuals are able
to attain success in their lives through hard work and dedication.
DEFINING THE AMERICAN DREAM
Notwithstanding the fact that the term “American Dream” was coined
in the early1930’s, the idea of the Dream had a much earlier beginning.
The American Dream dates back to the European settlers of the sixteenth
century and is historically rooted in the idea of the United States as a “new
nation of immigrants.”19 With the colonial settlements came the dream of
fulfillment, individual freedom, and the chance to succeed in the New
World.20
Historical documents show a clear history of the pursuit of the Dream.
The Declaration of Independence states that:
[w]hen in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for
one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected
them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth,
the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of
17

LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS,
What
is
the
American
Dream?,
http://memory.loc.gov/learn/lessons/97/dream/thedream.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
18
JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 214-15 (1931).
19
STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 2
(2004).
20
Id.
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Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of
mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel
them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.21
The phrase “pursuit of happiness” has become synonymous with the
American Dream,22 and the idea of immigrating to the United States in
hopes of having an equal chance to succeed as determined by individual
merit and hard work. 23 However, the idea of the American Dream has
since been broadened by some to include native-born Americans in its
definition.24
Although the origin of the American Dream is clear, there has never
been one set definition as to what it really means to obtain the Dream. In
fact, the Dream is much more clearly understood as a set of ideals that have
been able to shift with the times. Obtaining the American Dream has
transformed from being defined generally through success and achievement
to a more precise definition that involves the attainment of specific
representations of achievement.25 It has even been argued that when most
speak of the American Dream today, they mean “buying a big house,
driving an expensive automobile, and making a lot of money.”26
The strongest example of the transformation of the perception of
achievement is the connection of the American Dream to obtaining wealth.
Wealth is defined as an individual’s economic value in the form of material
possessions and resources. Differing from income, wealth represents

21

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1-2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
See JIM CULLEN, THE AMERICAN DREAM: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA THAT
SHAPED A NATION 38 (2003).
23
See MCNAMEE & MILLER, supra note 19, at 4.
24
There are some who believe that the concept of achieving the American Dream
only fits into the context of immigrating to America. This Note does not take this
standpoint and instead looks at the American Dream as something that is pursued by both
immigrants to the United States and native born Americans.
25
“Whereas the American Dream was once equated with certain principles of
freedom, it is now equated with things. The American Dream has undergone a
metamorphosis from principles to materialism.” Today’s American Dream, 2007, available
at http://www.todaysamericandream.com. (quoting JOHN E. NESTLER, THE AMERICAN
DREAM (1973)).
26
Id.
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financial resources and the ownership and control of those resources.27
Because wealth entertains the elements of ownership and control and it
serves as a form of social mobility,28 it is understandable why wealth
would be a representation of achieving the American Dream. “[W]ealth
allows families to secure advantages….” 29
THE DREAM AND HOMEOWNERSHIP
It is the law of property that controls the distribution of wealth
in society; consequently, there must be the most intimate relation
between that society’s economic and social characteristics and the
rules, practices and institutions of its property law.30
To many, the United States is “a nation of homeowners.”31 The quote
above illustrates that fitting squarely with the concept of wealth as a
representation of achieving the American Dream is the concept of property
ownership; specifically homeownership. Property and the ideals of
property ownership—one of the strongest identifiers of wealth32—have had
a long history in the United States. Home equity represents the largest
reservoir of wealth among America’s middle class.33 However, the
27

Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 53, 53-54 (2006).
28
Id. at 56.
29
“Like the American Dream broadly construed,
this one of the good life exists in a series of variations. The
most common form was cast in the form of commercial
success. For hundreds of years, American readers and
writers have had tireless appetites for tales of poor boys
(and, later, girls) who, with nothing but pluck and
ingenuity, created financial empires that towered over the
national imagination….”.
Id. at 55. See also, CULLEN, supra note 22, at 59-60.
30
JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY: TOWARD EGALITARIAN THEORY OF
OWNERSHIP 28 (1994) (quoting John Henry Merryman).
31
Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 668-69 (2002).
32
Shapiro, supra note 27, at 54.
33
See id. at 59 (noting that “home wealth accounts for 60% of the total wealth
among America’s middleclass.”). See also U.N. COMM. ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION [CERD], Residential Segregation and Housing Discrimination in the
United States: Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination, ¶ 34, (Dec. 2007) (prepared by Micheal B. de Leeuw, et al.) (available at
ww2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/usa/USHRN27.pdf).

302

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

connection of the American Dream with homeownership did not come
about until the mid twentieth century.34 In fact, it is said that the
correlation of homeownership with achieving the American Dream and
social success was promoted by realtors.35 Whether or not this association
was something that was created by realtors, it is clear that it has stuck in the
minds of Americans.
The creation of this “nation of homeowners” was very highly promoted
by government policy.36 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, barely
forty-five percent of the United States housing units were owneroccupied.37 During this period, owning a home was something primarily
for the “relatively well-to-do.”38 It was not until the 1930’s and the New
Deal that agencies such as the Home Owners Loan Corporation (“HOLC”),
39
the Federal Housing Association (“FHA”),40 and the Veteran’s
Administration (“VA”)41 began to facilitate and encourage broader
homeownership.
These programs opened doors for more White individuals to own
homes in the United States and helped to create the middle class.42
Unfortunately, “these same policies and practices left the AfricanAmerican community behind at the starting gate.”43 This had the effect of
freezing many African Americans out of “the greatest wealth building
opportunities in American history.”44
34

JEFFREY M. HORNSTEIN, A NATION OF REALTORS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 202-03 (2005).
35
Id. at 203.
36
Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 675-76.
37
Id. at 676.
38
Id.
39
HOLC’s primary purpose was to refinance homes to prevent foreclosure. It was
usually used to extend loans from shorter, expensive payments of 15 year loans to lower
payments of 30 year loans. See generally, Alan S. Binder, From the New Deal,A Way Out A
Mess,
N.Y.
Times,
Feb.
24,2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/business/
24view.html?pagewanted=print (last visted November 22, 2008).
40
FHA is a federal agency formed as part of the National Housing Act of 1934. Its
goals were to improve housing standards and conditions; to provide an adequate home
financing system through insurance of mortgage loans; and to stabilize the mortgage market.
See generally U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, What is the Federal
Housing Adminsitration?, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhahistory.cfm (last visited
November 22, 2008).
41
Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 676.
42
Shapiro, supra note 27, at 67-68.
43
Id. at 68.
44
Id. at 67.
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THE AFRICAN AMERICAN FIGHT FOR THE DREAM
THE ISSUE: HOUSING POLICIES WITH CLEAR DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT
FHA and “Racial Homogeneity”
As was expected, many of these governmental policies to increase
homeownership were very color restricted; especially that of the FHA.45 In
fact, the FHA’s Underwriting Manual specifically instructed that the
presence of “inharmonious racial or nationality groups” made a
neighborhood’s housing undesirable for insurance and explicitly
recommended racially restrictive covenants.46 One portion of the manual
notes that, “‘if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial
classes . . . .”‘47 Policies such as this made it clear that racial minorities
were not the groups aimed at gaining a benefit from the newly created
federal programs. As Florence Wagman Roisman notes in her article
Teaching About Inequality, Race and Property,
FHA adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from the
Nuremberg laws. From its inception FHA set itself up as the protector of
the all white neighborhood. It sent its agents into the field to keep Negroes
and other minorities from buying houses in white neighborhoods. FHA
“not only insisted on social and racial ‘homogeneity’ in all of its projects as
the price of insurance but became the vanguard of white supremacy and
racial purity--in the North as well as the South.48
The federal policies put into place to assist potential buyers in
obtaining homeownership can be contrasted with public housing program
that came just a few years later. In 1937, the United States Housing Act of
1937 was enacted.49 This represented the origins of what is now know as
public housing.50 The purpose of the U.S. Housing Act was to provide
45

See U.N. COMM. ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION [CERD], supra
note 33, at ¶ 5.
46
Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 677 (quoting KENNETH T. JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBORDINATION OF THE UNITED STATES 208 (1985)).
47
Id. at 677-78.
48
Id. at 678 (footnotes omitted).
49
Codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1437 to 1437bbb-8 (2000).
50
Paul R. Lusignan, Public Housing in the United States,1933-1949 1 CULTURAL
RESOURCE MGMT. 36, 37, available at http://crm.cr.nps.gov/archive/25-01/25-01-16.pdf.
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affordable housing to the urban poor.51 However, in effect, the government
created a two-tiered housing policy that held very strong racial
correlations.52 Blacks were kept out of homeownership and thus forced
into public housing. As Wagman Roisman notes, “the two ‘tiers held racial
significance; the upper tier nourished a growing, virtually all-white
constituency while public housing struggled to support primarily a
fragment of the minority community with which it became identified.’” 53
Homeowners Insurance Underwriters and “ the Immoral Blacks”
Along with the FHA’s discriminatory practices and the birth of public
housing, the push to deny housing to African Americans was also prevalent
in regards to homeowners insurance. Insurance in America dates back as
far as the 1790s.54 Discriminatory underwriting unfortunately also dates
back this far. 55 As noted by Brian Glenn in his article Shifting the Rhetoric
of Insurance Denial,
[o]ne insurance textbook noted that the underwriter’s job was
made easier by the risk report that contained information “as to the
applicant’s racial descent . . . and it must be specifically stated
whether he is Anglo-Saxon, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Negro, or of
other racial or national origin.”
Knowing the applicant’s
nationality, one can only suppose, provided the underwriter with
useful information about whether or not the applicant was a good
51

Id.
[L]ocal public housing authorities were given primary
responsibility for initiating, designing, building, and
operating their own housing projects, while the newly
created United States Housing Authority (USHA) provided
program direction, financial support, and technical and
design assistance. With these new federal funding
mechanisms and policies in place, the USHA spurred local
public housing authorities to construct more than 370
projects, which housed nearly 120,000 families at a cost of
approximately $540 million.

.

52

Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 676. See also U.N. COMM. ON THE
ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION [CERD], supra note 33, at ¶¶ 8-9.
53
Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 676.
54
See Brian J. Glenn, The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance Denial, 34 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 779, 781 (2000).
55
See id. at 789-90.
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risk . . . . Data on lynchings was used to show that immorality [of
Blacks] was on the increase, and since immorality led to increase
in illness, it was clear that slavery was much better for the health of
the black man than freedom. With blacks, attempts at education
were a waste of time, since decades of freedom had only proved
that the race was incorrigible. 56
Such texts—many of which were available at the time—had a goal of
proving that African Americans were uninsurable and could not be insured
under the risk pools of Whites.57
THE RESOLUTION: ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT LAWS
It took a great deal of advocating to gain even simple strides in the
direction of equal opportunity in homeownership for African Americans.58
In 1949, it was announced that FHA would refuse to issue mortgage
insurance on properties “bound by racially restrictive covenants recorded
after February 15, 1950.”59 However, the FHA took many actions that
showed a contrasting intent. For example, FHA’s executive board made
sure to note that “it should be made entirely clear that violation [of the new
rules] would not invalidate insurance.”60 Along with FHA’s refusal was
refusal by some administrations to help facilitate the reduction of housing
disparities between Blacks and Whites. “President Truman rejected a
request that he ‘bar FHA aid to any segregated housing . . . .’ [Similarly,]
the Eisenhower Administration . . . reject[ed] . . . demands that FHA
require open occupancy in its insured projects . . . .”61
These discriminatory practices in housing were seen until President
Kennedy’s Executive Order 11063 in 1962 and the 1968 Fair Housing
Act.62 Nevertheless, by the early 1970s, a large gap was already visible.
Eleven million Americans had purchased dwellings because of FHA and
VA financing.63 Almost all of those millions of loans went to Whites and
56

See id. at 789-90 (citations omitted).
Id. at 791.
58
See Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 679-681.
59
Id. at 679.
60
Id. at 679-80.
61
Id. at 680 (internal citation omitted).
62
Id. at 680-81; See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (Nov. 20, 1962);
See also 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
63
Id. at 681.
57
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were only available to Whites.64 It is estimated that less than two percent
of the housing financed with federal mortgage assistance was available to
African Americans.65
In regards to insurance, by the late 19th century, many states had made
it illegal to charge higher rates based on race.66 With the illegality of risk
classifications based on race, insurers had to find other ways to classify
groups. Thus began the “actuarial science” of risk classification that is said
to statistically prove a person’s insurance risk.
Even with the change in FHA models and insurance risk classifying,
the effect of the years of discriminatory treatment was apparent. Whites
continued to climb the social ladder in regards to wealth and African
Americans were forced to stay behind, effectively depriving them of the
advantages of particular homes and property appreciation and excluding
them from suburban areas.67 Contrastingly, the public support provided by
the FHA and VA allowed “whites who previously lacked the means to
remove themselves to racially homogeneous communities to do so.”68
Moreover, the homes purchased by Whites with this FHA and VA helped
to provide an invaluable opportunity for wealth appreciation. 69
Whites witnessed the values of their homes increase considerably,
especially during the 1970s when housing prices tripled.70 Correlatively,
those African Americans who had been barred from the housing market by
FHA policies and later sought to become first-time homebuyers faced
rising housing costs that curtailed their ability to purchase the kind of home
they desired. 71 The effects of this can still be seen today. Although the
African American homeownership rates have increased, the disparities
continue to show the effects of the past.
Along with the clear economic and homeownership effects, there have
also been damaging social effects tied to these housing disparities. The
African American identity has effectively become a reflection of stigma
regarding dense and overcrowded urban areas. Research on implicit bias
and cultural stereotyping suggests that Americans hold persistent beliefs
linking African Americans and other disadvantaged minority groups to
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
Id.
Glenn, supra note 54, at 791.
Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 681.
Id.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id.
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many social images, including but not limited to crime, violence, disorder,
welfare, and undesirability as neighbors.72 The identity of the urban city
and public housing has been transformed into a collective stigma affecting
the Blacks living in these cities. This negative cultural stereotyping has
been shown to account for White Americans’ widespread unwillingness to
share residential space with Blacks and other minority groups.73 Somehow,
crime, poverty, and welfare have become equated more so with the
minority groups negatively affected by them than with the public housing
system that perpetuated them in the first place.
A NEW FORM OF DISCRIMINATION: INSURANCE
UNDERWRITING AND THE DISPARATE IMPACT ARGUMENT
The below 2007 report of homeownership by race created by the
National Urban League illustrates that homeownership rates in the African
American community are extremely low as compared to that of Whites.

74

72
Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood
Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows”, 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 320
(2004).
73
Id. at 321.
74
Nat’l Urban League Pol’y Inst., supra note 1.
In 2006, the national
homeownership rate was 68.8%. However, the homeownership rate of Blacks was 47.9%,
which is staggeringly low as compared to that of Whites who have a homeownership rate of
75.8%. Id. What may be even more notable is that as of the time this data was collected,
Blacks have the lowest homeownership rate of all races within the United States. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY OF HOUSEHOLDER: 1994 to
2006
(2006),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual06/
ann06t20.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
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Despite Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 ( the Fair Housing
Act),75 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 76 Executive Order
11063,77 and many other state and federal laws that prevent housing
discrimination, there is still a clear racial inequality in regards to
homeownership.78 In 2006, the African American homeownership rate was
47.9% while the White homeownership rate continued to be above 75%.79
This staggering disparity cannot and should not be solely attributed to past
discrimination.
In looking to closing the homeownership gap with the intent of closing
the wealth gap between African Americans and Whites, discriminatory
institutional patterns must also be considered.80 One such clear pattern
concerns insurance underwriting. Because of the role insurance plays in
an individual’s ability to obtain a mortgage—thus, the ability to obtain a
home—insurance is strongly connected with racial homeownership
disparities.
As noted above,81 it is illegal to price insurance based on racial
However, insurance companies—through their
classifications.82
underwriting process—have created a process of risk classification of
individuals that has a disparate impact on African American
homeownership. Disparate impact results when a business’s policy or
practice, although neutral on its face, has a disproportionate negative

75

The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of
dwellings, and in other housing-related transactions, based on race, color, national origin,
religion, sex, familial status and handicap. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (2008).
76
Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in
programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(d)
(2008).
77
Executive Order 11,063 prohibits discrimination in the sale, leasing, rental, or
other disposition of properties and facilities owned or operated by the federal government or
provided with federal funds. See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 20,
1962).
78
Dana L. Kaersvang, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners
Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 1995 (2006).
79
Nat’l Urban League Pol’y Inst., supra note 1.
80
Shapiro, supra note 27, at 66.
81
See supra Part II.
82
Note that although race based pricing is illegal, there have been recent instances of
such blatant behavior within insurance companies. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Guidry, 489 F.3d
692 (2007). However, this Note will not deal with such pricing behavior. This Note
focuses specifically on risk based pricing that is labeled as non-discriminatory but has a
discriminatory effect.
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impact on a protected group.83 Under this theory, the business’s motive in
treating applicants differently may or may not be about race or another
prohibited basis, however the effect is that the protected class is adversely
impacted. 84 To understand this argument, the process of insurance
underwriting must first be explained.
Underwriting is a process by which the insurer determines what
applicants should be accepted by the company and which programs such
applicants fit under.85 This system is classified as one based on risks.
Because insurance companies desire certain groups more than others in
order to keep their risk pool down, those who do not fit the underwriter’s
vision of the ideal member of society have a difficult time obtaining
desired coverage.86 Blacks seem to fit squarely into this category of the
undesired group. As Brian Glenn notes:
[t]he idea of judging an applicant by her or his race or standing
in society appears to have been replaced by mathematically
justified matrices that rate individuals according to their risks and
charge them the appropriate premium. But even though the
stereotypes have formally disappeared from the rating systems,
they still exist and are used to exclude certain groups from
coverage. Rather than replacing these stories about undesired
groups, the numbers, data, and forms merely hide the fact that
applicants are still judged according to their standing in society.
The difference between the old era of underwriting and the current
one is that the appearance of subjectivity has been hidden behind a
process that appears objective, mitigating the denied applicants the
opportunity to develop awareness that they have been excluded on
the basis of subjective opinions about their lifestyles.87
Thus, the process of risk selection has allowed a great deal of
discrimination to continue. Outwardly, risk based pricing resembles a
game of numbers, statistics, and objectivity. However, when one considers

83
CHI CHI WU, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CREDIT SCORING AND
INSURANCE: COSTING CONSUMERS BILLIONS AND PERPETUATING THE ECONOMIC AND RACIAL
DIVIDE, 18, (2007), http://www.consumerlaw.org/reports/content/InsuranceScoring.pdf.
84
Id.
85
Glenn, supra note 54, at 780.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 792-93.
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the effect that many of these pricing criteria have on minorities, it is clear
that the objective test has many subjective levels of discrimination.
To explain, underwriting guidelines are hardly ever illustrated as
prejudiced or based on stereotypes.88 However, if one considers the wide
range of practices used, the reason for the pricing differential between
African Americans and Whites is evident.89 For example, homeowners
insurance becomes more costly—and eventually unavailable—depending
on the age of a home. Insurers are less likely to insurer older homes.90
When looking at the ratio of individuals who live in older homes, African
Americans are disproportionately more likely to own older homes than
Whites.91 Next, looking at the market value of homes, insurance
companies usually create a minimum value threshold under which
insurance will not be available. Again, African Americans are more likely
to buy inexpensive homes and because insurance is necessary to secure a
mortgage, a cyclical effect preventing homeownership is created.92
Insurance companies also adjust premiums by geographical area. Although
blatant redlining is now illegal, this same effect of drawing lines around
certain neighborhoods is created when insurance companies price
homeowner’s insurance premiums based on crime rates, vacant buildings
and the percentage of owner-occupied dwellings in a neighborhood.93
Moreover, insurance companies never completely abandoned their
subjective pricing methods. Insurance agents have the opportunity to use
their own biases when these subjective criteria are in play.94 Consider the
language insurance companies use such as “‘requiring that the insured ‘be a
person of integrity and financial stability who takes pride in his
property.’”95 Such subjectivity leaves much room for bias; a bias that
should not be present within an arguably objective standard.

88

Id. at 801.
“When insurance is available, blacks pay more per dollar of insurance than do
Whites, even when controlling for income.” Kaersvang, supra note 78, at 1995-96
(footnotes omitted).
90
Id. at 1996.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Kaersvang, supra note 78 at 1997.
95
Id. at 1997 (footnotes omitted).
89
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THE PRIMA FACIE CASE: CREDIT SCORING AND THE
DISPARATE IMPACT ARGUMENT
The use of credit scores in insurance pricing can be challenged under §
3604 of the Fair Housing Act. The Fair Housing Act (“the Act”) was
passed as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Although the Supreme
Court has not authoritatively stated that disparate impact claims are
covered under the Act, there is a consensus amongst the circuit courts that
disparate impact does apply.96
Section 3604(a) of the Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race. . . .”97 Whereas, § 3604(b) states that it is unlawful “[t]o
discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race. . . .”98 Courts have found that
property insurers are covered under both of these provisions,99 and the US
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) supports this
position. In regulations published in 1989, HUD notes that prohibited
activities related to dwellings include “[r]efusing to provide municipal
services or property or hazard insurance for dwellings or providing such
services or insurance differently because of race. . . .”100

96

See, e.g., Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dept., 885 F.2d 1215, 1223 (4th
Cir. 1989); Nat’l Ass’n. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Huntington, 844 F.2d
926 (2d Cir. 1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482–84 (9th Cir. 1988); Hanson v.
Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d
565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 986–88 (4th Cir.
1984); Smith v. Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).
97
42 U.S.C.S. § 3604(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
98
42 U.S.C.S. § 3604(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
99
See, e.g., Nat’l. Ass’n. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Am. Fam. Mut.
Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that “[s]ection 3604 applies to
discriminatory denials of insurance, and discriminatory pricing, that effectively preclude
ownership of housing because of the race of the applicant.”).
100
24 C.F.R. §§ 100.70(b), 100.70(d)(4) (2008). See also ROBERT G. SCHWEMM,
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 10:4 (2008).
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ARTICULATING THE STANDARD
The first step in making a prima facie case for disparate impact is to
identify a rule or policy that, while neutral on its face, has an adverse effect
on members of a protected class. This Note will focus on the use of credit
scores in insurance pricing as the identified policy.
Although the courts agree that a plaintiff must make a prima facie case,
there is a split amongst the circuits regarding the standard applied for
outlining a prima facie claim under the Fair Housing Act. The First,
Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth and Fourth Circuits have employed what is
referred to as a “pure effects” or “effects only” test.101 Under this standard,
the plaintiff must first identify a policy attributable to the defendant that
has a “substantially greater adverse impact” on minorities.102 The burden
then shifts to the defendant to “prove a business necessity sufficiently
compelling to justify the challenged practice.”103
There is debate as to whether the inquiry stops here, however. In the
1989 decision of Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc., v. Atonio,104 the Supreme
Court held that the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. The
Court noted that in discriminatory impact cases under Title VII,105 the
employee must prove not only a disparate impact, but also that the
employer has no reasonable business justification for its discriminatory
practices.106 Thus, the defendant need only prove that its business practice
serves a legitimate business goal.107 After this, the plaintiff has the burden
“to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the [defendant’s] legitimate
interest . . . Such a showing would be evidence that the employer was using

101

See, e.g., Wadley v. Park at Landmark LP, 264 Fed. Appx. 279, 281 (4th Cir. Va.
2008); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of P.R. Dist. of Arebcibo, 988 F.2d 252, 259 (1st Cir.
1993); Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564
F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977).
102
Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984).
103
Id. See also Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (3d Cir.
1977); JOHN P. RELMAN, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL DATABASE § 2:25
(2007).
104
Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc., v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989).
105
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2 (1999).
106
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-60.
107
Id.
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its tests merely as a ‘pretext’ for discrimination.”108 These twin burdens of
production and persuasion are extremely difficult for a plaintiff to meet.
The Wards Cove standard should not apply to claims brought under the
Fair Housing Act. Congress expressly overruled the Wards Cove standard,
as it related to Title VII, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.109 However, the
standard was upheld, as it related to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), in Smith v. City of Jackson.110 Nonetheless,
in upholding the Wards Cove standard in Smith, the Supreme Court noted
that, “textual differences between the ADEA and Title VII make it clear
that even though both statutes authorize recovery on a disparate-impact
theory, the scope of disparate-impact liability under the ADEA is narrower
than under Title VII.”111 The Court also noted that “Congress’ decision to
limit the coverage of the ADEA by including the RFOA provision is
consistent with the fact that age, unlike race or other classifications
protected by Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s
capacity to engage in certain types of employment.”112 In contrast to the
ADEA, the language of the Fair Housing Act is quite similar to that of Title
VII and contains no narrowing provisions.113 Because the Fair Housing
108

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citations omitted). See
also Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660.
109
See Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991) note (stating
that “the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections.”).
110
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005).
111
Id. at 240. ADEA contains a provision “permitting any ‘otherwise prohibited’
action ‘where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.’” Id. at 233.
112
Id. at 240.
113
Compare 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a) (1999) stating:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer: (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin,
with 42 U.S.C.S. § 3604 (2000) stating:
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Act is more like Title VII, the distinction the Supreme Court found between
ADEA and Title VII should not be applicable to cases brought under the
Fair Housing Act. Accordingly, I argue that the standard that will apply in
cases brought under the Fair Housing Act will place the burden on the
defendant to prove a business necessity for its acts or policies.
In contrast to the “effects only” test, the Seventh Circuit has created a
four factor test for disparate impact claims brought under the Fair Housing
Act. The test was enunciated in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
v. Village of Arlington Heights.114 Similar to the Betsey standard, the
plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence that the challenged act or
policy has a disparate racial effect. However, instead of formally shifting
the burden to the defendant, the court engages in a balancing test that looks
at (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect; (2)
whether there exists some evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the
defendant’s interest in taking the allegedly discriminatory action; and (4)
whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant affirmatively to provide
housing or merely to refrain from interfering with others who wish to
provide housing.115 The Arlington Heights standard, which exhibits a need
to balance the plaintiff’s interests with that of the defendant, has been most
commonly used in municipal zoning cases.116
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have adopted a standard similar to the one
announced in Arlington Heights. These circuits have enumerated a threefactor test, which includes all but the second Arlington Heights factor
regarding discriminatory intent;117 thus, relieving some of the burden
placed on the plaintiff.

it shall be unlawful (a) [t]o refuse to sell or rent after
the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for
the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny,
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin [; or] (b) [t]o
discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision
of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
114
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. Of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977).
115
Id.
116
RELMAN, supra note 103, § 2:25. See, e.g., Potomac Group Home Corp. v.
Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1295-96 (D. Md. 1993).
117
See, e.g., Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986).
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APPLYING THE STANDARD
The Prima Facie Case
Although the four-factor Arlington Heights test, the modified threefactor test, and the “effects only” tests are different in theory, in practice,
all tests “require the plaintiff to demonstrate a discriminatory effect and, if
that is shown, require the defendant to justify its practices.”118 It has been
noted that it is unlikely that the different methods will produce substantially
different results.119 Therefore, for consistency and because it has been
adopted in more circuits, the following analysis will focus on applying the
“effects only” test to a disparate impact claim against the use of credit
scoring in insurance underwriting.
A claimant may allege, under § 3604, that the use of credit scores in
The
insurance pricing discriminates against African Americans.120
statistical disparities between homeownership rates of Whites and African
Americans evidence this disparate impact.121 Low credit scores tend to be
correlated with low-income neighborhoods and certain minority
communities;122 thus leading to the likelihood that those with lower credit
scores will have higher insurance rates or not be able to procure insurance
at all. One noteworthy study regarding credit scoring is diagramed below:

118
John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and the
Question of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 186 (2002).
119
Id. See also SCHWEMM, supra note 100, at § 10:7.
120
The key to proving a disparate impact claim is “statistical evidence showing that
the defendant’s policy or practice has a greater impact on protected class members than on
others.” SCHWEMM, supra note 100, § 10:6. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding disparate impact where defendant’s action “had twice the adverse
impact on minorities as it had on whites”); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983,
988 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that a prima facie case of disparate impact was established
where 74.90% of the minorities were affected, while only 26.40% of the whites were
affected); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1064-65 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that a
decision that “fell 2.65 times more harshly on [the] black population than on the white
[population]” left “no doubt” of adverse impact).
121
See supra text accompanying footnotes 75-82.
122
NORMA P. GARCIA, SCORE WARS: CONSUMERS CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE. THE
CASE FOR BANNING THE USE OF CREDIT INFORMATION IN INSURANCE 3 (2006) (available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/ScoreWars.pdf).
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123

This diagram reflects data that was compiled during a study conducted
in 2004 by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University.124
This study was based on a simulation of credit scores using 200,000 credit
files purchased by the Federal Reserve Board, matched with data from the
triennial Survey of Consumer Finances.
The cut-off for what is considered “good credit” is a score of 660 or
above.125 Research indicated that, for the period of 1989 to 2001, although
the median credit score had increased for the general population,
tremendous divergence in credit scores also took place during this time.126
Credit scores for Whites increased significantly during the 1990s, from 727
to 738, while the median credit scores for African Americans dropped from
693 to 676 and for Latinos from 695 to 670.127 More staggeringly, “[t]he
percentage of African Americans with credit scores under 660 . . . grew
from 27% to 42% and for Latinos it grew from 29% to 49%; while among
whites it rose only slightly from 17% to 19%.”128 These facts show clear
evidence of credit score differentials based on race.
Moreover, a 2006 study conducted regarding this issue was produced
by the Brookings Institution.129 An examination of quarterly samples of 25
million anonymous consumer credit reports and scores for every U.S.
County between 1999 and 2004 found that, “counties with relatively high

123
124
125
126
127
128
129

WU, supra note 83, at 14.
See id. at 13.
See id.
See id.
See id.
WU, supra note 83, at 13.
Id. at 14.
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proportions of racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to have lower
average credit scores.”130 The report noted that:
this association reflects the numerous, historical disparities
between races in the access to the availability of high quality
education, well-paying jobs, and access to loans, among other
factors. But the presence of this relationship does raise important
questions that should be explored through further research,
particularly in instances where information in reports are being
used in nontraditional, under-researched market application, like
screening job applicants and pricing insurance.131
Blacks have become the undesired group in regards to obtaining
insurance and have had a difficult time in search of coverage.132 The
outward numbers game played by insurers has created an effect of
lessening the number of African Americans that have been able to obtain
homeowner’s insurance coverage.133 As noted by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, “[n]o insurance, no loan; no loan, no house; lack of
insurance thus makes housing unavailable.” 134 Thus, statistical proof
shows racial disparities created by insurance scoring in homeowner’s
insurance. This impact can and should be challenged under the Fair
Housing Act.135
SHIFTING THE BURDEN TO FIND BUSINESS NECESSITY
Under the “effects only” standard, the burden will shift to the insurer to
defend its policy by showing a “business necessity.”136 However, an
insurance company will not be able to prove a business necessity for the
use of credit scores.137 The insurance industry is known for using credit

130

GARCIA, supra note 122, at 7.
Id.
132
See supra text accompanying notes 81-94.
133
Id.
134
Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
978 F.2d 287, 297 (1992).
135
See WU, supra note 83, at 20.
136
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977).
137
This argument makes the assumption that the Wards Cove decision will not apply
to a claim brought under the Fair Housing Act; thus, the burden of persuasion will not shift
back to the plaintiff. See supra text accompanying notes 104-112.
131
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information in determining insurance risk classifications.138 Although
insurance companies claim that this provides speed and efficiency, credit
scores also have racial connections.139 As was noted in a report by the
Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. titled Score Wars: Consumers Caught in
the Crossfire. The Case for Banning the Use of Credit Information in
Insurance, “[e]ven though credit information can be ‘race and income
neutral’ on its face, credit information can function as a proxy for race and
income. Whether discrimination results from intentional conduct or is
inadvertent, its impact must be carefully considered and addressed.”140
The use of credit scores in the underwriting process is based on three
“intuitive” claims.141 First, the insurance industry claims that credit scores
are indicative of personal responsibility because “it is intuitive and
reasonable to believe that the responsibility required to prudently manage
one’s finances is associated with other types of responsible and prudent
behaviors, for example proper maintenance of homes and automobiles and
safe operation of cars.”142 Second, “it is intuitive and reasonable to believe
that financially stable individuals are likely to exhibit stability in other
areas of their lives.”143 Finally, credit scores are claimed to be indicative of
“financial stress [that] could lead to stress, distractions or other behaviors
that produce more losses, such as deferral of car or home maintenance.”144
Despite these allegedly “intuitive” claims it is unlikely, that an insurer
will meet the burden of persuasion in arguing that the use of credit scores is
essential to the business of insurance. “[T]he defendant insurer should be
held to a significant burden of demonstrating some relationship between its
underwriting criteria and protection of the interests it urges as matters of
business necessity.”145
Greater regulation will not endanger the insurance marketplace.146 In
fact, some states have already made efforts to regulate the use of credit

138

GARCIA, supra note 122, at 1.
Id. at 3.
140
Id. at 6-7.
141
Ian O’Neil, Disparate Impact, Federal/State Tension, and the Use of Credit
Scores by Insurance Companies, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 155-56 (2007).
142
Id. at 155.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 155-56.
145
Christopher P. McCormack, Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing An
Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563,
601 (1986).
146
GARCIA, supra note 122, at 23.
139
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scores in insurance pricing.147 These states continue to have healthy
insurance markets.148 Thus, the argument of protecting the marketplace can
be countered.149
Hawaii was one of the first to pass a law banning the use of credit
information.150 In 1973, Hawaii made any use of credit information illegal
in all automobile insurance policies.151 In 2002, Maryland’s homeowner
insurance statute was amended to establish limitations on the use of credit
history.152 Under Maryland’s statute, there are “prohibitions on particular
payment plans, or refusal to underwrite, renew or cancel policies based in
whole or in part on credit information.”153
Similar to Maryland, in 2004, Oregon enacted a statute regulating the
use of credit scores in insurance pricing.154 Oregon’s law prohibits insurers
from being able to cancel or refuse to renew existing policies “based in
whole or in part on credit information.”155 Washington also has a similar
provision to that of the formerly mentioned laws.156 Also, Utah and
Georgia have enacted prohibitions against the use of credit scores in the
process of insurance underwriting.157
Additionally, although California has only enacted laws restricting the
use of credit scores in regards to automobile insurance, the California
Department of Insurance has taken a strong stance in opposition of its use
in homeowner’s insurance underwriting as well.158 In an August 2004
report, the Department noted that it, “does not allow use of credit or
insurance scores in underwriting homeowner’s insurance. This is because
the insurance companies have failed to demonstrate that credit scores are
not discriminatory toward protected classes such as women, the elderly, the
poor, and racial/ethnic groups.”159 In fact, in June of 2005, the Department
and Allstate entered into a $30 Million settlement to refund $30 million in
policy credits and premium returns to eligible California policyholders who
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 18. See also WU, supra note 83, at 18.
GARCIA, supra note 122, at 23.
See id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
GARCIA, supra note 122, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O’Neil, supra note 141, at 163.
GARCIA, supra note 122, at 18.
Id.
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had been affected by several of Allstate’s practices, including the “use of
‘Financial Stability’ criteria, a form of credit scoring, to underwrite
property coverage, resulting in the placement of some consumers in a
program with higher rates.”160
Disparate impact challenges to the use of credit scores by insurers are
proper under the Fair Housing Act. The purpose of the Act is to ensure
housing opportunities to groups that face discrimination in the market.
Bringing disparate impact claims against use of credit scores serves this
purpose and should be upheld by the Supreme Court.
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AND STATE PREEMPTION
The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012, is a United States
federal law passed by Congress in 1945 in response to and overruling the
Supreme Court in U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533
(1944).161 The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not itself regulate insurance,
160

Id.
See U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (holding that
insurance can be regulated by the federal government via the Commerce Clause).
Delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Hand noted:
161

This business [of insurance] is not separated into 48
distinct territorial compartments which function in isolation
from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and
integration of activities in all the states in which they
operate are practical aspects of the insurance companies’
methods of doing business. A large share of the insurance
business is concentrated in a comparatively few companies
located, for the most part, in the financial centers of the
East. Premiums collected from policyholders in every part
of the United States flow into these companies for
investment. As policies become payable, checks and drafts
flow back to the many states where the policyholders
reside. The result is a continuous and indivisible stream of
intercourse among the states composed of collections of
premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the
countless documents and communications which are
essential to the negotiation and execution of policy
contracts. Individual policyholders living in many different
states who own policies in a single company have their
separate interests blended in one assembled fund of assets
upon which all are equally dependent for payment of their
policies. The decisions which that company makes at its
home office -- the risks it insures, the premiums it charges,
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nor does it mandate that states regulate insurance.162 However, it does
empower Congress to pass laws that will have the effect of regulating the
“business of insurance.”163
The most significant provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act states
that, “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business,
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”164 The
relevant issue here becomes whether the use of the Fair Housing Act to
preempt credit based underwriting would violate the McCarran Ferguson
Act.
This question was answered by the Fifth Circuit in the renowned
Dehoyos case. In Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2003),
the court noted that homeowners insurance is covered by the Fair Housing
Act.165 Moreover, the court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not
preempt a claim that the use of credit scores by the Allstate Indemnity
Company violated the anti-discrimination measures of the Fair Housing
Act.166 As the court noted, while the Fair Housing Act is not directly
related to the business of insurance, application of the Act’s provisions did
not frustrate or conflict with any articulated state policy or law.167 Thus,
under the Dehoyos decision, the issue of federal preemption is nonexistent.
the investments it makes, the losses it pays -- concern not
just the people of the state where the home office happens
to be located. They concern people living far beyond the
boundaries of that state.
Id. at 541-42.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012.
163
15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 (declaring “that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States.”).
164
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b).
165
O’Neil, supra note 141, at 169. See also WU, supra note 83, at 20.
166
O’Neil, supra note 141, at 169.
167
WU, supra note 83, at 20. See also Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 313-14
(1999)(noting that when a federal law does not directly conflict with a state regulation, and
when application of the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere
with a state’s administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude its
application). The court noted that because the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) advances the interest of the state of Nevada in combating
insurance fraud, and does not frustrate any articulated Nevada policy, the McCarranFerguson Act does not block the respondent policy beneficiaries’ recourse to RICO. Id.
162
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One main argument regarding the Dehoyos decision is that it is only
applicable when there is no state law or regulation in place to contradict
that of the federal law and thus would be ineffective.168 However, thirtyfive states have created regulations requiring that the insurance departments
have a filing of the insurer’s insurance scoring methodologies. 169 These
regulatory measures can be considered evidence of the pursuit to control
and lessen the negative use of credit scores in the process of insurance
underwriting.
When following the decision in Dehoyos, the Fair Housing Act in no
way invalidates, impairs, or supersedes any law enacted by any state for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance. The Supreme Court has
defined the terms invalidate and supersede as follows: “the term
‘invalidate’ ordinarily means ‘to render ineffective, generally without
providing a replacement rule or law.’ .… And the term ‘supersede’
ordinarily means ‘to displace (and thus render ineffective) while providing
a substitute rule.’”170 If the assumption is correct that these thirty-five
states which have regulatory measures do so to prevent the negative use of
credit scores in insurance pricing, then the Fair Housing Act will not and
cannot displace nor render such laws ineffective. Instead, the Fair Housing
Act serves alongside each state’s regulatory policy to advance similar
interests.
A CALL TO ACTION: THERE SHOULD BE CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION LIMITING THE USE OF CREDIT SCORES IN
INSURANCE UNDERWRITING
In addition to arguing in support of a disparate impact argument against
the use of credit scores in insurance underwriting, this Note also makes a
Congressional call to action. Homeownership is of critical importance. By
early 2009, homeownership in the United States is set to decline.171
Although this issue seems to be an important topic to the current
168
See, e.g., William Goddard, Swimming in the Wake of Dehoyos: When Federal
Courts Sail into Disparate Impact Waters, Will State Regulation of Insurance Remain Above
the Waves?, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 369, 390 (2006) (noting Judge Edith Jones’ dissent in
Dehoyos “that carefully points out that at the time the action was commenced, Texas and
Florida had not adopted statutes regulating credit scoring in insurance, but have done so
since.”).
169
Id.
170
Humana Inc., 525 U.S. at 307 (citations omitted).
171
Editorial, The American Dream in Reverse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/opinion/08mon1.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
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administration, mortgaging practices and foreclosure relief have become
the focal point.172 President Bush noted in August of 2007 that the FHA
would soon be proposing a new program called FHA-Secure that would
allow American homeowners who have good credit history but cannot
afford their current payments to refinance into FHA-insured mortgages.173
The guideline went into effect July 2008. However, the program will only
serve as temporary assistance to the problems of the current housing
market. Also, in December of 2007, President Bush signed into law H.R.
3648, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, to help
homeowners who are struggling with rising mortgage payments.174
However, the focus should not only be on decreasing the foreclosure
rates within the United States. There must also be governmental action to
increase homeownership opportunities. In its December 2007 report, the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) called
to attention the United State government’s inability to resolve race based
housing disparities.175 According to the treaty signed by the United State at
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination (“ICERD”), the United States government has an obligation
to eliminate all discriminatory actions in housing, “including those that are
discriminatory in effect regardless of intent….”176
The courts cannot and should not have to maintain the full burden of
remedying the discriminatory effects of the use of credit scoring.
Therefore, to effectuate the government’s obligation under ICERD, this
Note proposes that Congress adopt the model law created by the
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. and the United States Public Interest
Research Group. The Model Law Regulating the Use of Credit-Based
Information in Insurance Underwriting and Pricing (“the Model Law”) was
adapted from the Maryland Insurance Code § 27-501.177 The applicable
language of the Model Law states that “an insurer may not require a
172

Id.
George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Homeownership Financing (August
31, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/200708315.html.
174
Press Release, George W. Bush, President Bush Signs H.R. 3648, the Mortgage
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2007/12/20071220-6.html (creating a “three-year window for homeowners to refinance their
mortgage and pay no taxes on any debt forgiveness that they receive”).
175
See de Leeuw, supra note 33, at ii.
176
Id. at 1-2 (citing International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination art. 5 §§ (d)(v), (e)(iii)).
177
GARCIA, supra note 122, at 24.
173
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particular payment plan for an insured for coverage under a private
passenger or homeowner’s insurance policy based on the credit history of
the insured.” 178 Moreover, with respect to residential property, and other
personal lines of insurance, an insurer may not:
(i) refuse to underwrite, cancel, refuse to renew a risk, or
increase the renewal premium based, in whole or in part, on the
credit history of an applicant or insured;
(ii) rate a risk based, in whole or in part, on the credit history of
an applicant or insured in any manner, including: the provision or
removal of a discount and assigning the insured or applicant to a
rating tier; placing an insured or applicant with an affiliated
company;
(iii) require a particular payment plan based, in whole or in
part, on the credit history of the insured or applicant; or
(iv) use, in whole or in part, insurance scores or consumer
reports, as a basis to make a written or oral solicitation of insurance
that is not initiated by the consumer.”179
Federal legislative action is the most valuable method to counter the
effect that the use of credit scoring has on African American
homeownership. The states mentioned in Part III.B.2 seem to be
progressive in understanding and taking steps to counter the disparate
impact of insurance credit scoring.180 Many states have taken some stride
towards monitoring or limiting the use of credit scores in insurance
pricing.181 Also, as noted above, thirty-five states have created regulations
regarding insurance scoring methodologies. 182 This could be viewed as a
consensus that something must be done. Regulatory monitoring alone is
not a large enough step towards resolving the issue. Moreover, a federal
law banning the use of credit scores will eliminate the need to bring
disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act and create uniformity
amongst the courts. When there are issues regarding discrimination, there
is a need for uniformity. Otherwise, the fundamental concerns about the

178
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id. at 24-25.
Cf. id. at 19.
O’Neil, supra note 141, at 162-63.
Id.
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use of credit information in insurance decisions will continue to be largely
unaddressed and African American consumers will remain unprotected.183
CONCLUSION
There is a large gap between the net worth of homeowner’s and renters
in the United States.184 Data calculated from the Federal Reserve’s Survey
of Consumer Finances shows that as of January of 2006 for individuals
with a net income of $80,000 and up, homeowners averaged net worth is
$451,200 while renters only averaged a net worth of $87,400.185 In regards
to income of $50,000 to $79,999, owners averaged a net worth of $194,610
while renters averaged $25,000.186 Similarly, for an income level of
$30,000 to $49,999 the average net worth was $126,500 for owners and
$10,600 for renters.187 For individuals with income of $16,000 to $29,999,
owners had an average net worth of $112,600 and renters averaged
$4,240.188 Even within the lowest income level of individuals taking in
under $16,000 annually, homeowners averaged a net worth of $73,000
while renters averaged a $500 net worth.189 This data makes it clear that
homeownership has a very significant effect on net worth and wealth. With
the lowest homeownership rate in the nation,190 these statistics are very
critical to the African American community’s inability to obtain wealth.
The use of credit scores in insurance pricing has a very substantial
effect on African American homeownership rates.
Without laws
preventing the use of credit scores in insurance underwriting (currently) in
place, African Americans will continue to fight a losing battle. It is time to
note this effect, acknowledge disparate impact and extend protection
beyond that of prohibiting discriminatory treatment.
The African American identity is plagued by the inability to realize the
American Dream. If disparate impact is not acknowledged, African
Americans will continue to be prisoners of a dream forever deferred.
Homeownership should not be a dream for some races while it is a reality
183

See GARCIA, supra note 122, at 23.
Why It’s Smarter to Buy than Rent, FREE MONEY FINANCE, Jan. 16, 2006,
available at http://www.freemoneyfinance.com/2006/01/why_its_smarter.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2008).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 74.
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for others; especially not when it is so significant in creating opportunities,
and securing a standard of living.191

191
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST
WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 34 (2004).
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BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW

COGSWELL V. AMERICAN TRANSIT INSURANCE COMPANY
Maggie Flanagan
ABSTRACT
This casenote examines the 2007 case of Cogswell v. American Transit
Insurance Company, which involves a clash between Connecticut
insurance claims and a New York insurance company that was not licensed
to do business in Connecticut. Under the precedent of International Shoe,
constitutional rights of the New York company and the court’s declination
to accept jurisdiction are discussed. The note focuses on some of the major
questions of American civil procedure, exemplified by this recent
Connecticut case, and it addresses the major subjects of personal
jurisdiction, its burdens on the defendant, the State’s and plaintiff’s interest
in the matter, and the Connecticut Supreme Court’s rulings on the various
issues. The note also examines the Court’s citation of other decisions from
varying jurisdictions on similar cases. Finally, the note concludes by
viewing the broader policy implications of the denial of jurisdiction in this
case.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Mickey Reavis, a Connecticut resident, was involved in an auto
accident on a Connecticut highway. The driver of the other vehicle
involved in the accident, a New York livery driver, was insured by an
insurance company registered to do business only in the State of New
York. When Mr. Reavis made his claim against the New York insurance
company, the company sent an appraiser licensed in the State of
Connecticut to assess the damage. The insurance company then sent a
letter from New York to Connecticut offering to settle the claim. Mr.
Reavis and a representative of the New York insurance company then
spoke on the phone about his claim. Mr. Reavis was unhappy with how his
claim was handled, and filed a complaint with the Connecticut Department
of Insurance.
When the Insurance Commissioner investigated the New York
Insurance Company’s licensing, she found that neither the insurance
company nor its internal claims adjusters were licensed to do business in
the State of Connecticut. It also came to light that this insurance company
had been settling claims in Connecticut for some time. In order to further
her investigation, the Commissioner served the New York insurance
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company with a subpoena, with the Connecticut Secretary of State acting
as agent per the Connecticut long-arm statute. The New York insurance
company argues that the Commissioner does not have personal jurisdiction
over the company, as the company does not solicit or transact business in
Connecticut.1 Can the New York Insurance company be held accountable
in Connecticut courts?
This set of facts seems concocted to strike fear into the hearts of firstyear law students preparing to take a Civil Procedure exam. However, the
Connecticut Supreme Court recently decided this very case, determining
that while the Commissioner’s subpoena satisfied the requirements of the
Connecticut long-arm statute,2 the insurance company had not established
the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy the constitutional due process
requirement set out in the United States Supreme Court decision
International Shoe3.
The trial court had held that the insurance company should have
expected to be haled into court due to its “purposeful communications”
with Mr. Reavis and the fact that the insurance industry is highly regulated,
thus creating the expectation that insurance companies will engage in
litigation.4 The trial court also cited Connecticut’s “strong policy” of
protecting Connecticut residents from unfair business practices.5
The questions that remain for students of Civil Procedure and observers
of the insurance industry are the following: (1) Did the Commissioner’s
subpoena violate the company’s Constitutional rights, and (2) What are the
consequences of declining to exercise jurisdiction? Both of these questions
will be addressed in this paper.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After Ms. Cogswell (the Commissioner in the fact pattern above)
served a subpoena pursuant to Connecticut statute6 on the Connecticut
1

Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 638, 642-44 (Conn. 2007).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-273(a) (2007) (“[a]ny act of doing an insurance business,
as set forth in subsection (a) of section 38a-271, by any authorized person or insurer”
confers personal jurisdiction over the party).
3
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
4
Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., No. CV040832164S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2167 at *13 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2004).
5
Id.
6
See § 38(a)-16(a) (authorizing the insurance commissioner to conduct
investigations and hearings to investigate insurance matters, including the power to issue
subpoenas).
2
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Secretary of State as agent for American Transit (the insurance company),
American Transit mailed a letter to Ms. Cogswell contesting jurisdiction
and requesting a hearing on the issue. Ms. Cogswell replied by letter that
she did have the authority to issue such an investigative subpoena and
directed American Transit to comply with the subpoena and provide the
requested information.7
When American Transit refused to comply, Ms. Cogswell filed suit in
Connecticut Superior Court to enforce the subpoena. American Transit
then filed both a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and a
motion to quash the subpoena. As outlined above, the trial court found that
American Transit had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of
Connecticut and that its actions fulfilled the state long arm statute, and thus
denied both of American Transit’s motions.8 This denial was accompanied
by findings that American Transit is licensed with its principal place of
business in New York, it has no places of business or property in
Connecticut, does not solicit business in Connecticut, does not insure
Connecticut residents, and did not execute Mr. Reavis’s contract in
Connecticut.9
In response to Ms. Cogswell’s enforcement action, American Transit
filed an answer asserting nine special defenses. The defense argued that
American Transit did not conduct insurance business in the state of
Connecticut as defined by Connecticut law; therefore, Ms. Cogswell had no
authority to serve process on the Secretary of State as agent.10 Ms.
Cogswell then filed a motion to strike four of the nine special defenses, and
the trial court granted the motion to strike the defense that American
Transit did not conduct business in Connecticut on the grounds that the
judge who decided the previous motion to dismiss had already decided the
question.11 American Transit then filed an appeal to the Appellate Court,
which was removed to the Supreme Court.12
7

Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 638, 644 (Conn. 2007).
Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. 2167, at *2.
9
Id. at *2-3.
10
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38(a)-271 (6) (2007) (defining doing insurance business
as, inter alia, “directly or indirectly acting as an agent for or otherwise representing or aiding
on behalf of another any person or insurer in [the]…investigation or adjustment of claims or
losses…or in any other manner representing or assisting a person or insurer in the
transaction of insurance with respect to subjects of insurance resident, located, or to be
performed in this state”).
11
Cogswell v. Am. Trust [sic] Ins. Co., 2005 WL 758051 at *1 (Conn. Super. Feb.
28, 2005).
12
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199(c) (2007).
8
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III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The inquiry into whether a state court may obtain personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant can be a tortuous undertaking. In each case,
two requirements must be fulfilled: first, the court must determine if the
state’s long-arm statute reaches the conduct of the defendant corporation,13
and second, the defendant must have established enough contact with the
state to meet the Constitutional due process requirement that it is not
unreasonably and unexpectedly “haled into court”.14
In this case, both the trial court and the Supreme Court concluded that
American Transit acted in a manner that satisfied the state long arm statute.
In general, a long arm statute is “[a]”a statute providing for jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant who has had contacts with the territory where
the statute is in effect.”15 In other words, the statute is the means by which
the state legislature tells the state courts whom they may pull in as
defendants from out of state. The long-arm statute is a way for the
legislature to control the number and nature of cases that are litigated in a
state’s courts, keeping in mind respect for the sovereign rights of other
states to regulate the conduct of their own citizens. Another important
function of long-arm statutes is predictability for out-of-state actors, who
may look to a state’s long-arm statute to determine whether their conduct
could lead to litigation in the state in question.
The Connecticut long-arm statute states that if the defendant has done
insurance business in Connecticut, then it is deemed to have appointed the
Secretary of State as its attorney, who in turn may be served all legal
process.16 Once a defendant has a statutorily appointed attorney in a state,
it has an official presence in that state and is considered present for the
purpose of obtaining personal jurisdiction. “Doing insurance business” is
defined as, inter alia, adjusting claims or mailing correspondence to a
Connecticut resident involved in an insurance claim.17 This is a far
reaching statute, as even the simplest communication will suffice for
enactment. The fact that the Connecticut legislature drafted such an allencompassing statute may lend credence to the trial court judge’s assertion
13

See generally Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595 (Conn. 1995), for a
treatment of Connecticut law surrounding long-arm statutes.
14
See Int’l Shoe v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
15
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (8th ed..2005).
16
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-273(a) (2007).
17
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-271(a) (2007).

2008]

COGSWELL V. AMERICAN TRANSIT INSURANCE

331

that out-of-state based insurance companies should expect to litigate, on
occasion, in the state of Connecticut, subsequent to dealings with its
residents.
What the trial court and the Supreme Court did not agree on, however,
was whether American Transit’s conduct established enough contacts in
Connecticut to satisfy the second requirement of personal jurisdiction -- the
minimum contacts requirement.
This is a federally established
constitutional baseline requirement that binds state courts, even if their
state long-arm statute allows for less contact with a state.18 The state longarm statute may require more contacts with the state than are
constitutionally required, but it may not allow personal jurisdiction on the
basis of fewer contacts.19 This requirement is based on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.20
Included in the guarantee of due process is the guarantee that
defendants will not be subjected to unexpected and unfair litigation in a
jurisdiction with which they have very limited or no contacts.21 Due
process of law, then, may be interpreted in the context of personal
jurisdiction to mean that a defendant may be properly served with notice
and obligated to defend a suit in that jurisdiction only if a defendant has
committed some positive action in a given jurisdiction,. This concept is
perhaps best illustrated in the following example: a car dealership sells a
car in jurisdiction A. The dealership does not advertise in any other
jurisdiction, makes no sales outside of jurisdiction A, and has otherwise no
contacts with any other jurisdiction. The family then drives the car to
jurisdiction B and is involved in an accident. Subsequently, the family sues
the dealership, attempting to force the dealership to defend the suit in
jurisdiction B? The United States Supreme Court has held that this tactic
would be unfair to the defendant.22 Forcing a defendant to appear and
defend a suit in a jurisdiction to which it is totally unrelated is akin to other
violations of the due process clause, such as, for example, imposing a
penalty on a defendant without affording the defendant a chance to be
18

Bensmiller v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 47 F.3d 79, 82-84 (2d Cir. 1995)
(no personal jurisdiction where foreign corporation’s sole contact with Connecticut was
involvement in a joint venture).
19
Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1965).
20
Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
712-13 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
21
Id.
22
Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); See Bernhard v.
Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976).
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heard.23 Both circumstances involve unfair surprise and lack of notice to a
defendant. The Constitution acts as a safeguard against such abuses by the
judiciary.
There are two types of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants. First, a court may have general jurisdiction.
General
jurisdiction is defined as the proper assertion of jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant when the defendant has had “systematic and continuous”
contacts with the jurisdiction; so that it is fair to bring the defendant into
court on any action.24 The defendant, if subject to general jurisdiction in a
forum, has a sufficient presence in a forum so that it will not be surprised to
find itself litigating in that forum’s courts, and thus due process will be
satisfied. For example, suppose a small businessman based in Jurisdiction
A services computers in Jurisdiction B. He has several clients in
Jurisdiction B and advertises there. If he makes a slanderous remark about
someone in Jurisdiction B, completely separate from his work as a
computer serviceman, he may be sued for slander in Jurisdiction B because
he has established enough of a presence in Jurisdiction B to be fairly
subject to suit in that jurisdiction for any action at all.
The other type of personal jurisdiction that a court may exercise over
an out-of-state defendant is specific jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction is
defined as the jurisdiction that a court has when the transaction that is the
subject of the suit “arises out of” or is related to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum.25 Now suppose that our computer serviceman went only
once from his base in Jurisdiction A to service a computer in Jurisdiction
B. He could probably not be sued in Jurisdiction B for a slanderous remark
made in Jurisdiction A, but he could be sued in Jurisdiction B for, say,
negligently ruining the computer belonging to the customer in Jurisdiction
B. In that case, the court in Jurisdiction B would be exercising specific
jurisdiction because the cause of action, negligently ruining a computer,
arises out of the contact that the defendant had with the jurisdiction
conducting his business there. The trial court in Cogswell pointed to the
U.S. Supreme Court finding that one purposeful letter sent to a resident of
another state may serve to establish a purposeful contact and justify
specific jurisdiction.26 Another aspect of this specific jurisdiction is the
concept that the defendant availed himself of the privilege of conducting
23

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
Helicopteros Nactionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
25
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
26
Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *12, citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
24
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business in the state, invoking the benefits and protections of the state and
thereby creating obligations to follow the state’s laws.27
Thus, in order for a Connecticut court to exercise jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant, both the state’s long-arm statute and the
requirements of due process must be satisfied.28
IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S CASE FOR PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN COGSWELL
The trial court judge in Cogswell29 ruled that there was proper personal
jurisdiction to pull American Transit into court in Connecticut.30 American
Transit argued that Connecticut did not have jurisdiction, because, inter
alia, it has its principal place of business in New York, it has no place of
business or facilities in Connecticut, and does not own property in
Connecticut.31 Its only actions in Connecticut, claimed American Transit,
were sending a letter to the claimant in Connecticut and making at least one
phone call to Connecticut in the course of adjusting the claim.32 The trial
court asserted that the clear language of the statute justified the long arm
jurisdiction.33 Additionally, the court opined,34 that American Transit had
done enough in Connecticut to satisfy the constitutional due process
requirements, arguing, in part, that the regulated nature of the insurance
industry created a condition that satisfied the due process requirement.35
The constitutional due process assertion of jurisdiction in this case is one of
specific jurisdiction; that is, that the claim arose specifically out of the
defendant’s actions in the state.36 Specifically, the trial court held that due
to the fact that insurance companies are subject to complicated and specific
27

Burger King Corp. v. Rudewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-76 (1985).
Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 674 A.2d 426, 428-29 (Conn. 1996).
29
In the interest of full disclosure, the trial court judge, Judge Beach (now of the
Connecticut Appellate Court) is the father of the author of this article. The views expressed
are entirely my own.
30
Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *14.
31
Id. at *2-3.
32
Id. at *3.
33
Id. at *6. (“The clear language of the statute refers to singular acts, and, in light of
the highly regulated nature of the insurance industry, is not surprising.”)Id. at *2 (“The clear
language of the statute refers to singular acts, and, in light of the highly regulated nature of
the insurance industry, is not surprising.”)
34
Id.
35
Id. at *13.
36
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. at 414 (also includes
a discussion of personal jurisdiction).supra note 24.
28
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regulations in many states, it is not an unfair surprise that an insurance
company will have to defend an action in a jurisdiction other than that in
which it is based.37
To support its assertion of jurisdiction, the trial court cited the interests
that the U.S. Supreme Court considered when deciding its canon of
personal jurisdiction cases, which include “the interests of the forum, the
defendant, and the litigation.”38 More specifically, the Court laid out
factors to be evaluated when determining whether the minimum contacts
are “reasonable” for the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction: the
burden on the defendant of answering in the forum, the forum’s interest in
exerting jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, the interstate
judicial system’s interest in efficient regulation, and states’ shared interest
in furthering substantive social policies.39 While the trial court did not
specifically cite all five factors, relying instead on the more general three the defendant, the forum, and the litigation - it is relevant to assess the
reasonableness of personal jurisdiction according to the factors laid out in
Burger King and World-Wide Volkswagen that are relevant to this case the burden on the defendant, the forum’s interest in exercising personal
jurisdiction, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.
A. THE BURDEN ON THE DEFENDANT
The trial court in this case reasoned that this element of the evaluation
of personal jurisdiction was satisfied: “[t]he burden of a New York
insurer’s answering in Connecticut is minimal; thousands of Connecticut
residents work in New York every day and Hartford is hundreds of miles
closer to New York City than is Buffalo.”40 In a case which in some ways
mirrors this case, the District of Connecticut court reasoned that a New
York defendant’s burden of having to litigate in Connecticut was
outweighed by the state’s interest in “adjudicating a dispute involving

37

Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *4.
Cogswell, 2004. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *7, citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775-776.(1984).
39
Burger King v. Rudewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). See also Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn.
App. 634, 639 (1999) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Robertson-CECO Corp., 84 F.3d 560,
567-568 (2d Cir. 1996)).
40
Cosgwell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *13.
38
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services provided by unlicensed out-of-state accountants to a Connecticut
resident.”41
The First Circuit has a particularly well developed line of case law on
this question. The court has held that, unless the burden of litigating in the
forum would be “onerous in a special, unusual, or other constitutionally
significant way,” this is not a factor that will prevent the proper assertion of
personal jurisdiction.42 As long as the other elements of the Burger King
test are satisfied, some inconvenience on the part of the defendant is not
sufficient to block the court from exercising personal jurisdiction.43 In fact,
the court has held that there was not an undue burden on a defendant who
was forced to travel from Hong Kong to Massachusetts: this was
outweighed by the fact that much of the relevant evidence was to be found
in Massachusetts.44
It may certainly be true that the closer the case, the more important this
factor becomes. If the court is basing its personal jurisdiction on the
minimum contacts of one letter and one phone call, augmented by the fact
that the insurance industry is heavily regulated and therefore state interests
are greater,45 the burden on the defendant becomes weightier.
B. THE INTEREST OF THE FORUM
Generally, every state has an interest in protecting its citizens, and may
choose to assert its jurisdiction over a defendant to ensure that the
defendant is subject to its regulations when acting within the forum state’s
borders.46 The interest analysis that courts in most jurisdictions apply to
conflicts of law cases is relevant to the analysis that the court in this case
had to apply to determine whether minimum contacts were present: the
factors as enumerated by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit for
evaluating the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction47 track the factors
enumerated by the courts for evaluating states’ interests in conflicts of laws
41

Gerber Trade Finance, Inc. v. Davis, Sita & Co., 128 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Conn.

2001).

42

Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 718 (1st Cir. 1996).
Id. (explaining that this factor may “tip the balance” in close cases, but alone is
not a particularly significant factor).
44
Id. at 717.
45
See infra Part B.
46
See Hall v. Nevada, 503 P.2d 1363, 1364 (1972) (holding that the state of
Nevada’s interest in staying out of court in California under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is outweighed by California’s policy of compensating its residents in tort cases).
47
See supra notes 32, 33, and 37.
43
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cases, as illustrated by the Second Restatement.48 The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a state’s interest in protecting its citizens can outweigh
contrary contractual provisions in a conflicts of law situation, showing a
strong federal policy towards allowing states to act affirmatively to create a
regulatory scheme that will protect its residents from out-of-state business
interests in the face of a due process challenge.49 The Second Circuit also
held in one case that the District Court of Connecticut was justified in
refusing to decide a question of state insurance law, explaining, “the fact
that the insurance industry is heavily regulated makes it all the more
important that we stay our hand in favor of a definitive and uniform
interpretation from state courts.”50 This assertion by a federal court
accustomed to interpreting Connecticut law shows that Connecticut has a
strong interest in regulating insurance contracts within the state.
In this case, Connecticut has a “strong policy regarding the fair
handling of claims and seeks to ensure fair practices”51, and, in support of
this assertion,, the trial court cited Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-816(6), which
lists unfair claim settlement practices in the context of the Connecticut
Unfair Insurance Practices Act.52 The legislation shows that Connecticut
has an interest in protecting its citizens from unfair or unscrupulous
insurance practices. American Transit was “doing insurance business” in
48

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (2) (1969) (“When there is no
such directive [a statutory provision], the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule
of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interest of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of
justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f)
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied.”) Compare the factors cited by the Courts in Burger
King (see supra note 33) for evaluating personal jurisdiction, i.e. the burden on the
defendant of answering in the forum, the forum’s interest in exerting jurisdiction, the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in efficient
regulation, and states’ shared interest in furthering substantive social policies. The
Metropolitan Life factors are designed to balance the state’s interest with those of the
individual litigants, the state’s interests being largely those expounded by the Second
Restatement. Thus, decisions evaluating a state’s interest in a conflicts of law context are
relevant to a determination of a state’s interest in a personal jurisdiction context.
49
Watson v. Employer’s Liab.Ass’n Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954); for an excellent
analysis of state interests in regulation see QSP Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 1998 WL
892997, at *7 n.14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998) (Levin, J.).
50
Smith v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1980).
51
Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., No. CV040832164S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2167 at *13 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2004).
52
Id.
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Connecticut as defined by Connecticut statute.53 Therefore, the second
element of the test as expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burger
King and World-Wide Volkswagen, that of the interest of the forum, is
clearly satisfied by the facts of the case.
C. THE PLAINTIFF’S INTEREST
The trial court did not address this point expressly, but in this case the
factor is closely connected to the concept of state interest as discussed
above. Because the plaintiff is the Connecticut Insurance Commissioner,
she is carrying out the state’s interest in regulating companies that do
business within Connecticut, and thus this factor weighs in favor of
allowing Connecticut to take personal jurisdiction.
The latter two factors point towards Connecticut having a strong state
interest in exercising personal jurisdiction, which, according to Burger
King, makes such exercise more reasonable.54 Having established that it
appears reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over this defendant, the
Supreme Court’s objections must now be examined.
V. THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT’S OBJECTIONS TO
THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND
CRITIQUE OF THOSE OBJECTIONS
The Connecticut Supreme Court objected to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction on the grounds that American Transit had not “purposely
availed” itself of the forum.55 Purposeful availment means that the
defendant has, of his own volition, made use of the benefits of the state so
as to create obligations to the state, including being subject to that state’s
personal jurisdiction.56 This consideration prevents a plaintiff from

53

See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38(a)-271 (6) (defining doing insurance business as, inter
alia, “directly or indirectly acting as an agent for or otherwise representing or aiding on
behalf of another any person or insurer in [the]…investigation or adjustment of claims or
losses…or in any other manner representing or assisting a person or insurer in the
transaction of insurance with respect to subjects of insurance resident, located, or to be
performed in this state”).
54
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-76 (1985) (“A State generally has a
‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries
inflicted by out-of-state actors.”).
55
Cogswell v. Am. Transit Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 638, 654-55 (2007).
56
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92-93 (1978).
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unilaterally claiming a relationship based on the plaintiff’s own actions.57
In this case, the Supreme Court held that American Transit had not, in fact,
satisfied this element of specific personal jurisdiction because all of
American Transit’s actions were taken in response to the claimant’s actions
and American Transit had never reached into the state to take advantage of
Connecticut’s market or other benefit: “before receiving the claim from
Reavis, defendant had [not] engaged in any behavior so as to invoke the
benefits and privileges of Connecticut law. It did not solicit business,
maintain offices, own property, or otherwise seek to conduct its insurance
business in Connecticut.”58
The purpose of the requirement of purposeful availment is to ensure
that the defendant will not be haled into court unexpectedly.59 I believe
that this requirement is based on two theories. First, courts reason that
when a defendant acts, he will realize that he is incurring obligations
through his action. Therefore, there is no surprise when he is haled into
court in the jurisdiction in which he acted.60 Second, courts justify this
exercise of personal jurisdiction on the idea that once a defendant has taken
advantage of the benefits if a jurisdiction (e.g., marketed his products
there), he owes the jurisdiction something: the obligation to abide by its
laws.61
These bases are simplistic and can lead to unfortunate results, as in the
Connecticut Supreme Court decision in this case. While the defendant
insurance company may not have purposely availed itself of business in
Connecticut through the traditional means of advertising, there is no doubt
but that it secured the business of New York drivers entering Connecticut.
The trial court has a valid point in suggesting that, given the close ties
between the two states, there is no doubt that these drivers would enter
Connecticut.62 American Transit would have undoubtedly lost business
had it specified that its clients would lose coverage if they enter
Connecticut. In this manner, the insurance company availed itself of
Connecticut’s laws. Under this analysis, American Transit should be
subject to Connecticut’s personal jurisdiction.

57

Hanson v.,Denckla. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
Cogswell, 923 A.2d at 655.
59
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75.
60
Id.
61
Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92-93.
62
Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., No. CV040832164S, 2004 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2167 at *13 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2004).
58
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There is an argument to be made that the simple act of sending a
Connecticut-licensed appraiser to examine the damage to Mr. Reavis’s
vehicle is enough to establish minimum contacts with the state of
Connecticut. In Home Impressions, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the actions of independent
contractors acting as salespeople was enough to create the minimum
contacts between the wholesale seller of mailboxes and the forum state of
New Jersey.63 It did not matter that the defendant itself did not directly
conduct business in the state, but the simple fact of sending its contractors
to do business there was enough to justify extending the New Jersey tax
jurisdiction over the corporation. As in Cogswell, the tax director had
statutory authority to investigate possible abuses of New Jersey tax law.64
The mere fact that American Transit sent an appraiser to investigate Mr.
Reavis’s claim, regardless of the fact that the appraiser was licensed to do
business in Connecticut, should be enough to justify jurisdiction of the
court over American Transit. It is indicative of an underlying transaction
between a Connecticut resident and American Transit, and therefore the
insurance commissioner should have the power to investigate the
transaction. This activity satisfies the legislature’s definition of “doing
insurance business” in the state.65
The trial court also suggested that the regulated nature of the insurance
business decreases the defendant’s surprise at having to defend an action in
the forum state. As every reader of this journal is aware, the insurance
industry is fraught with litigation. There is a reason why insurance
companies employ herds of lawyers for their own defense as well as the
defense of insureds. There is no reason that American Transit could not
have foreseen the possibility of litigation from the state of Connecticut,
given the fact that (a) it knew that it insured drivers in metropolitan New
York, and given the close business relationship between New York and
Connecticut, could guess that these drivers would enter Connecticut, (b) it
could certainly predict that some of these drivers would get into accidents,
and (c) it knew that the insurance business in Connecticut was closely
regulated. Thus, it should certainly come as no surprise that it would be
adjusting and settling claims in Connecticut. Any insurance company that
knows that it will be settling claims in a state should be aware of the fact
that it might have to answer for those deeds in the courts of that state.
63
64
65

Home Impressions, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 448, 456 (2004).
Id.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-273(a) (2007).
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Therefore, any assumption on the part of the court that American
Transit would be surprised by having to defend an action in a Connecticut
court is naïve. Insurance companies should, and do, know better. The trial
court was correct in finding personal jurisdiction appropriate.
VI. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ DECISIONS ON THE ISSUE
The Connecticut Supreme Court cites the decisions of other
jurisdictions to support its finding that there was no personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.66 For example, in Hunt v. Erie Insurance Group67, the
ninth circuit held that a defendant insurance company, licensed and
practicing business on the East Coast only, was not required to defend a
suit in California when the only contact the company had with California
was a failure to pay contested medical costs arising out of an accident in
Colorado.68 This is a better case for declining to exercise jurisdiction,
because the only contact is a failure to act. The element of taking
advantage of the forum present in Cogswell is, in fact, notably absent. In
Hunt, the plaintiff was seeking a more satisfactory settlement from the
defendant insurance company. In contrast, the Insurance Commissioner
was looking to investigate the practices of an insurance company that had
adjusted a claim in Connecticut. These fact patterns are clearly different,
and the Connecticut Supreme Court misplaced its reliance on this case.
Next, the Court cited Batton v. Tennessee Farmers’ Mutual Insurance
Co.69 In Batton, the Arizona Supreme Court held that an insured who was
injured in a car accident in Arizona was not entitled to jurisdiction over
Tennessee Farmers’, since the action by which Tennessee Farmers’ was
drawn into Arizona was purely unilateral.70 Tennessee Farmers’ had no
offices or insureds in Arizona, and did not solicit business there; its only
contact with Arizona was to communicate with the plaintiff regarding his
claim for benefits under his insurance policy, which provided coverage in
all 50 states.71
The problem that the court had with extending jurisdiction to the
plaintiff in Arizona was that it found that the defendant insurance company
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Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d at 655-56 (Conn. 2007).
728 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1247.
153 Ariz. 268 (1987).
Id. at 273.
Id. at 269-70.
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had not “purposely availed” itself of the Arizona forum.72 There are two
reasons why this is not applicable to the Cogswell case: (1) the reasoning
itself is flawed, and (2) the facts of Batton are distinguishable from the
facts of Cogswell.
To address the first problem, if it is true that the defendant insurance
company did not purposely avail itself of the Arizona forum, then what is
the point of selling a policy that allows coverage in all 50 states? A buyer
purchases a policy stating that he is “covered” in all 50 states. The court
pointed out that the agreement in this case was to defend and indemnify
and that this agreement did not imply that the insured is allowed to bring
suit in any state he wishes.73 However, this seems contrary to basic
principles of consumer protection and jurisdiction. The court itself stated
that one reason for the existence of specific jurisdiction is so that an injured
plaintiff need not travel to a foreign jurisdiction to redress wrongs.74 Why
should an insured, who has been sold a policy that purports to cover him in
all 50 states, have to travel to a foreign jurisdiction to get compensation? It
is clear that the insurance company benefited from the fact that it sells its
policies as providing coverage in every state. If so, shouldn’t this mearured
action constitute purposeful availment? It seems unfair to ask an injured
plaintiff to travel back to the jurisdiction in which the policy was bought
and the defendant resides to claim coverage for an accident that was
supposedly covered by a policy that covered accidents in all 50 states.
Secondly, the facts of Batton and the facts of Cogswell are
distinguishable. In Batton, the plaintiff was seeking to get medical benefits
that had been denied by his insurance company after his accident in
Arizona.75 In Cogswell, the Insurance Commissioner was simply seeking
more information about the handling of a claim in Connecticut.76 There is
no question but that the inconvenience of the litigation to the defendant
affects the propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction.77 Even if a court is
justified in denying jurisdiction over a defendant who has sold a policy
covering all 50 states to a plaintiff seeking to litigate for recovery of
72
Id. at 273, for a discussion of this concept see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958).
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Id. at 272-73.
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Batton v. Tenn. Farmers’ Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 274 (1987).
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Id. at 269.
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Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 638, 643 (Conn. 2007).
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See, e.g., 63B Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 1677 (2008) (“[I]n determining
whether an exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant comports
with due process requirements, the court must consider the defendant’s…relative
inconvenience.”).
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medical expenses in a foreign jurisdiction, it is less reasonable to deny a
state’s insurance commissioner a subpoena to gather more information. In
Cogswell, American Transit was merely requested to provide information,
which does not involve much inconvenience at all. Modern methods of
communication and travel have affected the exercise of personal
jurisdiction as well,78 and it is difficult to believe that the defendant would
have been very inconvenienced by sending a few documents to Ms.
Cogswell.
Because the reasoning of the Batton court is flawed, and even if a court
were to accept its holding the facts of Cogswell are distinguishable. Batton
does not provide support for the Connecticut Supreme Court’s denial of
jurisdiction in Cogswell.
VII. SUPPORT FOR FINDING JURISDICTION OVER
AMERICAN TRANSIT
There is a significant body of legislation and case law supporting a
finding of personal jurisdiction over American Transit from both
Connecticut and other jurisdictions. As the trial court pointed out, there is
a strong policy in Connecticut of regulating the insurance business and
protecting consumers of insurance products.79 For example, in Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company v. Pasion, the Connecticut Supreme Court
examined the legislative history of § 38-175c (a) (2) to find that the
legislature had determined that this protection of the consumer in the
insurance business was a high priority for the legislature.80 Connecticut
also has enacted the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA)
for the very purpose of regulating insurance businesses within the state.81
These pieces of legislation indicate a strong policy in the state that should
be respected by the state’s courts.
Further, there is persuasive case law from other jurisdictions to support
a finding of jurisdiction over American Transit. In a case similar to
Cogswell, Florida Department of Insurance and Treasurer v. Bankers
Insurance Company, the Florida Court of Appeals reasoned that an
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See State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 657 P.2d 211, 214 (Or.
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Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., No. CV040832164S, 2004 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2167 at *13 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2004).
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Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-815 (2007).
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administrative agency may take steps that may or may not be proper for the
judiciary to take.
The…power involved here is the power to get information from those
who can best give it….Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to
summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it
does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the
laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original
inquiry….When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by
statute to an administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself as
to whether there is probable violation of the law.82
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that the New Jersey Bureau
of Securities was justified in issuing an investigative subpoena to an out-ofstate defendant in a securities action who engaged in purposeful conduct in
New Jersey. The court specifically reasoned that “to allow [the defendant]
to reside in New York, do business in New Jersey more than minimally,
and affect a well-regulated industry in New Jersey, without fear of
investigation or subpoena, is offensive to traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”83 The court did hold that the defendant must have
purposefully availed himself of the advantages of doing business in the
forum,84 but as explained above, in this case, American Transit did in fact
take advantage of doing business in Connecticut.85
Other jurisdictions have not hesitated to find jurisdiction over out-ofstate defendants in similar circumstances, particularly where the policy
interests of the state in regulating industries such as securities and
insurance are concerned. There is no reason why, in light of the important
interests at stake, the Connecticut Supreme Court should not have followed
suit.
VIII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DENYING JURISDICTION
One fact surrounding the Cogswell litigation that has not received
mention in this Note so far is the fact that Ms. Cogswell received notice
that American Transit had adjusted more claims than simply that of Mickey
Reavis.86 Ms. Cogswell alleged that she had discovered that twenty-one
claims had been handled by appraisers licensed by the state of Connecticut
82
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Florida Dept. of Ins. v. Bankers Ins. Co., 694 So. 2d 70, 71-72 (Fl. App. 1997).
Silverman v. Berkson, 661 A.2d 1266, 1267 (N.J. 1995).
Id. at 1276.
See Part V, supra.
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but adjusted by adjusters not licensed by the state of Connecticut, which
practice may violate Connecticut law.87 Therefore, her investigation is
even more significant than the investigation of a single claim; if an
insurance company has been regularly conducting insurance business in
Connecticut without proper licensing, the insurance commissioner has a
right to know and to investigate. Ms. Cogswell was simply seeking
enforcement of an investigative subpoena to determine what actions might
be taken against the out-of-state defendants in pursuance of Connecticut
law. By denying jurisdiction over the matter, the Connecticut Supreme
Court has hobbled the commissioner and allowed an insurance company
who may be dealing regularly with Connecticut residents to escape without
scrutiny of its compliance with Connecticut law.
There is a larger policy concern to be contended with in this case,
which is the cooperation between states. It is manifestly unfair to leave Mr.
Reavis without recourse in this matter. He is reliant on the officials of the
state of Connecticut, who have been appointed or elected to protect his
interests. He is not a citizen of New York, and is therefore not entitled to
rely on the New York regulatory system to protect his rights. While there
may be some courts that hold that this exercise of jurisdiction is a violation
of due process, is it not a violation of Mr. Reavis’s due process to be left
without the ability to complain of his treatment? To whom is he to turn to
express his displeasure, and possibly unlawful treatment, if not to the
insurance commissioner of the state in which he resides, the state in which
the accident occurred, and the state in which his claim was appraised and
adjusted? As the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned in Silverman, “a
form of horizontal federalism, one in which states cooperate in the
discharge of their governmental duties, is both timely and reasonable.”88
As the trial court pointed out, Connecticut has a strong policy in favor
of regulating insurance companies and protecting consumers’ rights.89 The
strength of the policy in favor of allowing the insurance commissioner to
investigate compliance with Connecticut law and the relatively
insignificant inconvenience of providing such information points in favor
of granting jurisdiction.
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Id. at 526-27, n. 13 (discussing the application of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-271(a)).
Silverman v. Berkson, 661 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. (1995).
Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *13.
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